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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in labor economics and contract theory.
The first essay examines whether one’s wage is based on information about the performance of
one’s personal contacts. I study wage determination under two assumptions about belief formation:
individual learning, under which employers observe only one’s own characteristics, and social
learning, under which employers also observe those of one’s personal contacts. Using data on
siblings in the NLSY79, I test whether a sibling’s characteristics are priced into one’s wage. If
learning is social, then an older sibling’s test score should typically have a larger adjusted impact
on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa. The empirical findings support this prediction.
Furthermore, I perform several exercises to rule out other potential factors, such as asymmetric
skill formation, human capital transfers, and role model effects.
The second essay analyzes the influence of macroeconomic conditions during childhood on
the labor market performance of adults. Based on Census data, I document the relationship of
unemployment rates in childhood to schooling, employment, and income as an adult. In addition,
a sample from the PSID is used to study how the background attributes of parents raising children
vary over the business cycle. Finally, information from the NLSY79-CH is examined in order
to characterize the impact of economic fluctuations on parental caregiving. Overall, the evidence
is consistent with a negative effect of the average unemployment rate in childhood on parental
investments in children and the stock of human capital in adulthood.
The third essay studies the bilateral trade of divisible goods in the presence of stochastic trans-
action costs. The first-best solution requires each agent to transfer all of her good to the other
agent when the transaction cost reaches a certain threshold value. However, in the absence of
court-enforceable contracts, such a policy is not incentive compatible. We solve for the unique
maximal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which agents can realize some gains from
trade by transferring their goods sequentially. Several comparative statics are derived. In some
cases, the first-best outcome can be approximated as the agents become infinitely patient.
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Chapter 1
Social Learning in the Labor Market: An
Analysis of Siblings
1.1 Introduction
An important question in labor economics concerns the mechanisms through which personal
contacts influence job search behavior and wage setting decisions. As Granovetter’s (1974) classic
survey of workers in the Boston area illustrates, approximately half of all jobs are obtained with
the help of a social contact. The extensive use of friends, relatives, and acquaintances in job search
makes it possible for personal contacts to play a role in shaping employers’ beliefs about a worker’s
skills. As Rees (1966) notes when studying workers in a Chicago neighborhood, “Present employ-
ees tend to refer people like themselves, and they may feel that their own reputation is affected by
the quality of the referrals.” Likewise, Montgomery (1991) presents a model of job search through
personal contacts in which workers belonging to the same reference group are endowed with sim-
ilar abilities and firms make wage offers to referred workers based on the performance of current
employees. Given the importance of informal social ties in finding a job, an analysis of the effects
of social networks on the wage structure appears to be essential for a complete understanding of
the functioning of labor markets.
This paper develops and implements an empirical test for whether a worker’s wage incorpo-
rates information on the performance of her personal contacts. Combining a sibling model similar
to Griliches (1979) with a learning model related to Altonji and Pierret (2001), I construct a frame-
1
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work in which workers are organized into disjoint social groups composed of a small number of
agents with correlated abilities and differing ages, and I examine wage determination under two
competing assumptions about the market’s formation of beliefs: individual learning and social
learning. Under individual learning, a worker’s wage is set equal to the conditional expectation
of her productivity given only her own schooling and performance, whereas under social learn-
ing, a worker’s wage is set equal to the conditional expectation of her own productivity given the
schooling and performance of all the members of her social group, including herself.
Using sibling data from the NLSY79, I apply this framework to test for a form of statistical
nepotism in which a worker’s wage can be decomposed into a component based on a sibling’s
performance as well as a component based on one’s own performance. The basic logic behind
this test is as follows. If one sibling is older than another sibling, then employers should have
more precise information about the older sibling, because the older sibling’s performance is likely
to have been observed for a longer length of time. Consequently, when market participants form
Bayesian beliefs about the abilities of the two siblings, the older sibling’s average performance
would have a greater impact on employers’ mean beliefs about the younger sibling’s ability than
vice versa. Assuming that the labor market is competitive, this asymmetry should be reflected in the
wages of the two siblings. Hence, the component of the younger sibling’s wage attributable to the
older sibling’s ability would be larger than the component of the older sibling’s wage attributable
to the younger sibling’s ability.
Empirically, given data on the test scores and schooling of siblings, this weighting can be de-
tected by regressing an individual’s log wage on her own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling.
As in much of the literature on employer learning, the test scores in the data are treated as being
known to the econometrician but not directly observable to employers. If employer learning is
nepotistic in nature, then the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to the coefficient on
one’s own test score should typically be higher in a younger sibling’s log wage than in an older
sibling’s log wage. However, if employer learning is entirely individual, then the ratio of the co-
efficient on a sibling’s test score to the coefficient on one’s own test score should be the same
for both a younger and an older sibling. In addition to performing this simple test, I document
several pieces of evidence indicating that the main patterns observed in the data are unlikely to be
explained by factors unrelated to the learning processes studied in this paper.
The empirical strategy here integrates elements from five largely distinct literatures in labor
Chapter 1: Social Learning in the Labor Market: An Analysis of Siblings 3
economics. First, this paper is part of a sizeable literature on the identification of social effects.1
The most closely related paper in this literature is Case and Katz (1991), which attempts to detect
neighborhood influences by regressing an individual’s outcome variable on the background vari-
ables of her peers. The current paper tests for social learning by regressing a worker’s log wage
on a sibling’s test score as well as other control variables. In addition, I seek to address the con-
cerns of Manski (1993) regarding the difficulties in distinguishing between social and nonsocial
effects by focusing on the relative values of the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s
test scores instead of the absolute value of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score in itself. Further-
more, because siblings form a clearly defined social unit, the use of sibling data mitigates some of
the econometric problems associated with the misspecification of peer groups. By contrast, when
using information on friends, such issues may be more severe.
Second, this paper belongs to a long line of research that exploits the special structure of sib-
ling data to address a variety of questions in labor economics. As noted above, the model of social
groups used in this paper is based on the sibling model in Griliches (1979). Moreover, sibling data
appears to be relatively well suited for the purpose of analyzing social effects in employer learning,
because non-twin siblings tend to have a moderately high correlation in ability. By contrast, if in-
dividuals were assigned to social groups mostly at random as in some quasi-experimental designs,
then an individual’s performance might provide little information from which employers could
infer the ability of her peers, and if individuals in the same social group had very similar character-
istics as could be the case with identical twins, then it might be difficult to distinguish empirically
between the components of a person’s wage based on her own and her peer’s performance.
Third, this paper contributes to a growing literature on employer learning. In order to examine
social interactions in the employer learning process, I extend the basic methodology developed by
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). Given the assumption that the AFQT
scores in the NLSY79 are not directly observable to employers, Altonji and Pierret (2001) develop
a test for statistical discrimination, in which employers use a worker’s easily observable charac-
teristics to infer her productive ability. Those authors find that employers statistically discriminate
on the basis of education but not race. The current paper devises a test for statistical nepotism, in
which employers infer an individual’s productivity based partly on information about her relatives.
1See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for a review of existing research on social effects in labor markets.
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Fourth, this paper is relevant to a theoretical literature on social networks in labor markets.
The framework in the current paper is most similar to the model in Montgomery (1991), which
examines job search through homophilous social networks. In that model, workers are arranged
into social groups containing either one or two members, and social groups of size two consist of an
older and a younger worker with correlated abilities. Because employers initially have imperfect
information about each worker’s ability, they use the observed performance of the more senior
worker in each pair to infer the ability of her more junior counterpart. The empirical analysis in
the current paper can be regarded as a test of the basic information transmission mechanism in
Montgomery (1991), whereby employers learn about a younger peer’s productivity from her older
peer’s performance.
Fifth, this paper contributes to a small empirical literature that attempts to test for nepotism
in a variety of labor market settings. The most closely related paper in this literature is Lam
and Schoeni (1993), whose empirical strategy involves comparing the coefficient on a father’s
schooling to the coefficient on a father-in-law’s schooling in a wage equation.2 Using data from
Brazil, those authors find that a father-in-law’s schooling has a stronger impact on a worker’s wage
than a father’s schooling and interpret this result as evidence against the hypothesis that the positive
coefficient on parental education in wage equations is due to nepotistic connections. In addition,
there is at least some existing evidence suggesting that siblings may have an important impact on
labor market outcomes. Rees and Gray (1982) observe that the presence of an employed older
sibling is associated with a significantly higher probability of being employed. Those authors find
no evidence that parents affect a youth’s employment outcomes.
The main empirical results in this paper are consistent with the presence of statistical nepotism
in the labor market. That is, I find that an older sibling’s test score has a significantly larger impact
on a younger sibling’s log wage than a younger sibling’s test score has on an older sibling’s log
wage. Nonetheless, there are mechanisms other than social learning that could generate similar
patterns in the data, including asymmetries in skill formation, human capital transfers between
siblings, and role model effects. Therefore, I perform a number of additional exercises to differen-
tiate social learning from other possible explanations for the results. First, I provide evidence of
2Similarly, Hellerstein and Morrill (2011) examine trends in the transmission of human capital from fathers to
daughters by analyzing changes in the likelihood that a woman enters her father’s as compared to her father-in-law’s
occupation.
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differences in job search behavior among siblings of different ages, documenting a robust positive
correlation between birth order and the probability of obtaining one’s job with the help of a sib-
ling. This finding makes it plausible that a sibling might exert a direct influence on labor market
outcomes with older siblings having a larger effect on younger siblings than vice versa. Second,
I show that there is no evidence that a person’s test score is more strongly related to an older sib-
ling’s test score than to a younger sibling’s test score. Third, I also find no evidence that an older
sibling’s test score has a greater impact on a younger sibling’s schooling than a younger sibling’s
test score has on an older sibling’s schooling. These two results cast doubt on the role of asym-
metric skill formation, human capital transfers, and role model effects in explaining the findings
regarding the log wage. Fourth, while an older sibling’s test score is seen to have a greater impact
on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa, the same regressions indicate that an older sib-
ling’s schooling has a smaller impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa. This result
suggests that an informational mechanism like employer learning may be helpful in explaining the
asymmetries observed in the log wage regressions, because a hard-to-observe ability measure like
test scores is seen to exhibit a different pattern of behavior than an easy-to-observe ability measure
like schooling levels.
In order to provide an additional layer of evidence that labor market interactions in general
and social learning in particular are responsible for generating the sibling effects observed in the
log wage regressions, I report the results of three falsification tests. First, I demonstrate that the
test scores of older and younger siblings without substantial labor market experience have similar
impacts on a person’s log wage. Second, I find no discernable difference between the impacts
of the test scores of older and younger siblings who were living in different geographic regions
during the early stages of their careers. Third, there is some evidence of a decrease in the impact of
a sibling’s test score when two siblings initially residing in the same region become geographically
separated. Overall, the findings from these three tests, as well as the four facts listed above, seem
to isolate social learning in the labor market as the most compelling explanation for the main
empirical results.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the basic learning
models that serve as a framework for the empirical investigation in this paper. This section con-
tains four parts, the first of which develops a statistical model of the labor market characteristics
of siblings, the second of which examines the properties of schooling and test scores as ability
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measures, the third of which studies the structure of log wages under individual learning, and the
fourth of which explores wage determination under social learning. Section 1.3 outlines several
extensions of the basic learning models in the previous section. Section 1.4 addresses some es-
timation issues that arise because the regression coefficients are predicted to change with one’s
own age and possibly those of one’s siblings. Section 1.5 discusses the construction of the main
estimation sample. Section 1.6 presents the empirical results. This section contains five parts,
the first of which studies job search behavior among siblings, the second of which analyzes the
relationships among the test scores, schooling levels, and log wages of siblings, the third of which
performs various robustness checks on the main estimation results, the fourth of which tests some
further implications of the learning models, and the fifth of which discusses the three falsification
exercises mentioned above. Section 1.7 summarizes the findings of this paper and concludes.
1.2 Sibling Models with Employer Learning
This section discusses the empirical implications of employer learning for the observed rela-
tionship between siblings’ test scores and log wages. Section 1.2.1 presents a model of the labor
market characteristics of a pair of siblings. The framework developed in this section embeds a
sibling model based on Griliches (1977, 1979) into a learning model related to Farber and Gibbons
(1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Lange (2007). Section 1.2.2 characterizes the statistical
relationships among siblings’ test scores, schooling choices, and ability levels. The results derived
there shed light on the determinants of sibling correlations in human capital measures and facilitate
the analysis of employer learning in the subsequent sections. Section 1.2.3 examines the relation-
ship between test scores and log wages if employers use information only on an individual’s own
schooling and performance when setting wages, and section 1.2.4 explores how this relationship
changes if employers also use information on a sibling’s schooling and performance.
1.2.1 Labor Market Characteristics of Siblings
This section presents a statistical model of siblings’ labor market attributes. The treatment here
focuses on the case in which there are two siblings, 1 and 2.3 As in much of the literature on
3See appendix A.4 for an extension of the model to include an arbitrary number of siblings.
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employer learning,4 the log labor productivity l(si, ai, ti) of person i ∈ {1, 2} is assumed to be
decomposable into two components:
l(si, ai, ti) = g(si, ai) + h(ti), (1.1)
where g(si, ai) is a time-invariant component of productivity, and h(ti) represents additional hu-
man capital accumulated with age ti. Letting β > 0, the function g(si, ai) is linear in schooling si
and ability ai:
g(si, ai) = βsi + ai, (1.2)
where the coefficient on ai is without loss of generality normalized to one. Note that the production
function in equation (1.2) does not include any direct interactions between siblings.
The abilities a1, a2 of the two siblings are joint normally distributed with respective means µa1
and µa2, identical variance σ2a > 0, and correlation ρa ∈ (0, 1). Letting γ > 0, schooling is related
to ability through:
si = γai + i, (1.3)
where i, which represents factors other than labor market ability that influence education deci-
sions, is assumed to be independent of a1, a2. The error terms 1, 2 are joint normally distributed
with respective means µ1 and µ2, identical variance σ2 > 0, and correlation ρ ∈ (0, 1). Specifi-
cation (1.3) is consistent with a setting in which siblings do not affect each other prior to entry into
the labor market and choose schooling levels independently based on their own ability.5
The information available to employers about ability ai is symmetric but imperfect. In partic-
ular, employers observe the schooling si of each person as well as a sequence ri = {riu}tiu=1 of
noisy productivity signals given by:
riu = g(si, ai) + ηiu, (1.4)
where each measurement error ηiu is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance σ2η >
4See Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), and Lange (2007).
5Note that the model allows for arbitrary differences between siblings in mean schooling levels and mean test
scores. Such differences might arise, for instance, because of birth order effects on human capital investment as
documented by Behrman and Taubman (1986) and Black et al. (2005).
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0. The ηiu are assumed to be independent of each other and of all the other variables in the model.6
The assumption that the errors in the productivity observations are uncorrelated between siblings
plays no role in the analysis when learning is purely individual but simplifies the treatment of
situations that involve social learning. Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 discuss the relationship between
wages and information sets under differing assumptions about the learning process.
The econometrician is assumed to observe a test score zi in addition to the education level si.
Letting θs > 0 and θa > 0, the ability measure zi takes the form:
zi = θssi + θaai + ωi, (1.5)
where ωi, which represents factors unrelated to labor productivity that affect the test score, is
independent of both a1, a2 and s1, s2. The error terms ω1, ω2 are joint normally distributed with
respective means µω1 and µω2, identical variance σ2ω > 0, and correlation ρω ∈ (0, 1). In addition,
the test score zi is assumed to be unobservable to employers as in Altonji and Pierret (2001); so
that, employers cannot use zi as an additional signal of productivity when forming beliefs about
ai. Note that specification (1.5) resembles the model of the late test score in Griliches (1977).
In particular, it accounts to some extent for the possibility that zi is not a pure indicator of labor
market ability ai and is affected by human capital investment si.7
1.2.2 Informational Content of Test Scores and Schooling
In order to derive the empirical implications of wage determination under different learning
processes, it is necessary to characterize the relationship among siblings’ test scores, schooling
choices, and innate abilities. Specifically, I analyze the coefficient obtained from a hypothetical
regression of the siblings’ abilities a1, a2 on their test scores z1, z2 after controlling for their
schooling s1, s2. In the discussion that follows, I let σ2y be the variance of the variable yi and ρy be
the correlation between y1 and y2. The analysis proceeds in two steps.
6Observe that the formulation in equation (1.4) is equivalent to one in which g(si, ai) is replaced with any linear
function of ai and si. None of the results derived here depend qualitatively on the assumption that the ηiu have
identical variance or are serially uncorrelated.
7For example, Neal and Johnson (1996) present empirical evidence from the NLSY79 that additional schooling
has a positive effect on AFQT scores.
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The first step is to calculate the component of each sibling’s test score that is orthogonal to her
own and her sibling’s schooling. The result below characterizes the problem of predicting the test
scores z1, z2 from a regression on the schooling levels s1, s2.8
Proposition 1.2.1 The regression coefficient of (z1, z2)′ on (s1, s2)′ is given by:
C
[(
z1
z2
)
,
(
s1
s2
)]
V
[(
s1
s2
)]−1
=θs
(
1 0
0 1
)
+θa
γσ2a
σ2s(1− ρ2s)
(
1− ρaρs ρa − ρs
ρa − ρs 1− ρaρs
)
. (1.6)
The first term in the above formula accounts for the causal effect of schooling on the test score.9
The second term, which arises from the relationship of schooling with ability, is a generalization
of the univariate measurement error formula, where schooling is treated as ability measured with
error.10
Note that this formula provides a method for answering one of the central questions raised by
Griliches (1979) regarding the role of families in human capital formation.11 In particular, one
can directly test whether the sibling correlation ρa in ability is greater than the sibling correlation
ρs in schooling, especially if the schooling variable itself is not measured with error.12 Formula
(1.6) shows that if (z1, z2)′ is regressed on (s1, s2)′, then the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is
positive if ρa > ρs and negative if ρa < ρs.13 As explained in Griliches (1979), this question is
relevant when interpreting family fixed-effects estimates of the returns to schooling. Depending on
whether siblings have a higher or lower correlation in ability than in schooling, the within-family
estimator of the return to schooling may either mitigate or exacerbate ability bias relative to the
ordinary least squares estimate of the schooling coefficient.
8The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.1.
9See appendix A.3 for a further discussion of the endogeneity of the test score.
10Consider the special case where ρa = ρs and γ = 1. Then, in the second term, the coefficient on one’s own
schooling is the parameter θa multiplied by the reliability ratio σ2a/σ
2
s . The coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is zero
in this case.
11An analogous formula applies if the log wage instead of the test score is used as the dependent variable, provided
that the log wage can be modeled like the test score as a linear combination of ability, schooling, and an error term.
12The effect of classical measurement error in the schooling variable is examined in appendix A.9.
13Note that this procedure is more informative than simply comparing the raw sibling correlations in schooling and
test scores, because it accounts for the fact that test scores are imperfect indicators of ability that contain measurement
error whose correlation between siblings is unknown.
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The intuition behind formula (1.6) is as follows. Suppose, for example, that ρa < ρs, in which
case the model predicts a perverse negative relationship between a sibling’s schooling and one’s
test score, conditional on one’s own schooling. For a given realization of sibling 1’s schooling
s1, a high value of sibling 2’s schooling s2 suggests that a2 or 2 is high. Because ρa < ρ
whenever ρa < ρs, it follows that a1 is less likely than 1 to be high when s2 is high. Thus,
holding constant the value of s1, a high value of s2 conveys unfavorable information about a1. In
other words, there are two determinants of the regression coefficient on a sibling’s schooling after
controlling for one’s own schooling. A sibling’s schooling reflects not only one’s own ability but
also other factors that affect one’s schooling decision, such as discount rates, liquidity constraints,
and institutional parameters. If schooling is more highly correlated among siblings than ability,
then a sibling’s schooling is more informative about these other influences on one’s schooling than
it is about one’s ability.
Having calculated the component of each sibling’s test score orthogonal to both siblings’
schooling, the second step is to characterize the relationship between siblings’ abilities and test
scores after partialling out the influence of schooling. Denoting s = (s1, s2)′ and z = (z1, z2)′,
consider the regression coefficient of the siblings’ abilities on their schooling and test scores:
C
[(
a1
a2
)
,
(
s
z
)]
V
[(
s
z
)]−1
=
(
ψo ψf pio pif
ψf ψo pif pio
)
. (1.7)
The result below enumerates the basic properties of the regression parameters pio and pif , which
represent the relationship of one’s ability to one’s own test score and a sibling’s test score.14
Proposition 1.2.2 The regression parameters pio and pif satisfy pio > pif , pio > 0, and pi2o > pi2f .
The three parts of proposition 1.2.2 can be stated as follows. First, one’s own test score remains
a stronger predictor of one’s ability than a sibling’s test score after controlling for one’s own and
a sibling’s schooling. Second, the partial correlation of one’s ability with one’s own test score is
positive. Third, the coefficient on one’s own test score is larger in absolute value than the coefficient
on a sibling’s test score in the regression of one’s ability on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores
and schooling. These simple properties will be important in deriving the empirical implications of
14The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.1.
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the learning models developed in the sections that follow.
Although proposition 1.2.2 demonstrates that one’s own test score is positively related to one’s
ability given the other regressors, there is no analogous result for the coefficient on a sibling’s
test score, which can in general have either a positive or a negative partial correlation with one’s
ability. The reason for this ambiguity is that the test score is affected by factors other than ability
that may be correlated between siblings. In other words, the sign of the coefficient pif on a sibling’s
test score is the outcome of two competing effects: a positive correlation in ability ai leads pif to
be positive, but a positive correlation in testing error ωi leads pif to be negative. This feature of
the model is akin to the finding in proposition 1.2.1 that a sibling’s schooling can have either a
positive or a negative coefficient in the regression of one’s test score on one’s own and a sibling’s
schooling.15
The complexities introduced by such interactions in measurement error are the reason for as-
suming in section 1.2.1 that the error terms η1u1 and η2u2 in siblings’ performance signals are
uncorrelated. Although this assumption is seemingly inconsequential, it has substantive economic
consequences for the analysis of social learning in section 1.2.4. If the measurement errors in per-
formance signals were permitted to be correlated between siblings, then it would be possible for an
individual’s log wage to be negatively related to the performance of one’s sibling. In other words,
employers might assign a negative price to a sibling’s performance when determining wages. This
possibility arises because a high-performing sibling would indicate not only that one’s own ability
is high, but also that the measurement error in one’s own performance signal is high. If the latter
effect were to dominate, then a high-performing sibling would convey unfavorable information
about one’s own ability, conditional on one’s own performance. The assumption of uncorrelated
measurement error in the performance signals ensures that a sibling’s performance enters an indi-
vidual’s log wage equation with a positive price.16
15Similarly, Altonji and Pierret (2001) find that the coefficient on the interaction term of each easy- or hard-to-
observe variable with time cannot be signed in general when more than one variable of each type is included in their
regression analysis, because each of these variables can have either a positive or a negative partial correlation with the
component of employers’ beliefs orthogonal to the information available when a worker first enters the labor market.
16Note, however, that this assumption plays no role in the analysis if employer learning has no social component.
Hence, a failure to account for correlated measurement error in the performance signals cannot result in a rejection of
the individual learning model if it is in fact true.
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1.2.3 Individual Learning
This section analyzes the case where employer learning is individualistic; so that, the wage
wi of person i ∈ {1, 2} is based only on her own education si and her own performance ri. For
concreteness, employers are assumed to set the wage wi equal to the conditional expectation of
labor productivity given si and ri. The analysis here proceeds in two steps. I first express log(wi)
as a function of si and ri. I then examine the conditional expectation of log(wi) given s1, s2 and
z1, z2.
In order to calculate log(wi), I derive beliefs given si and ri. Conditional on the observed level
of schooling si, employers’ beliefs about g(si, ai) are normally distributed with mean µmi(si) and
variance σ2m where:
µmi(si) = E[g(si, ai)|si] = βsi + E(ai|si) and σ2m = V[g(si, ai)|si] = V(ai|si). (1.8)
Because all variables are assumed to be joint normally distributed, the conditional variance does
not depend on the realization of any variable. From the results in DeGroot (1970), it follows that
employers’ beliefs about g(si, ai) given both si and ri are normally distributed with mean µgi(si, ri)
and variance σ2gi where:
µgi(si, ri) = (1− χi)µmi(si) + χir¯i, σ2gi = (σ−2m + tiσ−2η )−1, χi = tiσ−2η σ2gi, (1.9)
and r¯i is the sample mean of the sequence ri = {riu}tiu=1. Note that equation (1.9) accounts for
the effect of age on the precision of employers’ beliefs about a worker’s ability. As in Farber and
Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001), the precision tiσ−2η of the information contained in
the sequence of performance observations increases with age ti.17 Thus, if worker 1 is older than
worker 2, then χ1 will be larger than χ2, indicating that beliefs about worker 1 are based less on
schooling and more on performance relative to beliefs about worker 2. The effect of differences in
siblings’ age levels on the relative precisions of employers’ beliefs will play a central role in the
model developed in section 1.2.4.
17One difference between the presentation here and in those papers is that individuals here accumulate productivity
signals with age instead of with labor market experience. This expositional choice is justified if individuals acquire
productivity signals not only when working but also while enrolled in school as suggested by Arcidiacono et al. (2010).
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Given the normality of employers’ beliefs about g(si, ai), the conditional expectation of labor
productivity given si and ri can be expressed as:
E{exp[l(si, ai, ti)]|si, ri} = exp[µgi(si, ri) + 12σ2gi + h(ti)]; (1.10)
so that, the log wage of each person is simply:
log(wi) = µgi(si, ri) +
1
2
σ2gi + h(ti), (1.11)
where µgi(si, ri) and σ2gi are given by equation (1.9).
I now calculate the conditional expectation of the log wage given the information available to
the econometrician. Using equations (1.4), (1.9), and (1.11), one obtains:
E[log(wi)|s1, s2, z1, z2] = χiE(ai|s1, s2, z1, z2) + fi(si, ti), (1.12)
where the function fi(si, ti) is given by:
fi(si, ti) = (1− χi)µmi(si) + χiβsi + 12σ2gi + h(ti). (1.13)
Note that the conditional expectation appearing on the right-hand side of equation (1.12) was the
subject of proposition 1.2.2. In addition, equation (1.12) underscores the importance of controlling
for an individual’s own schooling when calculating the conditional expectation of the log wage.
By doing so, the test scores z1, z2 appear in the conditional expectation only insofar as they predict
the component of log(wi) based on information about an individual’s ability ai gained from the
productivity signal ri. Because of this feature of the model, one can obtain the following invariance
result concerning the ratio of coefficients on the test scores in a regression of log(w1), log(w2) on
s1, s2 and z1, z2. The result is an immediate consequence of equation (1.12).
Proposition 1.2.3 Suppose that learning is individual. Let αij denote the regression coefficient on
person j’s test score in the conditional expectation of person i’s log wage given s1, s2 and z1, z2.
Then α12α22 = α21α11 = (χ1pif )(χ2pio).
To understand this result, suppose that sibling 1 is older than sibling 2; so that, sibling 1’s wage
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is based less on education and more on performance than sibling 2’s wage. Because each sibling’s
wage has a different composition, it might be difficult to compare the results of wage regressions
across siblings. The importance of proposition 1.2.3 is that it enables such comparisons to be
made. Even though α11 is larger in magnitude than α22 by the proportion χ1/χ2, it follows from
proposition 1.2.3 that α12 is also larger in magnitude than α21 by this proportion. In other words,
the impact of a sibling’s test score on one’s log wage grows with age at the same rate as the impact
of one’s own test score. Because employers do not use information on a person’s siblings in the
current model, this result is also valid in the case where an individual has more than one sibling.
Section 1.2.4 examines how deviations from this rule can arise when employers use information
on one sibling when determining the wage of another sibling.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that there can exist situations in which employer learning is
purely individual but the invariance result derived above does not hold. Suppose, for example, that
unobserved ability is multidimensional instead of being the single factor assumed so far. Although
this modification of the model is not problematic in itself, it now becomes possible to specify dis-
tinct learning processes for different components of ability; so that, employers learn more quickly
about some components relative to others. Because these separate components are unlikely to all
have the same relationship with schooling and test scores, there may no longer be a stable under-
lying association between test scores and log wages that holds across age levels. In such cases, it
can be useful to compare siblings at the same age level instead of at the same point in time.18
1.2.4 Social Learning
This section examines the case in which employer learning has an element of statistical nepo-
tism. In particular, the wage vi of each sibling incorporates information on the education s1, s2
and performance r1, r2 of both siblings; so that, employers set the wage of sibling i ∈ {1, 2} equal
to the conditional expectation of her own labor productivity given s1, s2 and r1, r2.19 Proceeding
18See appendix A.2 for an analysis of siblings at the same age level.
19A potential concern with this assumption about wage determination is that a sibling’s characteristics may not be
observable to a person’s employer unless both individuals work for the same firm. To address this issue, appendix
A.13 presents a simple model of employee referrals in which an older sibling’s attributes can affect a younger sibling’s
log wage even if the two siblings work for different employers. The model there yields similar predictions to the setup
here.
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as in the previous section, I first derive the log wage as a function of the information available
to employers and then compute the conditional expectation of the log wage given the variables
observable to the econometrician.
I begin by calculating beliefs given s1, s2 and r1, r2. For a given sibling with index i, let e
be the index of the other sibling; so that, e = 2 if i = 1, and vice versa. Conditional on the
schooling si, se of both siblings and the performance re of sibling e, employers’ beliefs about
the time-invariant component g(si, ai) of sibling i’s log productivity are normally distributed with
mean µni(si, se, re) and variance σ2ni where:
µni(si, se, re) = βsi + E(ai|si, se, re) and σ2ni = V(ai|si, se, re). (1.14)
Note that the conditional variances σ2ni, σ
2
ne satisfy σ
2
ni ≥ σ2ne if ti ≥ te. This observation follows
from the fact that the conditional expectation minimizes the mean squared error of the prediction;
so that, as one controls for additional variables, the mean squared error cannot increase.20 In other
words, if sibling i is at least as old as sibling e, then sibling i’s performance history is at least as
long as sibling e’s, which implies that ri is no less informative about sibling e than re is about
sibling i. Hence, beliefs about sibling e conditional only on se, si, and ri are at least as precise as
beliefs about sibling i conditional only on si, se, and re.
Because the measurement errors in the performance observations are independent of each other
and of all the other variables in the model, employers’ beliefs about g(si, ai) given both si, se and
ri, re are normally distributed with mean µqi(si, se, ri, re) and variance σ2qi where:
µqi(si, se, ri, re) = (1− ξi)µni(si, se, re) + ξir¯i, σ2qi = (σ−2ni + tiσ−2η )−1, ξi = tiσ−2η σ2qi, (1.15)
and r¯i is the sample mean of {riu}tiu=1. In equation (1.15), if ti is greater than te, then tiσ−2η is
greater than teσ−2η , and σ
−2
ni is no greater than σ
−2
ne ; so that, ξi is greater than ξe. To paraphrase, if
sibling i is older than sibling e, then beliefs about sibling i are based more on her own performance
and less on other measures of her ability compared to beliefs about sibling e.
It follows that the conditional expectation of sibling i’s labor productivity given si, se and ri,
20Because all random variables are normally distributed, the mean squared error is identical to the conditional
variance.
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re is:
E{exp[l(si, ai, ti)]|si, se, ri, re} = exp[µqi(si, se, ri, re) + 12σ2qi + h(ti)], (1.16)
resulting in the proceeding expression for sibling i’s log wage:
log(vi) = µqi(si, se, ri, re) +
1
2
σ2qi + h(ti), (1.17)
where µqi(si, se, ri, re) and σ2qi are given by equation (1.15).
I now derive the conditional expectation of log(vi) given si, se and zi, ze. Combining equations
(1.4), (1.14), (1.15), and (1.17), one obtains:
E[log(vi)|si, se, zi, ze] =(1− ξi)E[E(ai|si, se, re)|si, se, zi, ze]
+ ξiE(ai|si, se, zi, ze) + bi(si, ti),
(1.18)
where the function bi(si, ti) is given by:
bi(si, ti) = βsi +
1
2
σ2qi + h(ti). (1.19)
Because the rue have identical covariances with each other and with si, se, and ai, the conditional
expectation of ai given si, se, and re has the form:
E(ai|si, se, re) = E(ai|si, se, r¯e) = ζci + ζoisi + ζfise + ζrir¯e; (1.20)
so that, (si, se, r¯e) is a sufficient statistic for (si, se, re) with respect to ai. Thus, the iterated expec-
tation in equation (1.18) can be expressed as:
E[E(ai|si, se, re)|si, se, zi, ze] = ζriE(ae|si, se, zi, ze) + di(si, se), (1.21)
where di(si, se) is defined as:
di(si, se) = ζci + ζoisi + (ζfi + ζriβ)se. (1.22)
Combining equations (1.18) and (1.21), I obtain the final expression for the conditional expectation
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of the log wage:
E[log(vi)|si, se, zi, ze] = (1−ξi)ζriE(ae|si, se, zi, ze)+ξiE(ai|si, se, zi, ze)+pi(si, se, ti), (1.23)
where pi(si, se, ti) is given by:
pi(si, se, ti) = bi(si, ti) + (1− ξi)di(si, se). (1.24)
Equation (1.23) demonstrates that in the presence of social interactions in the learning process, the
log wage can be decomposed into two separate components, one of which contains a person’s own
ability, and the other of which reflects her sibling’s ability. Note that in the previous section where
employer learning was individual, it was essential to control for one’s own schooling, in order to
identify the relationship of test scores to the component of the wage based on one’s own ability.
In the current model, the wage also incorporates information on one’s sibling, making it important
to control as well for the sibling’s schooling, so as to isolate the part of the log wage based on the
abilities of the two siblings.
It is now possible to prove the following counterpart to proposition 1.2.3 for the current model
in which employer learning has a social component.21 The first part of the proposition is an im-
mediate consequence of the symmetric treatment of the two siblings.22 In the second part of the
proposition, an analogous statement holds if t2 > t1 instead of t1 > t2.
Proposition 1.2.4 Suppose that learning is social. Let νij denote the regression coefficient on
person j’s test score in the conditional expectation of person i’s log wage given s1, s2 and z1, z2.
1. If t1 = t2, then ν12ν22 = ν21ν11.
2. If t1 > t2, then ν12ν22 < ν21ν11.
On the one hand, the first part of proposition 1.2.4 can be regarded as a variant of the results in
Manski (1993) concerning the difficulties of distinguishing between social and nonsocial effects. If
21The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.1.
22To be specific, if t1 = t2, then ξ1 = ξ2 in equation (1.15); so that, the conditional expectations of log(v1), log(v2)
in equation (1.18) have the same form up to a constant.
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the two siblings have the same age, then both the individual and the social learning model predict
that the ratio of the coefficients on test scores should be the same for the two siblings. On the
other hand, if there are asymmetries in the age levels of the siblings, then the two models generate
different predictions regarding the relative values of this ratio, making it possible to detect social
interactions in the learning process.
Intuitively, if sibling 1 is older than sibling 2, then the labor market acquires more precise
information about sibling 1 than about sibling 2, because sibling 1’s performance is observed over
a longer length of time than sibling 2’s. Thus, when the market forms Bayesian beliefs about
the abilities of the two siblings, greater weight is placed on information about sibling 1 than on
information about sibling 2. Given that the labor market is competitive, this relative weighting is
reflected in the wages of the two siblings; so that, the component of sibling 2’s wage attributable
to sibling 1’s ability is larger than the component of sibling 1’s wage attributable to sibling 2’s
ability. This phenomenon manifests itself in the data available to the econometrician as follows.
If sibling 1 is older than sibling 2, then the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to the
coefficient on one’s own test score is typically higher in sibling 2’s log wage than in sibling 1’s
log wage, because sibling 2’s log wage is more strongly influenced by sibling 1’s ability than vice
versa, and sibling 1’s ability is more strongly associated with sibling 1’s than with sibling 2’s test
score, conditional on the other regressors.
1.3 Extensions of Employer Learning Models
The supplemental appendices discuss several extensions of the employer learning models de-
veloped in the preceding section. These extensions demonstrate the robustness of the theoretical
predictions to simple changes in the setup of the model. Appendix A.2 describes the relationship
between log wages and test scores when younger and older siblings are compared at a given age
level instead of in a given time period. Appendix A.3 examines the issues that arise when the
test score is endogenously influenced by an individual’s schooling at the time of taking the test.
Appendix A.4 explains how the analysis of social learning can be generalized to allow for an ar-
bitrary number of siblings in a family. Appendix A.5 studies a social learning model in which an
individual has at least two siblings with one sibling being older than the other.
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1.4 Empirical Implementation
This section addresses some issues concerning the estimation of the learning models in section
1.2. A potential obstacle to implementing the tests in propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 is that the
regression coefficients are predicted to change with age in the conditional expectation of one’s
log wage given one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling.23 The analysis in section 1.2
treated the ages of the siblings in each family as being fixed. In the data, however, siblings from
a sample of households are interviewed over multiple years, and the age structure varies across
families and over time; so that, the coefficients in the conditional expectation function may not
be constant across different households and survey years. One way to deal with this problem
might simply be to include interactions of schooling and test scores with age when estimating the
conditional expectation function. Nonetheless, this approach is unattractive in the current setting,
because the social learning model implies that the coefficients on test scores are a function not only
of one own’s age but also of a sibling’s age. Hence, the number of interaction terms that would
need to be included in the specification is an order of magnitude greater than that required under
individual learning, making it difficult to obtain precise estimates for the coefficients of interest
given the limited data at disposal.
Remarkably, there is a simple procedure that in large part overcomes this estimation problem.
First, I show that the main predictions of both the individual and the social learning model hold
in aggregate. Specifically, if one considers all the pairs of younger and older siblings that can be
derived from a sample of sibships with different age structures, then the predictions of each of the
two learning models regarding the coefficients on test scores in a log wage regression also apply
to the expected values of these coefficients for a randomly selected pair of siblings. This finding
is somewhat surprising because these predictions involve a nonlinear function of the regression
coefficients: the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to that on one’s own test score.
Nevertheless, the normality assumptions in this paper impose sufficient structure on the learning
process to make aggregation of this sort possible. Second, I show that the pooled ordinary least
squares estimator of the conditional expectation function will under reasonable conditions generate
a consistent estimate of the expected values of the regression coefficients for a randomly selected
23In particular, the regression coefficients will depend on only one’s own age under individual learning and on both
one’s own and a sibling’s ages under social learning.
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pair of siblings, provided that one controls sufficiently flexibly for the ages of the siblings under
analysis. To simplify the exposition in this section, I assume that all families consist of exactly two
siblings and that all sibships enter the labor market in the same year.24
Consider a random sample of I ≥ 1 sibships. The families in the sample are indexed from 1
to I , and the siblings in each family are labeled 1 and 2. Sibling 1 is assumed to be older than
sibling 2. There are D years under observation, which are labeled from 1 to D. Both members
of each sibship i are assumed to be working in all of these years. Let ti,j,d represent the age of
sibling j from family i in year d, and let si,j and zi,j respectively denote the schooling and the test
score of sibling j from family i. The age of each person increases by one in each year. Letting
ti,0 = (ti,1,0, ti,2,0) represent the ages of the two siblings from family i in year zero, the set T of
possible realizations of ti,0 is taken to be finite. Every element of T is assumed to be a pair of
distinct nonnegative integers.
Let bi,j be a K × 1 vector of background variables for sibling j from family i. Although these
variables were not discussed earlier, there is a simple way to formally introduce them into the
framework in section 1.2.1 without changing the predictions of either learning model.25 Assuming
that bi,j is observable both to employers and to the econometrician, let the respective means µa,i,j ,
µ,i,j , µω,i,j of ai,j , i,j , ωi,j have the form:
(µa,i,j, µ,i,j, µω,i,j) = E [(ai,j, i,j, ωi,j)|bi,1, bi,2, ti,0]
=
(
φa,0 + b
′
i,jφa, φ,0 + b
′
i,jφ, φω,0 + b
′
i,jφω
)
,
(1.25)
where φa,0, φ,0, and φω,0 are constants, and φa, φ, and φω are K × 1 coefficient vectors.26
Each sibling pair can be represented by the triple (i, p, q), where i indexes the family from
which the two siblings are drawn, and p and q are the respective labels of the first and the second
24Appendix A.8 contains a more general treatment that extends the setup here to allow for an arbitrary number of
siblings in a family and for different dates of labor market entry across families.
25Pinkston (2009) uses a similar strategy to add demographic characteristics to a model of asymmetric employer
learning.
26The other parameters of the model in section 1.2.1—β, σ2a, ρa, γ, σ
2
 , θa, θs, σ
2
ω , ρω , σ
2
η—are assumed not to
depend on the realizations of bi,1, bi,2, and ti,0. The term h(ti,j,d) in equation (1.1) is assumed to be a function only
of ti,j,d.
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siblings in the pair.27 I define two vectors:
ti,(p,q),d = (ti,p,d, ti,q,d)
′, xi,(p,q) = (zi,p, zi,q, si,p, si,q, b′i,p, b
′
i,q)
′, (1.26)
where ti,(p,q),d represents the ages of the two siblings from family i in year d, and xi,(p,q) contains
their labor market characteristics. The conditional expectation of the log wage wi,p,d of sibling p
from family i in year d given xi,(p,q) and ti,(p,q),d can be put in the following general form both
under individual and under social learning:
E
(
wi,p,d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d
)
= c(ti,(p,q),d) + x
′
i,(p,q)v(ti,(p,q),d), (1.27)
where v(ti,(p,q),d) is a (2K + 4) × 1 coefficient vector, and c(ti,(p,q),d) is a constant.28 Note that
v(ti,(p,q),d) and c(ti,(p,q),d) can vary with the age vector ti,(p,q),d of the two siblings from family i in
year d.
I next define the two parameters of interest. For each family i, let Gi be a random variable
that takes on the value of each natural number between 1 and D with equal probability 1/D. Each
realization of Gi represents a particular year from the set of observed dates. The random variable
Gi is assumed to be independent of all the other variables in the model. Letting δ(t˜i,0) denote the
proportion of families in which the ages of the two siblings in year zero are t˜i,0 ∈ T , the expected
value νH of v(ti,(1,2),Gi) is equal to:
νH = E[v(ti,(1,2),Gi)] = D
−1 ∑
t˜i,0∈T
δ(t˜i,0)
D∑
d=1
v(t˜i,(1,2),0 + d · 12), (1.28)
and the expected value νL of v(ti,(2,1),Gi) is equal to:
νL = E[v(ti,(2,1),Gi)] = D
−1 ∑
t˜i,0∈T
δ(t˜i,0)
D∑
d=1
v(t˜i,(2,1),0 + d · 12), (1.29)
27Note that each family i contains two sibling pairs: (i, 1, 2) and (i, 2, 1).
28The expression for the conditional expectation in equation (1.27) is a consequence of equation (1.12) if learning
is individual and of equation (1.23) if learning is social.
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where 12 is a 2 × 1 vector of ones. For a randomly sampled family, νH and νL can be interpreted
as the average values of the coefficient vectors v(ti,(1,2),Gi) and v(ti,(2,1),Gi) in a random year.
29
It is now possible to state the following result, which is a generalization of propositions 1.2.3
and 1.2.4.30 Consider the conditional expectation function in equation (1.27) as well as the ex-
pected values of the coefficient vectors in equations (1.28) and (1.29). First, if learning is individ-
ual, then the ratio of the second to the first entry of νH will be equal to the ratio of the second to the
first entry of νL. That is, under individual learning, the ratio of the average coefficient on a younger
sibling’s test score to the average coefficient on one’s own test score in an older sibling’s log wage
will be the same as the ratio of the average coefficient on an older sibling’s test score to the average
coefficient on one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage. Second, if learning is social,
then the ratio of the second to the first entry of νH will be less than the ratio of the second to the
first entry of νL, especially assuming that the first entries of νH and νL are both positive. That is,
under social learning, the ratio of the average coefficient on a younger sibling’s test score to the
average coefficient on one’s own test score in an older sibling’s log wage will typically be lower
than the ratio of the average coefficient on an older sibling’s test score to the average coefficient on
one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage.
Proposition 1.4.1 For i ∈ {1, 2}, let νH,i denote the ith element of the vector νH in equation (1.28),
and let νL,i denote the ith element of the vector νL in equation (1.29).
1. If learning is individual, then νH,2νL,1 = νL,2νH,1.
2. If learning is social, then νH,2νL,1 < νL,2νH,1.
Having shown that the main predictions of the learning models survive aggregation, I now
discuss the estimation of the expected values νH and νL of the coefficient vectors v(ti,(1,2),Gi) and
v(ti,(2,1),Gi). Fixing any nonnegative integer M , let P represent the set composed of every pair
of nonnegative integers whose sum is no greater than M . Letting #P be the number of elements
29Observe that the first and second elements of the vector νH (resp. νL) represent the average values of the coeffi-
cients on one’s own and a younger (resp. an older) sibling’s test scores in the conditional expectation of an older (resp.
a younger) sibling’s log wage in equation (1.27).
30The proof of proposition 1.4.1 is omitted from the paper, because a more general version of the result is proved in
appendix A.8.
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in the set P , the elements of P can be labeled from 1 to #P with es = (es1, e
s
2) denoting the s
th
element of P . Given a 2 × 1 vector t = (t1, t2)′, let ft denote the #P × 1 vector whose sth entry
is equal to the product te
s
1
1 t
es2
2 ; so that, ft consists of one element for every term of a M
th-order
bivariate polynomial in t. Let hi,(p,q),d be the (2K + 4 + #P ) × 1 vector formed by stacking the
vector xi,(p,q) on top of the vector fti,(p,q),d . That is, I define:
hi,(p,q),d = (x
′
i,(p,q), f
′
ti,(p,q),d
)′, (1.30)
where xi,(p,q) comprises the test scores, schooling levels, and background attributes of the two
siblings from family i, and fti,(p,q),d contains the terms of a bivariate polynomial in their ages in
year d.
Some further assumptions become relevant when estimating νH and νL. Fix (p, q) = (1, 2) or
(p, q) = (2, 1). First, the conditional expectation of xi,(p,q) given that ti,(p,q),Gi = t is assumed to
be adequately approximated by a M th-order bivariate polynomial in t. That is, I assume that:
E(xi,(p,q)|ti,(p,q),Gi = t) =
∑
e∈P
αe(p,q)(t
e1
1 t
e2
2 ), (1.31)
where t is any 2×1 vector of nonnegative integers such that ti,(p,q),Gi = t with positive probability,
and αe(p,q) is a (2K + 4)× 1 vector that does not depend on t. Second, the matrix representing the
expected value of hi,(p,q),Gih
′
i,(p,q),Gi
is required to be nonsingular. That is, I assume that:
rank
[
E(hi,(p,q),Gih
′
i,(p,q),Gi
)] = 2K + 4 + #P. (1.32)
Third, the variance of xi,(p,q) given that ti,(p,q),Gi = t is restricted to be a matrix of constants that
do not vary with t. That is, letting ri,(p,q),Gi = xi,(p,q) − E(xi,(p,q)|ti,(p,q),Gi), I assume that:
E(ri,(p,q),Gir
′
i,(p,q),Gi
|ti,(p,q),Gi = t) = Σx,(p,q), (1.33)
where t is any 2×1 vector of nonnegative integers such that ti,(p,q),Gi = t with positive probability,
and Σx,(p,q) is a (2K + 4) × (2K + 4) matrix of constants that do not depend on t.31 In addition,
31This restriction on the conditional variance matrix can be weakened to some extent. Specifically,
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note that all random variables are treated as having finite first and second moments.
The following result shows that, under the assumptions above, the parameters νH and νL can
be consistently estimated simply by pooling the observations on each sibling pair across every year
and running ordinary least squares regressions on the resulting dataset. In particular, let:
ν˜H =
(
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=1
hi,(1,2),dh
′
i,(1,2),d
)−1( I∑
i=1
D∑
d=1
hi,(1,2),dwi,1,d
)
, (1.34)
and let:
ν˜L =
(
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=1
hi,(2,1),dh
′
i,(2,1),d
)−1( I∑
i=1
D∑
d=1
hi,(2,1),dwi,2,d
)
. (1.35)
Let νˆH and νˆL be vectors containing the first 2K + 4 elements of ν˜H and ν˜L, respectively. That is,
νˆH (resp. νˆL) denotes the estimated coefficient on the covariate vector xi,(1,2) (resp. xi,(2,1)) in a
log wage regression that also controls for fti,(1,2),d (resp. fti,(2,1),d). The result below shows that as
the number of sampled sibships I goes to infinity, the estimators νˆH and νˆL converge in probability
to νH and νL, respectively. The proof of proposition 1.4.2 is similar to those given by Wooldridge
(2004), who examines the identification of average partial effects in correlated random coefficient
models.32
Proposition 1.4.2 Suppose that the assumptions in equations (1.31), (1.32), and (1.33) are satis-
fied. As the number of sampled sibships I goes to infinity, the estimators νˆH and νˆL, which consist
of the first 2K + 4 elements of ν˜H and ν˜L in equations (1.34) and (1.35), respectively converge in
probability to νH and νL, which are defined in equations (1.28) and (1.29).
The results in propositions 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 suggest the following basic strategy for estimating
and testing the individual and social learning models.33 The log wages of all older (resp. younger)
proposition 1.4.2 remains valid if equation (1.33) is replaced by E[Σx,(p,q)(ti,(p,q),Gi)v(ti,(p,q),Gi)] =
E[Σx,(p,q)(ti,(p,q),Gi)]E[v(ti,(p,q),Gi)], where Σx,(p,q)(t) = E(ri,(p,q),Gir′i,(p,q),Gi |ti,(p,q),Gi = t) for any 2× 1 vector
t of nonnegative integers such that ti,(p,q),Gi = t with positive probability. That is, the random coefficient vector
v(ti,(p,q),Gi) is assumed to be uncorrelated with the random conditional variance matrix Σx,(p,q)(ti,(p,q),Gi).
32The proof of proposition 1.4.2 is omitted from the paper, because a more general version of the result is proved in
appendix A.8.
33See sections 1.5 and 1.6 for more detailed information regarding the construction of the estimation sample and
the specification of the learning models.
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siblings across all years are regressed both on their own and their younger (resp. older) sibling’s
test scores, schooling levels, and background attributes and on a bivariate polynomial in their own
and their younger (resp. older) sibling’s ages. When computing standard errors and test statistics,
the Huber-White estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is used to allow for arbitrary forms
of correlation among the error terms of observations on the same family. To evaluate the nonlinear
restriction implied by the individual learning model in proposition 1.4.1, I calculate the Wald
statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on a younger sibling’s test score in an older
sibling’s log wage times the coefficient on one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage
minus the coefficient on an older sibling’s test score in a younger sibling’s log wage times the
coefficient on one’s own test score in an older sibling’s log wage is equal to zero.34
1.5 Dataset Construction and Description
The dataset used in this study is constructed from the 1979-2008 waves of the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), which contains panel data on 12,686 men and women
aged 14-22 in 1979. Respondents were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially
thereafter. The NLSY79 is especially well suited to the purpose of this paper, which is to exam-
ine social learning among siblings in the labor market. Because the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was administered to participants in the NLSY79, a growing literature
on employer learning uses the resulting Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score as an abil-
ity measure that is not directly observable to employers. In addition, a large number of sibling
studies analyze data from the NLSY79, which includes 5,863 respondents who have one or more
interviewed siblings. The current paper uses the AFQT scores of pairs of siblings to identify the
components of a person’s log wage based on information about one’s own and a sibling’s ability.
In order to implement the empirical strategy developed above, I assemble a dataset in which
each observation represents a particular sibling pair in a given survey year.35 This dataset will serve
34By the delta method, this test statistic is, in general, asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with one degree of
freedom.
35If there are two siblings p and q, then a sibling pair in which sibling p appears first and sibling q second is regarded
as distinct from a sibling pair in which sibling q appears first and sibling p second. For example, if a family consists
of three siblings, then six different pairs of siblings can be formed.
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as the main estimation sample for the paper; therefore, the current section describes in detail how
this dataset is constructed.36 However, a variety of other related samples are used for the empirical
analysis in certain sections, and the selection criteria for these samples are provided in the relevant
text and tables. The data are derived from the 6,111 respondents in the cross-sectional sample
and the 5,295 respondents in the supplemental sample of the NLSY79.37 For this group of 11,406
individuals, I identify every survey year in which a respondent has a non-missing wage observation
on a full-time job, where full-time is defined as 35 or more hours per week.38 Each wage is then
deflated using the CPI to a base period of 1982-1984, and any real wage less than $1 or greater
than $100 is omitted from the analysis. The resulting sample consists of 126,101 observations on
10,945 individuals.
I next compile the required information on each respondent’s education and AFQT score.
Schooling is defined in each survey year as the highest grade that a respondent reports having
completed up to the time of the current interview.39 The AFQT scores are standardized among all
respondents in the NLSY79 with the same year of birth, so as to account directly for the effect
of age on one’s test score. An additional 5,339 observations from 603 individuals with missing
data on education or AFQT scores are deleted at this stage. I also exclude all observations that
occur prior to the first survey year in which a respondent has left school for the first time. This
criterion reduces the sample size to 117,649 observations on 10,331 individuals. In restricting the
estimation sample to respondents who have left school for the first time and who are working at a
full-time job, I seek to identify those individuals who are well attached to the workforce and for
whom employer learning is likely to be relevant.40
36The main estimation sample is restricted to observations on sibling pairs in which both members have worked
since the last interview. However, selection into employment may not be entirely exogenous. Therefore, appendix A.21
expands the dataset to include non-working individuals and examines the joint work-wage outcomes of respondents. I
continue to find evidence of sibling effects on labor market variables after performing this extension.
37The military sample does not contain any pairs of interviewed siblings; therefore, all 1,280 of its members are
excluded from the empirical analysis.
38If an individual reports holding multiple jobs, then only information on the CPS job is used.
39As in Altonji and Pierret (2001), schooling is required to be nondecreasing over time. Hence, if an individual
reports a higher schooling level in one year and a lower schooling level in a later year, then the education variable is
set equal to the greater of these two values in both years.
40Nevertheless, the empirical results in Tables 1.3 and 1.5 do not change substantially if the estimation sample is
expanded to include respondents who have not yet left school or who work at a part-time job.
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Having created a sample of wage observations on the period after each individual’s initial
transition from school to work, I isolate those respondents for whom valid sibling data is avail-
able. There are 7,639 observations from 623 individuals who are missing data on either their total
number of siblings or their number of older siblings.41 These observations are excluded from the
estimation sample, bringing the sample size to 110,010 observations on 9,708 individuals. At this
point, each observation in the sample corresponds to a specific person in a given survey year. To
generate a new dataset consisting of sibling pairs instead of individuals, I apply the following pro-
cedure to the existing sample. For each person in the sample in a given survey year, I search over
all the other individuals in the sample in that year for an observation on the person’s sibling. If a
sibling is found, then an observation containing information on the person and her sibling is added
to the new dataset in that survey year. In the event that multiple siblings are located, one such
observation is included for each sibling identified. If no sibling exists, then the person is excluded
from the main estimation sample in that year. The resulting dataset contains 55,242 observations
on 7,180 sibling pairs, which comprise 4,766 individuals from 2,012 sibships. Because the empiri-
cal strategy is based primarily on differences in age between siblings, any pairs of siblings in which
both members have the same year and month of birth are eliminated, which reduces the dataset to
54,474 observations on 7,074 sibling pairs, covering 4,726 individuals from 1,993 families.42
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for the main sample used in the empirical analysis.
58.88 percent of observations in the data originate from households in the nationally represen-
tative cross-sectional sample of the NLSY79, with the remaining 41.12 percent of observations
belonging to members of the supplemental sample, which oversamples minorities and disadvan-
taged whites.43 The demographic composition of the estimation sample is 42.43 percent female,
32.22 percent black, and 17.71 percent Hispanic. In locational terms, 77.70 percent of observations
are on respondents living in an urban area, and 41.58 percent of observations are on individuals
residing in the South. The sample is composed primarily of siblings from large families with the
41These figures include 3,823 observations from 300 individuals who do not have data on their number of older
siblings because they are only children.
42The analysis in Table 1.11 does not exploit age differences between siblings; therefore, twins are not excluded
from the results reported there.
43Because the background characteristics of the sample used in this paper differ from those of the workforce at large,
the empirical results in Tables 1.3 and 1.5 were replicated using only those sibling pairs belonging to the representative
cross-sectional sample. The findings were similar to those reported in the paper.
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average sibship size being 5.732 across all observations.44 The mean birth order is 2.849 for the
older member and 4.203 for the younger member of each sibling pair. The corresponding differ-
ence in age between the older and the younger sibling in each pair is on average 2.53 years.45
Turning to the labor market outcomes of siblings in the estimation sample, the average hourly
real wage is $8.10 for the older sibling and $7.57 for the younger sibling in each pair. Sample
members appear to have a substantial commitment to the labor force, working an average of 43.10
hours per week across all observations. The mean schooling level is 12.89, and the mean AFQT
score is -0.0566.46 The average differences between older and younger siblings in these human
capital measures are not large. The older sibling in each pair typically has 0.12 more years of
schooling than the younger sibling. However, after standardizing the AFQT scores within each
birth cohort, younger siblings have AFQT scores that are on average 0.0685 standard deviations
higher than those of older siblings. Therefore, the 6.23 percent higher wage earned by older relative
to younger siblings appears to be attributable mostly to greater experience as opposed to underlying
disparities in educational attainment or cognitive ability.47
For the purpose of identifying social interactions in employer learning, it is desirable for there
to be a moderate correlation in ability among siblings. On the one hand, if the sibling correlation
in ability is close to zero, then a sibling’s performance is a weak predictor of one’s own ability
and has little impact on one’s log wage. On the other hand, if the sibling correlation in ability
is near perfect, then each person’s test score has a similar relationship to both one’s own and
a sibling’s ability; so that, the components of a person’s log wage based on one’s own and a
44Note that larger sibships tend to be overrepresented in the estimation sample because each observation from a
given survey year represents a sibling pair instead of an individual. For example, a sibship with two members contains
only two pairs of siblings, whereas a sibship with three members consists of six sibling pairs.
45Because the employer learning process is relatively rapid as demonstrated by Lange (2007), even an age gap
of 2.53 years can generate a sizeable disparity in the precision of the market’s beliefs about each sibling’s ability,
especially at the early stages of a worker’s career. The estimates in Lange (2007) indicate that the variance of the
market’s ability prediction error declines by 41.17 percent after two years and 51.21 percent after three years of
employment.
46Since AFQT scores are standardized using all respondents in the NLSY79 instead of only members of the estima-
tion sample, the mean and standard deviation of the AFQT scores reported in Table 1.1 differ slightly from zero and
one, respectively.
47Nevertheless, to the extent that such birth order effects are present in the data, the framework in section 1.2
accounts for any differences between younger and older siblings in the mean levels of schooling, test scores, and
productive ability.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Sibling Pairs in Labor Market
Both Siblings Older Sibling Younger Sibling
Labor Market
Real Hourly Wage
Mean (S.D.) 7.838 (5.336) 8.101 (5.565) 7.574 (5.082)
Inter-Sib. Corr. 0.3556 —— ——
Log Real Hourly Wage
Mean (S.D.) 1.908 (0.527) 1.939 (0.531) 1.877 (0.522)
Inter-Sib. Corr. 0.3882 —— ——
Weekly Hours Worked
Mean (S.D.) 43.10 (7.46) 43.23 (7.55) 42.96 (7.37)
Human Capital
Years of Schooling
Mean (S.D.) 12.89 (2.40) 12.95 (2.41) 12.83 (2.38)
Inter-Sib. Corr. 0.5174 —— ——
Standardized AFQT
Mean (S.D.) -0.0566 (1.0019) -0.0909 (1.0150) -0.0224 (0.9875)
Inter-Sib. Corr. 0.6586 —— ——
Basic Demographics
Pct. Black 32.22 —— ——
Pct. Hispanic 17.71 —— ——
Pct. Female 42.43 42.30 42.55
Pct. Urban 77.70 78.00 77.40
Region of Residence
Pct. Northcentral 25.09 25.14 25.04
Pct. Northeast 16.49 16.64 16.34
Pct. South 41.58 41.41 41.75
Pct. West 16.85 16.82 16.88
Age
Mean (S.D.) 31.07 (7.34) 32.34 (7.25) 29.81 (7.21)
Family Background
Birth Order
Mean (S.D.) 3.526 (2.231) 2.849 (2.075) 4.203 (2.175)
Sibship Size
Mean (S.D.) 5.732 (2.657) —— ——
Mother’s Schooling
Mean (S.D.) 10.78 (3.14) —— ——
Father’s Schooling
Mean (S.D.) 10.67 (4.08) —— ——
Mother’s Age
Mean (S.D.) 57.38 (9.02) —— ——
Father’s Age
Mean (S.D.) 60.95 (9.66) —— ——
Sample Size
No. Families 1993 —— ——
No. Individuals 4726 2695 2707
No. Sibling Pairs 7074 —— ——
No. Observations 54474 —— ——
Note: The hourly wage is deflated using the CPI with 1982-1984 as the base period. The reference group for standardizing the AFQT score is all
respondents in the NLSY79 having the same year of birth. Observations with missing data on a given variable are omitted when calculating the
summary statistics for that variable.
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sibling’s performance cannot be empirically distinguished from each other.48 Using the available
human capital measures as indicators of ability, the sibling correlations in AFQT scores, schooling,
and log wages are 0.6586, 0.5174, and 0.3882, respectively.49 For comparison, the survey of
sibling studies in Griliches (1979) lists the following ranges of intraclass correlation coefficients
between non-twin brothers: 0.47-0.58 for test scores, 0.24-0.55 for schooling, and 0.11-0.40 for
log earnings.
1.6 Empirical Results
This section presents empirical evidence of social interactions among siblings in the labor mar-
ket. Section 1.6.1 documents the influence of sibship size and birth order on job search behavior.
Section 1.6.2 analyzes the relationships among the AFQT scores, schooling levels, and log wages
of younger and older siblings. Section 1.6.3 performs various robustness checks on the main esti-
mation results, such as analyzing the impacts of youngest and oldest siblings on middle siblings,
modifying the empirical specification to include interactions among more than two siblings, com-
paring the log wages of older and younger siblings at the same age, and accounting for the causal
effect of schooling on AFQT scores. Section 1.6.4 tests additional predictions of the learning mod-
els for the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling in log wage equations and for the
variance of the change in log wage residuals between successive age levels. Section 1.6.5 conducts
three falsification exercises based on samples of sibling pairs in which one member has little labor
market experience, was geographically isolated from the other member, or moves to a different
region.
48In order to assess whether the variation in ability among siblings is sufficient to differentiate between the compo-
nents of one’s log wage based on one’s own and a sibling’s ability, family fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the
AFQT score on the log wage are performed in appendix A.14.
49The sibling correlation in log wages is based on the real hourly wage in each survey year. As discussed in Solon et
al. (1991), the sibling correlation in permanent earnings is likely to be greater than the correlation between siblings in
a single-year measure of earnings. Averaging the log wage of each member of a sibling pair over all the survey years
in which that sibling pair appears in the main estimation sample, the sibling correlation in log wages rises to 0.4157.
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1.6.1 Job Search Estimates
Job search is a potential channel through which employers might acquire information about
a person’s siblings. This section, therefore, analyzes the job search patterns of siblings as back-
ground evidence for the main empirical results on social learning.50 The first four columns in the
upper panel of Table 1.2 report estimates for linear probability models relating birth order and
sibship size to the likelihood of obtaining one’s most recent job with the help of a sibling. In
a parsimonious specification that controls only for a gender dummy and fixed effects for year of
birth, the coefficients on sibship size and birth order are respectively 0.0087 and 0.0133 with corre-
sponding standard errors 0.0014 and 0.0017 when each variable is used individually as a regressor.
However, when both variables are jointly included in the regression, the coefficient of 0.0019 on
sibship size is not significantly different from zero, whereas the coefficient of 0.0117 on birth order
is statistically significant. This finding is essentially unchanged after controlling for a variety of
additional demographic variables such as race, urban location, region of residence, and parental
age and education.
So as to account more flexibly for the impact of birth order and sibship size on the likelihood
of obtaining a job through a sibling, I also estimate specifications in which a series of indicator
variables for birth order and sibship size are included as regressors. The first four columns in the
lower panel of Table 1.2 reveal a clear monotonic positive association between birth order and
the probability of finding one’s job through a sibling. Conditional on sibship size and relevant
demographic variables, a second-born child is just 0.64 percentage points more likely than the
eldest child to receive a sibling’s help, whereas a seventh- or later-born child has a 6.81 percentage
point higher likelihood of being helped by a sibling. By contrast, after controlling for birth order,
there is only limited evidence of a systematic relationship between sibship size and the probability
of obtaining a job through a sibling, although individuals from sibships with three or more members
may be slightly more likely to receive help from a sibling than those belonging to sibships of size
two.
50See appendix A.15 for detailed summary statistics regarding the role of different relatives in job search. In the
sample used in this section, 4.52 percent of individuals found their most recent employer with the help of a sibling,
and 3.68 percent of individuals report that this sibling also worked for their most recent employer. When tabulated by
birth order, the former percentage ranges from 1.34 for first-born children to 10.35 for seventh- or later-born children,
and the latter percentage ranges from 1.05 for first-born children to 8.17 for seventh- or later-born children.
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Table 1.2: Relationship of Sibship Size and Birth Order to Probability of Sibling Helping Respon-
dent Obtain Most Recent Job
Linear Specification
Receive Help from Sibling Also Have Same Employer
Sibship Size 0.0087 0.0019 0.0014 0.0080 0.0032 0.0030
(0.0014) —— (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0013) —— (0.0017) (0.0019)
Birth Order 0.0133 0.0117 0.0101 0.0109 0.0081 0.0071
—— (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0028) —— (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0026)
Demographic Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
R2 0.0160 0.0224 0.0227 0.0293 0.0164 0.0194 0.0204 0.0273
Families 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303
Individuals 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973
Non-Linear Specification
Receive Help from Sibling Also Have Same Employer
Sibship Size 3 0.0170 0.0095 0.0088 0.0034 -0.0014 -0.0023
(0.0069) —— (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0059) —— (0.0062) (0.0062)
Sibship Size 4 0.0201 0.0030 0.0028 0.0160 0.0036 0.0033
(0.0071) —— (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0068) —— (0.0070) (0.0072)
Sibship Size 5 0.0394 0.0133 0.0114 0.0313 0.0114 0.0099
(0.0094) —— (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0087) —— (0.0088) (0.0091)
Sibship Size 6 0.0432 0.0096 0.0068 0.0289 0.0032 0.0011
(0.0111) —— (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0099) —— (0.0105) (0.0113)
Sibship Size 7+ 0.0643 0.0150 0.0108 0.0541 0.0188 0.0161
(0.0090) —— (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0085) —— (0.0101) (0.0107)
Birth Order 2 0.0098 0.0093 0.0064 0.0094 0.0087 0.0068
—— (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0060) —— (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0056)
Birth Order 3 0.0306 0.0275 0.0220 0.0216 0.0189 0.0152
—— (0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0091) —— (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0081)
Birth Order 4 0.0535 0.0501 0.0433 0.0459 0.0393 0.0342
—— (0.0103) (0.0111) (0.0122) —— (0.0094) (0.0101) (0.0111)
Birth Order 5 0.0639 0.0568 0.0487 0.0572 0.0474 0.0423
—— (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0158) —— (0.0129) (0.0140) (0.0147)
Birth Order 6 0.0790 0.0719 0.0656 0.0662 0.0551 0.0508
—— (0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0206) —— (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0191)
Birth Order 7+ 0.0881 0.0793 0.0681 0.0693 0.0535 0.0470
—— (0.0161) (0.0187) (0.0207) —— (0.0148) (0.0173) (0.0192)
Demographic Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes
R2 0.0152 0.0236 0.0240 0.0303 0.0157 0.0207 0.0217 0.0283
Families 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303 4303
Individuals 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973 4973
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for gender and birth year
fixed effects. Demographic controls include indicators for race, urban location, region of residence, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s
age, father’s age, and dummies for missing data on a given variable. The estimates above are based on responses to the questions on job search
methods in the 1982 round of the NLSY79. The sample used here consists of respondents who have left school for the first time and are working at
a full-time job when surveyed in 1982. Individuals are excluded from the analysis if they report being an only child or have missing data on birth
order or sibship size.
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In order to confirm that the observed positive relationship between birth order and the use
of a sibling in job search is due in part to siblings working for the same employer, the second
four columns of Table 1.2 present estimates of the impact of birth order and sibship size on the
likelihood that an individual obtained her most recent job with the help of a sibling who was
working for the employer that offered her the job. The pattern of results in the second four columns
is largely similar to that in the first four columns. In the upper panel, when both sibship size and
birth order are added to the regression along with relevant background variables, the coefficient on
sibship size is not significantly different from zero, whereas the positive coefficient on birth order
is statistically significant. In the lower panel, where indicator variables for sibship size and birth
order are included as regressors, the probability of obtaining a job through a sibling appears to be
more strongly related to birth order than to sibship size.
Overall, there is substantial evidence of a positive association between birth order and the use
of a sibling in job search.51 One way to interpret this finding is as follows. Consider the model of
job search through social networks in Montgomery (1991). In that setup, social groups consist of
either one or two members with groups of size two containing an older and a younger agent. The
older agent always finds an employer without intervention by the younger agent, but the younger
agent sometimes obtains a job with assistance from the older agent. The results in this section
indicate that the job search patterns of later- and earlier-born children resemble the behavior of
younger and older agents in Montgomery (1991). In particular, a later-born child is more likely
than an earlier-born child to obtain a job through a sibling in a similar way that a younger agent
unlike an older agent can find an employer through a personal contact.
This analogy can be taken further. In Montgomery (1991), an employer that hires a younger
worker through an older worker learns the older agent’s ability based on her performance but has
imperfect information about the younger agent’s productivity. Since the abilities of the two workers
in each social group are correlated, the employer uses its knowledge of the older agent’s perfor-
mance to infer the younger agent’s productivity when setting wages. Consequently, a younger
worker’s wage incorporates information about an older worker’s ability but not vice versa. The
empirical question that arises is whether a younger sibling’s wage is more closely tied than an
51Moreover, appendix A.15 conducts a family fixed-effects analysis of the influence of birth order on job search
behavior. The within-family estimates also indicate that birth order has a significant positive impact on the use of a
sibling in job search.
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older sibling’s wage to the ability of another sibling.52 That is, does the basic informational mech-
anism in Montgomery (1991) also apply to the wages of siblings? In the next section, I examine
this question.
1.6.2 Sibling AFQT Impacts
This section presents the main estimates of sibling effects. Table 1.3 displays the impacts of
one’s own and a sibling’s AFQT scores on a person’s log wage. The estimated coefficients on an
older sibling’s AFQT score and schooling in a younger sibling’s log wage are respectively greater
than and less than the estimated coefficients on a younger sibling’s AFQT score and schooling
in an older sibling’s log wage. In addition, an older sibling has a higher estimated coefficient on
one’s own AFQT score and a lower estimated coefficient on one’s own schooling than a younger
sibling. The latter pair of findings is consistent with the empirical results on employer learning
in Altonji and Pierret (2001), who observe a rise in the coefficient on AFQT scores and a fall
in the coefficient on schooling as workers gain labor market experience. In some specifications,
the estimated coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage is
negative. This finding does not necessarily suggest that a sibling’s performance has a negative
causal effect on a person’s log wage, even though such a phenomenon is theoretically possible
in a more general model where the measurement errors in the performance signals are correlated
among siblings. Instead, as explained in section 1.2.2, a negative coefficient on a sibling’s test
score can be attributed to a positive correlation between the error terms in siblings’ test scores.
I next differentiate between the two learning models in section 1.2 based on the predictions
in propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4. Using the estimates in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3,
I perform a Wald test of the nonlinear hypothesis that the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s
AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score is the same in both a younger and an older sibling’s
log wage. This restriction is rejected at the one percent level for both specifications. In particular,
the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in
a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly greater than the ratio of the coefficient on a younger
52A potential concern with the empirical results here is that the percentages of individuals obtaining a job through a
sibling or also working at the same firm as a sibling might be too small to produce the substantial estimates of sibling
effects seen in section 1.6.2. To address this issue, appendix A.13 presents a simple model of employee referrals that
can generate sibling effects even if siblings work for different firms in equilibrium.
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Table 1.3: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling in Labor Market on Log
Wage
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0409 0.0261 0.0304 0.0243 0.0270 0.0222
(0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0099) (0.0118) (0.0111)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0188 0.0027 0.0059 -0.0022 -0.0142 -0.0184
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1704 0.1507 0.0997 0.0939 0.1001 0.0942
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.2259 0.2031 0.1600 0.1495 0.1650 0.1550
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0123)
Own Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0524 0.0498 0.0516 0.0493
—— —— (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0043)
Own Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0468 0.0435 0.0410 0.0390
—— —— (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0046)
Older Sibling’s Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0025 0.0017
—— —— —— —— (0.0039) (0.0039)
Younger Sibling’s Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0161 0.0143
—— —— —— —— (0.0042) (0.0041)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0083 0.0092
R2 0.3278 0.3425 0.3580 0.3670 0.3595 0.3681
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4726 4726 4726 4726 4726 4726
Sibling Pairs 7074 7074 7074 7074 7074 7074
Observations 54474 54474 54474 54474 54474 54474
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The main estimation sample described in the text is used here.
Chapter 1: Social Learning in the Labor Market: An Analysis of Siblings 36
sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage. This finding
provides strong evidence against the individual learning model in proposition 1.2.3 but is consistent
with the social learning model in proposition 1.2.4. An older sibling’s ability seems to have a larger
influence on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa.
Table 1.4 illustrates how the main estimates vary depending on whether the members of each
sibling pair are working in the same or different occupations or industries.53 If labor market in-
teractions are generating the observed sibling effects, then these findings might be expected to
strengthen among siblings working in the same occupation or industry, because such individuals
would be more likely to have come into contact with each other’s employer. In the upper panel,
the first, second, and third pairs of columns display results for siblings working in the same oc-
cupation, industry, and occupation or industry, respectively. An older sibling’s AFQT score has
a large positive estimated impact on a younger sibling’s log wage, whereas a younger sibling’s
AFQT score has a small negative estimated impact on an older sibling’s log wage. Notably, the
estimated impact of an older sibling’s AFQT score on a younger sibling’s log wage is greater than
the estimated impact of a younger sibling’s own AFQT score. In the lower panel, the first, second,
and third pairs of columns display results for siblings working in different occupations, industries,
and occupations and industries, respectively. For both younger and older siblings, the estimated
impact of a sibling’s AFQT score on a person’s log wage is smaller than the estimated impact of
one’s own AFQT score. In every specification, the restriction arising under individual learning can
be rejected at least at the five percent level of significance with the deviation from the null hypoth-
esis being consistent with social learning.54 Nonetheless, the asymmetries between the impacts of
older and younger siblings’ AFQT scores on a person’s log wage appear to be more pronounced
when siblings work in the same as opposed to different fields.
53The 2000 Census 3-digit codes for the occupation and industry of each job are used to construct the samples for
this exercise. Between the 1979 and 2000 rounds of the NLSY79, the occupation and industry of every job were
entered as 1970 Census 3-digit codes. Using the crosswalks available from the U.S. Census Bureau, these fields were
sequentially mapped into 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census 3-digit codes based on the occupation or industry with the
most workers in a given Census year for each occupation or industry in the previous Census year.
54Because of the narrow definition of occupations and industries used here, siblings may be employed at the same
firm even if they work in different fields, and individuals may have some contact with firms outside of their exact field.
Moreover, siblings currently working in different occupations and industries may have previously worked in the same
occupation or industry. Therefore, some evidence of social effects might be expected even if siblings work in different
fields.
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Table 1.4: Impact on Log Wage of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling Working
in Same or Different Occupation or Industry
Same Occupation Same Industry Either or Both
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0919 0.0862 0.0972 0.0901 0.0992 0.0915
(0.0356) (0.0335) (0.0257) (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0230)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling -0.0242 -0.0184 -0.0304 -0.0094 -0.0250 -0.0124
(0.0332) (0.0317) (0.0269) (0.0258) (0.0247) (0.0233)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0548 0.0461 0.0640 0.0740 0.0529 0.0539
(0.0334) (0.0345) (0.0281) (0.0270) (0.0253) (0.0254)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.2127 0.1953 0.1514 0.1227 0.1731 0.1491
(0.0271) (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0270) (0.0234) (0.0234)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.0230 0.0265 0.0098 0.0348 0.0029 0.0066
R2 0.4419 0.4810 0.4146 0.4554 0.4108 0.4428
Families 486 486 587 587 746 746
Individuals 1060 1060 1290 1290 1674 1674
Sibling Pairs 1202 1202 1476 1476 1968 1968
Observations 2424 2424 4040 4040 5364 5364
Different Occupation Different Industry Both
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0257 0.0214 0.0231 0.0193 0.0213 0.0175
(0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0120) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0112)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling -0.0119 -0.0157 -0.0083 -0.0131 -0.0090 -0.0138
(0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0113)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1027 0.0973 0.1053 0.0989 0.1068 0.1006
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0116)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1646 0.1556 0.1681 0.1593 0.1667 0.1581
(0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0128)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.0147 0.0167 0.0384 0.0351 0.0447 0.0433
R2 0.3573 0.3656 0.3597 0.3680 0.3584 0.3666
Families 1964 1964 1952 1952 1946 1946
Individuals 4652 4652 4623 4623 4609 4609
Sibling Pairs 6924 6924 6856 6856 6830 6830
Observations 47878 47878 46262 46262 44938 44938
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. In the upper panel, the subsample in the first (second) pair of columns is composed of those observations from the main estimation
sample in which both siblings work in the same 2000 Census 3-digit occupation (industry), and the subsample in the third pair of columns includes
any observation belonging to either or both of the samples in the first and second pairs of columns. In the lower panel, the subsample in the first
(second) pair of columns is composed of those observations from the main estimation sample in which both siblings work in different 2000 Census
3-digit occupations (industries), and the subsample in the third pair of columns includes any observation belonging to both the samples in the first
and second pairs of columns. Between the 1979 and 2000 rounds of the NLSY79, the occupation and industry of each job were originally recorded
as 1970 Census 3-digit codes. To construct the datasets used here, these fields are converted to 2000 Census 3-digit codes based on the crosswalks
available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Although social learning is a plausible explanation for the empirical results, there are other
models that could give rise to similar patterns in the data. One possibility is that the results do
reflect labor market interactions between siblings but that an informational mechanism such as
employer learning is not involved. In particular, some of the existing literature on nepotism is
based on a human capital framework in which individuals earn returns to familial connections. For
example, Lam and Schoeni (1993) attempt to test for nepotism by comparing the coefficients on
a father’s and a father-in-law’s schooling in a log wage equation. In the current setting, one can
perform an analogous test using the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s schooling in
the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3.55 If nepotistic returns to a sibling’s human capital were
driving the empirical results, then one might expect an older sibling’s schooling to have a higher
coefficient than a younger sibling’s schooling in an individual’s log wage equation. However, I
obtain the opposite result. The coefficient on a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s
log wage is greater than the coefficient on an older sibling’s schooling in a younger sibling’s log
wage.56 Thus, nepotistic connections associated with a sibling’s human capital do not appear to
explain the empirical results.
Another potential factor might be taste-based nepotism, which is discussed in Becker’s (1971)
study of discrimination. Specifically, employers may exhibit favoritism towards the younger sib-
ling of an older employee, or an older individual may wish to use her influence within a firm to
assist a younger sibling. However, such behavior does not seem to provide a satisfactory explana-
tion for the empirical results in Table 1.3. First, it is unclear whether preferential treatment given
to the older sibling of a younger worker would be associated with human capital measures such
as AFQT scores and education. Second, even if such preferences were connected to human cap-
ital, there is little reason to believe that they would be positively related to a difficult-to-observe
variable like the AFQT score but negatively related to an easy-to-observe variable like schooling,
unless some sort of informational mechanism is involved. By contrast, the social learning model in
section 1.2.4 is capable of generating both a higher coefficient on an older compared to a younger
sibling’s AFQT score and a lower coefficient on an older compared to a younger sibling’s school-
55Similar results are obtained if the proposed test is instead performed using the subsamples in Table 1.4.
56The two-sided p-values for this test are respectively 0.0171 and 0.0210 for the specifications in the fifth and sixth
columns of Table 1.3.
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ing, although there also exist some parameter values for which it does not predict both of these
outcomes.
In addition, several mechanisms other than labor market interactions could play a role in pro-
ducing the asymmetries observed in Table 1.3. First, there might be human capital transfers be-
tween siblings, especially while siblings are living together in the parental home. For example,
Zajonc (1976) notes that older children might serve as teachers for younger children within a
household. Therefore, an individual’s human capital may be more closely linked to the skills of
an older compared to a younger sibling. Second, even if siblings do not directly transfer human
capital to each other, other factors might give rise to asymmetries in the relationship of an individ-
ual’s skills to the abilities of a younger and an older sibling. For example, Cunha and Heckman
(2007) observe that the critical period for the development of one’s cognitive skills occurs early
in life, particularly during the first ten years of childhood. Because an older sibling would tend to
be present for a greater portion of this critical period than a younger sibling, an older sibling may
have a greater influence than a younger sibling on the formation of one’s skills. Third, an older
sibling might serve as a role model for a younger sibling. That is, the actions of an older sibling
may provide signals of appropriate behavior for a younger sibling to follow. For example, Butcher
and Case (1994) find that women raised only with brothers in their family have greater educational
attainment than women with at least one sister in their family, perhaps because education is a mas-
culine trait and women with brothers imitate such traits. In the current setting, if human capital
investment is a characteristic of able individuals and older siblings are stronger role models than
younger siblings, then a more able older sibling may be expected to have a greater positive effect
on a person’s skill acquisition than a more able younger sibling.
All three factors mentioned above—human capital transfers, asymmetries in skill formation,
and role model effects—might contribute to the findings in Table 1.3, which indicate that an
older sibling’s AFQT score has a greater impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa.
Nonetheless, these mechanisms are unrelated to wage setting in particular and would likely affect
other human capital measures. Specifically, if interactions among siblings prior to labor market
entry were driving the empirical results, then one would expect test scores or schooling to exhibit
the same asymmetric relationships as the log wage. In order to test for such an effect, I assemble
a dataset consisting of one observation on each sibling pair in the main estimation sample and
regress one sibling’s AFQT score and schooling on the AFQT score of the other sibling in the pair.
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The coefficient on the other sibling’s AFQT score is estimated separately depending on whether
the sibling whose AFQT score and schooling are used as dependent variables is the older or the
younger sibling in the pair. Table 1.5 displays the impact of an individual’s AFQT score on the
AFQT score and schooling of a younger or an older sibling. Although there is some evidence of
differences in the impact of a younger compared to an older sibling’s AFQT score, the asymme-
tries observed in Table 1.5 all have the opposite direction from those in Table 1.3. In particular,
the estimates in Table 1.5 indicate that, if anything, a younger sibling’s AFQT score has a larger
impact on an older sibling’s AFQT score and schooling than vice versa. Therefore, in the absence
of labor market interactions among siblings, it is difficult to explain why an older compared to a
younger sibling’s AFQT score has a greater impact on a person’s log wage.57
Nonetheless, there are two issues concerning the interpretation of the results in the first two
columns of Table 1.5. First, when regressing a younger sibling’s AFQT score on an older sib-
ling’s AFQT score and vice versa, one is essentially performing reverse regressions. Unless the
variance of an older sibling’s AFQT score differs from the variance of a younger sibling’s AFQT
score, the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score in the regression of a younger on an older
sibling’s AFQT score must be the same as the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score in
the regression of an older on a younger sibling’s AFQT score. Thus, the estimates in the first two
columns simply suggest that the conditional variance of an older sibling’s AFQT score may be
slightly greater than the conditional variance of a younger sibling’s AFQT score given the other
control variables included in the regressions. Therefore, these specific results are largely uninfor-
mative about potential social effects among siblings.58 Second, a possible reason for the observed
difference in the conditional variance of AFQT scores between younger and older siblings might
be that the variance of testing error is greater for older than for younger siblings.59 For example,
57Nevertheless, one might argue that human capital transfers and role model effects become relevant after labor
market entry, even though they do not seem to affect pre-labor market measures of skills. One piece of evidence
against this possibility is that the estimated coefficient on an older sibling’s schooling in a younger sibling’s log wage
is less than vice versa. Moreover, I provide further evidence against such factors in section 1.6.5, which conducts a
series of falsification exercises.
58To address this first issue, appendix A.16 presents results in which the AFQT score of a middle sibling is regressed
on the AFQT scores of both her youngest and her oldest sibling. In such a regression, the coefficient on the AFQT
score of the youngest sibling can differ from the coefficient on the AFQT score of the oldest sibling, even if the
variances of the youngest and the oldest sibling’s AFQT scores are the same.
59In the model from section 1.2.1, testing error is represented by ωi in equation (1.5).
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Table 1.5: Relationship of Own AFQT and Schooling to AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling
AFQT Schooling
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.5279 0.4120 1.0469 0.6251 0.3117 0.1334
(0.0197) (0.0203) (0.0544) (0.0552) (0.0416) (0.0434)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.5640 0.4390 1.1714 0.7370 0.3859 0.2132
(0.0185) (0.0203) (0.0505) (0.0533) (0.0385) (0.0410)
Own AFQT 1.3927 1.1932
—— —— —— —— (0.0395) (0.0420)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.0176 0.0633 0.0093 0.0147 0.0726 0.0548
R2 0.4821 0.5288 0.2313 0.3361 0.4116 0.4565
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4726 4726 4726 4726 4726 4726
Sibling Pairs 7074 7074 7074 7074 7074 7074
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable and fixed
effects for each of the two siblings’ years of birth. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. All specifications include an indicator for whether the respondent
is the older or the younger sibling in a given pair. The dataset contains the first observation on every sibling pair appearing in the main estimation
sample.
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a larger portion of the variation in the test scores of older individuals may be attributable to fac-
tors like educational systems or cultural influences that are not fully captured by basic background
variables. Such dissimilarities in the composition of test scores could contribute to asymmetries
between younger and older siblings in the impact of their AFQT scores on each other’s log wage.60
In addition, when regressing a younger sibling’s schooling on an older sibling’s AFQT score
and vice versa, the estimates in the third and fourth columns, which do not control for one’s own
AFQT score, may be preferable to those in the fifth and sixth columns, in which one’s own AFQT
score is included as a regressor. Specifically, because an individual’s AFQT score may to some
extent be an endogenous function of one’s own schooling, it may be difficult to interpret estimates
in which an individual’s own AFQT score is used as a regressor while one’s own schooling is the
dependent variable in the regression.61 In any case, none of the estimates suggest that an older
sibling’s AFQT score has a greater impact on a younger sibling’s schooling than vice versa. On
the contrary, there is significant evidence of the opposite relationship in some specifications.
As a further test for sibling effects on non-wage outcomes, Table 1.6 reports the impacts of
one’s own and a sibling’s AFQT scores on the probabilities of marriage, children, disability, and
incarceration. For the analysis here, the dataset is constructed by expanding the main estimation
sample to contain observations in which one or both siblings may not have valid wage data on
a full-time job and by limiting the resulting sample to observations in which both siblings have
information on the relevant non-wage outcomes.62 The dependent variables are indicators for
being legally married, having ever had a child, having a work disability, and currently residing in
jail. The explanatory variables include one’s own and a sibling’s AFQT scores and schooling as
60To address this second issue, appendix A.18 analyzes the log wages of younger and older siblings upon reaching
the same age level. As explained there, if the variance of testing error is greater for older than for younger siblings,
then the resulting asymmetries between siblings in the impacts of AFQT scores on log wages would tend to have the
opposite direction from those observed in the data.
61This issue is examined further in appendix A.20, which documents the relationship of one’s AFQT score and
schooling to one’s own and a sibling’s heights. Using height as a measure of cognitive ability that is unlikely to be
affected by educational investments, there is no evidence that a younger sibling’s AFQT score or schooling is more
strongly related to an older sibling’s height than vice versa.
62Including respondents without wage data in this exercise is desirable because many of the non-wage outcomes be-
ing analyzed are closely related to the likelihood of being employed. For example, incarcerated or disabled individuals
are comparatively unlikely to be working.
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in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3.63 For the most part, the estimated impacts of an older
and a younger sibling’s AFQT scores are small in size and similar to each other.64 To assess the
statistical significance of the findings, I apply the test from the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3
to the specifications here. Testing whether the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT
score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s outcome equation is equal to the
ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an
older sibling’s outcome equation, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any set of coefficients
as the p-values are considerably above the conventional thresholds for significance. Based on the
results in Table 1.6, I do not find substantial evidence of sibling effects on non-wage outcomes.
1.6.3 Robustness Checks
The supplemental appendices report a number of robustness checks on the main estimation
results. Because the evidence for sibling effects may be strongest when the age difference between
siblings is greatest, appendix A.16 estimates the impacts of the AFQT scores of one’s youngest and
oldest siblings in the labor market on one’s log wage, AFQT score, and schooling. Appendix A.17
documents the relationship between log wages and AFQT scores after modifying the empirical
specification to allow for social interactions among more than two siblings in a family. In order
to tighten the comparison between the log wages of younger and older siblings, appendix A.18
analyzes the log wages of younger and older siblings upon reaching the same age level. Appendix
A.19 seeks to account more adequately for the causal effect of schooling on AFQT scores and
presents results that control for schooling at AFQT administration. In addition, the analysis there
examines the determinants of sibling correlations in human capital measures. Overall, I continue to
find significant evidence of sibling effects on log wages after performing each of these robustness
checks.
63In particular, the regressors in the upper and lower panels of Table 1.6 are respectively the same as those in the
fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3.
64Nevertheless, some differences between the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s AFQT scores might
be expected, because these variables are seen to have asymmetric impacts on the log wage, and labor income may
affect the decision to get married, raise children, seek medical care, or commit a crime.
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Table 1.6: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling on Non-Wage Outcomes
Married Has Kids Disabled In Jail
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0046 -0.0186 0.0004 -0.0031
(0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0038) (0.0014)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0043 -0.0172 0.0040 -0.0013
(0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0045) (0.0013)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0364 -0.0069 -0.0181 -0.0044
(0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0043) (0.0016)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0656 0.0016 -0.0308 -0.0043
(0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0052) (0.0016)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No No No No
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.8387 0.5831 0.6579 0.4433
R2 0.1352 0.2416 0.0298 0.0242
Families 2169 2169 2169 2169
Individuals 5168 5168 5168 5168
Sibling Pairs 7988 7988 7988 7988
Observations 119708 119708 119708 119708
Married Has Kids Disabled In Jail
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0074 -0.0168 -0.0005 -0.0033
(0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0038) (0.0014)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0095 -0.0166 0.0041 -0.0017
(0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0044) (0.0013)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0404 -0.0049 -0.0186 -0.0047
(0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0042) (0.0016)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0662 0.0046 -0.0301 -0.0044
(0.0108) (0.0115) (0.0052) (0.0015)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.8919 0.5113 0.4849 0.5541
R2 0.1477 0.2507 0.0371 0.0317
Families 2169 2169 2169 2169
Individuals 5168 5168 5168 5168
Sibling Pairs 7988 7988 7988 7988
Observations 119708 119708 119708 119708
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s outcome is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The dataset used here is constructed as follows. First, the main estimation sample is expanded to include observations on sibling
pairs in which one or both members may not have valid wage data on a full-time job. Second, the resulting sample is restricted to observations
on sibling pairs in which both members have non-missing data on marital status, presence of children, health restrictions, and residence type. In
the third column, respondents are classified as disabled if they have a health condition that prevents them from working or that limits the kind or
amount of work that they can do. In the fourth column, respondents are classified as being in jail if they are residing in a correctional institution
when interviewed.
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1.6.4 Additional Predictions
This section tests some further implications of the individual and social learning models. In
appendix A.6, I characterize the coefficients obtained from the regression of one’s log wage on
one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. Under social learning, one’s own and a sibling’s schooling
are both easy-to-observe variables. Hence, the coefficients on one’s own and an older sibling’s
schooling in a younger sibling’s log wage should be the same as the corresponding coefficients on
one’s own and a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage.65 Under individual
learning, one’s own schooling is an easy-to-observe variable, but a sibling’s schooling is a hard-to-
observe variable. Thus, the coefficients on one’s own and an older sibling’s schooling in a younger
sibling’s log wage can differ from the corresponding coefficients on one’s own and a younger
sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage. The directions of the predicted differences
between these coefficients will depend on the relative values of the sibling correlations in ability
and in schooling. For example, if ability is more highly correlated among siblings than schooling,
then an older sibling should have a lower coefficient on one’s own schooling than a younger sibling,
and the coefficient on a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage should be higher
than vice versa.66
Table 1.7 displays the estimates from regressing one’s log wage on one’s own and a sibling’s
schooling. In the first two columns, one’s own schooling, but not a sibling’s, is included as a
regressor. Because one’s own schooling is an easy-to-observe variable both under individual and
under social learning, the coefficient on one’s own schooling should be the same in a younger and
an older sibling’s log wage. Consistent with both learning models, the hypothesis that the coef-
ficient on one’s own schooling is the same for a younger and an older sibling cannot be rejected
at conventional levels.67 In the second two columns, a sibling’s schooling is added to the regres-
sions. Consistent with social learning, one can reject neither the hypothesis that the coefficient on
65This result is a counterpart to the first prediction of the employer learning model in Farber and Gibbons (1996),
who show that the coefficient on schooling in a wage regression should not change with labor market experience,
provided that the other regressors are also easily observable to employers.
66These results are analogous to the implications of the statistical discrimination model in Altonji and Pierret (2001),
who show that the coefficients on test scores and schooling in a log wage regression should respectively increase and
decrease with labor market experience, especially if these variables are the only two regressors.
67The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.1794 in the first column and 0.4992 in the second column.
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one’s own schooling is the same in a younger as in an older sibling’s log wage nor the hypothesis
that the coefficient on an older sibling’s schooling in a younger sibling’s log wage is the same as
vice versa.68 In addition, as explained in section 1.2.2, the significantly positive coefficient on a
sibling’s schooling indicates that the sibling correlation in ability is greater than that in schooling,
especially assuming that schooling is not measured with substantial error or that the measurement
error in schooling is highly correlated between siblings.69
Another difference between the implications of the individual and the social learning model
concerns the variance of the change in log wage residuals between successive age levels.70 In
appendix A.7, I characterize the change between two age levels in the residual from the regression
of one’s log wage on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. Under individual learning, the variance
of the change in log wage residuals between two given ages should be the same for both a younger
and an older sibling, given that individuals of varying parities are treated symmetrically in the
model. Under social learning, this quantity should be smaller for a younger than for an older
sibling, and the absolute difference in this quantity between a younger and an older sibling should
be increasing in the size of the age gap between them. Intuitively, a younger sibling at a given age
has more signals of an older sibling’s performance than an older sibling at that age has of a younger
sibling’s performance; so that, the market forms more precise beliefs about the productivity of a
younger sibling at a given age than an older sibling at that age. Hence, additional signals about
one’s own or a sibling’s performance should have less of an impact on the market’s beliefs about
a younger than an older sibling’s productivity. Because the wage is assumed to be equal to the
conditional expectation of productivity given the market’s information, the variance of the change
in log wage residuals should be smaller for a younger than for an older sibling, and this effect
should be larger in size when the age gap between the two siblings is wider.
68The respective two-sided p-values in the third and fourth columns are 0.5208 and 0.6950 for the test of equality
between the coefficients on one’s own schooling and 0.4089 and 0.5171 for the test of equality between the coefficients
on a sibling’s schooling.
69In appendix A.22, I attempt to account for the effect of measurement error in the schooling variable by using a
variant of the instrumental-variables procedure in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Bronars and Oettinger (2006).
The results there suggest that the positive coefficient observed on a sibling’s schooling in the regression of one’s log
wage or test score on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling is unlikely to be merely an artifact of measurement error.
70Kahn (2009) develops a methodology for detecting asymmetric information between employers based on the
variance of log wage change residuals.
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Table 1.7: Impact of Own Schooling and Schooling of Younger or Older Sibling in Labor Market
on Log Wage
Own Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0769 0.0671 0.0701 0.0637
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Own Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0829 0.0705 0.0741 0.0660
(0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Older Sibling’s Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0141 0.0095
—— —— (0.0037) (0.0036)
Younger Sibling’s Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0190 0.0130
—— —— (0.0041) (0.0039)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
test for equality between coefficients
on own schooling (p-value) 0.1794 0.4992 0.5208 0.6950
test for equality between coefficients
on sibling’s schooling (p-value) —— —— 0.4089 0.5171
R2 0.3227 0.3403 0.3266 0.3419
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4726 4726 4726 4726
Sibling Pairs 7074 7074 7074 7074
Observations 54474 54474 54474 54474
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The main estimation sample described in the text is used here.
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In order to test for differences between younger and older siblings in the variance of the change
in log wage residuals between successive age levels, I construct a sample of sibling pairs in which
each wage observation on an older sibling at a given age is matched with a wage observation on
her younger sibling at that age. Specifically, I identify, for a given age level, those individuals in
the NLSY79 who, when interviewed at that age, have left school for the first time, have a wage
observation on a full-time job, and have a non-twin sibling also satisfying the preceding two criteria
at that age. If a pair of siblings meets these conditions at no less than two different age levels, then
the sample includes one observation on the sibling pair for every age at which these conditions are
met.71 In short, the resulting dataset is similar to the main estimation sample, except that wage
observations on older and younger siblings are matched at a given age level instead of in a given
survey year. The variance of the change in log wage residuals is estimated as follows. First, I
calculate the residuals from regressing the log wage of the first sibling in a pair on the schooling
and background variables of both siblings in the pair.72 Second, I chronologically sort the log wage
observations on every sibling pair, subtract the log wage residual for each observation on a sibling
pair from the log wage residual for the next observation on the sibling pair, and square the result.
Third, I regress the squared change in log wage residuals on a dummy variable equal to one if the
first sibling in a pair is younger than the second sibling in the pair and equal to zero otherwise.
Table 1.8 presents the results from this procedure. Consistent with social learning, the point es-
timate for the mean squared change in log wage residuals between successive age levels is smaller
for younger than for older siblings. However, this effect is not statistically significant when using
the full sample, perhaps because the mean age gap between younger and older siblings is not very
wide. To examine this issue further, I divide the sample into terciles based on the age difference
between the siblings in a pair and compute a distinct set of estimates for each of the three sub-
samples.73 Although one cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean squared change in log wage
71Because the social learning model properly applies to the period after both siblings in a pair have entered the labor
market, I exclude an observation on a pair of siblings at a given age if one sibling has not yet left school for the first
time when the other sibling is surveyed at that age.
72The regressions also control for a third-order bivariate polynomial in the two siblings’ ages as well as the interac-
tion of both siblings’ schooling and background variables with a third-order polynomial in the first sibling’s age. The
former control is needed because the constant term in the regression can vary with one’s own age under individual
learning and with both one’s own and a sibling’s ages under social learning. The latter control is needed because the
coefficients on schooling and background variables can depend on one’s own age under individual learning.
73Note that the social learning model predicts that the absolute difference between a younger and an older sibling
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residuals is the same for younger and older siblings from the first or second tercile, this quantity
is significantly lower for younger than for older siblings from the third tercile.74 Hence, the data
appear to support the prediction of the social learning model for the variance of the change in log
wage residuals, provided that the age gap between younger and older siblings is sufficiently large.
1.6.5 Falsification Exercises
In this section, I conduct three falsification exercises to strengthen the argument that labor
market interactions in general and social learning in particular are responsible for the sibling effects
identified in section 1.6.2. The analysis up to now has focused on the impacts of siblings who are
working at the same time. Nonetheless, a pertinent question is whether siblings who have not
had substantial labor market experience seem to influence a person’s log wage. Specifically, if
the AFQT scores of older and younger siblings with little connection to the labor market have
asymmetric impacts on log wages, then it would call into question the interpretation of the results
in Table 1.3 as representing labor market interactions among siblings. By contrast, a failure to
detect such effects using the AFQT scores of siblings without much work experience would lend
support to a labor market explanation for those results.
I now perform such a comparison. To construct a sample of working individuals who have
a sibling with low work experience, I identify in each year those pairs of interviewed siblings in
the NLSY79 for which one member is employed at a full-time job after initially leaving school
and the other member has never spent a year primarily working.75 The resulting sample of sibling
pairs is divided into two groups depending on whether the member who has never been primarily
working is older or younger than the member who has left school for the first time and is thereafter
employed at a full-time job. Finally, using these two groups of sibling pairs, the log wage of a
younger (resp. an older) sibling in the labor market is regressed on her own AFQT score as well
as that of her inexperienced older (resp. younger) sibling.
in the variance of the change in log wage residuals should be increasing in the size of the age gap between them.
74The two-sided p-values for the test of equality between younger and older siblings from the third tercile are 0.0198
in the upper panel and 0.0206 in the lower panel.
75As in Farber and Gibbons (1996), a respondent is defined as primarily working if she has worked in at least half
the weeks since her last interview for 30 or more hours per week on average during the working weeks.
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Table 1.8: Difference Between Younger and Older Siblings in Mean Squared Change in Log Wage
Residuals Between Successive Age Levels
Entire Terciles of Absolute Difference in Sibling Ages
Sample First Second Third
Second-Stage Regression
Younger Sibling -0.0097 (0.0065) -0.0027 (0.0108) -0.0041 (0.0096) -0.0268 (0.0115)
Constant 0.1250 (0.0072) 0.1179 (0.0111) 0.1258 (0.0110) 0.1351 (0.0120)
R2 0.0009 0.0013 0.0009 0.0022
First-Stage Regression
Basic Demographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No No No No
R2 0.3129 0.3256 0.3155 0.3108
Entire Terciles of Absolute Difference in Sibling Ages
Sample First Second Third
Second-Stage Regression
Younger Sibling -0.0095 (0.0065) -0.0030 (0.0109) -0.0032 (0.0094) -0.0264 (0.0114)
Constant 0.1247 (0.0072) 0.1178 (0.0111) 0.1248 (0.0109) 0.1341 (0.0118)
R2 0.0009 0.0013 0.0009 0.0021
First-Stage Regression
Basic Demographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.3315 0.3565 0.3501 0.3367
Own Mean Age Across
All Log Wage Observations 29.69 28.79 30.20 30.15
Mean Change in Age Between
Consecutive Log Wage Observations 2.260 2.283 2.231 2.263
Mean Absolute Difference
Between Own and Sibling Age 2.459 1.271 2.182 4.033
Families 1677 832 739 725
Individuals 3967 1878 1636 1688
Sibling Pairs 5754 2082 1730 1942
Observations 35780 12674 11524 11582
Note: The estimates above are based on a sample of log wage observations on younger and older siblings at the same ages. For a given age level, the
dataset comprises those individuals in the NLSY79 who, when interviewed at that age, have left school for the first time, have non-missing data on
their AFQT score and schooling, have a valid wage observation on a full-time job, have non-missing sibling data including birth order and sibship
size, and have a non-twin sibling also satisfying these criteria. If a pair of siblings meets these conditions at no less than two different age levels,
then the sample includes one observation on the sibling pair for every age at which these conditions are met. Otherwise, the sibling pair is dropped
from the analysis. An observation on a pair of siblings at a given age level is excluded if one sibling has not yet left school for the first time when
the other sibling is interviewed at that age. In the upper panel, the log wage residuals are obtained from a first-stage regression of the log wage for
the first member of a sibling pair on the following variables: the highest grade completed by each sibling in the pair; dummies for the race, gender,
region of residence, and urban location of each sibling; indicators for missing data; interactions of the aforementioned variables with a third-order
polynomial in the age of the first sibling; and a third-order bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings. In the lower panel, the first-stage
regression used to obtain the log wage residuals also controls for the following: sibship size, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age,
father’s age, each of the two siblings’ birth orders, and interactions of these variables with a third-order polynomial in the first sibling’s age. The
squared change in log wage residuals is calculated by chronologically sorting the log wage observations on every sibling pair, subtracting the log
wage residual for each observation on a sibling pair from the log wage residual for the next observation on the sibling pair, and squaring the result.
In the second-stage regressions, the squared change in log wage residuals is regressed on a dummy variable equal to one if the first member of
a sibling pair is younger than the second member and equal to zero otherwise. A quartic time trend with base year 1993 is also included in the
first- and second-stage regressions. The standard errors in parentheses are computed using the nonparametric bootstrap with 10,000 replications.
Each bootstrap sample is formed by sampling families with replacement from the original dataset, and the two-stage procedure described here is
performed on the observations in each sample. In the second through fourth columns, the dataset is divided into terciles depending on the age
difference between the siblings in a pair, and a separate set of estimates is computed for each of the three subsamples.
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Table 1.9 presents the results from these regressions. In all six specifications, the coefficient
on an older sibling’s AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is insignificantly lower than the
coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage. After controlling
for one’s own and a sibling’s schooling, the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s AFQT
scores are both negative, although not significantly so. Moreover, in no specification does one
find a significant difference between the coefficients on one’s own AFQT score in the log wages
of older and younger siblings.76 Using the estimates in the fifth and sixth columns to test the
restriction implied by the individual learning model in proposition 1.2.3, one cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own
AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is equal to the ratio of the coefficient on a younger
sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage.77 In fact,
the former ratio is insignificantly less than the latter ratio, which is contrary to the predictions of
the social learning model in proposition 1.2.4. Therefore, as would be expected if the asymmetric
impacts of a younger and an older sibling’s AFQT scores in Table 1.3 were generated by labor
market interactions, I find no evidence of such differences in Table 1.9 when using the AFQT
scores of younger and older siblings without substantial labor market experience.
Nonetheless, one concern with this conclusion is that the two groups of siblings being analyzed
in Table 1.9 may be dissimilar to each other. For example, if the sibling correlation in ability is
sufficiently lower in families with an inexperienced older sibling than in those with an inexpe-
rienced younger sibling, then such a difference could conceal an underlying positive effect that
older relative to younger siblings outside the labor force may be having on a person’s log wage.
However, one can address this issue to some extent by using AFQT scores as a measure of ability
and comparing the sibling correlations in AFQT scores. Specifically, using a dataset containing
one observation on every sibling pair included in the sample from Table 1.9, I regress the AFQT
score of any individual who is working full-time after having left school on the AFQT score of her
sibling who has never been classified as primarily working. The coefficients on a sibling’s AFQT
score are estimated separately depending on whether the inexperienced sibling is older or younger
76The estimated coefficients in a younger sibling’s log wage are somewhat more imprecise than those in an older
sibling’s log wage, because the sample of older siblings with an inexperienced younger sibling is larger than the sample
of younger siblings with an inexperienced older sibling.
77The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.6771 in the fifth column and 0.8837 in the sixth column.
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Table 1.9: Impact on Log Wage of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling Not Yet
Primarily Working
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0173 0.0068 0.0056 0.0048 -0.0184 -0.0105
(0.0253) (0.0238) (0.0245) (0.0234) (0.0322) (0.0280)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0232 0.0129 0.0141 0.0091 -0.0048 -0.0070
(0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0131)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1572 0.1346 0.1070 0.0925 0.1084 0.0938
(0.0271) (0.0253) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0269) (0.0249)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1439 0.1297 0.1071 0.0996 0.1115 0.1046
(0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0152)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.6771 0.8837
R2 0.2573 0.2805 0.2708 0.2915 0.2752 0.2951
Families 1528 1528 1528 1528 1528 1528
Individuals 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175 2175
Sibling Pairs 2670 2670 2670 2670 2670 2670
Observations 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596 9596
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-
order bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship
size, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control
variables, except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent
variable for a given pair. For a given survey year, the sample used here consists of those individuals in the NLSY79 who have left school for the
first time, have non-missing data on their AFQT score and schooling, have a valid wage observation on a full-time job, have non-missing sibling
data including birth order and sibship size, and have a non-twin sibling who has not yet spent a year primarily working. An interviewed sibling
is classified as primarily working if she has worked in at least half the weeks since the last interview for an average of at least 30 hours per week
during the working weeks. In every survey year, any respondent satisfying the criteria listed above is paired with each of her siblings who has not
yet spent a year primarily working, and the resulting sample of sibling pairs is divided into two groups based on whether the respondent is older
or younger than the sibling who has not yet been primarily working. The analysis excludes any siblings whose first year spent primarily working
cannot be accurately determined because they have a positive number of weeks unaccounted for in the work history data.
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than the individual whose AFQT score is used as a dependent variable. Testing for differences
between the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s AFQT scores, there is insufficient ev-
idence to reject the null hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal.78 Therefore, there is little
indication that differences across families in the correlation among siblings’ abilities are disguising
significant asymmetries between the impacts of siblings’ AFQT scores on the log wage in Table
1.9.
I now conduct a second round of falsification exercises, in which the AFQT scores and log
wages of spatially isolated siblings are analyzed. First, I compare younger and older siblings
who were residing in different geographic regions towards the beginning of their careers. If labor
market interactions among siblings are generating the disparate impacts of a younger and an older
sibling’s AFQT scores on the log wage in Table 1.3, then such asymmetries should largely be
absent when studying younger and older siblings who have worked in different regional labor
markets since early in their careers, especially assuming that the observed asymmetries are driven
primarily by siblings working for the same employer or that workers and firms in one geographic
region have little contact with individuals residing in another region. Second, I examine pairs
of siblings who start their careers working in the same region but later become geographically
separated. If employers are using their knowledge of one sibling’s performance to infer another
sibling’s productivity when setting wages, then the impact of a sibling’s AFQT score on a person’s
log wage might decrease relative to the impact of one’s own AFQT score when either of two
siblings initially residing in the same geographic region moves to a different region.
In order to perform the first of these two exercises, it is important to identify a sample of
siblings who are living apart from close to the outset of their careers. Otherwise, if a pair of
siblings becomes separated only later in life, then it may be possible for some information on
one sibling’s performance to get incorporated into the other sibling’s wage if the two siblings are
initially working together and for such information to be transmitted between employers when
either sibling changes jobs if the wage is publicly observable. Therefore, I assemble a dataset
composed only of observations on those pairs of siblings who reside in different geographic regions
78The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.7387 when the specification controls only for basic demographic at-
tributes as in the odd-numbered columns of Table 1.9 and 0.5450 when the specification also contains relevant family
background variables as in the even-numbered columns of Table 1.9.
Chapter 1: Social Learning in the Labor Market: An Analysis of Siblings 54
from each other during the first survey year when living in one’s own dwelling unit.79 Using this
subset of the main estimation sample, I replicate the analysis in Table 1.3, regressing a younger
sibling’s log wage on an older sibling’s AFQT score and vice versa.
The results from these regressions are reported in Table 1.10. Out of six specifications, there
are three cases in which the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score is insignificantly greater
than that on a younger sibling’s AFQT score and three cases in which the coefficient on a younger
sibling’s AFQT score is insignificantly greater than that on an older sibling’s AFQT score. Using
the estimates in the last two columns to test the restriction imposed by the individual learning
model in proposition 1.2.3, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the ratio of the coefficient on
an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in the log wage of a younger
sibling is equal to the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s
own AFQT score in the log wage of an older sibling.80 Moreover, counter to the implications of
the social learning model in proposition 1.2.4, the former ratio is insignificantly smaller than the
latter ratio. Overall, I am unable to find significant evidence of differences between the impacts
of the AFQT scores of younger and older siblings who were residing in different regions during
the early stages of their careers. This is another result consistent with the interpretation of the
relevant asymmetries in Table 1.3 as representing labor market interactions between younger and
older siblings.
It appears to be possible to take the analysis of spatially isolated siblings at least one step
further. This final exercise studies how the coefficient on a single sibling’s AFQT score changes
over time when two siblings initially living in the same region become geographically separated.
To motivate the empirical findings, appendix A.12 presents some basic comparative statics results
describing how the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores are predicted to change in
a log wage regression when an individual gains additional signals about her own or her sibling’s
performance. In particular, consider the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to that
on one’s own test score in the regression of an individual’s log wage on both her own and her
sibling’s test scores and schooling levels. On the one hand, if learning is individual as in section
79The regions referred to above are the four Census geographic regions of the United States: Northeast, Midwest,
South, and West.
80The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.7785 in the fifth column and 0.6727 in the sixth column.
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Table 1.10: Impact on Log Wage of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling Residing
in Different Geographic Region When First Living on Own
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0079 -0.0144 -0.0141 -0.0254 -0.0371 -0.0503
(0.0364) (0.0291) (0.0379) (0.0301) (0.0418) (0.0335)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0011 -0.0320 -0.0120 -0.0296 -0.0280 -0.0373
(0.0285) (0.0290) (0.0280) (0.0287) (0.0296) (0.0310)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1934 0.1583 0.1346 0.1237 0.1379 0.1298
(0.0372) (0.0351) (0.0391) (0.0349) (0.0388) (0.0347)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.2349 0.1996 0.1468 0.1378 0.1479 0.1384
(0.0351) (0.0298) (0.0380) (0.0339) (0.0381) (0.0338)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.7785 0.6727
R2 0.3119 0.3901 0.3501 0.4120 0.3530 0.4140
Families 271 271 271 271 271 271
Individuals 641 641 641 641 641 641
Sibling Pairs 746 746 746 746 746 746
Observations 5698 5698 5698 5698 5698 5698
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The dataset is constructed from the main estimation sample by identifying each individual’s region of residence in the first survey
year in which she is living in her own dwelling unit. The estimates are based on those pairs of siblings who each reside in a different region of
the United States when first living on one’s own. A sibling pair is excluded from the analysis if either sibling had resided outside the four Census
geographic regions of the United States as of the first survey year when living on one’s own or if either sibling’s first survey year when living on
one’s own could not be accurately determined because of missing data on type of residence.
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1.2.3, then this ratio will remain constant, irrespective of the number of productivity signals that
a person or her sibling has acquired. Hence, when comparing the log wages of two siblings who
are initially living together but who later become spatially separated, this ratio would be expected
to stay the same from before to after separation if employer learning is indeed individual. On the
other hand, if learning is social as in section 1.2.4, then this ratio is typically decreasing in the
number of signals about one’s own performance and increasing in the number of signals about a
sibling’s performance. Thus, there is some reason to believe that this ratio might decrease if either
of two siblings currently living in the same region moves to a different region.
The analysis of the log wages of siblings before and after being separated is conducted as
follows. First, because this exercise does not involve comparing younger and older siblings, I
expand the main estimation sample to include observations on pairs of siblings having the same
year and month of birth.81 Second, I identify those sibling pairs for which there exists a successive
pair of survey years such that the two siblings are living in the same geographic region in the first
year but not in the second year. Third, whenever such a pair of years is located for a particular
sibling pair, the observation on the sibling pair in the first of these years is added to a sample
representing siblings before separation, and the observation on the sibling pair in the second of
these years is added to a sample representing siblings after separation. Finally, the log wages
of the first member of each sibling pair are regressed on her own AFQT score and that of the
second member of the sibling pair. The coefficients are estimated separately based on whether the
dependent variable is the log wage before or after the siblings are residing in different regions.
The results from this procedure are presented in Table 1.11. Even though the estimates are
somewhat imprecise because of the comparatively small sample sizes involved, the basic pattern
of results appears to be consistent with a model of social learning in which a person’s log wage
incorporates information on the performance of a sibling living sufficiently nearby. Between the
last survey year in which two siblings are living in the same region and the first survey year in
which they are living in different regions, the point estimate for the coefficient on a sibling’s AFQT
score falls, and the point estimate for the coefficient on one’s own AFQT score rises. Computing
distinct sets of estimates based on whether the first member of a sibling pair moves to a different
81In addition, since this exercise does not depend on differences in birth order between siblings, the sample used
here also includes sibling pairs in which one or both members may be missing data on their number of older siblings.
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job or stays with the same employer between the two survey years, the decline in the coefficient
on a sibling’s AFQT score appears to be more pronounced for individuals changing their jobs
than for those remaining with their original employer, although the estimates become increasingly
imprecise as one segments the sample. This finding is sensible because the current employer of a
person changing jobs compared to the employer of a person staying at the same job may be less
likely to have come into direct contact with the person’s sibling during the period when the two
siblings were residing in the same region as each other.
In order to assess the statistical significance of the pattern of results in Table 1.11, I test whether
the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score remains
constant before and after the siblings in each pair become separated. For the full sample, the
restriction implied by the individual learning model can be rejected at the five percent level of
significance.82 Specifically, I find that the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s AFQT score to that
on one’s own AFQT score decreases significantly when two siblings residing in the same region
as each other become geographically separated. When the sample is partitioned into two groups
depending on whether or not the first member of a sibling pair changes employers between the two
survey years, there is some suggestion of a decrease in this ratio from before to after separation in
both subsamples, although the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels in either
subsample by itself.
Overall, the empirical results for the full sample in Table 1.11 lend further support to the posi-
tion that employer learning is partly social as opposed to purely individual. Moreover, these results
seem to provide additional evidence against the argument that the main findings in this paper are
driven by human capital transfers or role model effects among siblings in the labor market. In
particular, the latter two mechanisms would have some difficulty explaining why the coefficient on
a sibling’s AFQT score in a log wage regression decreases relative to the coefficient on one’s own
AFQT score when a person becomes separated from her sibling, unless human capital acquired
from a sibling rapidly deteriorates during this period, or lessons learned from a sibling are sud-
denly forgotten at this time. That is, the findings here appear to be easiest to understand within a
framework in which employers have access to information on a sibling working sufficiently nearby.
82The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.0431 in the first column and 0.0351 in the second column.
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Table 1.11: Impact of Own and Sibling’s AFQT on Log Wage Immediately Before and After
Siblings Reside in Different Geographic Regions
Entire Sample Job Change No Job Change
Sibling’s AFQT×Before Separated 0.0285 0.0258 0.0245 0.0400 0.0213 0.0203
(0.0284) (0.0281) (0.0486) (0.0490) (0.0325) (0.0355)
Sibling’s AFQT×After Separated -0.0197 -0.0320 -0.0570 -0.0463 0.0032 0.0141
(0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0516) (0.0473) (0.0314) (0.0331)
Own AFQT×Before Separated 0.0929 0.0930 0.0792 0.0800 0.0976 0.0951
(0.0257) (0.0247) (0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0373) (0.0359)
Own AFQT×After Separated 0.1223 0.1060 0.1059 0.0629 0.1171 0.1116
(0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0471) (0.0481) (0.0331) (0.0329)
Own Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.0431 0.0351 0.1468 0.1888 0.3937 0.7159
Families 263 263 203 203 220 220
Individuals 598 598 279 279 344 344
Sibling Pairs 692 692 329 329 380 380
Observations 1480 1480 680 680 800 800
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the dependent variable is the log wage observation before or after the siblings
are separated. To construct the dataset used here, the main estimation sample is first expanded to include pairs of siblings born in the same year and
month as well as sibling pairs in which one or both members may be missing data on their number of older siblings. This intermediate sample is
then used to identify those sibling pairs for which there exists a consecutive pair of survey years such that the two siblings are living in the same
Census geographic region of the United States in the first year but not in the second year. If such a pair of years exists for a given sibling pair,
then the observations on the sibling pair for the first and second years are included in the samples of sibling pairs before and after being separated,
respectively. If there is more than one such pair of years for the sibling pair, then all such pairs of years are used in the analysis. The dataset
excludes any sibling pair in which either member is recorded as residing in a region other than one of the four Census geographic regions of the
United States. A sibling pair is included in the job-change sample if there is a change between the two years in the CPS job of the sibling whose
wage is used as the dependent variable for the pair. Otherwise, the sibling pair is added to the no-change sample.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper has constructed and implemented a test for statistical nepotism in the labor market.
Embedding a sibling model into an employer learning framework, I presented a theory of labor
markets with symmetric but imperfect information among employers in which workers belong to
disjoint social groups and workers in the same group have similar attributes. This setup was used
to study wage determination under two alternative assumptions about employers’ formation of
beliefs: individual learning and social learning. Under the former specification, a worker’s wage
incorporates information only about her own schooling and performance, whereas under the latter
specification, a worker’s wage can also include information about the schooling and performance of
her personal contacts. Using data on the AFQT scores of siblings from the NLSY79, I applied this
setup to examine whether a worker’s wage contains a component based on a sibling’s performance.
If learning is social, then the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on
one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage should typically be greater than the ratio
of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older
sibling’s log wage. However, if learning is individual, then these two ratios should be the same.
The empirical results provided strong support for the central prediction of the social learning
model. Moreover, I presented a large body of evidence to substantiate the claim that the findings
are best understood as representing social effects among siblings in employer learning. First, I
documented a robust positive correlation between birth order and the probability of obtaining a job
through a sibling. Second, I found that an individual’s AFQT score shows no evidence of being
more closely related to an older sibling’s AFQT score than to a younger sibling’s AFQT score.
Third, there was also no evidence that an older sibling’s AFQT score has a greater impact on a
younger sibling’s schooling than vice versa. Fourth, although an older sibling’s AFQT score has a
larger impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa, the same regressions indicated that
an older sibling’s schooling has a smaller impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa.
Fifth, the AFQT scores of older and younger siblings without substantial labor market experience
were shown to have similar effects on a person’s log wage. Sixth, I found no discernable difference
between the impacts of the AFQT scores of older and younger siblings who were residing in
different geographic regions during the early stages of their careers. Seventh, there was some
evidence of a decrease in the impact of a sibling’s AFQT score when either of two siblings initially
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living in the same region moves to a different region.
A possible area for extending the investigation of statistical nepotism in the current paper would
be to examine the schooling decisions or occupational choices of siblings. An analysis of school-
ing decisions might be interesting because sibling effects in employer learning could potentially
contribute to the negative correlation between birth order and educational attainment documented
by Behrman and Taubman (1986) and Black et al. (2005). Specifically, if an older sibling’s per-
formance provides information to employers about a younger sibling’s ability, then the signaling
returns to schooling may be lower for younger than for older siblings, leading younger siblings
to invest less in education than their older counterparts. Alternatively, an analysis of occupational
choices among siblings could help determine whether social learning can increase the efficiency
of labor markets by improving the quality of information available about a worker’s suitability for
a given type of job.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions
in Childhood on Adult Labor Market
Outcomes
2.1 Introduction
The process of skill formation in childhood is an important area of research in labor economics.
An understanding of the effects of business cycles on child development can be useful to policy-
makers when designing and targeting economic stimulus plans or health care programs. This paper
investigates how macroeconomic conditions during one’s formative years affect one’s labor mar-
ket performance in adulthood. The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, a large sample from
the Census is used to document the relationship of state and national unemployment rates during
childhood to schooling, employment, and income as an adult. Second, a matched sample of parents
and children from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is constructed in order to assess
whether the observed impact of the macroeconomy can be attributed to selection over the business
cycle in the background characteristics of parents raising children. Third, detailed information
on parental caregiving behavior from the Child Supplement of the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 (NLSY79-CH) is used to examine how the quality of a child’s home environment
varies with the unemployment rate.
This paper is related to a substantial literature studying how macroeconomic fluctuations affect
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health outcomes.1 Ruhm (2000) uncovers a procyclical relationship between mortality and unem-
ployment, although suicides rise during recessions. Using data on babies born in the late twentieth
century, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) find that infant health tends to improve when state un-
employment rates increase. Based on a sample of individuals born in the Netherlands between
1812 and 1912, van den Berg et al. (2006) observe that children born during recessions display
higher mortality later in life. The current paper extends this line of research in at least two direc-
tions. First, whereas much existing work focuses on health outcomes, the current paper analyzes
economic variables such as schooling, income, and employment. Second, whereas some existing
work has documented the impact of recessions on health behaviors, the current paper examines
how parental caregiving and home environments change over the business cycle.
The investigation in this paper begins with an analysis using Census data of the relationship
between childhood economic conditions and labor market performance in adulthood. The average
unemployment rate between the year before one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday
is used to appraise the state of the macroeconomy during one’s childhood.2 Variation in both the
national and the state unemployment rate is examined. Specifications using the national unem-
ployment rate as a regressor control for basic demographic variables as well as state fixed effects
and current economic conditions. Regressions involving the state unemployment rate also account
for national cohort effects and linear state trends. In addition, several robustness checks are per-
formed so as to determine the sensitivity of the results to changes in the measurement of economic
fluctuations and the construction of the estimation sample.
The next segment of this paper uses data from the PSID to study whether differences over
the business cycle in the quality of parents raising children are likely to explain the observed
impacts of childhood conditions on adult outcomes.3 A number of exercises are conducted for this
1Other relevant studies include: Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), who analyze the impact of the lowest unemployment
rate since beginning a job on the wage; Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who examine the influence of stock market
returns during one’s adult lifetime on risk preferences; and Oreopoulos et al. (2012), who investigate the long-term
effects of an economic downturn at college graduation on earnings.
2Some authors have argued that early childhood is an especially crucial period for human capital formation (Al-
mond and Currie, 2011; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Therefore, estimates for the impacts of unemployment rates at
different stages of development are also presented.
3See Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) for a theoretical and empirical discussion of how the unemployment rate
affects the characteristics of women selecting to give birth.
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purpose. First, I examine how the estimated coefficient on the unemployment rate changes after
controlling for parental background variables such as mother’s and father’s year of birth, education,
and occupation. Second, I document the relationship between the unemployment rate during one’s
childhood and the schooling, employment, and income of one’s parents. Third, I estimate family
fixed-effects models using sibling data so as to account for the influence of parental background
on the results.
The final component of this paper analyzes information from the NLSY79-CH on home en-
vironments and caregiving practices in order to illustrate a possible mechanism through which
childhood economic conditions can affect the stock of human capital in adulthood. A series of
results are presented. I start by estimating the impact of the current unemployment rate on an
aggregate measure for the quality of a child’s home environment. Next, I investigate whether the
estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of maternal background variables, and I characterize the
relationship between the unemployment rate and the attributes of mothers raising children. To
disentangle the causal effect of economic conditions from changes in parental quality, I compute
family and person fixed-effects estimates for the impact of the unemployment rate on a child’s
home environment. Finally, I examine how specific parenting behaviors vary over the course of
the business cycle, and I discuss how economic conditions around the time of birth affect prenatal
and postnatal care.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the information
on unemployment rates as well as the data from the Census, PSID, and NLSY79-CH. Section
2.3 discusses the basic estimates from each dataset and presents various supplemental results and
robustness checks. Section 2.4 contains some concluding remarks.
2.2 Data
This section outlines the construction of the datasets in the paper. Section 2.2.1 describes the
source of the national and state unemployment rates used in the empirical analysis. Sections 2.2.2,
2.2.3, and 2.2.4 document the main estimation samples for the Census, PSID, and NLSY79-CH,
respectively.4
4Further information about each sample used in the analysis is located in the notes to the tables.
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2.2.1 Unemployment Rate Series
A national unemployment rate series from 1890 to 2010 is compiled as follows. For each year
from 1941 to 2010, the annual average unemployment rate is obtained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).5 Between 1931 and 1940, the estimates of the unemployment rate from Coen
(1973) are used. Between 1890 and 1930, the unemployment rate series constructed by Romer
(1986) is employed.
A state unemployment rate series from 1947 to 2009 is generated as follows.6 For each year
from 1976 to 2009, the annual average unemployment rate for each state is obtained from the BLS.
Because the BLS does not provide state unemployment rates prior to 1976, yearly information on
the rate of insured unemployment is obtained for each state from ET Financial Data Handbook
349. The rate of insured unemployment is available for all states from 1947 to 2009.7 In order
to estimate the unemployment rate for each state between 1947 and 1975, the average annual
unemployment rate for a given state is regressed on the rate of insured unemployment and a linear
trend in year using the observations on that state between 1976 and 2009.8 The estimated regression
equation for that state is then applied to the rates of insured unemployment to predict the average
annual unemployment rates between 1947 and 1975.
In addition, some robustness checks later in the paper replace the unemployment rate with the
employment-to-population ratio as a measure of macroeconomic conditions. Because national and
state employment-to-population ratios are available from the BLS beginning respectively in 1948
and 1976, the values of these variables in earlier years are estimated as follows. The national
employment-to-population ratio is regressed on the national unemployment rate and a linear trend
in year using observations from 1948 to 2010, and the estimated regression equation is applied to
historical data on the national unemployment rate to predict the national employment-to-population
ratios between 1890 and 1947. The employment-to-population ratio for a given state is regressed
5The national unemployment rate covers individuals 16 years old and above from 1948 to 2010 and individuals 14
years old and above from 1941 to 1947.
6The District of Columbia is included as a state.
7Only three states—Georgia, Hawaii, and Oregon—have data on the rate of insured unemployment before 1947.
8The coefficient on the linear trend in year is significantly positive for five states and significantly negative for
eleven states.
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on the rate of insured unemployment and a linear trend in year using the observations on that
state from 1976 to 2009, and the estimated regression equation is applied to the rates of insured
unemployment to predict the employment-to-population ratios for that state between 1947 and
1975.
2.2.2 Census Sample
To document the relationship between unemployment rates in childhood and adult economic
outcomes, I construct a sample using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
for the 1960, 1970, and 1980 Censuses.9 The dataset is restricted to individuals aged between 30
and 65 at the end of the Census year who have data on educational attainment, working last year,
employment status, labor force status, and wage income. In addition, only persons born in one
of the fifty states or the District of Columbia are included. Consequently, the sample used for the
analysis of national unemployment rates in childhood contains data on individuals born between
1895 and 1930 in the 1960 Census, between 1905 and 1940 in the 1970 Census, and between 1915
and 1950 in the 1980 Census. Because state unemployment rates are available for all states only
from 1947 onwards, the sample used for the analysis of state unemployment rates between the
year before one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday contains data on individuals born
between 1948 and 1950 in the 1980 Census.
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for the main samples from the Census. The samples used
with national and state unemployment rates contain 12,374,991 and 917,783 observations, respec-
tively. The mean years of birth for the respective samples are 1929 and 1949. Correspondingly,
the mean ages are 46 and 31. For the former sample, the average national unemployment rate
between the year before one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday has mean 8.14 and
standard deviation 3.05. For the latter sample, the average state unemployment rate in this interval
has mean 8.80 and standard deviation 1.87. The outcomes used in the analysis are: indicators for
high school completion, college graduation, and receipt of some graduate education; indicators for
having worked in the past calendar year, currently being in the labor force, and being employed
9In particular, I combine: the 1960 1% sample; forms 1 and 2 of the 1970 1% metro, state, and neighborhood
samples; and the 1980 5%, 1%, 1% urban/rural, 1% labor market area, and 1% detailed metro/non-metro samples.
Information from more recent Censuses is not used because precise information on year of birth is not available.
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at present; and indicators for having both worked in the past calendar year and received a wage
income of at least $10,000, $20,000, and $30,000 during that period.10 Note that the analysis of
income levels utilizes joint work-wage outcomes instead of log wages so as to account for selection
into employment.11
2.2.3 PSID Sample
In order to examine whether the observed relationship between unemployment rates in child-
hood and adult economic outcomes can be attributed to changes in the characteristics of parents
raising children, I begin by constructing a sample of respondents from the 1968 to 2009 waves of
the PSID.12 These individuals are later matched to information on their parents, provided that their
parents are also respondents in the PSID. The dataset contains sample family members from both
the Survey Research Center (SRC) and Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) components of
the PSID. The analysis is restricted to individuals with valid data on year of birth who grew up in
one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia.
One observation is generated on an individual for each survey year in which the individual is
a head or wife between the ages of 30 and 65 as of the end of the year and has data on years of
schooling, total hours worked in the past calendar year, total labor income in the past calendar year,
and current employment status. Overall, the sample used for the analysis of national unemploy-
ment rates in childhood includes observations on individuals with birth years ranging from 1903
to 1979. When analyzing state unemployment rates between the year before one’s birth and the
year of one’s fifteenth birthday, the sample is limited to individuals born between 1948 and 1979,
because state unemployment rates are available for all states only from 1947 onwards.
Descriptive statistics for the main samples from the PSID are presented in Table 2.2. The sam-
ples used with national and state unemployment rates comprise 150,604 observations on 11,802
individuals and 67,122 observations on 7,138 individuals, respectively. The mean years of birth
10The income figures are expressed in 1982-1984 terms.
11Other methods of accommodating the employment decision include the use of a median regression or a selection
correction. However, such procedures are difficult to justify here because they usually rely on an assumption about
the wage offers of nonparticipants relative to participants or the existence of a variable affecting participation but not
wage offers.
12The data from the PSID are annual from 1968 to 1997 and biennial thereafter.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Observations from Census Sample
Born Between 1895 and 1950 Born Between 1948 and 1950
Basic Demographics
Pct. Black 10.15 12.04
Pct. Hispanic 2.44 3.76
Pct. White 88.78 86.42
Pct. Female 51.60 50.60
Region of Residence
Pct. Northcentral 31.84 30.58
Pct. Northeast 25.19 23.13
Pct. South 33.39 32.42
Pct. West 9.57 13.87
Mean (S.D.) Year Born 1929.48 (12.08) 1949.02 (0.82)
Mean (S.D.) Age 46.06 (10.41) 30.99 (0.82)
Unemployment Rate
National U.E. Rate
Mean (S.D.) at Age -1 8.04 (5.57) ——
Mean (S.D.) at Age 0 8.10 (5.58) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 1 and 5 8.04 (5.09) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 6 and 10 8.16 (5.34) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 11 and 15 8.23 (5.32) ——
State U.E. Rate
Mean (S.D.) at Age -1 —— 8.67 (3.60)
Mean (S.D.) at Age 0 —— 9.38 (3.43)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 1 and 5 —— 8.01 (2.04)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 6 and 10 —— 9.13 (2.23)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 11 and 15 —— 9.16 (1.83)
Schooling
Pct. High School and Above 65.25 86.24
Pct. College and Above 14.78 24.58
Pct. Some Graduate School 6.98 11.00
Employment
Pct. Worked Last Year 73.84 82.28
Pct. in Labor Force 70.43 78.85
Pct. Currently Employed 67.63 74.36
Wage Income
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $10K 49.04 55.70
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $20K 28.32 28.25
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $30K 12.59 9.62
Sample Size
Observations 12,374,991 917,783
Note: The summary statistics above are based on the main estimation sample for the Census. Wage income is deflated using the CPI with 1982-1984
as the base period. National and state unemployment rates are constructed as described in the text.
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for the respective samples are 1944 and 1957. Correspondingly, the mean ages are 45 and 38. For
the former sample, the average national unemployment rate between the year before one’s birth
and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday has mean 6.85 and standard deviation 2.87. For the latter
sample, the average state unemployment rate in this interval has mean 7.94 and standard deviation
1.70. The outcomes examined are: indicators for high school completion, college graduation, and
receipt of some graduate training; indicators for having worked in the past calendar year, currently
being in the labor force, and being employed at present; and indicators for having both worked in
the past calendar year and received at least $10,000, $20,000, and $30,000 in labor income during
that period.13
2.2.4 NLSY79-CH Sample
In order to understand how parental caregiving behavior changes with the unemployment rate, I
construct a sample of individuals from the 1986 to 2008 waves of the NLSY79-CH, which surveys
children born to female participants in the NLSY79.14 The restricted-access geocode files for
the NLSY79 and NLSY79-CH are obtained so as to match respondents to state-level data on the
unemployment rate.15
Information from the Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment-Short Form
(HOME-SF) inventory is used to assess the quality of each child’s household surroundings.16 The
scores on the HOME-SF inventory are based on both parental reports and interviewer observations.
The topics covered by the HOME-SF vary with each child’s developmental level: infant/toddler
(part A, ages 0-2), early childhood (part B, ages 3-5), middle childhood (part C, ages 6-9), and
early adolescence (part D, ages 10-14). Examples of items on the HOME-SF include: number of
children’s books and toys at home; frequency of visits to the grocery, theater, and museum; whether
the child eats meals with his/her mother and father; whether the child’s mother spoke to, caressed,
13The income figures are expressed in 1982-1984 terms.
14Individuals in the NLSY79-CH are interviewed biennially.
15This research was conducted with restricted access to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The views expressed
here do not necessarily reflect the views of the BLS.
16The HOME-SF is a condensed version of the longer Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment
(HOME) inventory. The HOME-SF inventory was developed for use in the NLSY79-CH and is also administered in
the PSID. See Caldwell and Bradley (2003) for more details on the HOME inventory.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Observations from PSID Sample
Born Between 1903 and 1979 Born Between 1948 and 1979
Basic Demographics
Pct. Black 34.54 38.92
Pct. Hispanic 2.54 3.08
Pct. White 61.49 56.99
Pct. Female 52.62 55.43
Region of Residence
Pct. Northcentral 26.43 27.89
Pct. Northeast 17.20 15.72
Pct. South 45.51 43.04
Pct. West 10.87 13.34
Mean (S.D.) Year Born 1943.72 (14.61) 1956.92 (6.91)
Mean (S.D.) Age 44.92 (10.16) 38.42 (6.88)
Unemployment Rate
National U.E. Rate
Mean (S.D.) at Age -1 7.02 (5.12) ——
Mean (S.D.) at Age 0 7.05 (5.14) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 1 and 5 7.11 (4.67) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 6 and 10 6.93 (4.46) ——
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 11 and 15 6.42 (3.84) ——
State U.E. Rate
Mean (S.D.) at Age -1 —— 8.34 (2.93)
Mean (S.D.) at Age 0 —— 8.34 (2.92)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 1 and 5 —— 8.28 (2.28)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 6 and 10 —— 8.08 (2.29)
Mean (S.D.) btw. Ages 11 and 15 —— 7.29 (1.88)
Schooling
Pct. High School and Above 75.86 89.79
Pct. College and Above 19.13 23.07
Pct. Some Graduate School 7.91 9.35
Employment
Pct. Worked Last Year 82.17 87.15
Pct. in Labor Force 78.65 85.30
Pct. Currently Employed 74.25 78.83
Wage Income
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $10K 56.70 60.59
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $20K 30.92 31.61
Pct. Worked and Income ≥ $30K 14.44 13.95
Sample Size
Individuals 11,802 7,138
Observations 150,604 67,122
Note: The summary statistics above are based on the main estimation sample for the PSID. Wage income is deflated using the CPI with 1982-1984
as the base period. National and state unemployment rates are constructed as described in the text.
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or spanked the child during the interview; how often the child spends time with his/her father;
whether the child’s mother helps teach the child numbers, letter, colors, and shapes; whether the
child is expected to make his/her bed, clean up after him/herself, and perform regular housekeeping
tasks; whether the child’s home appears to be well lighted, clean, and free of trash. The HOME
inventory has been widely employed in the child psychology literature to study how the family
setting affects cognitive and behavioral development.17
The sample from the NLSY79-CH contains individuals whose mother belongs to the cross-
sectional or supplemental sample of the NLSY79. The dataset is restricted to observations on
children who live in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia and are aged between 0
and 15 as of the end of the survey year. Each observation is classified into one of four categories,
depending on which age-appropriate part of the HOME-SF inventory was administered to the child
in that survey year. Each category includes only observations in which the child has valid data on
the total, cognitive stimulation, and emotional support raw scores for the applicable part of the
HOME-SF inventory. In addition, many of the items used to compute the scores are individually
analyzed in order to further investigate how parenting behavior changes over the business cycle.
Therefore, observations on individuals with missing data on these items are excluded from the
analysis.18
Table 2.3 summarizes the main sample of children from the NLSY79-CH. The datasets for
parts A, B, C, and D of the HOME-SF inventory respectively contain 6,505 observations on 5,280
individuals, 8,187 observations on 6,386 individuals, 11,749 observations on 7,523 individuals,
and 11,259 observations on 6,620 individuals. The mean survey years for the respective samples
are 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998. Correspondingly, the mean ages are 1.6, 4.5, 8.0, and 12.2. For
the respective parts, the current national unemployment rate has means 6.01, 5.88, 5.76, 5.52 and
standard deviations 0.95, 0.95, 0.99, and 0.96, and the current state unemployment rate has means
17For example, see Elardo et al. (1977), Bradley and Caldwell (1980), and Bradley et al. (1988).
18The specific items examined are as follows with the relevant parts given in parentheses: number of children’s
books (A, B, C, D); frequency of being read to (A, B, C); frequency of grocery visits (A); number of cuddly or role-
playing toys (A); number of push or pull toys (A); frequency of seeing father (A, B); frequency of eating with parents
(A, B, C, D); frequency of being spanked (A, B, C, D); number of magazines (B); presence of tape recorder (B);
frequency of museum visits (B, C, D); hours of television (B); presence of musical instrument (C, D); receipt of daily
newspaper (C, D); frequency of theater visits (C, D); enrollment in special lessons (C, D); frequency of interacting
with father (C, D); discussion of television shows (C, D).
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6.10, 5.93, 5.82, and 5.56 and standard deviations 1.64, 1.59, 1.57, and 1.42. The main outcome
variables are the total, cognitive stimulation, and emotional support scores on each part of the
HOME-SF inventory.19
2.3 Results
This section discusses the results from the analysis of unemployment rates in childhood. Sec-
tions 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 present the findings from the Census, PSID, and NLSY79-CH, respec-
tively.
2.3.1 Census Results
Section 2.3.1 describes the basic estimates for the Census sample. Section 2.3.1 reports some
robustness checks for the Census results.
Basic Estimates
The upper panel of Table 2.4 displays estimates for the impact of national unemployment rates
between the year before one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday on schooling, employ-
ment, and income between the ages of 30 and 65. The specifications control for race, gender, state
of birth, age dummies, and indicators for survey year.20 In general, the coefficients on national
unemployment rates in childhood are moderate in size and precisely estimated. For schooling out-
comes, the average national unemployment rate in childhood has an insignificantly positive impact
on high school completion and a significantly negative impact on graduation from college and at-
tendance in graduate school. For employment outcomes, a higher average national unemployment
rate in childhood significantly lowers the likelihoods of having worked in the previous year, of cur-
rently participating in the labor force, and of being employed at present. For income outcomes, the
19Although Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the raw scores on the HOME-SF inventory, the regression
analysis uses standardized scores so as to facilitate interpretation of the results. Furthermore, several items from each
part of the HOME-SF inventory are analyzed as discussed in the text but omitted from the tables because of space
constraints.
20The standard errors are clustered by year of birth, because the national unemployment rate in childhood is the
same for all individuals with the same year of birth.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Observations from NLSY79-CH Sample
HOME-SF Inventory
Part A: Part B: Part C: Part D:
Infant/Toddler Early Childhood Middle Childhood Early Adolescence
Basic Demographics
Pct. Black 24.77 24.44 27.46 29.19
Pct. Hispanic 18.80 19.08 19.41 20.46
Pct. White 56.43 56.48 53.13 50.35
Pct. Female 49.19 49.77 49.28 49.86
Region of Residence
Pct. Northcentral 27.70 27.48 26.84 27.17
Pct. Northeast 16.89 16.17 15.46 14.38
Pct. South 34.80 35.98 37.56 38.32
Pct. West 20.60 20.36 20.14 20.13
Mean (S.D.) Age 1.58 (0.93) 4.51 (0.94) 8.01 (1.29) 12.15 (1.36)
Mean (S.D.) Year 1991.34 (4.67) 1992.78 (5.22) 1994.62 (5.84) 1997.62 (5.47)
Unemployment Rate
Mean (S.D.) National 6.01 (0.95) 5.88 (0.95) 5.76 (0.99) 5.52 (0.96)
U.E. Rate
Mean (S.D.) State 6.10 (1.64) 5.93 (1.59) 5.82 (1.57) 5.56 (1.42)
U.E. Rate
HOME-SF Inventory
Mean (S.D.) Total 141.53 (23.98) 206.37 (35.47) 201.17 (36.67) 204.48 (34.92)
Raw Score
Mean (S.D.) Cognitive 68.03 (15.63) 117.78 (22.19) 99.15 (24.25) 93.86 (22.83)
Stimulation Raw Score
Mean (S.D.) Emotional 73.53 (14.52) 88.54 (19.79) 102.02 (19.88) 110.61 (19.85)
Support Raw Score
Sample Size
Individuals 5,280 6,386 7,523 6,620
Observations 6,505 8,187 11,749 11,259
Note: The summary statistics above are based on the main estimation sample for the NLSY79-CH. Parts A, B, C, and D of the HOME-SF inventory
are generally administered to children aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-9, and 10-14 years, respectively. National and state unemployment rates are constructed as
described in the text.
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impact of a higher national unemployment rate in childhood is more complex, lowering the prob-
ability of having worked and earned at least $10,000 and increasing the probabilities of having
worked and earned at least $20,000 and $30,000.
The lower panel of Table 2.4 replicates the preceding analysis using state instead of national
unemployment rates in childhood. Recall that state unemployment rates are available for only a
small subset of the sample used with national unemployment rates. The estimates control for race,
gender, birth state, age dummies, and a linear trend in age specific to each birth state.21 Overall,
the coefficients on state unemployment rates in childhood are large in magnitude but imprecisely
estimated. Significant negative impacts are found on the probabilities of currently participating in
the labor force, being employed at present, and having worked and earned at least $10,000. Most
of the point estimates are negative in sign, and no significant positive effects are obtained.
In addition, Table 2.4 provides estimates for the impacts of average national and state unem-
ployment rates at different stages of child development: prenatal (age -1), infancy (age 0), early
childhood (ages 1-5), middle childhood (ages 6-10), and early adolescence (ages 11-15). Both
significantly positive and negative impacts are found for the sample used with national unemploy-
ment rates. For the sample used with state unemployment rates, the estimated impacts are typi-
cally negative. The results provide little evidence suggesting that high unemployment rates earlier
in childhood have a larger negative impact on adult economic outcomes than high unemployment
rates later in childhood.
As a preliminary test of whether changes in the characteristics of parents raising children can
explain the observed impacts of state unemployment rates in childhood, I use data from the 1960
Census to construct a sample of parents between the ages of 30 and 65 with children born between
1948 and 1950.22 I then regress indicators for mother’s and father’s schooling, employment, and in-
come on the average state unemployment rate between the year before the child’s birth and the year
21The standard errors are clustered by state of birth, in order to account for serial correlation across birth years
among individuals born in the same state. See Bertrand et al. (2004) for a discussion of how serial correlation affects
the standard errors for differences-in-differences estimates.
22The results described here are not included in the tables but are available from the author on request. Because of
data limitations, a similar test is not performed using national instead of state unemployment rates in childhood. In
particular, precise information on year of birth is typically unavailable in earlier Census years, and individuals do not
have data on their parents if they have left the parental home. Consequently, insufficiently many cohorts are available
for estimating the relationship between national unemployment rates in childhood and parental characteristics.
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Table 2.4: Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood to Schooling, Employment, and
Income for Census Sample
H.S. College Grad. Worked In Labor Currently Worked & Worked & Worked &
Diploma Degree School Last Yr. Force Employed Y ≥ $10K Y ≥ $20K Y ≥ $30K
Born Between 1895 and 1950
Average National Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0005 -0.0026 -0.0021 -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.0072 -0.0029 0.0002 0.0012
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Average National Unemployment Rate at Different Stages of Childhood
U.E. Rate at -0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0007 0.0011 0.0016
Age -1 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
U.E. Rate at 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0003
Age 0 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0003
Ages 1 and 5 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0011
Ages 6 and 10 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.0040 -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0003
Ages 11 and 15 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Birth Years ———–56———–
Observations ———–12,374,991———–
Born Between 1948 and 1950
Average State Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0110 -0.0051 -0.0336 -0.0643 -0.0941 -0.1001 -0.0797 -0.0447 -0.0060
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0302) (0.0385) (0.0204) (0.0482) (0.0424) (0.0437) (0.0372) (0.0427) (0.0275)
Average State Unemployment Rate at Different Stages of Childhood
U.E. Rate at 0.0022 -0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0030 -0.0049 -0.0063 -0.0061 -0.0006 0.0021
Age -1 (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0021)
U.E. Rate at 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0049 -0.0055 -0.0050 -0.0036 0.0001
Age 0 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0016)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0072 -0.0141 -0.0161 -0.0191 -0.0169 0.0055
Ages 1 and 5 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0128) (0.0133) (0.0111) (0.0067)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0075 -0.0133 -0.0090 -0.0098 -0.0234 -0.0231 -0.0317 -0.0386 0.0012
Ages 6 and 10 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0116) (0.0077)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0044 -0.0070 -0.0125 -0.0192 -0.0257 -0.0254 -0.0396 -0.0193 0.0121
Ages 11 and 15 (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0120) (0.0165) (0.0083)
Birth States ———–51———–
Observations ———–917,783———–
Note: The main estimation sample for the Census is used to generate the estimates above. The specifications in the upper panel contain indicator
variables for race, gender, birth state, survey year, and age at the end of the survey year. The specifications in the lower panel control for race,
gender, birth state, age dummies, and a linear trend in age specific to each birth state. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by birth year in the
upper panel and by birth state in the lower panel, are reported in parentheses.
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of the child’s fifteenth birthday as well as controls for parent’s race, child’s state of birth, dummy
variables for parent’s age, fixed effects for child’s birth year, and a linear trend in child’s year of
birth specific to each state of birth. In general, I do not find a significant relationship between state
unemployment rates and parental characteristics. Nonetheless, the estimates for the coefficients
on state unemployment rates are often imprecise. Hence, it is unclear whether changes over the
business cycle in the characteristics of parents raising children may be generating the observed
relationship between state unemployment rates in childhood and adult economic outcomes.23
Robustness Checks
A few robustness checks are conducted to assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in
the sample used for estimation and the measurement of economic conditions.24 First, I replicate
the results in the bottom panel of Table 2.4 using the raw data on the rate of covered unemploy-
ment for each state instead of the estimated values of the state unemployment rate to generate the
regressors.25 This substitution does not qualitatively change the results. Second, I perform the
regressions in Table 2.4 using the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment
rate as an indicator of economic conditions.26 This modification does not substantially affect the
conclusions of the analysis. Third, I estimate the specifications in the upper panel of Table 2.4
using only the 1% samples from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 Censuses.27 This restriction does not
drastically alter the basic pattern of estimates. However, the national unemployment rate between
the year before one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday now has a significantly positive
impact on high school completion as well as the probability of having worked and earned at least
23Section 2.3.2 provides a more complete analysis of the relationship between childhood unemployment rates and
parental characteristics based on data from the PSID.
24These results are omitted from the tables but are available from the author on request.
25Recall from section 2.2.1 that the rate of covered unemployment from ET Financial Data Handbook 349 is used
to estimate the annual state unemployment rates between 1947 and 1975, because the BLS does not provide annual
state unemployment rates prior to 1976.
26As noted by Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004), the use of the employment-to-population ratio instead of the
unemployment rate avoids measurement error in determining the size of the labor force and the number of unemployed
workers.
27In the original sample from the upper panel of Table 2.4, individuals in 1980 are overrepresented relative to
individuals in 1960 and 1970, and individuals in 1970 are overrepresented relative to individuals in 1960.
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$20,000.
2.3.2 PSID Results
The basic estimates for the PSID sample are presented in section 2.3.2, and some robustness
checks for the PSID results are summarized in section 2.3.2.
Basic Estimates
Table 2.5 reproduces the analysis in Table 2.4 using the PSID instead of the Census sample.28
The upper panel displays the impacts of national unemployment rates between the year before
one’s birth and the year of one’s fifteenth birthday on schooling, employment, and income between
the ages of 30 and 65. The estimates control for race, gender, childhood state, age dummies,
and indicators for survey year.29 The point estimate for the coefficient on the average national
unemployment rate in childhood is negative for each outcome examined. Except for the probability
of having worked and earned at least $30,000, all of the deviations from zero are statistically
significant.
The impacts of state unemployment rates in childhood on adult economic outcomes are exhib-
ited in the lower panel. The estimates control for race, gender, childhood state, age dummies, fixed
effects for survey year, indicator variables for year born, and a linear trend in year born specific
to each childhood state.30 The results are mixed with the point estimates being positive for some
outcomes and negative for other outcomes. None of the observed deviations from zero are statisti-
cally significant, except for the positive impact on the probability of having worked and earned at
least $30,000.
In addition, Table 2.5 presents estimates in which a separate coefficient is computed for the
average national or state unemployment rate at each stage of childhood. On the whole, there is
little evidence indicating that high unemployment rates earlier in childhood are more detrimental
than high unemployment rates later in childhood.
28Although the sample sizes are smaller for the PSID than for the Census, the PSID sample covers a larger number
of birth cohorts than the Census sample.
29The standard errors are clustered by year of birth.
30The standard errors are clustered by childhood state.
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Table 2.5: Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood to Schooling, Employment, and
Income for PSID Sample
H.S. College Grad. Worked In Labor Currently Worked & Worked & Worked &
Diploma Degree School Last Yr. Force Employed Y ≥ $10K Y ≥ $20K Y ≥ $30K
Born Between 1903 and 1979
Average National Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0092 -0.0078 -0.0037 -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.0078 -0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0014
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0014)
Average National Unemployment Rate at Different Stages of Childhood
U.E. Rate at -0.0054 -0.0069 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0016 0.0005
Age -1 (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0020)
U.E. Rate at 0.0009 0.0031 0.0013 0.0016 0.0017 0.0024 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0013
Age 0 (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0024)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0012 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0003
Ages 1 and 5 (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0017)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0020 0.0005 -0.0001
Ages 6 and 10 (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0014)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0064 -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0002
Ages 11 and 15 (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Birth Years ———–77———–
Individuals ———–11,802———–
Observations ———–150,604———–
Born Between 1948 and 1979
Average State Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0026 -0.0086 -0.0163 -0.0043 -0.0062 0.0040 0.0119 0.0184 0.0138
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0133) (0.0123) (0.0100) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0070)
Average State Unemployment Rate at Different Stages of Childhood
U.E. Rate at -0.0030 0.0079 0.0017 0.0020 0.0016 0.0032 0.0043 0.0081 0.0090
Age -1 (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0041)
U.E. Rate at 0.0041 -0.0035 0.0032 0.0014 0.0037 0.0037 0.0023 0.0000 0.0014
Age 0 (0.0030) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0023)
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0028 -0.0086 -0.0174 -0.0031 -0.0058 -0.0020 0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0049
Ages 1 and 5 (0.0062) (0.0094) (0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0049)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0092 0.0075 0.0050 0.0023 0.0012 0.0067 0.0067 0.0140 0.0134
Ages 6 and 10 (0.0050) (0.0088) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0073) (0.0062) (0.0043)
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0025 -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0038 0.0004 0.0043 0.0051
Ages 11 and 15 (0.0047) (0.0100) (0.0069) (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0062) (0.0065) (0.0051)
Childhood States ———–49———–
Individuals ———–7,138———–
Observations ———–67,122———–
Note: The main estimation sample for the PSID is used to generate the estimates above. The specifications in the upper panel contain indicator
variables for race, gender, childhood state, survey year, and age at the end of the survey year. The specifications in the lower panel control for race,
gender, childhood state, age dummies, fixed effects for survey year, indicator variables for year born, and a linear trend in year born specific to each
childhood state. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by birth year in the upper panel and by childhood state in the lower panel, are reported in
parentheses.
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I now conduct several exercises to determine whether changes over the business cycle in the
characteristics of parents raising children are likely to explain the observed relationship between
unemployment rates in childhood and adult labor market outcomes. I begin by identifying a subset
of individuals from the sample in Table 2.5 whose mother or father has information on important
background variables and economic outcomes, and I replicate the analysis from the upper row in
each panel of Table 2.5 excluding and including controls for parental background variables such
as year born, education, and occupation.31
Table 2.6 reports the results of this procedure. Using the average national unemployment rate
in childhood as a regressor in the upper panel, the estimated coefficients on the unemployment rate
decrease for six outcomes and increase for three outcomes when parental background variables
are added to the specification. Both before and after controlling for parental background, the only
statistically significant result obtained for this sample is a negative impact on high school comple-
tion. Using the average state unemployment rate in childhood as a regressor in the lower panel,
the estimated coefficients on the unemployment rate decrease for all nine outcomes as a result of
controlling for parental background. Although no statistically significant results are detected when
parental background variables are excluded, significant negative impacts are seen on graduation
from college and receipt of graduate training after the inclusion of parental background controls.
In sum, it appears unlikely that changes over the business cycle in the characteristics of parents
raising children are contributing to a negative relationship between childhood unemployment rates
and adult economic outcomes.
I next document how the characteristics of parents raising children vary with the unemploy-
ment rate. To perform this exercise, I construct a sample consisting of observations between the
ages of 30 and 65 on the schooling, employment, and income of mothers and fathers of children
in the dataset from Table 2.6.32 I then regress indicators for each parent’s outcomes on the average
national or state unemployment rate between the year before the child’s birth and the year of the
child’s fifteenth birthday as well as other control variables.33 These regressions are presented in
31See the note to Table 2.6 for more details on the construction of the sample and the specification being estimated.
Observe that the dataset used in Table 2.6 consists of PSID respondents whose mother or father is also a sample
member in the PSID.
32See the note to Table 2.7 for additional information on the sample selection criteria.
33These regressions are run separately for mothers and for fathers. In specifications with the average national
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Table 2.6: Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood to Schooling, Employment, and
Income for PSID Sample Before and After Controlling for Parental Background Variables
H.S. College Grad. Worked In Labor Currently Worked & Worked & Worked &
Diploma Degree School Last Yr. Force Employed Y ≥ $10K Y ≥ $20K Y ≥ $30K
Has Parent with Data in Survey and Born Between 1903 and 1979
Average National Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0265 -0.0026 0.0082 -0.0027 0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0050 0.0044 0.0069
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0101) (0.0117) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0100) (0.0065)
Parental No No No No No No No No No
Background
Average National Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0298 -0.0052 0.0051 -0.0050 0.0009 -0.0028 -0.0057 0.0057 0.0098
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0122) (0.0146) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0086)
Parental Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background
Birth Years ———–51———–
Individuals ———–6,742———–
Observations ———–64,798———–
Has Parent with Data in Survey and Born Between 1948 and 1979
Average State Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0037 -0.0106 -0.0158 -0.0063 -0.0061 0.0016 0.0101 0.0124 0.0094
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0143) (0.0130) (0.0098) (0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0074)
Parental No No No No No No No No No
Background
Average State Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0129 -0.0384 -0.0291 -0.0092 -0.0099 -0.0028 0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0041
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0076)
Parental Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Background
Childhood States ———–49———–
Individuals ———–6,439———–
Observations ———–58,642———–
Note: The dataset used here is constructed by restricting the main estimation sample for the PSID to observations on individuals whose mother
or father has information on first occupation and birth year as well as years of schooling, total hours worked, total labor income, and employment
status for some survey year when aged between 30 and 65. Parental background variables are indicators for mother’s and father’s first occupation,
educational attainment, and birth year. The categories for occupation at first regular job are: professional and technical workers; managers, officials,
and proprietors; self-employed businessman; clerical and sales workers; craftsmen and foremen; operatives; laborers and service workers; and armed
services and protective workers. The categories for educational attainment are: less than high school graduate, high school diploma, some college,
college degree, and some post-graduate training. The specifications in the upper panel contain indicator variables for race, gender, childhood state,
survey year, and age at the end of the survey year. The specifications in the lower panel control for race, gender, childhood state, age dummies,
fixed effects for survey year, indicator variables for year born, and a linear trend in year born specific to each childhood state. Huber-White standard
errors, clustered by birth year in the upper panel and by childhood state in the lower panel, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.7. In general, the coefficient on the unemployment rate is either statistically insignificant or
significantly positive. That is, a higher unemployment rate may be associated with an improvement
in the quality of parents raising children. Hence, selection over the business cycle into raising chil-
dren appears unlikely to generate a negative correlation between unemployment rates in childhood
and economic performance as an adult.
As a final exercise to control for a possible association between childhood unemployment rates
and parental quality, I use sibling data to calculate family fixed-effects estimates for the impact of
national unemployment rates in childhood on schooling, employment, and income in adulthood.
Table 2.8 contains the results of the estimation.34 Although the point estimates for the coefficient
on the average national unemployment rate between the year before one’s birth and the year of
one’s fifteenth birthday are negative for all but one outcome analyzed, the only statistically signifi-
cant result is a negative impact on high school completion. In specifications that compute separate
coefficients for the average national unemployment rates at different stages of childhood, unem-
ployment rates earlier in childhood do not generally appear to be a bigger determinant of adult
economic outcomes than unemployment rates later in childhood. Overall, the results from sibling
data are consistent with a negative causal effect of the unemployment rate in childhood on labor
market success as an adult, although the estimates are in this case too imprecise to draw a definitive
conclusion.
Robustness Checks
This section performs a few robustness checks analogous to those in section 2.3.1.35 First, the
results in the bottom halves of Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 are replicated using the raw data on the
rate of covered unemployment for each state instead of the actual and estimated values of the state
unemployment rate to construct the regressors. The basic pattern of estimates in the lower panel
unemployment rate as a regressor, the other control variables are: parent’s race, state where child grew up, parental
age dummies, fixed effects for survey year of observation on parent, and a linear trend in child’s year of birth. In
specifications with the average state unemployment rate as a regressor, the other control variables are: parent’s race,
state where child grew up, parental age dummies, fixed effects for survey year of observation on parent, indicator
variables for child’s year of birth, and a linear trend in child’s year of birth specific to the state where child grew up.
34The sample used here comprises all individuals in the dataset from Table 2.5 who have a sibling also belonging to
the dataset. The specification includes a gender dummy as well as fixed effects for age level and survey year.
35The estimates summarized here are available from the author on request.
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Table 2.7: Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood to Parental Schooling, Employment,
and Income for PSID Sample
H.S. College Grad. Worked In Labor Currently Worked & Worked & Worked &
Diploma Degree School Last Yr. Force Employed Y ≥ $10K Y ≥ $20K Y ≥ $30K
Mothers of Individuals Born Between 1903 and 1979
Average National Unemployment Rate in Youth’s Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0288 0.0261 0.0151 0.0123 0.0131 0.0063 0.0215 0.0199 0.0101
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0140) (0.0097) (0.0044) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0105) (0.0056) (0.0028)
Birth Years ———–49———–
for Youth
Observations ———–106,941———–
on Mother
Fathers of Individuals Born Between 1903 and 1979
Average National Unemployment Rate in Youth’s Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0624 0.0226 -0.0163 0.0068 0.0102 0.0077 0.0128 0.0213 0.0192
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0172) (0.0202) (0.0133) (0.0081) (0.0099) (0.0098) (0.0113) (0.0148) (0.0139)
Birth Years ———–46———–
for Youth
Observations ———–91,502———–
on Father
Mothers of Individuals Born Between 1948 and 1979
Average State Unemployment Rate in Youth’s Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0112 0.0034 0.0020 0.0121 0.0127 0.0097 0.0051 0.0052 0.0006
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0171) (0.0082) (0.0029) (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0057) (0.0027)
Childhood States ———–48———–
for Youth
Observations ———–104,100———–
on Mother
Fathers of Individuals Born Between 1948 and 1979
Average State Unemployment Rate in Youth’s Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. 0.0584 0.0238 0.0235 0.0065 0.0046 0.0050 0.0330 0.0148 0.0094
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0203) (0.0192) (0.0154) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0222) (0.0237)
Childhood States ———–46———–
for Youth
Observations ———–89,394———–
on Father
Note: The dataset used for the top (resp. bottom) row of estimates in each half of the table is constructed as follows. First, the main estimation
sample for the PSID is restricted to observations on individuals whose mother or father has information on first occupation and birth year as well
as years of schooling, total hours worked, total labor income, and employment status for some survey year when aged between 30 and 65. Second,
every individual in the resulting sample is matched to the available information on her mother (resp. father). Third, one observation is generated for
each survey year in which her mother (resp. father) has valid data on years of schooling, total hours worked, total labor income, and employment
status. The specifications in the upper half of the table contain indicator variables for parent’s race, youth’s childhood state, parent’s survey year,
and parent’s age at the end of the survey year as well as a linear trend in the youth’s birth year. The specifications in the lower half of the table
control for parent’s race, youth’s childhood state, parental age dummies, fixed effects for parent’s survey year, indicator variables for youth’s birth
year, and a linear trend in the youth’s birth year specific to the youth’s childhood state. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by youth’s birth year
in the upper half and by youth’s childhood state in the lower half, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Family Fixed-Effects Estimates for Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood
to Schooling, Employment, and Income for PSID Sample
H.S. College Grad. Worked In Labor Currently Worked & Worked & Worked &
Diploma Degree School Last Yr. Force Employed Y ≥ $10K Y ≥ $20K Y ≥ $30K
Born Between 1903 and 1979
Average National Unemployment Rate in Childhood
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0330 -0.0055 0.0003 -0.0121 -0.0089 -0.0119 -0.0209 -0.0092 -0.0020
Ages -1 and 15 (0.0151) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0172) (0.0092) (0.0084)
Average National Unemployment Rate at Different Stages of Childhood
U.E. Rate at -0.0047 0.0061 0.0033 0.0027 0.0027 0.0021 -0.0029 -0.0002 0.0025
Age -1 (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0035)
U.E. Rate at -0.0013 -0.0124 -0.0066 -0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0051
Age 0 (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0041)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0035 0.0027 0.0006 -0.0046 -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0106 -0.0081 0.0011
Ages 1 and 5 (0.0076) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0063)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0193 0.0049 0.0054 -0.0085 -0.0051 -0.0079 -0.0021 0.0040 0.0020
Ages 6 and 10 (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0088) (0.0054) (0.0044)
U.E. Rate btw. -0.0071 0.0071 0.0103 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0037
Ages 11 and 15 (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0058) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0071) (0.0061) (0.0055)
Families ———–1,897———–
Individuals ———–5,703———–
Observations ———–58,849———–
Note: The dataset used here is constructed by restricting the main estimation sample for the PSID to observations on individuals with a sibling also
in the sample for some year. The specifications include fixed effects for survey year and dummy variables for age at the end of the survey year.
Huber-White standard errors, clustered by family, are reported in parentheses.
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of Table 2.5 remains intact after this substitution. However, the positive impact of average state
unemployment on having worked and earned at least $30,000 is no longer statistically significant.
The main conclusions from the bottom halves of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are also unchanged when the
unemployment rate is replaced with the rate of covered unemployment.
Second, the regressions in Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 are conducted using the employment-to-
population ratio instead of the unemployment rate as a measure of macroeconomic conditions. The
findings from Table 2.5 change little as a result of this modification. In the lower panel, however,
the positive impact of worse childhood economic conditions on having worked and earned at least
$30,000 loses significance, and the negative impact of worse childhood economic conditions on
receipt of graduate training gains significance. Although the main conclusions from the bottom
halves of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are unaffected, some changes in the top halves of these tables should
be noted. When the employment-to-population ratio is used in the top halves of Tables 2.6 and
2.7, the negative impact of worse childhood economic conditions on adult outcomes frequently
weakens when parental background variables are included in the specification, and worse economic
conditions while raising a child are occasionally associated with significantly lower schooling and
income among parents.
By contrast, the negative impact of worse childhood economic conditions often becomes stronger
in the family fixed-effects estimates from Table 2.8 when the unemployment rate is replaced with
the employment-to-population ratio. Even though the impact on high school completion is no
longer statistically significant, worse childhood economic conditions are now seen to have a very
significant negative impact on college graduation, receipt of graduate training, and having worked
and earned at least $20,000. On balance, there continues to be evidence that the negative impact
of worse childhood economic conditions on some adult outcomes cannot be fully explained by
changes over the business cycle in the background characteristics of parents raising children.
Third, the specifications in Tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 are estimated only for members of the
nationally representative SRC sample of the PSID.36 The results in Table 2.5 are mostly robust
to this sample restriction. However, the negative impacts of the average national unemployment
rate on receipt of graduate training and having worked with earnings of at least $20,000 lose
36The original dataset combines individuals in the SRC and SEO samples. Low-income households are overrepre-
sented in the SEO sample.
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significance in the upper panel, and the negative impact of the average state unemployment rate on
having worked in the previous year gains significance in the lower panel.
The findings from Table 2.6 are more complex after the exclusion of the SEO sample. In
the upper panel, the impacts of the national unemployment rate on having worked and earned at
least $10,000 and $20,000 now become larger in size and are significantly positive when parental
background variables are added as regressors. In the lower panel, the basic pattern of estimates is
largely robust to the sample restriction. Likewise, the findings from Table 2.7 are more complex
after the exclusion of the SEO sample. In the upper half of the table, the impact of the national
unemployment rate is now significantly positive, statistically insignificant, or significantly negative
depending on the parental outcome examined. In the lower half of the table, the basic pattern of
estimates is largely robust to the sample restriction.
The family fixed-effects estimates from Table 2.8 are essentially unaffected by the removal of
the SEO sample. The negative impact of the national unemployment rate on high school comple-
tion now becomes larger in size and more significant. In sum, the results of the estimation are not
driven by the inclusion of the SEO sample. However, some findings become more ambiguous after
the SEO sample is omitted.
2.3.3 NLSY79-CH Results
Section 2.3.3 contains the basic estimates for the NLSY79-CH sample. Section 2.3.3 discusses
additional items from the NLSY79-CH data. Section 2.3.3 performs some robustness checks on
the NLSY79-CH results.
Basic Estimates
In order to elucidate a possible mechanism behind the observed influence of childhood eco-
nomic conditions on adult outcomes, this section examines how the quality of a child’s home
environment varies over the business cycle. Table 2.9 exhibits the impact of the current state or
national unemployment rate on the standardized values of the total score as well as the cognitive
stimulation and emotional support subscores from the HOME-SF inventory.37 Four sets of esti-
37The scores for each part of the home inventory are standardized among all members of the sample at the same age
level.
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mates are computed, one for each stage of development: infant/toddler, early childhood, middle
childhood, and early adolescence. The specifications using the national unemployment rate as a
regressor control for race, gender, state of residence, indicator variables for age, and a linear trend
in survey year.38 The specifications containing the state unemployment rate as a regressor control
for race, gender, state of residence, indicator variables for age, fixed effects for survey year, and a
linear trend in survey year specific to each state of residence.39 In most cases, the point estimate
for the coefficient on the unemployment rate is negative. The national unemployment rate has a
significantly negative impact on the emotional score in early adolescence. The state unemployment
rate has a significantly negative impact on the total and emotional scores in middle childhood as
well as the total score in early adolescence.
I now assemble several pieces of evidence to determine whether the impact of the unemploy-
ment rate on the home environment is likely to be due to variation over the business cycle in the
characteristics of parents raising children or to a causal effect of macroeconomic conditions on the
caregiving behavior of parents. I first examine how the estimates for the specifications in Table
2.9 change from before to after controlling for maternal background variables such as year born,
education, occupation, and test score.40 Table 2.10 reports the findings from this comparison. On
the whole, the estimated coefficient on the unemployment rate does not change drastically as a
result of including maternal background variables. Although the addition of these variables some-
times attenuates the negative coefficient on the unemployment rate, the negative impact of the state
unemployment rate on the cognitive score in early adolescence gains significance after controlling
for them.
I next analyze the relationship between the current unemployment rate and the characteristics
of mothers raising children. To perform this exercise, each observation on a child from Table 2.10
is matched to data on the schooling level and test score of the child’s mother. Indicators for the
mother’s test performance and education level are then regressed on the current national or state
unemployment rate.41 The specifications using the national unemployment rate as a regressor con-
38The standard errors are clustered by survey year.
39The standard errors are clustered by state of residence.
40See the note to Table 2.10 for more details on the sample selection criteria as well as the coding of the maternal
background variables. Recall that the children in Table 2.10 have a mother who is a participant in the NLSY79.
41The test score used here is the Armed Forces Qualifying Test. During the summer and fall of 1980, the Armed
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Table 2.9: Relationship of Current Unemployment Rate to HOME-SF Inventory Scores for
NLSY79-CH Sample
HOME-SF Inventory
Standardized Total Score Standardized Cognitive Score Standardized Emotional Score
Part A: Infant/Toddler
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0528 (0.0655) -0.0423 (0.0629) -0.0456 (0.0557)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0078 (0.0165) -0.0026 (0.0168) -0.0097 (0.0155)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 5,280 Individuals / 6,505 Observations
Part B: Early Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate 0.0017 (0.0528) -0.0022 (0.0403) 0.0034 (0.0530)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0111 (0.0176) -0.0135 (0.0143) -0.0061 (0.0177)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 6,386 Individuals / 8,187 Observations
Part C: Middle Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0191 (0.0514) -0.0180 (0.0477) -0.0130 (0.0397)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0332 (0.0115) -0.0136 (0.0168) -0.0446 (0.0146)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 7,523 Individuals / 11,749 Observations
Part D: Early Adolescence
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0466 (0.0277) -0.0140 (0.0339) -0.0663 (0.0243)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0550 (0.0236) -0.0334 (0.0173) -0.0581 (0.0314)
Sample Size 11 Years / 50 States / 6,620 Individuals / 11,259 Observations
Note: The main estimation sample for the NLSY79-CH is used to generate the estimates above. The scores for each part of the HOME-SF inventory
are standardized among all individuals at the same age level in the sample. The upper set of estimates for each part of the HOME-SF inventory
control for race, gender, state of residence, a linear trend in survey year, and fixed effects for age at the end of the survey year. The lower set of
estimates for each part of the HOME-SF inventory control for race, gender, state of residence, indicator variables for survey year, fixed effects for
age at the end of the survey year, and a linear trend in survey year specific to each state of residence. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by
survey year for the upper set of estimates in each part and by state of residence for the lower set of estimates in each part, are reported in parentheses.
Chapter 2: The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions in Childhood on Adult Labor
Market Outcomes 87
Table 2.10: Relationship of Current Unemployment Rate to HOME-SF Inventory Scores for
NLSY79-CH Sample Before and After Controlling for Maternal Background Variables
HOME-SF Inventory
Standardized Total Score Standardized Cognitive Score Standardized Emotional Score
Part A: Infant/Toddler
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0519 (0.0643) -0.0534 (0.0594) -0.0404 (0.0626) -0.0410 (0.0581) -0.0464 (0.0551) -0.0482 (0.0525)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0038 (0.0162) -0.0060 (0.0147) 0.0028 (0.0173) 0.0008 (0.0162) -0.0094 (0.0154) -0.0113 (0.0151)
Maternal No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 5,051 Individuals / 6,232 Observations
Part B: Early Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0048 (0.0513) -0.0030 (0.0417) -0.0068 (0.0392) -0.0062 (0.0291) -0.0033 (0.0514) -0.0009 (0.0457)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0076 (0.0164) -0.0042 (0.0139) -0.0097 (0.0131) -0.0059 (0.0139) -0.0044 (0.0167) -0.0007 (0.0150)
Maternal No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 6,105 Individuals / 7,849 Observations
Part C: Middle Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0185 (0.0518) -0.0143 (0.0427) -0.0138 (0.0502) -0.0095 (0.0427) -0.0169 (0.0377) -0.0145 (0.0309)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0267 (0.0102) -0.0172 (0.0086) -0.0019 (0.0151) 0.0087 (0.0112) -0.0469 (0.0156) -0.0423 (0.0160)
Maternal No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 7,195 Individuals / 11,270 Observations
Part D: Early Adolescence
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0498 (0.0271) -0.0419 (0.0247) -0.0150 (0.0335) -0.0067 (0.0322) -0.0708 (0.0234) -0.0664 (0.0206)
Current State Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0536 (0.0236) -0.0603 (0.0218) -0.0259 (0.0172) -0.0324 (0.0143) -0.0641 (0.0313) -0.0684 (0.0306)
Maternal No Yes No Yes No Yes
Background
Sample Size 11 Years / 50 States / 6,339 Individuals / 10,815 Observations
Note: The dataset used here is constructed by restricting the main estimation sample for the NLSY79-CH to observations on individuals whose
mother has information on first occupation, years of schooling, and AFQT score. The scores for each part of the HOME-SF inventory are stan-
dardized among all individuals at the same age level in the sample. Maternal background variables are indicators for mother’s first occupation,
educational attainment, AFQT quartile, and birth year. The quartiles for the AFQT score are computed by comparing each mother’s AFQT score
to the AFQT scores of all female respondents in the NLSY79 with the same year of birth. The categories for occupation after first leaving school
are the 23 major occupational groups in the 2000 SOC. The categories for educational attainment are: less than high school graduate, high school
diploma, some college, college degree, and some post-graduate training. The upper set of estimates for each part of the HOME-SF inventory control
for race, gender, state of residence, a linear trend in survey year, and fixed effects for age at the end of the survey year. The lower set of estimates
for each part of the HOME-SF inventory control for race, gender, state of residence, indicator variables for survey year, fixed effects for age at the
end of the survey year, and a linear trend in survey year specific to each state of residence. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by survey year
for the upper set of estimates in each part and by state of residence for the lower set of estimates in each part, are reported in parentheses.
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trol for mother’s race, state of residence, fixed effects for mother’s year of birth, and a linear trend
in survey year. The specifications using the state unemployment rate as a regressor control for
mother’s race, state of residence, fixed effects for mother’s year of birth, indicator variables for
survey year, and a linear trend in survey year specific to each state of residence. Table 2.11 dis-
plays the results of the analysis. Although the coefficient on the unemployment rate is statistically
insignificant in most cases, the unemployment rate does have a significantly negative relationship
with some measures of parental quality. Hence, it is possible that the observed negative impacts
of the unemployment rate on the home environment could be attributed in part to changes over the
business cycle in the characteristics of parents raising children.
To reduce the potential influence of underlying changes in parental quality on the results, I
compute family and person fixed-effects estimates for the impact of the national unemployment
rate on the home environment. The former and latter sets of estimates are presented in Tables 2.12
and 2.13, respectively.42 The specifications contain indicator variables for age and a linear trend in
survey year.43 The point estimate for the coefficient on the unemployment rate is negative in most
cases. In the family fixed-effects regressions, the unemployment rate has a significantly negative
impact on the total, cognitive, and emotional scores for infants/toddlers and early adolescents. In
the person fixed-effects regressions, the unemployment rate has a significantly negative impact on
the cognitive score in middle childhood as well as the total, cognitive, and emotional scores in
early adolescence. Overall, the findings from the family and person fixed-effects regressions are
consistent with a causal effect of macroeconomic conditions on parental caregiving behavior.
Additional Items
To investigate the factors contributing to a relationship between the unemployment rate and
the quality of a child’s home environment, several items from each part of the HOME-SF inven-
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery was administered to participants in the NLSY79. In the regressions, the indica-
tors for mother’s test performance are binary variables for the mother’s AFQT score being above the first, second, and
third quartiles of all female participants in the NLSY79 with the same year of birth.
42To construct the dataset in Table 2.12, the sample from each part of Table 2.9 is limited to observations on
individuals having a sibling who belongs to the sample from that part of Table 2.9 in some survey year. To construct
the dataset in Table 2.13, the sample from each part of Table 2.9 is limited to observations on individuals who appear
in the sample from that part of Table 2.9 in at least two survey years.
43A gender dummy is also included in the family fixed-effects regressions.
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Table 2.11: Relationship of Unemployment Rates in Childhood to Maternal AFQT and Schooling
AFQT ≥ Q1 AFQT ≥ Q2 AFQT ≥ Q3 H.S. Diploma College Degree Grad. School
Mothers of Individuals in Home Inventory Part A
National Unemployment Rate for Youth when Infant/Toddler
U.E. Rate -0.0024 (0.0046) 0.0054 (0.0053) 0.0005 (0.0045) 0.0026 (0.0101) -0.0005 (0.0047) 0.0011 (0.0013)
State Unemployment Rate for Youth when Infant/Toddler
U.E. Rate 0.0005 (0.0069) -0.0096 (0.0088) -0.0069 (0.0070) -0.0096 (0.0079) -0.0106 (0.0082) 0.0004 (0.0035)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 6,232 Observations
Mothers of Individuals in Home Inventory Part B
National Unemployment Rate for Youth in Early Childhood
U.E. Rate 0.0040 (0.0063) -0.0043 (0.0064) -0.0056 (0.0054) 0.0023 (0.0155) -0.0103 (0.0047) -0.0019 (0.0016)
State Unemployment Rate for Youth in Early Childhood
U.E. Rate -0.0138 (0.0097) -0.0126 (0.0106) -0.0120 (0.0095) -0.0215 (0.0059) -0.0060 (0.0065) 0.0003 (0.0028)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 7,849 Observations
Mothers of Individuals in Home Inventory Part C
National Unemployment Rate for Youth in Middle Childhood
U.E. Rate -0.0062 (0.0112) -0.0074 (0.0076) -0.0029 (0.0052) -0.0025 (0.0213) -0.0054 (0.0037) -0.0007 (0.0016)
State Unemployment Rate for Youth in Middle Childhood
U.E. Rate -0.0085 (0.0059) -0.0074 (0.0060) -0.0051 (0.0061) -0.0165 (0.0048) -0.0069 (0.0041) -0.0003 (0.0023)
Sample Size 12 Years / 50 States / 11,270 Observations
Mothers of Individuals in Home Inventory Part D
National Unemployment Rate for Youth in Early Adolescence
U.E. Rate -0.0045 (0.0034) 0.0021 (0.0031) 0.0033 (0.0031) -0.0170 (0.0111) 0.0007 (0.0038) 0.0010 (0.0013)
State Unemployment Rate for Youth in Early Adolescence
U.E. Rate 0.0068 (0.0097) -0.0058 (0.0086) 0.0014 (0.0067) 0.0090 (0.0068) -0.0004 (0.0055) -0.0042 (0.0018)
Sample Size 11 Years / 50 States / 10,815 Observations
Note: The dataset used here is constructed as follows. First, the main estimation sample for the NLSY79-CH is restricted to individuals whose
mother has information on first occupation, years of schooling, and AFQT score. Second, every observation on an individual in the resulting sample
is matched to the available information on the individual’s mother. The quartiles for the AFQT score are computed by comparing each mother’s
AFQT score to the AFQT scores of all female respondents in the NLSY79 with the same year of birth. The upper set of estimates for each part of
the HOME-SF inventory control for mother’s race, state of residence, fixed effects for mother’s year of birth, and a linear trend in survey year. The
lower set of estimates for each part of the HOME-SF inventory control for mother’s race, state of residence, fixed effects for mother’s year of birth,
indicator variables for survey year, and a linear trend in survey year specific to each state of residence. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by
survey year for the upper set of estimates in each part and by state of residence for the lower set of estimates in each part, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.12: Family Fixed-Effects Estimates for Relationship of Current Unemployment Rate to
HOME-SF Inventory Scores for NLSY79-CH Sample
HOME-SF Inventory
Standardized Total Score Standardized Cognitive Score Standardized Emotional Score
Part A: Infant/Toddler
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0565 (0.0201) -0.0437 (0.0208) -0.0485 (0.0220)
Sample Size 1,576 Families / 3,779 Individuals / 4,723 Observations
Part B: Early Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0003 (0.0136) -0.0059 (0.0149) 0.0035 (0.0160)
Sample Size 1,988 Families / 4,899 Individuals / 6,393 Observations
Part C: Middle Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0142 (0.0107) -0.0197 (0.0108) -0.0017 (0.0130)
Sample Size 2,449 Families / 6,343 Individuals / 10,080 Observations
Part D: Early Adolescence
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0527 (0.0120) -0.0293 (0.0116) -0.0590 (0.0143)
Sample Size 2,163 Families / 5,539 Individuals / 9,604 Observations
Note: The dataset used here is constructed by restricting the main estimation sample for each part of the HOME-SF inventory to observations on
individuals who have a sibling in the sample for that part of the HOME-SF inventory in some survey year. The scores for each part of the HOME-SF
inventory are standardized among all individuals at the same age level in the sample. The specifications include a linear trend in survey year and
fixed effects for age at the end of each survey year. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by family, are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: Person Fixed-Effects Estimates for Relationship of Current Unemployment Rate to
HOME-SF Inventory Scores for NLSY79-CH Sample
HOME-SF Inventory
Standardized Total Score Standardized Cognitive Score Standardized Emotional Score
Part A: Infant/Toddler
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0663 (0.0352) -0.0643 (0.0361) -0.0346 (0.0382)
Sample Size 1,225 Individuals / 2,450 Observations
Part B: Early Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0173 (0.0215) -0.0329 (0.0244) 0.0029 (0.0263)
Sample Size 1,801 Individuals / 3,602 Observations
Part C: Middle Childhood
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0272 (0.0146) -0.0425 (0.0151) 0.0017 (0.0183)
Sample Size 4,080 Individuals / 8,306 Observations
Part D: Early Adolescence
Current National Unemployment Rate
U.E. Rate -0.0451 (0.0149) -0.0304 (0.0149) -0.0442 (0.0176)
Sample Size 3,924 Individuals / 8,563 Observations
Note: The dataset used here is constructed by restricting the main estimation sample for each part of the HOME-SF inventory to observations on
individuals who are in the sample for that part of the HOME-SF inventory in at least two years. The scores for each part of the HOME-SF inventory
are standardized among all individuals at the same age level in the sample. The specifications include a linear trend in survey year and fixed effects
for age at the end of each survey year. Huber-White standard errors, clustered by person, are reported in parentheses.
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tory are separately analyzed.44 The specifications from Tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 are
reestimated using the individual items instead of the aggregate scores as dependent variables. The
outcomes examined from each part of the HOME-SF inventory are as follows with the applicable
parts listed in parentheses: an indicator for the child having at least one children’s book (A, B, C,
D); an indicator for the mother reading to the child at least once a week (A, B, C); an indicator
for the mother taking the child to the grocery at least once a week (A); the number of cuddly or
role-playing toys that the child has (A); the number of push or pull toys that the child has (A);
an indicator for the child seeing his/her father daily (A, B); an indicator for the child eating with
both his/her mother and father at least once a day (A, B, C, D); an indicator for the mother having
spanked the child in the past week (A, B, C, D); an indicator for the child’s family receiving at least
one magazine regularly (B); an indicator for the child having a tape recorder or similar device (B);
an indicator for the child having been taken to a museum in the past year (B, C, D); the number
of hours that the television is on at home (B); an indicator for the child having a musical instru-
ment to use at home (C, D); an indicator for the child’s family receiving a daily newspaper (C, D);
an indicator for the child being taken to the theater in the past year (C, D); an indicator for the
child participating in special lessons or extracurricular activities (C, D); an indicator for the child
spending time daily with his/her father (C, D); an indicator for the parents discussing television
programs with the child (C, D).
In regressions similar to those from Table 2.9, the unemployment rate is seen to have different
influences at different stages of childhood. Using the national unemployment rate as a regressor,
the only statistically significant result is a negative impact in early adolescence on the probability
of having been taken to a museum in the past year. Using the state unemployment rate as a re-
gressor, a significant negative impact is found on: the number of cuddly or role-playing toys for
infants/toddlers; the presence of a tape recorder at home in early childhood; the probabilities in
middle childhood of spending time daily with one’s father and of eating with both one’s mother
and father at least once a day; the probabilities in early adolescence of having access to a musical
instrument at home, of having been taken to a museum in the past year, of eating with both one’s
mother and father at least once a day, and of having been spanked by one’s mother in the past week.
The state unemployment rate is also seen to have a significant positive impact in early childhood
44The estimates summarized here are available from the author on request.
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on the probability of having been taken to a museum in the past year.
To assess whether changes over the business cycle in the characteristics of parents raising chil-
dren are affecting the results, the regressions are performed both including and excluding maternal
background variables as in Table 2.10. In most cases, the estimates do not change substantially
depending on whether or not maternal background variables are added to the specifications. How-
ever, the national unemployment rate has a significant negative impact on participation in special
lessons among early adolescents if and only if maternal background controls are excluded, and the
state unemployment rate has a significant negative impact in early adolescence on the probabilities
of having been taken to a museum in the past year and of having been spanked by one’s mother in
the past week if and only if maternal background controls are included.45
In addition, family and person fixed-effects estimates are computed as in Tables 2.12 and 2.13,
in order to account for a possible relationship between the unemployment rate and parental back-
ground. In the family fixed-effects regressions, a significant negative impact of the national un-
employment rate is found on: the probability of the child’s family receiving at least one magazine
regularly in early childhood; the probabilities in middle childhood of having access to a musical
instrument at home, of having been taken to a museum in the past year, and of having been taken
to the theater in the past year; the probabilities in early adolescence of having been taken to a
museum in the past year and of participating in special lessons. The unemployment rate also has a
significant positive impact in these regressions on the probability among early adolescents of being
spanked by one’s mother in the past week. In the person fixed-effects regressions, a significant pos-
itive impact of the national unemployment rate is found on the probabilities in middle childhood of
having been taken to a museum in the past year, of having been taken to the theater in the past year,
and of participating in special lessons as well as the probability in early adolescence of having
been taken to a museum in the past year. The unemployment rate also has a significant positive
impact in these regressions on the probability among infants/toddlers of having been spanked by
one’s mother in the past week.
The discussion thus far has paid little attention to parental behavior during the prenatal and
postnatal period. However, the NLSY79-CH contains a number of questions related to this topic,
45Recall that the sample from Table 2.10 is a subset of the sample from Table 2.9. Hence, the estimates for the
specification without maternal background variables using the sample from Table 2.10 can differ from those using the
sample from Table 2.9.
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which I use to document the impact of economic conditions on prenatal and postnatal care.46 The
outcomes examined are: an indicator for the mother visiting a medical professional for prenatal
care; indicators for the mother drinking alcohol and smoking in the twelve months before the
child’s birth; indicators for the mother taking vitamins, reducing caloric intake, and lowering salt
consumption during pregnancy; the gestation length for the child in weeks; indicators for the
child being born preterm, at term, and postterm; an indicator for the child being delivered by
Caesarean section; the child’s birth weight in ounces; indicators for the child being born with low
birth weight, very low birth weight, and extremely low birth weight; the child’s length at birth in
inches; indicators for the child being ever breastfed, breastfed for at least six months, breastfed for
at least one year, and breastfed for at least eighteen months.47
The main estimation sample consists of children who have valid data on the variables listed
above as well as information on year of birth and mother’s state of residence at age fourteen.48 Only
individuals whose mother belongs to the cross-sectional or supplemental sample of the NLSY79
are included. The analysis focuses on macroeconomic conditions around the time of a child’s birth.
The average unemployment rate in the year before the child’s birth and the year of the child’s birth
is used for outcomes related to the period before or at birth, and the average unemployment rate in
the year of the child’s birth and the year after the child’s birth is used for outcomes related to the
period after birth.49
I begin by performing an analysis similar to that in Table 2.9. In specifications using the
national unemployment rate around the time of the child’s birth as a regressor, the control variables
are indicators for race and gender, fixed effects for mother’s state of residence at age fourteen, and a
46The results summarized here are available from the author on request.
47A birth is defined as preterm if the gestation length is 36 weeks or less, at term if the gestation length is between
37 and 42 weeks inclusive, and postterm if the gestation length is 43 weeks or more. An infant’s birth weight is defined
as low if it is no more than 88 ounces, very low if it is no more than 52 ounces, and extremely low if it is no more than
35 ounces.
48The dataset is limited to individuals whose mother was residing in one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia
at age fourteen.
49The outcomes related to the period before or at birth are: the mother visiting a medical professional for prenatal
care; the mother smoking and drinking during pregnancy; the mother taking vitamins, reducing calories, lowering salt;
the child’s gestation length; the mother giving birth pre-term, at term, and postterm; the mother having a Caesarean
section; the child’s birth weight; the child’s birth weight being low, very low, and extremely low; the child’s length
at birth. The outcomes related to the period after birth are the child being ever breastfed as well as the child being
breastfed for at least six months, one year, and eighteen months.
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linear trend in year of birth.50 In specifications using the state unemployment rate around the time
of the child’s birth as a regressor, the control variables are indicators for race and gender, fixed
effects for mother’s state of residence at age fourteen and for child’s year of birth, and a linear
trend in child’s year of birth specific to each state of residence for the mother at age fourteen.51
The main findings from these regressions are as follows. A significant positive impact of the
national unemployment rate around birth is found on the probabilities of the mother lowering salt
consumption during pregnancy, of the child ever being breastfed, and of the child being breastfed
for at least six months. A significant negative impact of the state unemployment rate around birth
is found on the probability of the mother drinking alcohol in the twelve months before the child’s
birth as well as the child’s gestation length and length at birth.
I also conduct several exercises to determine whether the results are driven by a relationship
between the unemployment rate and parental background. As in Table 2.10, I estimate the speci-
fications including and excluding maternal background variables. In general, the main findings do
not change much with the addition of these variables. As in Table 2.11, I test for an association of
the unemployment rate with the schooling levels and test scores of parents. In specifications us-
ing the national unemployment rate around the time of the child’s birth as a regressor, the control
variables are dummies for child’s race, fixed effects for mother’s state of residence at age fourteen
and for mother’s year of birth, and a linear trend in child’s year of birth. In specifications using the
state unemployment rate around the time of the child’s birth as a regressor, the control variables
are dummies for child’s race, fixed effects for mother’s state of residence at age fourteen and for
mother’s year of birth, indicators for child’s year of birth, and a linear trend in child’s year of birth
specific to each state of residence for the mother at age fourteen. These regressions indicate that
the unemployment rate has a significant positive impact on the probability of the child’s mother
having completed high school. Hence, it is possible that changes over the business cycle in the
characteristics of mothers giving birth could explain improved prenatal and postnatal care during
a recession.
To lessen the potential influence of parental background on the results, I compute family fixed-
effects estimates as in Table 2.12 using children with a sibling also in the sample. The specification
50The standard errors are clustered by year born.
51The standard errors are clustered by mother’s state of residence at age fourteen.
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controls for gender as well as a linear trend in year of birth. In these regressions, the national un-
employment rate is seen to have a significant positive impact on the probabilities of the mother
reducing caloric intake during pregnancy, of the mother lowering salt consumption during preg-
nancy, of the child ever being breastfed, and of the child being breastfed for six months. Overall,
a higher unemployment rate appears to generate an improvement in some aspects of prenatal and
postnatal care even after accounting for the quality of mothers giving birth.
Robustness Checks
This section describes the results from a series of robustness checks parallel to those in sec-
tions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. First, the specifications in the lower row of each panel from Tables 2.9, 2.10,
and 2.11 are reestimated using the rate of insured unemployment for each state instead of the state
unemployment rate as a regressor. This substitution does not substantially affect the conclusions
of the analysis. However, state unemployment is now seen to have a significantly negative impact
in Table 2.9 on the emotional score for early adolescents. In addition, the negative impact of state
unemployment in Table 2.10 on the cognitive score for early adolescents does not gain significance
after the inclusion of parental background variables, and the negative relationship of state unem-
ployment to maternal high school completion in Table 2.11 is no longer statistically significant for
individuals in middle childhood.
Second, the estimates in Tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 are replicated using the employment-
to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate as a gauge of labor market tightness. On
balance, the findings from Table 2.9 do not change much as a result of this modification. Worse
national economic conditions are now seen to have a significant negative impact on the total score
for early adolescents, and worse state economic conditions are now seen to have a significant nega-
tive impact on the total and cognitive scores in early childhood. Nonetheless, the negative impacts
of worse state economic conditions on the total and emotional scores in middle childhood as well
as the total score in early adolescence are no longer statistically significant.
In Table 2.10, the results using the employment-to-population ratio usually resemble those us-
ing the unemployment rate, although some changes should be noted. Worse national economic
conditions are observed to have a significant negative impact on the total score for early adoles-
cents both before and after controlling for maternal background variables. By contrast, the negative
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impacts of worse state economic conditions on total and cognitive scores in early childhood lose
significance after maternal background variables are added to the specification, and no statisti-
cally significant impact of state economic conditions on the total, emotional, or cognitive score is
detected in middle childhood or early adolescence irrespective of the inclusion of maternal back-
ground variables. In Table 2.11, there continues to be some evidence of a significant relationship
between economic conditions and maternal characteristics.
Computing family and person fixed-effects estimates as in Tables 2.12 and 2.13, a significant
impact of economic conditions on the home environment is detected at several stages of childhood
when using the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate as a regressor. In
addition to the significant results originally obtained in Table 2.12, a significant negative impact of
worse economic conditions is found on the total and cognitive scores in early childhood as well as
the total, cognitive, and emotional scores in middle childhood. In addition to the significant results
originally obtained in Table 2.13, a significant negative impact of worse economic conditions is
found on the total and cognitive scores for infants/toddlers as well as the total score in middle
childhood.
Third, the estimates in Tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13 are recalculated using only chil-
dren with a mother in the cross-sectional sample of the NLSY79.52 This restriction leaves the
basic pattern of results in Table 2.9 mostly unaffected. However, the negative impacts of the state
unemployment rate on the total scores in middle childhood and early adolescence lose significance.
On balance, the findings from Table 2.10 do not change drastically as a result of excluding
children with a mother in the supplemental sample. The national unemployment rate now has a
significant negative impact on the total score in early adolescence both before and after the addi-
tion of maternal background variables, but the state unemployment rate no longer has a significant
negative impact on the total score in middle childhood before or after maternal background vari-
ables are included. In addition, the negative impact of the state unemployment rate on the total
score in early adolescence is now significant only after controlling for maternal background, and
the negative impact of the state unemployment rate on the cognitive score in early adolescence no
longer gains significance after the inclusion of maternal background variables.
52The original dataset contains individuals with a mother in the cross-sectional or supplemental sample of the
NLSY79. Blacks, hispanics, and disadvantaged whites are overrepresented in the supplemental sample.
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In Table 2.11, there is only weak evidence of a systematic relationship between the unem-
ployment rate and maternal characteristics once the analysis is limited to children whose mother
belongs to the cross-sectional sample. In particular, the national unemployment rate has a sig-
nificant negative impact only on the probability for early adolescents of one’s mother completing
high school and a significant positive impact only on the probability for early adolescents of one’s
mother having an AFQT score above the second quartile. Using the restricted sample, the state
unemployment rate does not have a significant impact on any of the maternal characteristics exam-
ined.
The findings from the family and person fixed-effects regressions in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 are
largely robust to the removal of the supplemental sample. The only notable change is that the
negative impact of the national unemployment rate on the emotional score for infants/toddlers is
no longer statistically significant in the family fixed-effects regressions.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper employs several strategies to examine the influence of macroeconomic conditions
in childhood on labor market outcomes as an adult. Using a large sample of individuals from the
Census, I find significant evidence of a negative relationship between the average unemployment
rate in childhood and some measures of schooling, employment, and income. However, the es-
timates provide little support for the hypothesis that economic conditions earlier versus later in
childhood are a bigger determinant of adult outcomes.
Using a matched sample of parents and children from the PSID, I demonstrate that the findings
cannot be easily attributed to selection by parents over the business cycle into raising children. In
particular, the impact of childhood economic conditions does not weaken much after controlling
for parental background variables, and the quality of parents raising children does not appear to
be lower during an economic downturn. Moreover, a negative impact of the unemployment rate in
childhood on adult economic performance is observed in family fixed-effects regressions, although
the estimates are not always statistically significant. The results are typically robust to changes in
the construction of the sample and the measurement of economic conditions.
Using detailed information on parental caregiving behavior from the NLSY79-CH, I investigate
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how the quality of a child’s home environment varies over the business cycle, in order to illustrate
a possible mechanism behind the impact of childhood economic conditions. The data indicate
that some measures of a child’s household surroundings deteriorate during a recession. Family
and person fixed-effects estimates confirm that the negative influence of the unemployment rate
on parental caregiving cannot be entirely explained by a relationship between macroeconomic
conditions and the background characteristics of parents raising children.
In sum, the evidence in this paper is consistent with a causal effect of childhood economic
conditions on parental investments in children as well as the stock of human capital in adulthood.
The observed impacts are often large in magnitude. However, the effect sizes can vary substantially
with the sample used, the outcome analyzed, and the estimation strategy employed. In terms
of policy implications, the empirical results provide a possible rationale for targeting economic
stimulus programs towards children. Policies designed to improve a child’s home environment
might help mitigate some of the adverse impacts of a recession on adult economic outcomes.
Improvements in neighborhoods and schools might also be beneficial for this purpose, although
these mechanisms were not explored in this paper. Additionally, the empirical results do not seem
to suggest a strong advantage to concentrating assistance on younger versus older children.
Chapter 3
Sequential Exchange with Stochastic
Transaction Costs
This chapter is joint work with Yuichiro Kamada.
3.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the following situation. Two firms operating in different markets
find it potentially profitable to exchange trade secrets, but there is a cost for transferring knowledge
from one firm to the other. This cost might represent the resources spent training employees of the
other firm or the expense of encrypting data to protect secrets from outsiders. Because of the
intangible nature of information, it is infeasible for the two parties to write a court-enforceable
contract specifying the goods to be traded. Moreover, if one party immediately reveals all of its
information to the other party, then the latter would have no incentive to reveal its information to
the former, because transferring knowledge is costly. In this situation, how can the two parties
exchange their knowledge with each other?
We study the bilateral exchange of divisible goods in a continuous-time environment. Each of
two agents possesses an equal amount of a different good that only the other agent values. In order
to transfer some amount of her own good to the other party, an agent must pay a transaction cost
100
Chapter 3: Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs 101
that evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion.1 Although the first-best solution requires
each agent to make a single transfer of all her good to the other agent once the cost reaches a
certain cutoff value, such a policy cannot be supported as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium
in the absence of court-enforceable contracts, because each agent is unwilling to transfer her own
good after receiving all the other agent’s good.
Our main objective is to solve for an incentive-compatible transaction scheme in which agents
can realize positive gains from trade by making a sequence of gradually decreasing transfers. We
obtain a closed-form solution for the unique maximal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Due to the uniqueness of the result, we can derive a number of meaningful comparative statics.
Specifically, we show that as agents become infinitely patient, the expected discounted payoff
from the second-best policy converges to the efficient outcome, provided that the drift of the cost
process is not excessively high relative to its volatility.
The idea behind the construction of an incentive-compatible scheme with positive transfers is
simple. In equilibrium, when the two agents make transfers, they withhold some amount of the
goods. The agents continue to transfer the withheld goods if and only if both parties have made
the prescribed transfers in the past. Because the agents receive a positive continuation value if and
only if they make the prescribed transfers, they are willing to incur a positive transaction cost in
equilibrium.
The key tradeoff lies between the size of the next transfer and the waiting time until the trans-
fer. In order for agents to anticipate a high ex ante payoff, they must exchange a large amount of
the goods at the next transaction. Hence, the amount withheld must be small. Because the result-
ing continuation value is low, the agents are willing to incur only a small cost when making the
transaction. However, the expected waiting time for a small cost to realize is high. Since agents
discount the future, a lengthy waiting time reduces the ex ante expected payoff. The maximal sym-
metric equilibrium derived in this paper balances the tradeoff between the size of the next transfer
and the waiting time until the transfer.
Methodologically, we combine the theory of optimal investment under uncertainty with the the-
1 The assumption of geometric Brownian motion is standard in the literature on investment under uncertainty.
For example, geometric Brownian motion is used by McDonald and Siegel (1986) to model the market value of an
investment, by Dixit (1991) to model a demand parameter, and by Bertola and Caballero (1994) to model an index of
business conditions.
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ory of repeated games by imposing incentive-compatibility constraints on investment decisions.2
The difference from standard models of repeated games is that the set of feasible actions and hence
the set of feasible instantaneous payoffs irreversibly changes depending on the actions taken by
agents. This feature makes it difficult to extrapolate from the literature on stochastic games, be-
cause existing research generally assumes irreducibility of the state transition.3
Besides the aforementioned example, our framework fits a number of social situations in the
real world where exchanges of goods are involved. For instance, consider the exchange of prisoners
or hostages between two groups that are enemies of each other or that are at war, as in the transfer
of captives that took place between the Taliban and the North Alliance.4 The two agents in the
model would be representatives of the parties who are negotiating for the release of prisoners.
Each group typically does not derive any benefit from holding prisoners of war from the other
group, but each group wishes to exchange these captives for the return of its own prisoners held
by the other group. The stochastic transfer cost might be a measure of the political climate or
degree of tensions between the two groups. When the tensions are high and the relationship is
more hostile, each group has a high cost of releasing prisoners from the other group. When the
tensions are low and the relationship is less hostile, each group has a low cost of releasing prisoners
from the other group. In the example of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, what happened was
a gradual exchange of prisoners, as our model predicts.
A further prediction of our model is that the size of transfers decreases over time. An example
of this pattern in the real world is provided in Article Two of the Treaty with the Creeks at Indian
Springs in February of 1812.5 The following extract describes how the United States intended to
compensate the Creek Indians for lands ceded to the state of Georgia:
But whereas said Creek nation have considerable improvements within the limits of the ter-
ritory hereby ceded, and will, moreover, have to incur expenses in their removal, it is further
stipulated that, for the purpose of rendering a fair equivalent for the losses and inconveniences
which said nation will sustain by removal, and to enable them to obtain supplies in their new
2See footnote 1 for references to the literature on investment under uncertainty.
3 See Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011), and Horner et al. (2011) for folk theorems in stochastic
games at varying levels of generality.
4A news article on prisoner exchanges between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance can be found at http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/203926.stm.
5A copy of this document can be found at http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/indspri2.htm.
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settlement, the United States agree to pay to the nation emigrating from the lands herein ceded
the sum of four hundred thousand dollars; of which amount there shall be paid to said party
of the second part, as soon as practicable after the ratification of this treaty, the sum of two
hundred thousand dollars. And as soon as the said party of the second part shall notify the
Government of the United States of their readiness to commence their removal, there shall
be paid the further sum of one hundred thousand dollars. And the first year after said em-
igrating party shall have settled in their new country, they shall receive, of the amount first
above named, the further sum of twenty-five thousand dollars; and the second year, the sum
of twenty-five thousand dollars; and annually thereafter, the sum of five thousand dollars, until
the whole is paid.
According to the agreement, the United States would make a gradually decreasing series of mon-
etary payments to the Creek Indians as they progressively surrendered their existing lands and
relocated to a different territory.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3.3 outlines our basic model of bilateral trade with stochastic transaction costs and defines
the concept of a maximal symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium in the context of our model. In
section 3.4, we analyze the model in several steps. First, we prove an impossibility result stating
that if (a) the transaction cost is bounded below by a positive number and (b) the quantity of goods
available for trade is fixed, then there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium in which an agent obtains
a positive expected discounted payoff.
We then relax assumption (a) by considering the case where the transaction cost follows a
geometric Brownian motion. In this case, we derive a closed-form solution for the unique maximal
symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the agents obtain positive expected discounted
payoffs by exchanging the goods through a sequence of transfers of decreasing size. Section 3.5
presents a number of comparative statics for the solution. In section 3.6, we prove an efficiency
result stating that the first-best expected discounted payoffs can be approximated as the agents
become infinitely patient, provided that the drift of the cost process is not excessively high relative
to its volatility.
Section 3.7 examines the robustness of our results. First, in subsection 3.7.1, we relax assump-
tion (b) by considering a model in which the supply of each good evolves according to a geometric
Brownian motion. We show that if there is some volatility in the supply of each good, then positive
gains from trade can be supported in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, even if the transaction cost is
a positive constant. In subsection 3.7.2, we consider the case where the transaction cost depends
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not only on the term that evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion, but also on a term
that is proportional to the amount of each good transferred. We show that positive transfers can be
sustained in such a setting.
Finally, section 3.8 offers some concluding remarks. All proofs, except the one for the main
result (Theorem 3.4.4), are provided in the appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
Our model is related to a line of literature on gradualism in contribution games and concession
bargaining.6 In these models, parties arrive at an agreement in a step-by-step fashion, and there is
an efficiency loss due to delay in reaching an agreement. Likewise, cooperation between the two
parties in our model is sustained through a gradual sequence of transactions over time. Nonethe-
less, our model differs from much of this literature in that transactions continue indefinitely in
equilibrium; so that, our model cannot be solved using an iterated-dominance procedure. The key
modeling difference from, for instance, Admati and Perry (1991) is that in their model, a bene-
fit from cooperation is realized only when a joint project is completed, whereas in our model, a
benefit is received every time a transaction takes place.
Kamada and Kandori (2009) consider the exchange of goods in the context of a revision game
in which agents have an opportunity to revise their actions according to a Poisson process and
payoffs are realized only upon reaching a given deadline. Those authors construct an equilibrium
in which a nontrivial exchange occurs at the deadline and transfers become smaller and smaller as
the deadline approaches. However, the logic behind gradually decreasing transfers is significantly
different in our paper. In their model, an assumption on payoff functions implies that as actions
become smaller, the instantaneous gain from deviation becomes infinitely negligible relative to the
payoff from cooperation, whereas in our model, the transfers must become smaller because the
stock of goods is fixed, and an infinite sequence of transfers is required to sustain cooperation.
Moreover, since payoffs realize only once in Kamada and Kandori (2009), the tradeoff between
the transfer size and the waiting time described in the introduction is not an issue in their paper.
The paper most closely related to ours is Pitchford and Snyder (2004). Those authors consider
6See Admati and Perry (1991); Compte and Jehiel (1995, 2003, 2004); Marx and Matthews (2000).
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a holdup problem between a buyer and a seller in which no investment occurs in the equilibrium
of the static game. In a dynamic version of their model, however, positive investment can be
supported as part of an equilibrium in which the seller’s investment and the buyer’s repayment
take place alternately.
There are a number of differences between the model in Pitchford and Snyder (2004) and the
framework developed in this paper. Pitchford and Snyder (2004) consider a discrete-time model
with no uncertainty in the cost of transacting with the other party or the gains from trade that can be
realized. By contrast, this paper analyzes a continuous-time setting that accommodates volatility
in both the cost of transferring goods between parties and the quantity of goods available for trade.
Furthermore, as Pitchford and Snyder (2004) observe, the equilibrium of their model is not robust
to the inclusion of a fixed cost for making a transaction. If the seller must incur a fixed cost for
investing instead of a variable cost that decreases to zero with the size of the investment, then an
equilibrium with positive investment by the seller cannot be supported in an equilibrium of their
model. Our model provides two ways of resolving this issue. If there is uncertainty in either the
fixed cost of making a transaction or the quantity of goods available for trade, then agents might
be able to realize positive gains from trade as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In addition, the efficiency properties of our model are somewhat more nuanced than those of
Pitchford and Snyder (2004). Those authors demonstrate that as discounting frictions disappear,
the solution to their model converges to the efficient outcome. In our model, the fixed cost of
making a transaction acts as an additional friction in the bargaining process. Consequently, in
the limit as the discount rate approaches zero, the solution to our model converges to the efficient
outcome if and only if the drift of the transaction cost process is sufficiently low relative to its
volatility. Even if this condition is satisfied, the efficiency of the equilibrium is not obvious given
the results in Pitchford and Snyder (2004), because the timing of transactions in our model is
endogenous. As agents become infinitely patient, not only does the cost of the first transaction
decrease but the expected waiting time until this transaction increases. What our efficiency result
demonstrates is that the positive effect due to a lower discount rate dominates the negative effect
due to a longer waiting time. In contrast, the model of Pitchford and Snyder (2004) predicts that a
large amount of transfer occurs at the very first period irrespective of the degree of friction.
Finally, our model is related to the large literature on repeated games. In standard models of
repeated games, agents play a stage game for infinitely many periods, and the payoff structure
Chapter 3: Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs 106
for the stage game is typically constant over time.7 For such models, the folk theorem states that
any individually rational and feasible payoff can be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the supergame if the discount rate is sufficiently low. Such equilibria are sustained by using the
threat of future punishment to enforce cooperation in the current period. Likewise, the loss of
future utility from deviating provides an incentive for agents in our model to exchange goods with
each other. Nonetheless, there are two important differences between our model and the standard
framework. First, in the case where the total supply of each good is fixed, the present discounted
value of the relationship must eventually decrease with time if each agent is transferring a positive
quantity of her good. Hence, it is not immediately obvious that a non-degenerate equilibrium can
be sustained in our model. Indeed, we obtain an impossibility result demonstrating that a positive
expected discounted payoff cannot be supported in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of our model if
the transaction cost is bounded below by a positive number and the quantity of each good available
for trade is fixed. Second, the timing of moves is exogenously specified in standard models of
repeated games, but in our model it is an endogenous strategic response to the realization of the
cost process.
3.3 Model of Stochastic Transaction Costs
There are two agents, 1 and 2, who take actions in continuous time t ∈ [0,∞). The discount
rate is ρ > 0. There are two divisible goods, 1 and 2. The allocation of the goods at time t is
represented by st = [(s11t , s
12
t ), (s
21
t , s
22
t )], where s
ij
t denotes the amount of good j that agent i
possesses at time t. The total supply q > 0 of each good is taken to be constant over time; so that,
s1jt + s
2j
t = q > 0 for j = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0,∞).8 The initial endowment vector is assumed to be
s0 = [(q, 0), (0, q)]. That is, agent 1 is endowed with all of good 1, and agent 2 is endowed with all
of good 2. This assumption is without loss of generality provided that s110 = s
22
0 . In addition, there
is a transaction cost Ct for transferring goods between the two parties, which changes over time
7For example, see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). In addition, see footnote 3 for papers that analyze stochastic
games.
8Section 3.7.1 presents a model in which the supply of each good can vary over time.
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according to some stochastic process.9 For ease of exposition, the initial state C0 of the transaction
cost is assumed to be sufficiently high (e.g., C0 > q/ρ).
In every instant of time, each agent observes the current realization of the cost and chooses an
amount to transfer to the other agent. Formally, let Ht denote the set of all histories up to time
t, and let ht = ({Cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), Ct) be a generic element of this set. By convention, let h0 be the
null history consisting of a singleton set. Denote the set of all histories by H =
⋃
t∈R+ Ht. Then a
strategy for agent i = 1, 2 is a function pii : H → R+ satisfying pii(ht) ∈ [0, sˆiit ] for ht ∈ H and
sˆiit = limτ→t− s
ii
τ , where sˆ
ii
t denotes the amount of agent i’s good remaining when she chooses a
transfer at time t.10 The transfer made at time t by agent i = 1, 2 is denoted by xit = sˆ
ii
t − siit .
Finally, let Πi with generic element pii represent the set of all possible strategies for agent i.
We typically restrict attention to symmetric strategies. Our definition of a symmetric strategy
profile is provided below.
Definition A strategy profile pi is symmetric if pi1(ht) = pi2(ht) for any ht ∈ H such that
{s11τ }τ<t = {s22τ }τ<t.
The preceding definition of symmetry requires that given any symmetric history of play up to time
t, agent 1’s transfer of good 1 at time t is equal to agent 2’s transfer of good 2 at time t.
If {st} is the time path of allocations induced by a given symmetric strategy profile pi when the
cost path is {Ct}, then let t(k; pi) denote the time when the kth transfer is made.11 If the strategy
profile pi and the cost path {Ct} are such that fewer than k transactions occur in total, then define
9We do not allow for a continuous transfer of the good in which the transferred amount is zero at each moment but
the integrated amount with respect to time is positive. To avoid this possibility, one could define an expanded strategy
space in which at every moment of time, each agent chooses In or Out as well as the amount to transfer. A transaction
can be made and a transaction cost is paid if and only if In is chosen.
10Note that the limit exists because siit is a monotonic function of time. Defining strategies in continuous time
involves a number of difficulties in general, as discussed in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989). Nonetheless, agents take
only a countable number of actions as a best response after any history because a discrete positive cost is incurred at
every instance at which a transfer is made; so that, this definition of strategies is innocuous.
11We assume that for any τ > 0, the number of transactions in time [0, τ ] is finite with probability one. This
restriction is justified for the cost processes considered in this paper. In particular, if this restriction is violated when
strategy profile pi is played, each agent would make an infinite number of transfers in a finite amount of time with
positive probability, thereby obtaining an expected discounted payoff of −∞. Clearly, such a pi cannot constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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t(k; pi) =∞. The present discounted payoff to each agent at time d is given by
Ud(pi, {Ct}) =
∫ ∞
d
e−ρ·(t−d)sijt dt −
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]Ct(k;pi) for j 6= i. (3.1)
Since there is no uncertainty regarding past play and past events, we use subgame-perfect
equilibrium (henceforth “SPE”) as our equilibrium concept. Let Π∗ denote the nonempty set of
all symmetric SPE.12 In addition, when strategy profile pi is played, let E[Ud(pi, {Ct})|{C˜τ}τ∈[0,d]]
denote the expected discounted payoff to each agent at time d given that the cost path up to time d
is {C˜τ}τ∈[0,d]. Our definition of optimal behavior is as follows.
Definition A symmetric SPE pi is maximal in the class of symmetric SPE if for every time d and
cost path {C˜τ}τ∈[0,d] up to time d, there is no pi′ ∈ Π∗ such that E[Ud(pi′, {Ct})|{C˜τ}τ∈[0,d]] >
E[Ud(pi, {Ct})|{C˜τ}τ∈[0,d]].
There are several reasons for focusing on a maximal equilibrium.13 First, such an equilibrium is
salient. Second, we consider a situation in which the two parties have made an informal agreement
with each other. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that agents can coordinate their play so as to
induce their preferred outcome as long as the incentive constraints of each party are not violated.
Third, restricting attention to such an equilibrium makes it possible to obtain a unique solution,
which enables us to obtain meaningful comparative statics.
3.4 Analysis of Model
We begin with the following result that greatly simplifies the analysis as well as the exposition.
12The strategy profile in which each agent never makes a transfer conditional on any history is an element of Π∗;
therefore, the set Π∗ is nonempty.
13A weaker definition of a maximal symmetric equilibrium pi would simply require there to be no pi′ ∈ Π∗ such that
E[U0(pi′, {Ct})] > E[U0(pi, {Ct})]. The analysis of the model would not change substantially under this alternative
definition, except that there would be no restriction on events occurring with zero probability in equilibrium. In order
to simplify the exposition by eliminating reference to zero-probability events, the stronger definition given above is
used.
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Proposition 3.4.1 The expected discounted payoff Ud(pi, {Ct}) given in equation (3.1) is propor-
tional to
sijt(k−1;pi) +
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]xjt(k;pi) −
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]ct(k;pi),
where i 6= j, ct = ρCt, and t(k − 1;pi) = 0 if k = 1.
In other words, with an appropriate rescaling of the cost process, each agent can be regarded as
consuming the good from the other agent as soon as it is received.14 Because of its tractability,
we work directly with the process ct in our analysis, but we always keep in mind the original
maximization problem involving Ct.
The following theorem is an impossibility result. If the transaction cost is bounded below
by a positive number and the quantity of each good available for trade is fixed, then there is no
equilibrium in which an agent receives a positive expected discounted payoff.
Theorem 3.4.2 Assume that {c˜t} is an arbitrary cost process defined on the probability space
(Ω,F , P ) and that each random variable c˜t for t ≥ 0 takes values in the state space S ⊂ R with
inf(S) = c > 0. Then any SPE strategy profile satisfies sijt = 0 for all t and j 6= i.
Note that this result does not depend on assuming symmetric or maximal equilibrium strategies.
Furthermore, the proof only relies on an induction argument. That is, for any given c > 0 in
the statement of the theorem, only a finite hierarchy of knowledge about rationality is needed to
establish the proposition.
There are two approaches to resolve this issue and to proceed with the analysis. Section 3.7.1
examines a model with uncertainty in the quantity of each good available for trade, demonstrating
that the impossibility result may not hold in such a setting. In the current section, we relax the
assumption that the transaction cost is bounded below by a positive number while maintaining the
assumption that there is no uncertainty in the quantity of goods available for trade. Specifically, we
assume that the cost process ct follows a geometric Brownian motion dct = µctdt + σctdzt with
arbitrary drift µ and positive volatility σ2 > 0.
14Note that the additional term sijt(k−1;pi) simply reflects the fact that agent i can have some amount of good j at
time d. The presence of this term does not affect the analysis in this section.
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We will restrict attention to SPE in grim-trigger strategies. The following result provides justi-
fication for this restriction. Note again that this proposition does not require symmetric or maximal
equilibrium strategies to be played.
Proposition 3.4.3 Given an arbitrary SPE, there exists an SPE in grim-trigger strategies that
achieves the same equilibrium path of play.
In particular, this proposition implies that given an arbitrary symmetric SPE, there exists a sym-
metric SPE in grim-trigger strategies that achieves the same continuation payoff after any history
on the equilibrium path. However, the proposition has further content. It states that when char-
acterizing the equilibrium strategies on the path of play, it is permissible to limit the analysis to
grim-trigger strategies.
The basic idea behind the proof is that each agent can always obtain a continuation payoff of
zero by transferring nothing. If an opponent uses a grim-trigger strategy, then zero is the maximum
payoff that can be achieved after any deviation. Thus, the grim-trigger strategy is the most severe
punishment available.
Hereafter, we restrict attention to maximal symmetric SPE in grim-trigger strategies. We can
now state the main theorem of this paper, which provides a closed-form solution for the equilibrium
strategies.
Theorem 3.4.4 Any maximal symmetric SPE in grim-trigger strategies is characterized by a se-
quence {c∗k, x∗k}∞k=1 satisfying
c∗k =
(
q
1− β
)(
β
β − 1
)k−β
and x∗k =
(
q
1− β
)(
β
β − 1
)k−1
with
β = 1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
,
such that the kth transaction is made when the cost reaches c∗k for the first time, and the amount x
∗
k
is transferred by each agent at this transaction.
Proof We show that any maximal symmetric SPE in grim-trigger strategies is characterized by
the formula in the statement of the theorem. By Proposition 3.4.3, every maximal symmetric SPE
Chapter 3: Sequential Exchange with Stochastic Transaction Costs 111
must induce the same equilibrium path of play. Our proof relies on a sequence of nine lemmata
that are presented below.
It is helpful to introduce some further notation. Given any history ht such that {s11τ }τ<t =
{s22τ }τ<t, let W (ht; pi) denote the expected discounted payoff to each agent if both agents follow
the symmetric strategy profile pi from time t onwards. Letting Π˜ denote the set of symmetric SPE,
we define V (ct, sˆiit ) = supp˜i∈Π˜W (ht; p˜i), where ht is a history such that the cost at time t is ct,
the stock immediately before time t is sˆ11t = sˆ
22
t , and {s11τ }τ<t = {s22τ }τ<t.15 In addition, define
Y (ht; pi) as follows. If pii(ht) = 0, then Y (ht; pi) = W (ht; pi). If pii(ht) > 0, then Y (ht; pi) =
W (ht; pi)− [pii(ht)− ct].
We begin by establishing a few properties of the value function V (c, s) for the problem. The
result below shows that V (c, s) is decreasing in the size of the cost c and increasing in the stock of
each good s.
Lemma 3.4.5 V (c, s) is decreasing in c and increasing in s.
Proof To show that V (c, s) is decreasing in c, choose any α ∈ (0, 1). Fix any history ht =
({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and sˆiit = s. Let pi be an arbitrary symmetric SPE with W (ht; pi) >
0. Consider the symmetric SPE pi′ defined as follows. First, the agents make no transfers until a
history h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = αc and sˆ′iit′ = s is reached. Second, upon reaching
such a history h′t′ , the agents follow the symmetric strategy profile pi
′′, behaving as if the time is t
instead of t′ and the history is hˆt instead of h′t′ , where hˆt = ({αcτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), αct). The SPE pi′′ is
defined as follows. If h¯u = ({c¯τ , s¯τ}τ∈[0,u), c¯u) and h˜u = ({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u) are histories such that
({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u) = ({αc¯τ , s¯τ}τ∈[0,u), αc¯u), then pi′′i (h˜u) = pii(h¯u). Observe that W (h′t′ ; pi′) >
W (ht; pi). That is, given an arbitrary symmetric SPE pi and any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct)
with ct = c and sˆiit = s, one can find a symmetric SPE pi
′ such that W (h′t′ ; pi
′) > W (ht; pi) for any
history h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = αc and sˆ′iit′ = s.
Noting that V (c, s) > 0, choose any  such that 0 <  < V (c, s). Then one can find λ > 0,
ν > 0 such that for any symmetric SPE pi and any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and
sˆiit = s satisfying V (c, s) −W (ht; pi) < , the probability conditional on reaching history ht of a
transaction occurring between times t and ν inclusive must be greater than λ. Hence, one can find
15Note that the value function V (ct, sˆiit ) is stationary, depending only on the cost ct at time t and the stock sˆ
ii
t
immediately before time t.
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κ > 0 such that for any symmetric SPE pi and any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c
and sˆiit = s satisfying V (c, s) −W (ht; pi) < , the expected discounted sum of transaction costs
incurred from time t onward conditional on reaching history ht must be greater than κ > 0. It
follows that V (αc, s) > V (c, s), where α ∈ (0, 1).
To show that V (c, s) is increasing in s, choose any α > 1. Fix any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t),
ct) with ct = c and sˆiit = s. Let pi be an arbitrary symmetric SPE with W (ht; pi) > 0. Con-
sider the symmetric SPE pi′ defined as follows. First, the agents make no transfers until a his-
tory h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = c and sˆ′iit′ = αs is reached. Second, upon reach-
ing such a history h′t′ , the agents follow the symmetric strategy profile pi
′′, behaving as if the
time is t instead of t′ and the history is hˆt instead of h′t′ , where hˆt = ({cτ , αsτ}τ∈[0,t), ct). The
SPE pi′′ is defined as follows. If h¯u = ({c¯τ , s¯τ}τ∈[0,u), c¯u) and h˜u = ({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u) are
histories such that ({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u) = ({c¯τ , αs¯τ}τ∈[0,u), c¯u), then pi′′i (h˜u) = αpii(h¯u). Ob-
serve that W (h′t′ ; pi
′) > W (ht; pi). That is, given an arbitrary symmetric SPE pi and any history
ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and sˆiit = s, one can find a symmetric SPE pi′ such that
W (h′t′ ; pi
′) > W (ht; pi) for any history h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = c and sˆ′iit′ = αs.
Noting that V (c, s) > 0, choose any  such that 0 <  < V (c, s). Then one can find κ > 0
such that for any symmetric SPE pi and any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and
sˆiit = s satisfying V (c, s) −W (ht; pi) < , the expected discounted sum of transfers made from
time t onward conditional on reaching history ht must be greater than κ > 0. It follows that
V (c, αs) > V (c, s), where α > 1.
The next result shows that V (s, c) is homogenous of degree one. This property of the value
function is a consequence of the assumption that the cost process follows a geometric Brownian
motion.
Lemma 3.4.6 V (s, c) is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof Choose any α > 0. Fix any history ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and sˆiit = s. Let pi
be an arbitrary symmetric SPE. Consider the symmetric SPE pi′ defined as follows. First, the agents
make no transfers until a history h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = αc and sˆ′iit′ = αs is reached.
Second, upon reaching such a history h′t′ , the agents follow strategy profile pi
′′, behaving as if the
time is t instead of t′ and the history is hˆt instead of h′t′ , where hˆt = ({αcτ , αsτ}τ∈[0,t), αct). The
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symmetric SPE pi′′ is defined as follows. If h¯u = ({c¯τ , s¯τ}τ∈[0,u), c¯u) and h˜u = ({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u)
are histories such that ({c˜τ , s˜τ}τ∈[0,u), c˜u) = ({αc¯τ , αs¯τ}τ∈[0,u), αc¯u), then pi′′i (h˜u) = αpii(h¯u).
Note that W (h′t′ ; pi
′) = αW (ht; pi). That is, given an arbitrary symmetric SPE pi and any history
ht = ({cτ , sτ}τ∈[0,t), ct) with ct = c and sˆiit = s, one can find a symmetric SPE pi′ such that
W (h′t′ ; pi
′) = αW (ht; pi) for any history h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), ct′) with c′t′ = αc and sˆ′iit′ =
αs. Hence, V (αc, αs) ≥ αV (c, s). A symmetric argument can be used to show that V (c, s) ≥
α−1V (αc, αs). It follows that for any α > 0, we have V (αc, αs) = αV (c, s).
We now proceed to characterize the properties of a maximal symmetric SPE. The following
result shows that in any maximal symmetric SPE, the cost paid at each transaction is equal to the
continuation value immediately after the transaction. That is, the incentive constraint must bind at
every transaction in a maximal symmetric SPE.
Lemma 3.4.7 In any maximal symmetric SPE pi, each transaction k must satisfy
ct(k;pi) = V (ct(k;pi), s
ii
t(k;pi))
for every cost path {ct} with t(k; pi) <∞.
Proof Suppose that pi is a maximal symmetric SPE for which there exists a transaction k˜ such
that ct(k˜;pi) < V (ct(k˜;pi), s
ii
t(k˜;pi)
) for some cost path {c˜t} with t(k˜; pi) < ∞. If Y (ht(k˜;pi); pi) <
V (ct(k˜;pi), s
ii
t(k˜;pi)
) for cost path {c˜t}, then pi could not be a maximal symmetric SPE, because one
could find another SPE pi′ such that W (ht(k˜;pi); pi
′) > W (ht(k˜;pi); pi) for cost path {c˜t}. In particular,
let pi′ be defined as follows. The agents follow strategy profile pi until they reach a history h′t′ =
({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), c′t′) with Y (h′t′ ; pi) < V (c′t′ , s′iit′ ) such that the k˜th transaction occurs at history h′t′ .
Given such a history h′t′ , choose any history h
′′
t′ = ({c′′τ , s′′τ}τ∈[0,t′), c′′t′) such that c′′t′ = c′t′ and
sˆ
′′ii
t′ = sˆ
′ii
t′ − pi(h′t′). Then there exists a symmetric SPE strategy profile pi′′ such that Y (h′t′ ; pi) <
W (h′′t′ ; pi
′′) ≤ V (c′′t′ , sˆ′′iit′ ) = V [c′t′ , sˆ′iit′ − pi′(h′t′)]. Upon reaching such a history h′t′ , the agents
transfer the amount pi(h′t′) + pi
′′(h′′t′) at time t
′. After time t′, the agents follow strategy profile pi′′,
behaving as if history h′′t′ instead of history h
′
t′ were reached at time t
′.
Therefore, it must be that Y (ht(k˜;pi); pi) = V (ct(k˜;pi), s
ii
t(k˜;pi)
) for every cost path {ct} with
t(k˜; pi) < ∞. Now, if ct(k˜;pi) < Y (ht(k˜;pi); pi) for cost path {c˜t}, then pi could not be a maxi-
mal symmetric SPE, because one could find another symmetric SPE pˆi such that W (ht(k˜;pi); pˆi) >
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W (ht(k˜;pi), pi) for cost path {c˜t}. In particular, let t1, t2 be any two nonnegative real numbers such
that t1 < t2. Given a history ht1 for which {s11τ }τ≤t1 = {s22τ }τ≤t1 , let Σ(ht1 , {cτ}τ∈(t1,t2]; t1, t2; pi)
be the sum of the transfers that would be made between times t1 and t2 inclusive if history ht1 is
reached at time t1, the cost path {cτ}τ∈(t1,t2] is realized between times t1 and t2, and strategy profile
pi is played by the agents.
Define the symmetric strategy profile pˆi as follows. First, the agents make follow strategy profile
pi until they reach a history htˆ1 with ctˆ1 < Y (htˆ1 ; pi) such that the k˜
th transaction occurs at history
htˆ1 . Second, when any such history htˆ1 is reached, each agent transfers the amount pii(htˆ1)+δ(htˆ1),
where 0 < δ(htˆ1) < Y (htˆ1 ; pi)−ctˆ1 . Third, the agents do not make a transaction at any time t˜2 > tˆ1
such that the cost path {cτ}τ∈(tˆ1,t˜2] satisfies Σ(htˆ1 , {cτ}τ∈(tˆ1,t˜2]; tˆ1, t˜2; pi) < pii(htˆ1)+δ(htˆ1). Fourth,
each agent transfers the amount Σ(htˆ1 , {cτ}τ∈(tˆ1,tˆ2]; tˆ1, tˆ2; pi) − pii(htˆ1) − δ(htˆ1) at the first time
tˆ2 ≥ tˆ1 such that the cost path {cτ}τ∈(tˆ1,tˆ2] satisfies Σ(htˆ1 , {cτ}τ∈(tˆ1,tˆ2]; tˆ1, tˆ2; pi) ≥ pii(htˆ1)+δ(htˆ1).
Fifth, the agents follow strategy profile pi at any time t¯2 > tˆ2, behaving as if strategy profile pi had
been played from history htˆ1 onwards.
Because pˆi would be a symmetric SPE such that W (ht(k˜;pi); pˆi) > W (ht(k˜;pi), pi) for cost path
{c˜t}, it could not be that pi is a maximal symmetric SPE if ct(k˜;pi) < Y (ht(k˜;pi); pi) for cost path
{c˜t}. Hence, in any maximal symmetric SPE pi, it must be that each transaction k satisfies ct(k;pi) =
Y (ht(k;pi); pi) = V (ct(k;pi), s
ii
t(k;pi)) every cost path {ct} with t(k; pi) <∞.
The basic idea behind the preceding result is as follows. Suppose that the cost incurred at some
transaction k˜ is always less than the continuation value immediately after transaction k˜. Then it
might be possible to lower the transfer made at transaction k˜ + 1 by some amount and to raise the
transfer made at transaction k˜ by the same amount without violating any incentive constraints. By
doing so, a future payoff would be experienced at an earlier point in time, thereby increasing the
expected discounted value of the relationship. Thus, it could not be optimal for the cost incurred
at transaction k˜ to be less than the continuation value immediately after transaction k˜. The actual
proof is somewhat more complicated because the cost at which a transaction occurs and the amount
transferred at each transaction can be stochastic.
The result below identifies a proportionality condition that any maximal symmetric SPE must
satisfy. Specifically, the ratio of the cost paid at a given transaction to the amount of each good
remaining after that transaction must be a constant.
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Lemma 3.4.8 In any maximal symmetric SPE pi, each transaction k must satisfy
siit(k+1;pi)/s
ii
t(k;pi) = ct(k+1;pi)/ct(k;pi)
for every cost path {ct} with t(k + 1; pi) <∞.
Proof Let pi be a maximal symmetric SPE. Suppose that k˜ is such that (ct(k˜;pi)/ct(k˜+1;pi))siit(k˜+1;pi) >
sii
t(k˜;pi)
for some cost path {c˜t} with t(k˜ + 1;pi) < ∞. From Lemmata 3.4.6 and 3.4.7, we have
ct(k˜+1;pi) = V (ct(k˜+1;pi), s
ii
t(k˜+1;pi)
) = (ct(k˜+1;pi)/ct(k˜;pi))V [ct(k˜;pi), (ct(k˜;pi)/ct(k˜+1;pi))s
ii
t(k˜+1;pi)
] for cost
path {c˜t}. It follows from Lemma 3.4.5 that V [ct(k˜;pi), (ct(k˜;pi)/ct(k˜+1;pi))siit(k˜+1;pi)] > V (ct(k˜;pi), siit(k˜;pi))
for cost path {c˜t} if (ct(k˜;pi)/ct(k˜+1;pi))siit(k˜+1;pi) > siit(k˜;pi) for cost path {c˜t}. Hence, we have
ct(k˜;pi) > V (ct(k˜;pi), s
ii
t(k˜;pi)
) for cost path {c˜t}, which contradicts Lemma 3.4.7. Thus, each transac-
tion k must satisfy (ct(k;pi)/ct(k+1;pi))siit(k+1;pi) ≤ siit(k;pi) for every cost path {ct}with t(k+1;pi) <∞.
By a symmetric argument, each transaction k must satisfy (ct(k+1;pi)/ct(k;pi))siit(k;pi) ≤ siit(k+1;pi) for
every cost path {ct}with t(k+1; pi) <∞. Hence, it must be that siit(k+1;pi)/siit(k;pi) = ct(k+1;pi)/ct(k;pi)
for every cost path {ct} with t(k + 1; pi) <∞.
Because st(k;pi) > st(k+1;pi) by definition, Lemma 3.4.8 implies that ct(k;pi) > ct(k+1;pi) for every
cost path {ct} with t(k + 1; pi) < ∞ in a maximal symmetric SPE pi. That is, the sequence of
transaction costs paid in any maximal symmetric SPE must be decreasing.
The following result shows that in order to solve for a maximal symmetric SPE, attention can
be restricted to strategy profiles such that the next transaction occurs when the cost reaches some
fixed level. In particular, given a maximal symmetric SPE in which there is more than one possible
cost level at which the next transaction can occur, one can find another maximal symmetric SPE in
which there is only one possible cost level at which the next transaction can occur. Moreover, this
cost level can be any one of the cost levels at which a transaction can occur in the original SPE.
Lemma 3.4.9 Fix any transaction k. Let pi be a maximal symmetric SPE for which there exists
a cost path {cat } such that transaction k occurs at cost level c∗. Let t∗ denote the time when
transaction k − 1 occurs if the cost path is {cat } and strategy profile pi is played, where t∗ = 0 if
k = 1. Then one can construct a maximal symmetric SPE pi′ in which the following hold for every
cost path {cbt} with t(k; pi′) <∞ such that {cbτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗]:
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1. hbt∗ = h
a
t∗ ,
2. pi′i(h
b
t∗) = pii(h
a
t∗),
3. cbt(k;pi′) = c
∗,
where hat∗ is the history up to time t
∗ if the cost path is {cat } and strategy profile pi is played, and
hbt∗ is the history up to time t
∗ if the cost path is {cbt} and strategy profile pi′ is played.
Proof Fixing any transaction k, let pi be a maximal symmetric SPE for which there exists a cost
path {cat } such that transaction k occurs at cost level c∗. If ct(k,pi) = c∗∗ for every cost path {cbt}
with t(k; pi) <∞ such that {cbτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗], then the proof is complete, because pi′ in the
statement of the lemma can be defined to be the same as pi. Therefore, assume that there exists a
cost path {cdt } with {cdτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗] such that cdt(k,pi) = c∗∗ with c∗∗ 6= c∗.
For every such cost path {cdt } with c∗∗ > c∗, it must be that W (h′′t′′ ; pi) = W (h′t′ ; pi), where
h′t′ is any history up to a time t
′ such that cat′ = c
∗∗ and t(k − 1, pi) < t′ < t(k, pi) when the
cost path is {cat } and strategy profile pi is played, and h′′t′′ is any history up to a time t′′ such that
cdt′′ = c
∗∗ and t(k − 1, pi) < t′′ < t(k, pi) when the cost path is {cdt } and strategy profile pi is
played. For every such cost path {cdt } with c∗∗ < c∗, it must be that W (h′′t′′ ; pi) = W (h′t′ ; pi),
where h′t′ is any history up to a time t
′ such that cat′ = c
∗ and t(k − 1, pi) < t′ < t(k, pi) when
the cost path is {cat } and strategy profile pi is played, and h′′t′′ is any history up to a time t′′ such
that cdt′′ = c
∗ and t(k − 1, pi) < t′′ < t(k, pi) when the cost path is {cdt } and strategy profile pi
is played. These claims follow from two facts. First, a maximal symmetric SPE pi must satisfy
W (ht; pi) ≥ W (ht; pˆi) for every history ht on the equilibrium path and every symmetric SPE pˆi.
Second, if h′t′ = ({c′τ , s′τ}τ∈[0,t′), c′t′) and h′′t′′ = ({c′′τ , s′′τ}τ∈[0,t′′), c′′t′′) are two histories such that
c′t′ = c
′′
t′′ and sˆ
′
t′ = sˆ
′′
t′′ , then any path of play that can be supported as an SPE at history h
′
t′ can be
supported as an SPE at history h′′t′′ .
Hence, the maximal symmetric SPE pi′ in the statement of the lemma can be defined as follows.
The agents play strategy profile pi up to and including the time t˜ when the (k − 1)th transaction
occurs. If the cost path up to time t˜ is different from {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗], then the agents continue to play
strategy profile pi after time t˜. If the cost path up to time t˜ is the same as {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗], then the
agents do not make any transfers until the first time tˆ that the cost reaches c∗. In addition, letting t¯
denote the time when transaction k occurs if the cost path is {cat } and strategy profile pi is played,
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the agents follow strategy profile pi from time tˆ onwards, behaving at time tˆ as if the time were t¯,
the cost path were {caτ}τ∈[0,t¯], and strategy profile pi was always played.
In addition, as the next result demonstrates, attention can further be restricted to strategy pro-
files such that the next transaction occurs at the first time that the cost reaches some fixed level.
That is, in any maximal symmetric equilibrium such that the next transaction occurs when the cost
reaches some fixed level, the next transaction must occur at the first time that the cost reaches this
level.
Lemma 3.4.10 Fix any transaction k. Let pi be a maximal symmetric SPE. Fix any cost path {cat }
with t(k− 1;pi) <∞. Let t∗ denote the time when transaction k− 1 occurs if the cost path is {cat }
and strategy profile pi is played, where t∗ = 0 if k = 1. Suppose that cbt(k,pi) = c
∗ for every cost
path {cbt} with t(k; pi) < ∞ such that {cbτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗]. Then there is no cost path {cdt }
with {cdτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗] for which there exists a time tˆ such that tˆ < t(k, pi) and cdtˆ = c∗.
Proof Suppose to the contrary that {cdt } is a cost path with {cdτ}τ∈[0,t∗] = {caτ}τ∈[0,t∗] for which
such a time tˆ exists. Let hˆtˆ denote the history at time tˆ if the cost path is {cdt } and strategy
profile pi is played. Observe that if strategy profile pi is played, any possible next transaction upon
reaching history hˆtˆ must occur at a future history h
′
t′ in which the size of the transaction cost and
the remaining amount of each good are the same as at history hˆtˆ. Moreover, there must exist some
such future history h′t′ in which W (h
′
t′ ; pi) > W (hˆtˆ; pi), because W (ht; pi) > 0 for every history ht
on the equilibrium path in a maximal symmetric SPE.
Now, consider the symmetric SPE pi′ defined as follows. The agents play strategy profile pi up
to time tˆ. If the cost path up to time tˆ is different from {cdτ}τ∈[0,tˆ], then the agents continue to play
strategy profile pi from time tˆ onwards. If the cost path up to time tˆ is the same as {cdτ}τ∈[0,tˆ], then
the agents follow strategy profile pi from time tˆ onwards but behave at time tˆ as if the time is t′ and
the history is h′t′ .
Note that W (hˆtˆ; pi
′) > W (hˆtˆ; pi), contradicting the fact that pi is a maximal symmetric SPE.
Hence, no such cost path {cdt } can exist.
Consider any maximal symmetric SPE pi. Choose any nonnegative integer k. If k = 1, let h′t′
be any history before the first transaction. If k ≥ 2, let h′t′ be any history after transaction k−1 but
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before transaction k. For any nonnegative integerm, let x˜m be the amount of each good transferred
at transaction m, c˜m be the cost at which transaction m occurs, and s˜m be the amount of each good
remaining after transaction m. If m = 0, then simply define x˜0 = 0, c˜0 = c0, and s˜0 = sii0 .
From Lemmata 3.4.9 and 3.4.10, it can be assumed that history h′t′ is such that transaction k
occurs at the first time that the cost reaches c˜k. Furthermore, Lemma 3.4.7 shows that the cost paid
c˜k at transaction k must be equal to the continuation value V (c˜k, s˜k) at transaction k; so that, it is
only necessary to consider the instantaneous payoff x˜k at transaction k when calculatingW (h′t′ , pi).
Finally, note that W (h′t′ , pi) = V (c, s˜k−1), where c with c ≥ c˜k is the size of the cost at history h′t′ .
Hence, W (h′t′ , pi) is the same as the value of an asset that pays an amount x˜k at the first time
that the cost reaches c˜k when the size of the cost is currently c. The Bellman equation for this
asset-pricing problem is given by the following for c ≥ c˜k:
ρV (c, s˜k−1)dt = E(dV ) (3.2)
subject to the boundary condition V (c˜k, s˜k−1) = x˜k. The result below reports the solution for the
value function V (c, s˜k−1).
Lemma 3.4.11 The value function is given by V (c, s˜k−1) = x˜k(c/c˜k)β for any c ≥ c˜k, where β is
defined in the statement of Theorem 3.4.4.
Proof A straightforward application of Ito’s lemma to equation (3.2) yields
ρV (c, s˜k−1) = µc
∂V (c, s˜k−1)
∂c
+
1
2
σ2c2
∂2V (c, s˜k−1)
∂c2
,
which provides a second-order linear differential equation for V (c, s˜k−1). Seeking a solution of
the form g(c; c˜k, x˜k) = B(c˜k, x˜k)cβ˜ , the following quadratic equation is obtained by substituting
the functional form into the differential equation
1
2
σ2β˜(β˜ − 1) + µβ˜ − ρ = 0,
whose solution is given by
β˜ = 1
2
− µ
σ2
±
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
.
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Letting β˜+ and β˜− respectively denote the positive and negative roots of the quadratic, the general
solution to the differential equation is given by V (c, s˜k−1) = B+(c˜k, x˜k)cβ˜
+
+ B−(c˜k, x˜k)cβ˜
− . It
must be the case that B+(c˜k, x˜k) = 0, because V (c, s˜k−1) would otherwise become unboundedly
large in absolute value as c goes to∞. Moreover, the boundary condition V (c, s˜k−1) = x˜k yields
B−(c˜k, x˜k) = x˜k/c˜
β˜−
k . Hence, the solution to the Bellman equation in expression (3.2) is
V (c, s˜k−1) = x˜k(c/c˜k)β˜
−
.
Setting β = β˜−, the proof is complete.
Define r˜k = c˜k/s˜k if k ≥ 1 and y˜k = s˜k/s˜k−1 if k ≥ 2. Recall from Lemma 3.4.8 that if k ≥ 2,
then s˜k/s˜k−1 = c˜k/c˜k−1 or, equivalently, r˜k−1 = r˜k. The next result solves for the values of r˜k
with k ≥ 1 and y˜k with k ≥ 2 in a maximal symmetric equilibrium pi.
Lemma 3.4.12 In any maximal symmetric SPE, the following must hold:
1. r˜k = [−1/(β − 1)] · [(β − 1)/β]β for k ≥ 1,
2. y˜k = β/(β − 1) for k ≥ 2,
3. c˜1 = arg max c˜ (sii0 − c˜/r˜1)(c0/c˜)β ,
where β is defined in the statement of Theorem 3.4.4.
Proof From Lemma 3.4.11, we have V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1) = (s˜k−1 − s˜k)(c˜k−1/c˜k)β for k ≥ 2. Substi-
tuting c˜k/c˜k−1 = s˜k/s˜k−1 from Lemma 3.4.8, we can rewrite this as V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1) = s˜k−1(1 −
y˜k)(1/y˜k)
β . Since V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1) is strictly concave in y˜k, V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1) is maximized at a unique
value of y˜k, which is y˜k = β/(β − 1). Hence, the largest possible value of V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1) in a
maximal symmetric SPE occurs when y˜k = β/(β − 1).
In addition, using Lemma 3.4.7, r˜k−1 can be expressed as follows for k ≥ 2 if y˜k = β/(β− 1):
r˜k−1 = c˜k−1/s˜k−1 = V (c˜k−1, s˜k−1)/s˜k−1 = (1− y˜k)(1/y˜k)β = [−1/(β − 1)] · [(β − 1)/β]β.
From Lemma 3.4.11, the incentive constraint for each transaction can be written as c˜k−1 ≤
x˜k(c˜k−1/c˜k)β for k ≥ 2, which is equivalent to r˜k−1 ≤ (1 − y˜k)(1/y˜k)β . This inequality binds
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when r˜k−1 and y˜k are as specified above. Hence, these choices of r˜k−1 and y˜k can be supported as
part of a symmetric SPE.
It follows that any maximal symmetric SPE must be characterized by the choices of r˜k−1 and
y˜k in the statement of the lemma. In addition, c˜1 must be chosen to maximize V (c˜0, s˜0), which can
be written using Lemma 3.4.11 as x˜1(c˜0/c˜1)β or, equivalently, (sii0 − c˜1/r˜1)(c˜0/c˜1)β .
Finally, the result below solves for the sequence of costs paid and amounts transferred in a maximal
symmetric SPE.
Lemma 3.4.13 In any maximal symmetric SPE, c˜k and x˜k are given by c∗k and x∗k in the statement
of Theorem 3.4.4.
Proof From Lemma 3.4.12, we have c˜1 = arg max c˜ (sii0 − c˜/r˜1)(c0/c˜)β . The unique solution to
this maximization problem is c˜1 = sii0 r˜1[β/(β − 1)]. Using Lemma 3.4.12 to substitute for r˜1, we
obtain an explicit formula for c˜1.
Recalling that y˜k = c˜k/c˜k−1, we have c˜k = c˜1
∏k
m=2 y˜
m for k ≥ 2. Hence, c˜k can be calculated
for k ≥ 2 using the formula for c˜1 as well as Lemma 3.4.12. Recalling that r˜k = c˜k/s˜k, we have
s˜k = c˜k/r˜k for k ≥ 1. Hence, s˜k can be calculated for k ≥ 1 using the formula for c˜k as well as
Lemma 3.4.12. Finally, x˜k can be calculated for k ≥ 1 using the formula x˜k = s˜k−1 − s˜k.
Performing these calculations yields the solution in the statement of Theorem 3.4.4.
3.5 Comparative Statics
The closed-form solution for the maximal symmetric SPE in Theorem 3.4.4 enables us to obtain
a number of comparative statics. These results are enumerated in the corollaries below.
The result below states that the cost paid must decrease with each transaction.
Corollary 3.5.1 c∗k is decreasing in k.
This finding is obvious given Theorem 3.4.4. To understand the intuition for this result, observe
from Lemma 3.4.7 that the continuation value after each transaction must be equal to the transac-
tion cost incurred. In addition, recall from Lemma 3.4.5 that the value function for the problem is
decreasing in the current size of the transaction cost and increasing in the remaining stock of each
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good. Hence, the sequence of transaction costs incurred must be decreasing, because the remaining
stock of each good falls with each transaction.
The next result states that both the amount of each good transferred and the cost paid at each
transaction converge to zero in the limit as the number of past transactions goes to infinity.
Corollary 3.5.2 limk→∞ x∗k = limk→∞ c∗k = 0.
This result follows directly from Theorem 3.4.4. Intuitively, if the amount transferred did not con-
verge to zero, then the stock of each good would be completely exhausted with positive probability.
Consequently, if the cost incurred did not converge to zero while the amount transferred did, then
the incentive constraint would be violated for some transaction, because the expected discounted
value of future transfers would be less than the size of the transaction cost to be paid.
The result below shows that all of each good will be exchanged with probability one in the limit
as time goes to infinity, provided that the drift of the cost process is not excessively high relative
to the volatility.
Corollary 3.5.3 If µ < σ2
2
, then plimt→∞ s
12
t = plimt→∞ s
21
t = s
ii
0 .
The proof simply involves calculating the sums of infinite series and is therefore omitted. This
conclusion is in part a consequence of the maximality assumption. In particular, given an SPE in
which the amount of each good transferred is at most s˜ < sii0 , one can construct a Pareto superior
SPE in which the agents transfer the additional amount sii0 − s˜ at the first transaction.
The next corollary describes how the size of each transfer changes with the drift µ and volatility
σ2 of the cost process.
Corollary 3.5.4 If k − 1 > |β|, then x∗k is increasing in µ and decreasing in σ2. If k − 1 < |β|,
then x∗k is decreasing in µ and increasing in σ
2.
This is an intuitive result. If the drift µ of the cost process decreases, then the cost is more likely
to fall enough in the near future for the agents to make another transaction. The greater proximity
of a future transaction raises the continuation value of the relationship and relaxes the incentive
constraints for the problem; so that, agents can make larger transfers at early stages and smaller
transfers at later stages. If the volatility σ2 of the cost process increases, then both extremely high
and low realizations of the cost process become more likely. Because the solution has a cutoff
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form, the favorable impact of low cost realizations dominates the adverse impact of high cost
realizations. This option-value argument suggests that a high volatility σ2 has a similar effect on
the solution as a low drift µ.
The corollary below characterizes the impact of the drift µ and volatility σ2 of the cost process
on the sequence of transaction costs paid.
Corollary 3.5.5 For all k, c∗k is decreasing in µ and increasing in σ2.
Intuitively, if the drift µ decreases, then the continuation value of the relationship rises; so that,
higher cost payments can be elicited from each agent without violating the incentive constraints.
As has already been noted, a high volatility σ2 has an effect similar to a low drift µ.
The following corollary examines how the transfers made and costs incurred behave in the
limits as the discount rate goes to zero and to infinity.
Corollary 3.5.6 limρ→0 x∗1 = sii0 , limρ→0 x∗k = 0 for k ≥ 2, and limρ→0 c∗k = 0 for all k. In
addition, limρ→∞ x∗k = limρ→∞ c
∗
k = 0 for all k.
These results follow immediately from Theorem 3.4.4. On the one hand, as the agents become
infinitely patient, it is optimal for them to wait for an extremely low cost realization before making
a transfer. Furthermore, a large initial transfer can be supported in equilibrium, because the incen-
tive constraints are weak for low values of the transaction cost and so a high continuation value is
not needed to prevent deviation. On the other hand, as the agents become infinitely impatient, it
is impossible to induce them to incur a large transaction cost, because the continuation value from
the relationship is low and so the incentive to deviate is high. The size of each transfer must also
be small, in order to ensure that the continuation value is sufficiently high to sustain cooperation.
Observe that both extremely high and low values of the discount rate lead to a small cost cutoff
c∗k for each k. Thus, the expected waiting time to reach the allocation [(q − K,K), (K, q − K)]
for any fixed K with 0 < K < q is high in these extreme cases. This observation suggests that the
expected waiting time is non-monotonic in the discount rate. Letting c∗(K) denote the value of the
transaction cost at which the amount transferred by each agent first exceeds K, Figures 3.1 to 3.4
plot c∗(K) against β for q = 50 and K ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40}.
Note that β is decreasing in µ and ρ as well as increasing in σ2. Moreover, the expected waiting
time rises as c∗(K) falls, becoming infinite in the limit as c∗(K) goes to zero. The discontinuities
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in the graphs arise because the number of transactions needed for the amount transferred by each
agent to first exceedK changes at such points. Specifically, the right-most curve describes the case
where a single transaction is needed for the amount transferred by each agent to first exceed K.
This situation occurs when µ is low, σ2 is high, and ρ is low. In general, the kth curve from the
right corresponds to the case where k transactions are required for the amount transferred by each
agent to first exceed K.
Furthermore, several of the comparative statistics in this section can be interpreted in terms
of the applications described in the introduction. For instance, consider the example of prisoner
exchange between two hostile parties, where the transaction cost represents the level of tensions
between the opponents. The solution to the model suggests a prisoner exchange protocol in which
the prevailing level of tensions and the quantity of prisoners traded are smaller at the next transfer
than at the current transfer. In addition, if the level of tensions decreases more quickly or becomes
more volatile, then each transfer of prisoners would occur at a higher level of current tensions.
These changes in the environment would also result in larger transfers earlier in the relationship
and smaller transfers later in the relationship. An interesting insight to arise from the analysis is
that greater volatility in the level of tensions often has the same effect on the transaction scheme
as a more rapid decrease in the level of tensions.
3.6 Welfare Properties
Since the expected waiting time until the occurrence of a transaction becomes infinite as the
discount rate approaches zero, it is not immediate that the first-best outcome can be approximated
as agents become infinitely patient. The next theorem confirms that the second-best payoff con-
verges to the first-best payoff in the limit as the discount rate approaches zero, provided that the
drift of the cost process is not excessively high relative to the volatility.
Theorem 3.6.1 In the limit as ρ approaches zero, the expected payoff to each agent in the maximal
symmetric SPE of Theorem 3.4.4 converges to the first-best outcome if and only if µ ≤ σ2
2
.
On the one hand, if trading frictions are low in the sense that the drift of the cost process is suffi-
ciently small relative to the volatility, then the first-best outcome can be approximated as the the
agents become infinitely patient. On the other hand, if the drift is high and the volatility is low,
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Figure 3.1: c∗(K) vs. β for (K, q) = (10, 50)
Figure 3.2: c∗(K) vs. β for (K, q) = (20, 50)
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Figure 3.3: c∗(K) vs. β for (K, q) = (30, 50)
Figure 3.4: c∗(K) vs. β for (K, q) = (40, 50)
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then the trading environment tends to deteriorate over time, and there is uncertainty about whether
a future transaction will take place. In this case, the second-best solution fails to converge to the
first-best outcome.
The proof of preceding theorem results in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6.2 If µ > σ2
2
, then in the limit as ρ approaches zero, the ratio of the second-best
payoff to the first-best payoff is decreasing in µ and increasing in σ2.
Intuitively, a lower drift or a higher volatility results in a more favorable trading environment in
which future transactions are more likely to occur. Consequently, the continuation value from the
relationship is higher, and larger transfers can be sustained in equilibrium.
3.7 Variations of the Basic Model
This section describes two variations of the basic model. In section 3.7.1, we allow for growth
or volatility in the supply of each good available for trade. We show that even if the transaction
cost is bounded away from zero, positive transfers can be supported in equilibrium, provided that
there is some volatility in the supply of each good. In section 3.7.2, we study a setting in which
the cost incurred at a given transaction depends on the amount of each good transferred. Even in
such a situation, positive transfers can be supported in equilibrium.
3.7.1 Model with Stochastic Supplies of Goods
This section presents a model with growth or volatility in the supply of each good. The setup
here is the same as that described in section 3.3, except that the cost of making a transaction
is fixed at some positive constant and the stock of each good is assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion between transactions.16 Specifically, siit evolves between transactions according
to the equation of motion dsiit = θs
ii
t dt+ ξs
ii
t dzt, where zt is a Wiener process, θ < ρ is the growth
rate of each good, and ξ2 > 0 is the volatility in the stock of each good. In addition, the cost of
making a transaction is constant at χ > 0.
16In addition, it is assumed as in section 3.4 that each agent consumes the good from the other agent as soon as it is
received.
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The following result shows that the model with a stochastic supply of each good has an equi-
librium in which a transaction is made along the path of play with positive probability.
Theorem 3.7.1 There exists a symmetric SPE of the model with stochastic supplies of goods in
which the expected discounted payoff to each agent is positive at every point along the path of
play.
Three remarks are in order. First, the theorem is still valid if θ > ρ. However, the problem
is not well defined in this case, because there exists an SPE that generates an arbitrarily large
expected discounted payoff. Second, even in the case with θ < 0 where each good decays over
time, a positive expected discounted payoff can be supported in equilibrium, provided that there
is some volatility in the stock of each good. Although each good is decaying, there is a positive
probability that the stock of each good will rise enough for another transfer to be made.
Finally, the result offers a counterpoint to Theorem 3.4.2 in the following sense. Consider a
cost process with zero drift and zero volatility. If the supply of each good is fixed over time, then
this cost process satisfies the conditions in Theorem 3.4.2; so that, no transactions can occur in any
SPE of the model. However, if there is some volatility in the stock of each good as in the model
outlined here, then the result above states that a transaction can occur in equilibrium with positive
probability.
3.7.2 Model with Cost Proportional to Amount Transferred
This section examines the effect of letting the transaction cost paid depend on the amount
transferred. The setup here is the same as that described in section 3.3, except that the cost paid at
each transaction includes a term that is proportional to the amount transferred.17 Specifically, if an
agent transfers the amount xit at time t and the fixed cost of making a transfer is ct at time t, then
the agent incurs the transaction cost ct + φ · xit at time t, where φ ∈ (0, 1).18
The following result shows that as long as the component of the cost proportional to the amount
transferred is not excessively large, there exists an equilibrium of the model above such that a
17In addition, it is assumed as in section 3.4 that each agent consumes the good from the other agent as soon as it is
received.
18The fixed cost ct is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion as in the basic model. Note that the current
model would reduce to the basic model if φ = 0.
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transaction is made along the path of play with positive probability.
Proposition 3.7.2 There exists φ¯ > 0 such that if φ < φ¯, then the model with a cost proportional
to the amount transferred has a symmetric SPE in which the expected discounted payoff to each
agent is positive at every point along the path of play.
This result demonstrates that the implementation of positive transfers in equilibrium is robust to
the introduction of a transaction cost that depends on the amount transferred. That is, it is not
crucial to assume that the transaction cost does not vary with the amount transferred in order to
support an equilibrium with positive gains from trade.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the exchange of divisible goods between two agents facing a stochastic
transaction cost. We develop a model of trade in which the first-best policy requires a single
transfer of each good and the second-best policy requires a decreasing sequence of transfers of
each good. We derive several comparative statics for the solution to the model, and we examine
the convergence of the second-best to the first-best outcome. We also explain how the framework
in this paper can be applied to real-world situations involving the gradual exchange of trade secrets,
captured prisoners, or land claims.
In addition, we perform various robustness checks of the main results. We identify cases in
which positive gains from trade cannot be supported in equilibrium. We also consider a model
with uncertainty in the stock of each good available for trade as well as a model in which the
transaction cost paid varies with the amount of each good transferred. Further extensions of the
analysis might involve introducing asymmetries between the strategies followed by each agent or
allowing for more general cost processes and payoff functions.
Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs of Main Theoretical Results
This appendix contains the proofs of the propositions in section 1.2. The proofs of the other
results discussed in the text are provided in the supplemental appendices.
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.2.1
The conditional expectation of (z1, z2)′ given (s1, s2)′ is:
E
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z1
z2
)
|
(
s1
s2
)]
=
(
µz1
µz2
)
+ C
[(
z1
z2
)
,
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s1
s2
)]
V
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, (A.1)
where the regression coefficient is given by:
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. (A.2)
Inverting the variance matrix and rearranging terms leads to the formula in equation (1.6).
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2.2
Expressing the regression coefficient in equation (1.6) as:
C
[(
z1
z2
)
,
(
s1
s2
)]
V
[(
s1
s2
)]−1
=
(
θs + θaδo θaδf
θaδf θs + θaδo
)
, (A.3)
the component of (z1, z2)′ orthogonal to (s1, s2)′ is given by:(
zˆ1
zˆ2
)
=
(
z1
z2
)
−E
[(
z1
z2
)
|
(
s1
s2
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=
(
θa[a1− (δos1 + δfs2)] +ω1
θa[a2− (δfs1 + δos2)] +ω2
)
−
(
θa[µa1 − (δoµs1 + δfµs2)]
θa[µa2− (δfµs1 + δoµs2)]
)
,
(A.4)
where equations (1.5) and (A.1) are used to substitute for (z1, z2)′ and E[(z1, z2)′|(s1, s2)′], re-
spectively. Note that the coefficient on (z1, z2)′ in a regression on (s1, s2, z1, z2)′ is the same as
the coefficient on (zˆ1, zˆ2)′ in a regression on (s1, s2, zˆ1, zˆ2)′. Therefore, consider the regression
of (a1, a2)′ on (s1, s2, zˆ1, zˆ2)′. Because (zˆ1, zˆ2)′ is uncorrelated with (s1, s2)′, the coefficient on
(zˆ1, zˆ2)
′ is simply given by:
(
pio pif
pif pio
)
= C
[(
a1
a2
)
,
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zˆ1
zˆ2
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V
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zˆ1
zˆ2
)]−1
, (A.5)
where the inverse variance matrix can be expressed as:
V
[(
zˆ1
zˆ2
)]−1
= [σ4zˆ(1− ρ2zˆ)]−1
(
σ2zˆ −ρzˆσ2zˆ
−ρzˆσ2zˆ σ2zˆ
)
. (A.6)
I first show that C(a1, zˆ1) = C(a2, zˆ2) > 0. Using equations (A.4) and (1.6), this covariance is
given by:
C(a1, zˆ1) = C(a2, zˆ2) = θaσ2a[1− γ(δo + δfρa)] = θaσ2a
(
1− γ
2σ2a(1− 2ρaρs + ρ2a)
σ2s(1− ρ2s)
)
. (A.7)
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From equation (A.7), the statement C(a1, zˆ1) = C(a2, zˆ2) > 0 is equivalent to:
σ2s(1− ρ2s)− γ2σ2a(1− 2ρaρs + ρ2a) > 0, (A.8)
which can be expanded as:
ko = (γ
2σ2a + σ
2
 )
(
1− (γ
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2
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2
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2
a + ρσ
2

γ2σ2a + σ
2

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)
> 0. (A.9)
Note that ko = 0 when σ2 = 0. The derivative of ko with respect to σ
2
 is:
∂ko
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=
σ2 (1− ρ2) + 2γ2σ2aσ2 (1− ρ2) + γ4σ4a(1− ρ2a)
(γ2σ2a + σ
2
 )
2
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It follows that ko > 0 if σ2 > 0 and so C(a1, zˆ1) = C(a2, zˆ2) > 0 in equation (A.7).
I next show that C(a1, zˆ2) = C(a2, zˆ1) > 0. Using equations (A.4) and (1.6), this covariance is
given by:
C(a1, zˆ2) = C(a2, zˆ1) = θaσ2a[ρa − γ(δoρa + δf )]
= θaσ
2
a
(
ρa − γ
2σ2a[2ρa − ρs(1 + ρ2a)]
σ2s(1− ρ2s)
)
.
(A.11)
From equation (A.11), the statement C(a1, zˆ2) = C(a2, zˆ1) > 0 is equivalent to:
ρaσ
2
s(1− ρ2s)− γ2σ2a[2ρa − ρs(1 + ρ2a)] > 0, (A.12)
which can be expanded as:
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(A.13)
Note that kf = 0 when σ2 = 0. The derivative of kf with respect to σ
2
 is:
∂kf
∂σ2
=
γ4σ4aρ(1− ρ2a) + σ2 (2γ2σ2a + σ2 )ρa(1− ρ2)
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It follows that kf > 0 if σ2 > 0 and so C(a1, zˆ2) = C(a2, zˆ1) > 0 in equation (A.11).
I now show that C(a1, zˆ1) > C(a1, zˆ2). From equations (A.7) and (A.11), the statement
C(a1, zˆ1)
> C(a1, zˆ2) is equivalent to:
1− γ
2σ2a(1− 2ρaρa + ρ2a)
σ2s(1− ρ2s)
> ρa − γ
2σ2a(2ρa − ρ2aρs − ρs)
σ2s(1− ρ2s)
, (A.15)
which is satisfied whenever:
w = σ2s(1−ρs)−γ2σ2a(1−ρa) = (γ2σ2a+σ2 )
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2ρaσ
2
a + ρσ
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
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−γ2σ2a(1−ρa) > 0. (A.16)
Note that w = 0 if σ2 = 0. Differentiating w with respect to σ
2
 yields:
∂w
∂σ2
= 1− ρ > 0. (A.17)
Hence, w > 0 if σ2 > 0 and so C(a1, zˆ1) > C(a1, zˆ2).
It is now straightforward to prove the three claims in proposition 1.2.2. Given the form of the
inverse variance matrix in equation (A.6), it follows from C(a1, zˆ1) > C(a1, zˆ2) that pio > pif ,
proving the first claim. From equations (A.5) and (A.6), the regression parameters pio and pif take
the form:
pio = κo − ρzˆκf and pif = κf − ρzˆκo, (A.18)
where κo = τC(a1, zˆ1) > 0, κf = τC(a1, zˆ2) > 0, and τ > 0. Because it has been shown
above that C(a1, zˆ1) > C(a1, zˆ2) > 0, one has κo > κf > 0. These inequalities imply that
pio > 0 in equation (A.18), proving the second claim. Finally, because κ2o > κ
2
f from the preceding
inequalities, one has:
κ2o +ρ
2
zˆκ
2
f > ρ
2
zˆκ
2
o +κ
2
f ⇔ κ2o−2ρzˆκoκf +ρ2zˆκ2f > ρ2zˆκ2o−2ρzˆκoκf +κ2f
⇔ (κo−ρzˆκf )2 > (κf −ρzˆκo)2;
(A.19)
so that, pi2o > pi
2
f in equation (A.18), proving the third claim.
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A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.2.4
To prove the second part of the proposition, I first calculate the coefficient ζri on r¯e in the con-
ditional expectation of ai given si, se, and r¯e in equation (1.20). The component of r¯e orthogonal
to si and se is given by:
rˆe = r¯e − E(r¯e|si, se) = [ae − (δose + δfsi) + η¯e]− [µae − (δoµse + δfµsi)], (A.20)
where δo, δf are defined in equation (A.3), and η¯e is the sample mean of {ηue}teu=1. Note that the
coefficient on r¯e in the conditional expectation given si, se, and r¯e is the same as the coefficient on
rˆe in the conditional expectation given si, se, and rˆe. Because rˆe is uncorrelated with si and se, the
coefficient ζri is equal to:
ζri = C(ai, rˆe)/V(rˆe) = σ2a[ρa − γ(δoρa + δf )]/(ς2 + t−1e σ2η), (A.21)
where ς2 is defined as:
ς2 = V[ae − (δose + δfsi)]. (A.22)
Note that the bracketed term in the numerator of equation (A.21) also appears in equation (A.11)
and was shown to be positive in the proof of proposition 1.2.2. Thus, ζri is positive. Moreover, if
t1 > t2, then ζr1 < ζr2.
From equation (1.23), the coefficients νie, νii in proposition 1.2.4 can be expressed as:
νii = (1− ξi)ζripif + ξipio and νie = (1− ξi)ζripio + ξipif . (A.23)
Thus, the statement ν12ν22 < ν21ν11 is equivalent to:
[(1−ξ1)ζr1pio+ξ1pif ][(1−ξ2)ζr2pif +ξ2pio] < [(1−ξ2)ζr2pio+ξ2pif ][(1−ξ1)ζr1pif +ξ1pio], (A.24)
which reduces to:
(1− ξ1)ξ2ζr1pi2o + ξ1(1− ξ2)ζr2pi2f < (1− ξ2)ξ1ζr2pi2o + ξ2(1− ξ1)ζr1pi2f . (A.25)
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If t1 > t2, then ξ1 > ξ2 and ζr1 < ζr2. Thus, equation (A.25) is satisfied if pi2o > pi
2
f holds, and
proposition 1.2.2 shows that pi2o > pi
2
f .
A.2 Siblings at Same Age Level
As noted at the end of section 1.2.3, comparing siblings at a given age level instead of in the
same time period can provide a more robust test of the individual against the social learning model.
When analyzing the wages of siblings at different age levels, one needs to use the coefficient on
an individual’s own test score to deflate the coefficient on a sibling’s test score. This procedure,
however, is typically justified only if labor market ability is a unidimensional factor. By instead
comparing siblings’ wages at the same age level, one avoids having to deflate the regression co-
efficients in order to test between the two learning models. Nevertheless, a disadvantage of this
approach is that younger and older siblings reach the same age at different times, making it neces-
sary to control for other time-varying factors that may affect one’s wage.
The proposition below enumerates the predictions of the learning models in sections 1.2.3 and
1.2.4 for the log wages of siblings at a given age level. The first part is an immediate consequence
of equations (1.8), (1.9), and (1.12) when the two siblings have the same age ti. Likewise, the first
item in the second part follows directly from equations (1.14), (1.15), and (1.18) whenever t1 = t2.
The results are symmetric if sibling 2 is at least as old as sibling 1 instead of vice versa.
Proposition A.2.1 Suppose that sibling 1 is at least as old as sibling 2 with d ≥ 0 being the age
difference between them. Let ϑij denote the regression coefficient on sibling j’s test score in the
conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage at age t > d given s1, s2 and z1, z2.
1. If learning is individual, then ϑ12 = ϑ21 and ϑ11 = ϑ22.
2. If learning is social, then:
(a) ϑ12 = ϑ21 and ϑ11 = ϑ22 for d = 0,
(b) ϑ12 < ϑ21 and ϑ12ϑ22 < ϑ21ϑ11 for d > 0.
Proof Suppose that sibling 1 is older than sibling 2 by d > 0 periods. If employer learning is
social, then the market’s beliefs about the time-invariant component gi(si, ai) of sibling i’s log
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labor productivity at age t > d given the variables si, se and ri, re are normally distributed with
mean µqi(si, se, ri, re) and variance σ2qi, which can be expressed as:
µbi(si, se, ri, re) = βsi + E(ai|si, se, ri, re) and σ2qi = V(ai|si, se, ri, re), (A.26)
where ri is a vector of t productivity signals for sibling i ∈ {1, 2}, and re is a vector of t − d
productivity signals for sibling 2 if i = 1, e = 2 and a vector of t + d productivity signals for
sibling 1 if i = 2, e = 1. Note that, as in section 1.2.4, if i is the index of a given sibling, then e is
the index of the other sibling; so that, e = 1 if i = 2 and vice versa.
Therefore, the conditional expectation of sibling i’s labor productivity l(si, ai, t) at age t given
si, se and ri, re is:
E{exp[l(si, ai, t)]|si, se, ri, re} = exp[µbi(si, se, ri, re) + 12σ2qi + h(t)], (A.27)
which yields the following expression for sibling i’s log wage:
log(vi) = µbi(si, se, ri, re) +
1
2
σ2qi + h(t). (A.28)
Because the error terms in each sibling’s productivity signals are identically distributed and inde-
pendent of each other and all of the other variables in the model, the conditional expectation of ai
given si, se and ri, re can be expressed as:
E(ai|si, se, ri, re) = E(ai|si, se, r¯i, r¯e) = ϕci + ϕhisi + ϕkise + ϕair¯i + ϕbir¯e; (A.29)
so that, the conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage at age t given si, se and zi, ze has the
form:
E[log(vi)|si, se, zi, ze] = ϕaiE(ai|si, se, zi, ze) + ϕbiE(ae|si, se, zi, ze) + ci(si, se, t). (A.30)
It follows from equation (A.30) that the coefficients ϑii and ϑie in proposition A.2.1 are given by:
ϑii = ϕaipio + ϕbipif and ϑie = ϕaipif + ϕbipio. (A.31)
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I now calculate the coefficients ϕai and ϕbi on r¯i and r¯e in the regression of ai on si, se and r¯i,
r¯e. The components of r¯i and r¯e orthogonal to si and se are given by:(
rˆi
rˆe
)
=
(
r¯i
r¯e
)
−E
[(
r¯i
r¯e
)
|
(
si
se
)]
=
(
ai − (δosi + δfse) + η¯i
ae − (δfsi + δose) + η¯e
)
−
(
µai − (δoµsi + δfµse)
µae − (δfµsi + δoµse)
)
,
(A.32)
where δo and δf are defined in equation (A.3), η¯i is the sample mean of {ηui}tu=1, and η¯e is the
sample mean of {ηu2}t−du=1 if i = 1, e = 2 and the sample mean of {ηu1}t+du=1 if i = 2, e = 1.
Note that the coefficients on r¯i and r¯e in the regression of ai on si, se and r¯i, r¯e are the same as
the coefficients on rˆi and rˆe in the regression of ai on si, se and rˆi, rˆe. Because rˆi and rˆe are
uncorrelated with si and se, the regression coefficients ϕai and ϕbi are equal to:
(
ϕai ϕbi
)
= C
[
ai,
(
rˆi
rˆe
)]
V
[(
rˆi
rˆe
)]−1
=
(
υo υf
)(υo + t−1σ2η υf
υf υo + t
−1
e σ
2
η
)−1
, (A.33)
where te = t− d if i = 1, e = 2 and te = t+ d if i = 2, e = 1, and υo and υf are given by:
υo = σ
2
aτo = σ
2
a[1− γ(δo + δfρa)] and υf = σ2aτf = σ2a[ρa − γ(δoρa + δf )]. (A.34)
Note that τo and τf in the preceding equation also appear in equations (A.7) and (A.11) and were
shown to satisfy τo > τf > 0 in the proof of proposition 1.2.2. Therefore, υo > υf > 0. From
equation (A.33), the coefficients ϕai and ϕbi can be expressed as:
ϕai =
υo(υo + t
−1
e σ
2
η)− υ2f
(υo + t−1σ2η)(υo + t−1e σ2η)− υ2f
and ϕbi =
υf (υo + t
−1σ2η)− υoυf
(υo + t−1σ2η)(υo + t−1e σ2η)− υ2f
. (A.35)
In order to show that ϑ12 < ϑ21, I calculate the derivative of ϑie in equation (A.31) with respect
to te. Using the expressions for ϕai and ϕbi in equation (A.35), the derivative can be expressed as:
∂ϑie
∂te
=
υfσ
4
η[t(υopio − υfpif ) + σ2ηpio]
[tte(υ2o − υ2f ) + (t+ te)υoσ2η + σ4η]2
> 0, (A.36)
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where υo > υf > 0 and pio > pif . Because te = t − d for i = 1, e = 2 and te = t + d for i = 2,
e = 1, one has ϑ12 < ϑ21 as desired.
I now show that ϑ12ϑ22 < ϑ21ϑ11. From equation (A.31), one can define:
v = ϑ21ϑ11−ϑ12ϑ22 = (ϕa2pif+ϕb2pio)(ϕa1pio+ϕb1pif )−(ϕa1pif+ϕb1pio)(ϕa2pio+ϕb2pif ). (A.37)
Using equation (A.35) to substitute for ϕai and ϕbi, one obtains after some simplification:
v =
t(pi2o − pi2f )(te2 − te1)υoυfσ4η
[tte1(υ2o − υ2f ) + (t+ te1)υoσ2η + σ4η][tte2(υ2o − υ2f ) + (t+ te2)υoσ2η + σ4η]
> 0, (A.38)
where pi2o > pi
2
f , te1 = t−d, te2 = t+d, and υo > υf > 0. Because v > 0, one has ϑ12ϑ22 < ϑ21ϑ11
as desired.
On the one hand, if the learning process is purely individual, then there will be no differences
between siblings in the coefficients obtained from the regression of one’s log wage at a given age
on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling and test scores.1 This outcome also arises if the learning
process is social but the siblings have the same age; so that, each sibling has an equally strong
impact on the market’s beliefs about the other sibling. On the other hand, if there are interactions
in the learning process between an older and a younger sibling, then as in the second part of
proposition 1.2.4, the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to the coefficient on one’s own
test score is typically higher for the younger than for the older sibling in the regression of one’s
wage at a given age on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling. In particular, if sibling
1 is older than sibling 2, then the length of sibling 2’s performance history when sibling 1 reaches a
given age is less than the length of sibling 1’s performance history when sibling 2 reaches that age.
Therefore, sibling 2’s performance history when sibling 1 is a given age contains less information
than sibling 1’s performance history when sibling 2 is that age. As a result, sibling 1’s wage at
a given age places more weight on her own and less on her sibling’s performance compared to
sibling 2’s wage at that age.
The social learning model also makes a definitive prediction regarding the relative values of the
coefficients on a sibling’s test score. If one sibling is older than the other, then the coefficient on
1However, the constant term in the conditional expectation function can still differ between siblings who do not
have the same mean values of the regression variables.
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a sibling’s test score is higher for the younger than for the older sibling in the regression of one’s
log wage at a given age on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling. The logic for this
result is that an older sibling’s performance is observed over a longer length of time; so that, an
older sibling’s performance history is a stronger predictor of her own and therefore her sibling’s
ability. By contrast, it is unclear in general whether the older or the younger sibling has a higher
coefficient on her own test score when one’s log wage at a given age is regressed on one’s own and
a sibling’s test scores and schooling. That is, if sibling 1 is older than sibling 2, then it is possible
under social learning to obtain either ϑ11 < ϑ22 or ϑ22 > ϑ11 from the regression described in
proposition A.2.1.
The following two examples illustrate how this ambiguity arises. To understand the case where
ϑ11 < ϑ22, suppose that ρa = 1; so that, the abilities of the two siblings are the same. In this case,
the coefficient on one’s own test score is equal to the coefficient on a sibling’s test score in the
regression of one’s ability on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling. The same is true
if one’s log wage instead of one’s ability is used as the dependent variable in this regression. If
sibling 1 is older than sibling 2, then the performance history of sibling 2 when sibling 1 reaches a
given age is shorter than the performance history of sibling 1 when sibling 2 reaches that age. This
implies that employers have less information about the common ability of the two siblings when
sibling 1 is a given age than when sibling 2 is that age. Hence, sibling 1’s log wage at a given age
is less closely linked to the common ability of the two siblings than sibling 2’s log wage at that
age. As a result, the coefficient on one’s own test score is lower for sibling 1 than for sibling 2; so
that, ϑ11 < ϑ22 if ρa = 1.
To understand the case where ϑ11 > ϑ22, suppose that pif < 0; so that, one’s ability has a
negative partial correlation with a sibling’s test score given one’s own test score as well as one’s
own and a sibling’s schooling.2 If sibling 1 is older than sibling 2, then sibling 1 has a higher
coefficient on her own performance and a lower coefficient on her sibling’s performance in her
log wage equation at a given age in comparison to sibling 2 at the same age. That is, sibling 1’s
log wage has a higher coefficient than sibling 2’s log wage on a variable having a positive partial
correlation with one’s own test score and a lower coefficient than sibling 2’s log wage on a variable
2See section 1.2.2 for a discussion of the properties of the coefficients pif and pio obtained from the regression of
one’s ability on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling.
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having a negative partial correlation with one’s own test score. Hence, sibling 1 has a higher
coefficient than sibling 2 on one’s own test score in the regression of one’s log wage at a given age
level on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling; so that, ϑ11 > ϑ22 if pif < 0.
A.3 Endogeneity of Test Score
Although the model in section 1.2.1 accounts to some extent for the causal effect of schooling
on test scores, the analysis there assumes that one’s schooling at test administration is the same as
one’s schooling when in the labor market. Because individuals can acquire additional schooling
after the test is administered, it is important to examine the case where one’s schooling at test
administration differs from one’s schooling when in the labor market. This appendix, therefore,
discusses the conditions under which the results in sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 remain unchanged if
one also controls for schooling at test administration when analyzing the structure of the log wage.
The model analyzed here is the same as that in section 1.2.1, except that equation (1.5) for the
test score zi is replaced with:
zi = θss˜i + θaai + ωi, (A.39)
where s˜i denotes one’s schooling at the time of taking the test, and all the other variables in the
model are defined as before. Letting si continue to denote one’s schooling when in the labor
market, the variables s˜1 and s˜2 are assumed to satisfy the following two redundancy conditions:
E(ai|s1, s2, s˜1, s˜2) = E(ai|s1, s2) and E(ωi|s1, s2, s˜1, s˜2) = E(ωi|s1, s2) = 0. (A.40)
The restrictions above require one’s own and a sibling’s schooling at test administration to be
uninformative about one’s underlying ability ai and testing error ωi after controlling for one’s own
and a sibling’s schooling when in the labor market. These assumptions are justifiable if one’s
schooling when in the labor market represents one’s optimal level of schooling given one’s ability
while one’s schooling at test administration is an exogenous lower bound on one’s optimal level of
schooling. In any case, as explained later in this appendix, these assumptions can to some extent
be tested in the available data. Finally, because the test score itself is treated as being unobservable
to employers, it is also reasonable to assume that employers do not directly observe an individual’s
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schooling at test administration. As in section 1.2.1, the performance errors η1u and η2u in equation
(1.4) are required to be independent of all the other variables in the model, including s˜1 and s˜2.
Given the irrelevance conditions in equation (A.40), it is straightforward to show that the pre-
dictions of propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 remain unchanged if the test scores z1 and z2 are given by
equation (A.39) instead of equation (1.5) but the schooling levels at test administration s˜1 and s˜2
are added to the existing set of regressors s1, s2 and z1, z2. In particular, the log wage equations
(1.11) and (1.17) are unaffected, because s˜1 and s˜2 are unobservable to employers. Furthermore,
the restrictions in equation (A.40) imply that the component of zi orthogonal to s1, s2 in the model
in section 1.2.2 is the same as the component of zi orthogonal to s1, s2 and s˜1, s˜2 in the model in
this appendix. Therefore, the regression coefficients pio and pif in proposition 1.2.2 are the same
as the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores obtained here from the regression of
ai on s1, s2 and z1, z2 as well as s˜1, s˜2. Because the relationship of one’s ability to one’s own
and a sibling’s test scores is unchanged conditional on the other control variables, the regression
coefficients in propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 are the same as those in the model here when one’s own
and a sibling’s schooling levels at test administration are also included among the set of regressors.
The result below summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition A.3.1 Assume that zi is given by equation (A.39). Suppose that sibling 1 is at least
as old as sibling 2 with d ≥ 0 being the age difference between them. Let νij denote the regression
coefficient on sibling j’s test score in the linear projection of sibling i’s log wage on s1, s2 and z1,
z2 as well as s˜1, s˜2.
1. If learning is individual, then ν12ν22 = ν21ν11.
2. If learning is social, then:
(a) ν12ν22 = ν21ν11 for d = 0,
(b) ν12ν22 < ν21ν11 for d > 0.
There are two possible approaches to testing the restrictions in equation (A.40). First, it follows
from equation (A.39) that these restrictions have the following implications for the coefficients
obtained from the regression of zi on s1, s2 and s˜1, s˜2. The coefficients on one’s own schooling
both at test administration and when in the labor market should be positive—the former because of
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the causal effect of schooling on the test score, the latter because of the positive partial correlation
between one’s schooling and one’s ability. Moreover, the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling at test
administration should be zero due to its irrelevance in predicting any of the components of one’s
own test score given the other regressors, whereas the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling when
in the labor market can be either positive or negative as explained in section 1.2.2, depending on
whether ability or schooling is more highly correlated between siblings.
Second, information on the log wages of the two siblings can be used to test equation (A.40),
especially the restriction on the conditional expectation of each sibling’s ability ai given s1, s2
and s˜1, s˜2. Equations (1.11) and (1.17) imply that the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s
schooling at test administration should both be zero in the regression of one’s log wage on s1, s2
and s˜1, s˜2. This prediction, which is true regardless of whether learning is individual or social,
follows because one’s log wage can be written as a linear combination of a constant and one’s own
and a sibling’s underlying abilities, performance errors, and schooling levels when in the labor
market. However, neither sibling’s schooling at test administration is useful in predicting any of
these components of the log wage after controlling for s1 and s2.
A.4 Sibships of Arbitrary Size
To simplify the exposition, the model developed in section 1.2 emphasizes the case in which
each family is composed of only two siblings. However, some households in the data contain three
or more interviewed siblings, all of whom may interact with each other in the learning process. It is,
therefore, natural to examine the empirical implications of social learning for families with several
siblings. This appendix generalizes the learning models in section 1.2 to include an arbitrary
number N ≥ 2 of siblings in each family. The purpose of the analysis in this appendix is to derive
the implications of individual and social learning for the coefficients obtained from the regression
of one’s log wage on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores after controlling for one’s own as well as
every sibling’s schooling. Overall, the results here demonstrate that the predictions of propositions
1.2.3 and 1.2.4 remain essentially unchanged when considering families with arbitrarily many
siblings.
The assumptions made in this appendix about the labor market characteristics of siblings are
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the same as those in section 1.2.1 with the exception that there are now N instead of two siblings
in a given sibship. In particular, the statements in section 1.2.1 regarding a two-sibling family are
now treated as holding for every pair of siblings belonging to the same N -sibling family. The
siblings are labeled from 1 to N . The variances of the underlying variables ai, i, ωi, and ηiu are
assumed to be the same for every sibling, although the means of ai, i, and ωi are allowed to differ
among siblings. Likewise, the sibling correlations in ai, i, and ωi are assumed to be constant
across all pairs of siblings from the same family. The mean of ηiu is zero for every individual in
each period, and ηiu is uncorrelated both over time and across siblings. Each of the N siblings
can have a different age ti; so that, the length of the performance history {riu}tiu=1 can vary among
siblings.
The analysis here consists of three parts. First, propositions A.4.1 and A.4.2, which extend
propositions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, characterize the relationship of one’s own and a sibling’s test scores to
one’s ability, holding constant one’s own and every sibling’s schooling. Proposition A.4.3 analyzes
the problem of predicting one’s ability using the test scores of two of one’s siblings in addition to
the schooling levels of all the members of one’s sibship. Second, proposition A.4.4 like proposition
1.2.3 states the key predictions of the model when employer learning is purely individual. Third,
propositions A.4.5 to A.4.8 derive the relevant properties of the log wage under the assumption
of social learning. Proposition A.4.9 like proposition 1.2.4 examines how the predictions of the
model differ when learning is social instead of individual.
The first step is to derive the component of a person’s test score that is orthogonal to both her
own and all of her siblings’ schooling levels. It is useful to let xi = (N − 1)−1
∑
j 6=i sj denote
the mean schooling of person i’s siblings. Because sj and sk have the same variance as well
as identical covariances with si and zi for i /∈ {j, k}, the component of one’s test score that is
orthogonal to one’s own and every sibling’s schooling is the same as the component of one’s test
score that is orthogonal to one’s own schooling level and the mean schooling of one’s siblings. The
result below reports the coefficient obtained from the regression of zi on si and xi.
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Proposition A.4.1 The regression coefficient of zi on (si, xi) is given by:
C
[(
zi
)
,
(
si
xi
)]
V
[(
si
xi
)]−1
= θs
(
1 0
)
+ θa
γσ2a
σ2s(σ
2
x − ρ2sσ2s)
(
σ2x − ρsρaσ2s (ρa − ρs)σ2s
)
.
(A.41)
Proof The conditional expectation of zi given (si, xi)′ is:
E
[(
zi
)|(si
xi
)]
=
(
µzi
)
+ C
[(
zi
)
,
(
si
xi
)]
V
[(
si
xi
)]−1 [(
si
xi
)
−
(
µsi
µxi
)]
, (A.42)
where the regression coefficient is given by:
C
[(
zi
)
,
(
si
xi
)]
V
[(
si
xi
)]−1
=
[
θsσ
2
s
(
1 ρs
)
+ θaγσ
2
a
(
1 ρa
)]( σ2s ρsσ2s
ρsσ
2
s σ
2
x
)−1
,
(A.43)
where C(zi, xi) = C(zi, sj) and C(si, xi) = C(si, sj) for all j 6= i. Inverting the variance matrix
and rearranging terms leads to the formula in equation (A.41).
The component of zi orthogonal to s1, s2, . . . ,sN can be calculated using the preceding result.
The next step is to analyze the relationship of one’s ability to one’s own and a sibling’s test scores
after controlling for the schooling levels of all the members of one’s sibship. Let p and q index two
distinct siblings from the same family. Denoting s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN)′ and z = (zp, zq)′, consider
the regression coefficient of sibling p and q’s abilities on their own test scores as well as their own
and all of their siblings’ schooling levels:
C
[(
ap
aq
)
,
(
s
z
)]
V
[(
s
z
)]−1
=
(
Ψp Πo Πf
Ψq Πf Πo
)
. (A.44)
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The result below characterizes the regression parameters Πo and Πf , which represent the relation-
ship of one’s ability to one’s own test score and a sibling’s test score, holding constant the schooling
of all the members of one’s sibship.
Proposition A.4.2 The regression coefficients Πo and Πf satisfy Πo > Πf , Πo > 0, and Π2o > Π2f .
Proof Expressing the regression coefficient in equation (A.41) as:
C
[(
zi
)
,
(
si
xi
)]
V
[(
si
xi
)]−1
=
(
θs + θa∆o θa∆f
)
, (A.45)
the component of zi orthogonal to s, which is the same as the component of zi orthogonal to si and
xi, is given by:
zˆi = zi − E(zi|si, xi) = {θa[ai − (∆osi + ∆fxi)] + ωi} − {θa[µai − (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)]}, (A.46)
where equations (1.5) and (A.42) are used to substitute for zi and E(zi|si, xi), respectively. Note
that the coefficient on (zp, zq)′ in a regression on (s1, s2, . . . , sN , zp, zq)′ is the same as the coef-
ficient on (zˆp, zˆq)′ in a regression on (s1, s2, . . . , sN , zˆp, zˆq)′. Therefore, consider the regression
of (ap, aq)′ on (s1, s2, . . . , sN , zˆp, zˆq)′. Because (zˆp, zˆq)′ is uncorrelated with (s1, s2, . . . , sN)′, the
coefficient on (zˆp, zˆq)′ can be expressed as:
(
Πo Πf
Πf Πo
)
= C
[(
ap
aq
)
,
(
zˆp
zˆq
)]
V
[(
zˆp
zˆq
)]−1
, (A.47)
where the inverse variance matrix has the form:
V
[(
zˆp
zˆq
)]−1
= [σ4zˆ(1− ρ2zˆ)]−1
(
σ2zˆ −ρzˆσ2zˆ
−ρzˆσ2zˆ σ2zˆ
)
. (A.48)
I first calculate the covariances C(ap, zˆp) = C(aq, zˆq) and C(ap, zˆq) = C(aq, zˆp). Using equa-
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tions (A.41) and (A.46), the former covariance is equal to:
C(ap, zˆp) = C(aq, zˆq) = θaσ2a[1− γ(∆o + ∆fρa)]
= θaσ
2
a
(
1− γ
2
aσ
2
a[σ
2
x − σ2s(2ρaρs − ρ2a)]
σ2s(σ
2
x − ρ2sσ2s)
)
,
(A.49)
and the latter covariance is equal to:
C(ap, zˆq) = C(aq, zˆp) = θaσ2a[ρa − γ(∆oρa + ∆f%a)]
= θaσ
2
a
(
ρa − γ
2σ2a{(σ2x − ρaρsσ2s)ρa + σ2s(ρa − ρs)%a}
σ2s(σ
2
x − ρ2sσ2s)
)
,
(A.50)
where the parameter %a is defined as:
%a = [1 + (N − 2)ρa]/(N − 1). (A.51)
I next show thatC(ap, zˆq) > 0. From equation (A.50), the statementC(ap, zˆq) > 0 is equivalent
to:
K =σ2sρa[1 + (N − 2)ρs − (N − 1)ρ2s]
− γ2σ2a{ρa[1 + (N − 2)ρs − (N − 1)ρaρs] + (ρa − ρs)[1 + (N − 2)ρa]} > 0,
(A.52)
where the variance σ2s and the correlation ρs are given by:
σ2s = γ
2σ2a + σ
2
 and ρs = (γ
2ρaσ
2
a + ρσ
2
 )/(γ
2σ2a + σ
2
 ). (A.53)
Note that K = 0 if σ2 = 0. Using equation (A.53) to substitute for σ
2
s and ρs in equation (A.52),
the derivative of K with respect to σ2 is:
∂K
∂σ2
=
σ4ρa(1−ρ)[1+(N−1)ρ]+2γ2σ2aσ2ρa(1−ρ)[1+(N−1)ρ]+γ4σ4aρ(1−ρa)[1+(N−1)ρa]
(γ2σ2a+σ
2
 )
2
>0.
(A.54)
It follows that K > 0 if σ2 > 0 and so C(ap, zˆq) > 0.
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I now show that C(ap, zˆp) > C(ap, zˆq). From equations (A.49) and (A.50), the statement
C(ap, zˆp) > C(ap, zˆq) is equivalent to:
W = σ2s(1−ρa)[1 + (N −2)ρs− (N −1)ρ2s]
−γ2σ2a[1 + (N −2)ρs−2ρsρa(N −1) + (N −1)ρ2a]
+γ2σ2aρa[1 + (N −2)ρs− (N −1)ρsρa] +γ2σ2a(ρa−ρs)[1 + (N −2)ρa] > 0,
(A.55)
where σ2s and ρs are given by equation (A.53). Note that W = 0 if σ
2
 = 0. Using equation (A.53)
to substitute for σ2s and ρs in equation (A.55), the derivative of W with respect to σ
2
 is:
∂W
∂σ2
=
(1− ρa)(1− ρ){σ4 [1+(N−1)ρ] + 2γ2σ2aσ2 [1+(N−1)ρ] + γ4σ4a[1+(N−1)ρa]}
(γ2σ2a + σ
2
 )
2
>0.
(A.56)
It follows that W > 0 if σ2 > 0 and so C(ap, zˆp) > C(ap, zˆq).
Finally, I use the results shown above to prove the three claims in proposition A.4.2. Given the
form of the inverse variance matrix in equation (A.48), it follows from C(ap, zˆp) > C(ap, zˆq) that
Πo > Πf , proving the first claim. From equations (A.47) and (A.48), the regression parameters Πo
and Πf take the form:
Πo = Γo − ρzˆΓf and Πf = Γf − ρzˆΓo, (A.57)
where Γo = τC(ap, zˆp) > 0, Γf = τC(ap, zˆq) > 0, and τ > 0. Because it has been shown above
that C(ap, zˆp) > C(ap, zˆq) > 0, one has Γo > Γf > 0. These inequalities imply that Πo > 0
in equation (A.57), proving the second claim. In addition, because Γ2o > Γ
2
f from the preceding
inequalities, one has:
Γ2o+ρ
2
zˆΓ
2
f>ρ
2
zˆΓ
2
o+Γ
2
f ⇔ Γ2o−2ρzˆΓoΓf+ρ2zˆΓ2f>ρ2zˆΓ2o−2ρzˆΓoΓf+Γ2f
⇔(Γo−ρzˆΓf )2>(Γf−ρzˆΓo)2;
(A.58)
so that, Π2o > Π
2
f in equation (A.57), proving the third claim.
Because families can include more than two siblings in the model studied in this appendix, it is
also necessary to examine the relationship of sibling p and q’s test scores zp and zq to the ability ar
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of a third sibling r, holding constant the schooling levels {sk}Nk=1 of all the members of the sibship.
The regression coefficient for this prediction problem is given by:
C
[(
ar
)
,
(
s
z
)]
V
[(
s
z
)]−1
=
(
Ψx Πx Πx
)
. (A.59)
The result below shows that an individual’s ability has a positive partial correlation with a sibling’s
test score given another sibling’s test score as well as her own and all of her siblings’ schooling
levels.
Proposition A.4.3 Let N ≥ 3. Consider three distinct siblings p, q, and r from the same family.
Let Πx denote the regression coefficients on both sibling p and q’s test scores zp and zq in the
conditional expectation of sibling r’s ability ar given zp, zq, and {sk}Nk=1. Then Πx > 0.
Proof Let zˆi denote the component of zi orthogonal to {sk}Nk=1. Recall that zˆi is given by equation
(A.46). Note that the coefficient on (zp, zq) in a regression on (s1, s2, . . . , sN , zp, zq) is the same as
the coefficient on (zˆp, zˆq) in a regression on (zˆp, zˆq). Therefore, the regression coefficient Πx can
be expressed as: (
Πx Πx
)
= C
[(
ar
)
,
(
zˆp
zˆq
)]
V
[(
zˆp
zˆq
)]−1
, (A.60)
where the inverse variance matrix has the form:
V
[(
zˆp
zˆq
)]−1
= [σ4zˆ(1− ρ2zˆ)]−1
(
σ2zˆ −ρzˆσ2zˆ
−ρzˆσ2zˆ σ2zˆ
)
, (A.61)
which is analogous to equation (A.48). As in equation (A.50), the covariance terms in equation
(A.60) are given by:
Ξzˆ = C(ar, zˆp) = C(ar, zˆq) = θaσ2a
(
ρa − γ{∆oρa + ∆f [1 + (N − 2)ρa]/(N − 1)}
)
, (A.62)
which was shown to be positive in the proof of proposition A.4.2. From equations (A.60) and
(A.61), the coefficient Πx can be expressed as:
Πx = Ξzˆ[σ
2
zˆ(1 + ρzˆ)]
−1, (A.63)
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which is positive because Ξzˆ > 0.
Before analyzing social interactions among siblings, I consider the benchmark case in which
learning is individual. Because only one’s own characteristics are used to set wages, an individual’s
log wage is given as in section 1.2.3 by equation (1.11). Therefore, the conditional expectation of
the log wage for person i ∈ {p, q} given zp, zq and s1, s2, . . . , sN can be expressed as:
E[log(wi)|s1, s2, . . . , sN , zp, zq] = χiE(ai|s1, s2, . . . , sN , zp, zq) + fi(si, ti), (A.64)
where the function fi(si, ti) is defined in equation (1.13). The following analogue of proposition
1.2.3 is an immediate consequence of equation (A.64). As stated below, if learning is individual,
then the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to the coefficient on one’s own test score
will be the same for siblings p and q, irrespective of the age of any of the siblings in their family.
Proposition A.4.4 Suppose that learning is individual. Consider two distinct siblings p and q from
the same family. Let αij denote the regression coefficient on sibling j’s test score in the conditional
expectation of sibling i’s log wage given zp, zq and s1, s2, . . . , sN . Then αpqαqq = αqpαpp =
(χpΠf )(χqΠo).
The remainder of this appendix examines the case in which there are social interactions in
the learning process among the N siblings in a family. In particular, each individual’s wage is
assumed to be equal to the conditional expectation of her own labor productivity given her own
and all of her siblings’ schooling and performance. Conditional on the schooling {sj}Nj=1 and
the performance {rj}Nj=1 of all the members of a sibship, the market’s beliefs about the time-
invariant component gi(si, ai) of sibling i’s log labor productivity are normally distributed with
mean µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1) and variance σ2bi given by:
µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1)=βsi+E(ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1) and σ2bi=V(ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1). (A.65)
Noting that the error terms in each individual’s productivity signals are identically distributed and
independent of each other and all of the other variables in the model, the conditional expectation
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of ai given {sj}Nj=1 and {rj}Nj=1 can be expressed as:
E
(
ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1
)
= E
(
ai|{sj}Nj=1, {r¯j}Nj=1
)
= γi +
N∑
j=1
δijsj +
N∑
j=1
λij r¯j, (A.66)
where r¯j is the sample mean of {rju}tju=1. Because of the normality of the market’s beliefs, the
conditional expectation of sibling i’s labor productivity l(si, ai, ti) given {sj}Nj=1 and {rj}Nj=1 is:
E
(
exp[l(si, ai, ti)]|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1
)
= exp
[
µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1)+ 12σ2bi + h(ti)], (A.67)
which yields the following expression for sibling i’s log wage:
log(vi) = µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1)+ 12σ2bi + h(ti). (A.68)
Using equations (A.66) and (A.67) to substitute for µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1) in equation (A.68), one
obtains:
log(vi) =
N∑
j=1
λij r¯j + yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti), (A.69)
where the function yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) is defined as:
yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) = γi + βsi + N∑
j=1
δijsj +
1
2
σ2bi + h(ti). (A.70)
In order to understand the behavior of the log wage under social learning, it is necessary to de-
rive the properties of the coefficient λij on each sibling j’s mean performance r¯j in the regres-
sion of one’s ability ai on {sj}Nj=1 and {r¯j}Nj=1. Let rˆj denote the component of r¯j that is or-
thogonal to {sj}Nj=1. Let rˆ represent the vector (rˆ1, rˆ2, . . . , rˆN)′. Then the regression parameter
λi = (λi1, λi2, . . . , λiN) is given by:
λi = C(ai, rˆ)V(rˆ)−1. (A.71)
The next result establishes a few simple facts about the covariance vector C(ai, rˆ) and the variance
matrix V(rˆ) that are useful in deriving the properties of the regression coefficient λi. First, it
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shows that all the elements of the covariance matrix C(ai, rˆ) are equal to Ξf > 0, except for the
ith element, which is equal to Ξo > Ξf . Second, it shows that all the off-diagonal elements of
the variance matrix V(rˆ) are equal to Σ0 > 0 but that the ith diagonal element of V(rˆ) is equal to
Σi > Σ0. Observe that all the entries of C(ai, rˆ), except for the ith one, are equal to each other.
Likewise, all the off-diagonal entries of V(rˆ) are the same, whereas the diagonal entries can differ,
depending on the ages of the siblings.
Proposition A.4.5 For any i, let Ξo = C(ai, rˆi) and Σi = V(rˆi). For any i, j such that i 6= j,
let Ξf = C(ai, rˆj) and Σ0 = C(rˆi, rˆj). Then the vector C(ai, rˆ) satisfies Ξo > Ξf > 0, and the
invertible matrix V(rˆ) satisfies Σi > Σ0 > 0.
Proof I first calculate the covariance C(ai, rˆk) both for k = i and for k 6= i. The component of r¯k
orthogonal to {sk}Nk=1, which is identical to the component of r¯k orthogonal to sk and xk, is given
by:
rˆk = r¯k − E(r¯k|sk, xk) = [ak − (∆osk + ∆fxk) + η¯k]− [µak − (∆oµsk + ∆fµxk)], (A.72)
where ∆o and ∆f are defined in equation (A.45), and η¯k is the sample mean of {ηuk}tku=1. There-
fore, the covariance C(ai, rˆk) is as follows:
C(ai, rˆk) =
σ2a[1− γ(∆o + ∆fρa)] if k = iσ2a[ρa − γ(∆oρa + ∆f%a)] if k 6= i , (A.73)
where %a is defined in equation (A.51). The bracketed terms in equation (A.73), which also ap-
pear in equations (A.49) and (A.50), were shown in the proof of proposition A.4.2 to satisfy the
following:
1− γ(∆o + ∆fρa) > ρa − γ(∆oρa + ∆f%a) > 0. (A.74)
Therefore, one has C(ai, rˆi) > C(ai, rˆj) > 0 for all j 6= i, which is equivalent to Ξo > Ξf > 0 as
desired.
I next calculate the covariance C(rˆi, rˆj) for all i, j such that i 6= j. Observe that C(rˆi, rˆj)
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reduces to:
C(rˆi, rˆj) = C([ai − (∆osi + ∆fxi) + η¯i]− [µai − (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)], rˆj) = C(ai, rˆj), (A.75)
where the first step follows from substituting for rˆi using equation (A.72), and the second step uses
the fact that rˆj has zero covariance with si and xi. I now compute the variance V(rˆi) for all i. Note
that V(rˆi) can be expressed as:
V(rˆi) = C([ai − (∆osi + ∆fxi) + η¯i]− [µai − (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)], rˆi)
= C(ai, rˆi) + C(η¯i, rˆi) = C(ai, rˆi) + t−1i σ2η,
(A.76)
where the first step substitutes for rˆi from equation (A.72), the second step holds because rˆi is
orthogonal to si and xi, and the third step follows because η¯i has a nonzero covariance only with
itself. Because it has been shown above thatC(ai, rˆi) > C(ai, rˆj) > 0 for all j 6= i, the two preced-
ing results C(rˆi, rˆj) = C(ai, rˆj) and V(rˆi) = C(ai, rˆi) + t−1i σ2η imply that V(rˆi) > C(rˆi, rˆj) > 0
for all j 6= i, which is equivalent to Σi > Σ0 > 0 as desired.
I finally show that the matrix V(rˆ) is invertible. Note that V(rˆ) can be decomposed as:
V(rˆ) = A+ uu′, (A.77)
where A is the N × N diagonal matrix whose kth diagonal entry is Σk − Σ0, and u is an N × 1
vector each of whose entries is
√
Σ0. Then the determinant of V(rˆ) can be calculated as follows:
det[V(rˆ)] = det(A+ uu′) = (1 + u′A−1u) det(A) =
[1 +
N∑
k=1
Σ0(Σk − Σ0)−1]
N∏
k=1
(Σk − Σ0) > 0,
(A.78)
where the second equality follows from the matrix determinant lemma, and the inequality follows
because Σk > Σ0 > 0 for all k as shown above. Since det[V(rˆ)] > 0, V(rˆ) is invertible.
The behavior of the regression coefficient λi depends on the structure of the inverse variance
matrix V(rˆ)−1 in equation (A.71). Therefore, it is necessary to obtain a precise characterization of
the inverse of theN×N matrix V(rˆ) before proceeding with the analysis of the coefficient λi. The
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result below describes the relevant features of the inverses of matrices having a structure similar
to V(rˆ). In particular, I consider an arbitrary N˜ × N˜ matrix V˜ all of whose off-diagonal elements
are equal to the same positive constant and each of whose diagonal elements is greater than any
off-diagonal element. The result below shows that the matrix inverse V˜ −1 has positive diagonal
entries and negative off-diagonal entries. Moreover, the sum of the entries in each column of V˜ −1
is shown to be positive.
Proposition A.4.6 Let V˜ be an arbitrary N˜ × N˜ matrix whose off-diagonal entries are all equal
to Σ˜0 > 0 and whose ith diagonal entry is equal to Σ˜i > Σ˜0. Let Λ˜ij denote the (i, j)th element of
the matrix inverse V˜ −1. Then:
1. Λ˜ii > 0 for all i,
2. Λ˜ij < 0 for i 6= j,
3.
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kj > 0 for all j.
Proof From the definition of a matrix inverse, the parameters Λ˜ij must satisfy the following equa-
tion for all i, j:
Σ˜iΛ˜ij + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=i
Λ˜kj = δij, (A.79)
where δij is the Kronecker delta equal to 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j. Recall from the statement of the
proposition that Σ˜i > Σ˜0 > 0 for all i.
I first show that the sum
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kj of the elements in each column j of the matrix V˜
−1 is non-
negative. Suppose to the contrary that
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kl is negative for some l. Then there must be some
m such that Λ˜ml is negative. For this pair of l and m, it follows that:
0 > Σ˜0Λ˜ml + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=m
Λ˜kl > Σ˜mΛ˜ml + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=m
Λ˜kl, (A.80)
where the second step holds because Λ˜ml < 0 and Σ˜m > Σ˜0 > 0. However, the preceding equation
contradicts equation (A.79), which requires that Σ˜mΛ˜ml+Σ˜0
∑N˜
k 6=m Λ˜kl ≥ 0. Thus,
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kl must
be non-negative.
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I next show that the off-diagonal elements of the matrix V˜ −1 are non-positive; that is, Λ˜ij ≤ 0
for i 6= j. Suppose to the contrary that Λ˜ab > 0 for some a and b such that a 6= b. From equation
(A.79), one has:
Σ˜aΛ˜ab + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=a
Λ˜kb = 0. (A.81)
Because Σ˜a > Σ˜0 > 0, the preceding equation implies:
Σ˜0Λ˜ab + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=a
Λ˜kb < 0 ⇔
N˜∑
k=1
Λ˜kb < 0, (A.82)
which contradicts the result shown above that the sum
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kj of each column j of the matrix
V˜ −1 must be non-negative. Thus, Λ˜ij ≤ 0 for i 6= j.
I now show that the diagonal elements of the matrix V˜ −1 are positive; that is, Λ˜ii > 0 for all i.
From equation (A.79), one has:
Σ˜iΛ˜ii + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=i
Λ˜ki = 1. (A.83)
Because it has been shown above that Λ˜ij ≤ 0 for i 6= j, it must be that
∑
k 6=i Λ˜ki ≤ 0. Therefore,
noting that Σ˜i > 0 and Σ˜0 > 0, one must have Λ˜ii > 0, in order for the preceding equation to hold.
This proves the first claim.
I also show that the sum
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kj of the elements in each column j of the matrix V˜
−1 is
positive. Suppose to the contrary that
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kl is non-positive for some l. Because it has been
shown above that Λ˜ii > 0 for all i, there must be some m with m 6= l such that Λ˜ml is negative.
For this pair of l and m, it follows that:
0 ≥ Σ˜0Λ˜ml + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=m
Λ˜kl > Σ˜mΛ˜ml + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=m
Λ˜kl, (A.84)
where the second step follows because Λ˜ml < 0 and Σ˜m > Σ˜0 > 0. However, equation (A.79) indi-
cates that Σ˜mΛ˜ml + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=m Λ˜kl = 0, which contradicts the preceding equation. Thus,
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kl
must be positive, which proves the third claim.
I finally show that the off-diagonal elements of the matrix V˜ −1 are negative; that is, Λ˜ij < 0
for i 6= j. Suppose to the contrary that Λ˜ab ≥ 0 for some a and b such that a 6= b. From equation
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(A.79), one has:
Σ˜aΛ˜ab + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=a
Λ˜kb = 0. (A.85)
Because Σ˜a > Σ˜0 > 0, the preceding equation implies:
Σ˜0Λ˜ab + Σ˜0
∑
k 6=a
Λ˜kb ≤ 0 ⇔
N˜∑
k=1
Λ˜kb ≤ 0, (A.86)
which contradicts the result shown above that the sum
∑N˜
k=1 Λ˜kj of each column j of the matrix
V˜ −1 must be positive. Thus, Λ˜ij < 0 for i 6= j, proving the second claim.
It is now possible to examine the inference problem facing employers with imperfect infor-
mation about worker ability. The next result shows that each person j’s average performance has
a positive coefficient λij in person i’s log wage, which is given by equation (A.69). That is, an
individual’s wage assigns a positive price to both her own and every sibling’s performance.
Proposition A.4.7 Suppose that learning is social. Let λij denote the coefficient on sibling j’s
average performance r¯j in the regression of sibling i’s ability ai on {r¯k}Nk=1 and {sk}Nk=1. Then
λij > 0 for all i, j.
Proof In order to show that λij > 0 for all i, j, I represent the market’s beliefs about person i’s log
labor productivity as follows. Conditional on the schooling {sj}Nj=1 of person i and her siblings
and the performance {rj}j 6=i of person i’s siblings but not person i, the market’s beliefs about the
time-invariant component g(si, ai) of person’s i’s productivity are normally distributed with mean
µni
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i) and variance σ2ni where:
µni
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i)=βsi+E(ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i) and σ2ni=V(ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i). (A.87)
Noting that the error terms {ηju}tju=1 in each individual’s performance observations are identically
distributed and independent of each other and all of the other variables in the model, the conditional
expectation of ai given {sj}Nj=1 and {rj}j 6=i can be expressed as:
E
(
ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i
)
= E
(
ai|{sj}Nj=1, {r¯j}j 6=i
)
= γ˜i +
N∑
j=1
δ˜ijsj +
∑
j 6=i
λ˜ij r¯j, (A.88)
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where r¯j denotes the sample mean of {rju}tju=1. In addition, these properties of the error terms
{ηiu}tiu=1 imply that the market’s beliefs about g(si, ai) given the schooling {sj}Nj=1 and perfor-
mance {rj}Nj=1 of person i and her siblings are normally distributed with mean µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1)
and variance σ2bi where:
µbi
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}Nj=1)=(1−ξi)µni({sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i)+ξir¯i,
σ2bi = (σ
−2
ni +tiσ
−2
η )
−1, ξi= tiσ−2η σ
2
bi.
(A.89)
Using equations (A.87), (A.88), and (A.89) to substitute for µni
({sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i) in equation
(A.68), one obtains:
log(vi) = ξir¯i + (1− ξi)
∑
j 6=i
λ˜ij r¯j + yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti), (A.90)
where the function yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) is given by:
yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) = (1− ξi)
(
γ˜i + βsi +
N∑
j=1
δ˜ijsj
)
+ 1
2
σ2bi + h(ti). (A.91)
Recalling that rˆj is the component of r¯j orthogonal to {sj}Nj=1, let rˆ−i represent the vector (rˆ1, . . . ,
rˆi−1, rˆi+1, . . . , rˆN)′ formed by deleting the ith entry from the vector rˆ. Then the regression coeffi-
cient λ˜i = (λ˜i,1, . . . , λ˜i,i−1, λ˜i,i+1, . . . , λ˜i,N) is given by:
λ˜i = C(ai, rˆ−i)V(rˆ−i)−1. (A.92)
Note that each of the N − 1 elements of the vector C(ai, rˆ−i) is equal to Ξf , which was shown to
be positive in proposition A.4.5. Furthermore, the off-diagonal entries of the (N − 1) × (N − 1)
matrix V(rˆ−i) are all equal to Σ0, and the j th diagonal entry of V(rˆ−i) is equal to Σj if j < i
and Σj+1 if j ≥ i. In proposition A.4.5, it was shown that Σj > Σ0 > 0 for all j. Therefore,
V(rˆ−i) has the same form as the matrix V˜ in proposition A.4.6; so that, the sum of the entries in
each column of V(rˆ−i)−1 is positive. It follows from equation (A.92) that every element of λ˜i is
positive, because every entry of C(ai, rˆ−i) is equal to the same positive constant, and each column
of V(rˆ−i)−1 has a positive sum. Thus, noting that ξi ∈ (0, 1) in equation (A.90), the coefficient λij
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on sibling j’s average performance in sibling i’s log wage is positive, because λij is equal to ξi for
i = j and (1− ξi)λ˜ij for i 6= j.
The next result describes how the coefficient on a sibling’s average performance in an individ-
ual’s log wage depends on both the individual’s and the sibling’s ages. Suppose, for example, that
sibling p is older than sibling q; so that, sibling p’s average performance is a more precise indi-
cator of an individual’s underlying ability than sibling q’s average performance. The result below
demonstrates several intuitive facts regarding the coefficient λij on sibling j’s average performance
in sibling i’s log wage, which is given by equation (A.69). First, sibling p’s log wage places less
weight than sibling q’s log wage on the average performance of any sibling g /∈ {p, q}. Second, the
impact of one’s own average performance on one’s log wage is greater for sibling p than for sibling
q. Third, the coefficient on sibling q’s average performance in sibling p’s log wage is less than the
coefficient on sibling p’s average performance in sibling q’s log wage. Fourth, sibling p’s log wage
is based more on her own average performance than on sibling q’s average performance. Fifth,
sibling p’s average performance has a stronger influence than sibling q’s average performance on
the log wage of any sibling g /∈ {p, q}.
Proposition A.4.8 Suppose that learning is social. Consider two distinct siblings p and q from the
same family. Let λij denote the coefficient on sibling j’s average performance r¯j in the regression
of sibling i’s ability ai on {r¯k}Nk=1 and {sk}Nk=1. If tp > tq, then:
1. λpg < λqg for all g /∈ {p, q},
2. λqq < λpp,
3. λpq < λqp,
4. λpq < λpp,
5. λgq < λgp for all g /∈ {p, q}.
Proof I first show that λpg < λqg for all g /∈ {p, q}. Recall the inverse variance matrix V(rˆ)−1
appearing in equation (A.71). From proposition A.4.5, the off-diagonal entries of V(rˆ) are all
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equal to Σ0 > 0, and the ith diagonal entry of V(rˆ) is equal to Σi > Σ0. Let Λij denote the (i, j)th
entry of V(rˆ)−1. From equation (A.79), the elements of V(rˆ)−1 satisfy:
ΣiΛij + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
Λkj = δij, (A.93)
where δij equals 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j. Let e and f be two distinct indices. Subtracting the
above equation for (i, j) = (f, e) from the same equation for (i, j) = (e, e) results in:
ΣeΛee − ΣfΛfe + Σ0(Λfe − Λee) = 1 ⇔ Λfe = [Λee(Σe − Σ0)− 1]/(Σf − Σ0). (A.94)
Because Λfe < 0 from proposition A.4.6 and (Σf − Σ0) > 0 from proposition A.4.5, it must be
that [Λee(Σe − Σ0) − 1] < 0. Therefore, setting e = g and f ∈ {p, q} in the preceding equation,
one has Λpg < Λqg, because tp > tq implies that V(rˆp) < V(rˆq) or, equivalently, Σp < Σq. From
equation (A.71), the regression coefficient λig is equal to:
λig = ΞoΛig + Ξf
∑
k 6=i
Λkg; (A.95)
so that, the difference λqg − λpg is given by:
λqg − λpg = (Ξo − Ξf )(Λqg − Λpg) > 0, (A.96)
where the inequality follows because Ξo > Ξf and Λqg > Λpg. Thus, one has λpg < λqg, proving
the first claim.
I now show that λqq < λpp. Recall from equation (A.90) that sibling i’s log wage has the form:
log(vi) = ξir¯i + (1− ξi)
∑
j 6=i
λ˜ij r¯j + yi
({sj}Nj=1, ti), (A.97)
where the coefficient λ˜i = (λ˜i,1, . . . , λ˜i,i−1, λ˜i,i+1, . . . , λ˜i,N) is given as in equation (A.92) by:
λ˜i = C(ai, rˆ−i)V(rˆ−i)−1, (A.98)
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and the parameter ξi ∈ (0, 1) is defined as in equations (A.87) and (A.89) by:
ξi = tiσ
−2
η σ
2
bi, σ
2
bi = (σ
−2
ni + tiσ
−2
η )
−1, σ2ni = V
(
ai|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=i
)
. (A.99)
Since tp is greater than tq, sibling p’s performance history {rpu}tpu=1 contains more signals than
sibling q’s performance history {rqu}tqu=1. Therefore, the conditional variances must satisfy σ2np ≥
σ2nq, because the number of sibling q’s signals on which V
(
ap|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=p
)
conditions is less
than the number of sibling p’s signals on whichV
(
aq|{sj}Nj=1, {rj}j 6=q
)
conditions. It follows from
tpσ
−2
η > tqσ
−2
η and σ
−2
np ≤ σ−2nq that ξp > ξq in equation (A.99). Noting that λii = ξi, one obtains
λqq < λpp, which proves the second claim.
I next show that λpq < λqp. The main task here is to demonstrate that the coefficient λ˜i defined
by equation (A.98) satisfies λ˜pq < λ˜qp. Because the labeling of siblings is arbitrary, one can assume
without loss of generality that p = N − 1 and q = N . From proposition A.4.5, the covariance
vectors C(ap, rˆ−p) and C(aq, rˆ−q) and the variance matrices V(rˆ−p) and V(rˆ−q) have the following
properties. Each element of C(ap, rˆ−p) and C(aq, rˆ−q) is equal to Ξf > 0. Moreover, all the off-
diagonal entries of V(rˆ−p) and V(rˆ−q) are equal to Σ0 > 0, and the j th diagonal entries of V(rˆ−p)
and V(rˆ−q) are both equal to Σj > Σ0 if j < N − 1. Finally, if j = N − 1, then the j th diagonal
entry of V(rˆ−p) is equal to Σq > Σ0, and the j th diagonal entry of V(rˆ−q) is equal to Σp > Σ0.
Let Σpi and Σ
q
i denote the i
th diagonal entries of V(rˆ−p) and V(rˆ−q), respectively. Let Λpij
and Λqij denote the (i, j)
th entries of V(rˆ−p)−1 and V(rˆ−q)−1, respectively. Let b ∈ {p, q}. From
equation (A.79), the elements of V(rˆ−b)−1 satisfy:
ΣbiΛ
b
ij + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
Λbkj = δij, (A.100)
where δij equals 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j. If e and f are two distinct indices, then subtracting the
above equation for (i, j) = (f, e) from the same equation for (i, j) = (e, e) yields:
ΣbeΛ
b
ee − ΣbfΛbfe + Σ0(Λbfe − Λbee) = 1 ⇔ Λbfe = [Λbee(Σbe − Σ0)− 1]/(Σbf − Σ0), (A.101)
which is analogous to equation (A.94). Using equation (A.101) with (e, f) = (j, k) to substitute
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for Λbkj in equation (A.100) with j = i, one has:
ΣbiΛ
b
ii + Σ0[Λ
b
ii(Σ
b
i − Σ0)− 1]
∑
k 6=i
(Σbk − Σ0)−1 = 1. (A.102)
Solving for Λbii in equation (A.102) yields:
Λbii =
(
1 + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
(Σbk − Σ0)−1
)(
Σbi + Σ0(Σ
b
i − Σ0)
∑
k 6=i
(Σbk − Σ0)−1
)−1
, (A.103)
where Σbj > Σ0 > 0 for all j. If i = N − 1, then Σpi = Σq = V(rˆq) > V(rˆp) = Σp = Σqi and
Σpk = Σk = Σ
q
k for k 6= i. Therefore, equation (A.103) implies that Λpii < Λqii for i = N − 1.
Rearranging equation (A.102), one also obtains:
Σ0Λ
b
ii + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
Λbii(Σ
b
i − Σ0)− 1
Σbk − Σ0
= 1− Λbii(Σbi − Σ0)
⇔ Σ0Λbii = Υbi
(
1 + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
(Σbk − Σ0)−1
)
,
(A.104)
where Υbi is defined as:
Υbi = 1− Λbii(Σbi − Σ0). (A.105)
If i = N − 1, then Λpii < Λqii as shown above. Hence, equation (A.104) implies that Υpi < Υqi if
i = N − 1, noting that Σbk > Σ0 > 0 and Σpk = Σqk for all k 6= i.
The sum of the elements in the j th column of V(rˆ−b)−1 can be expressed as:
N−1∑
k=1
Λbkj = Λ
b
jj + [Λ
b
jj(Σ
b
j − Σ0)− 1]
∑
k 6=j
(Σbk − Σ0)−1 = Υbj/Σ0, (A.106)
where the first and second steps follow from equations (A.101) and (A.104), respectively. Recall
that Υbj is given by equation (A.105). If j = N − 1, then Υpj < Υqj as shown above; so that, one
has for j = N − 1:
N−1∑
k=1
Λpkj <
N−1∑
k=1
Λqkj. (A.107)
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Therefore, using equation (A.98), the regression coefficients λ˜pq and λ˜qp are as follows for j =
N − 1:
λ˜pq = Ξf
(
N−1∑
k=1
Λpkj
)
< Ξf
(
N−1∑
k=1
Λqkj
)
= λ˜qp, (A.108)
where the inequality is due to equation (A.107), noting that Ξf > 0 from proposition A.4.5. From
equation (A.97), the coefficients λpq and λqp are given by:
λpq = (1− ξp)λ˜pq and λqp = (1− ξq)λ˜qp. (A.109)
Because it has been shown above that ξp, ξq ∈ (0, 1) satisfy ξq < ξp and that λ˜pq, λ˜qp satisfy
λ˜pq < λ˜qp, it follows that λpq < λqp, noting that λpq, λqp > 0 and thus λ˜pq, λ˜qp > 0 from proposition
A.4.7. This completes the proof of the third claim.
I also show that λpq < λpp. Consider the formula for the regression coefficient λi in equation
(A.71). The result λpq < λqp, which has been proved above, is equivalent to:
λpq = ΞoΛpq + Ξf
∑
k 6=p
Λkq < ΞoΛqp + Ξf
∑
k 6=q
Λkp = λqp, (A.110)
where Λij denotes the (i, j)th entry of V(rˆ)−1. Recall that Ξo > Ξf > 0 from proposition A.4.5.
Because Λpp > 0 and Λqp < 0 from proposition A.4.6, one obtains:
λqp = ΞoΛqp + Ξf
∑
k 6=q
Λkp < ΞoΛpp + Ξf
∑
k 6=p
Λkp = λpp. (A.111)
Equations (A.110) and (A.111) imply that λpq < λpp, which proves the fourth claim.
I finally show that λgq < λgp for all g /∈ {p, q}. Using equation (A.90), sibling g’s log wage
can be expressed as:
log(vg) = ξgr¯g + (1− ξg)
∑
j 6=g
λ˜gj r¯j + yg
({sj}Nj=1, tg), (A.112)
where the coefficient λ˜g = (λ˜g,1, . . . , λ˜g,g−1, λ˜g,g+1, . . . , λ˜g,N) is given as in equation (A.92) by:
λ˜g = C(ag, rˆ−g)V(rˆ−g)−1, (A.113)
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and the parameter ξg ∈ (0, 1) is defined in equation (A.89). In order to prove that λgq < λgp, I
will show that λ˜gq < λ˜gp. From proposition A.4.5, every entry of C(ag, rˆ−g) is equal to Ξf > 0,
and every off-diagonal entry of V(rˆ−g)−1 is equal to Σ0 > 0. Moreover, the j th diagonal entry of
V(rˆ−g) is equal to Σj if j < g and to Σj+1 if j ≥ g, where Σi > Σ0 for all i.
Let Σgi denote the i
th diagonal entry of V(rˆ−g), and let Λgij denote the (i, j)th entry of V(rˆ−g)−1.
From equation (A.79), the elements of V(rˆ−g)−1 satisfy:
ΣgiΛ
g
ij + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
Λgkj = δij, (A.114)
where δij equals 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j. Let e and f be two distinct indices. Subtracting the
above equation for (i, j) = (f, e) from the same equation for (i, j) = (e, e), one obtains after some
rearrangement:
Λgfe = [Λ
g
ee(Σ
g
e − Σ0)− 1]/(Σgf − Σ0). (A.115)
Using equation (A.115) with (e, f) = (j, k) to substitute for Λgkj in equation (A.114) with j = i,
one obtains after solving for Λgii:
Λgii =
(
1 + Σ0
∑
k 6=i
(Σgk − Σ0)−1
)(
Σgi + Σ0(Σ
g
i − Σ0)
∑
k 6=i
(Σgk − Σ0)−1
)−1
. (A.116)
Note that equations (A.115) and (A.116) are analogous to equations (A.101) and (A.103), respec-
tively.
The sum of the elements in the j th column of V(rˆ−g)−1 can be expressed as:
N−1∑
k=1
Λgkj = Λ
g
jj + [Λ
g
jj(Σ
g
j − Σ0)− 1]
∑
k 6=j
(Σgk − Σ0)−1
=
(
Σgj + Σ0(Σ
g
j − Σ0)
∑
k 6=j
(Σgk − Σ0)−1
)−1
,
(A.117)
where the first step uses equation (A.115) to substitute for Λgkj if k 6= j, and the second step follows
from substituting for Λgjj using equation (A.116) and simplifying the resulting expression. Note
that Σgi > Σ0 > 0 for all i in equation (A.117).
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Let pˆ and qˆ respectively denote the columns of the matrix V(rˆ−g) that correspond to siblings
p and q. That is, for b ∈ {p, q}, let bˆ = b if b < g, and let bˆ = b − 1 if b > g. Then it follows
from tp > tq that Σ
g
pˆ = Σp = V(rˆp) < V(rˆq) = Σq = Σ
g
qˆ . Therefore, one has Σ
g
pˆ < Σ
g
qˆ and∑
k 6=pˆ(Σ
g
k − Σ0)−1 <
∑
k 6=qˆ(Σ
g
k − Σ0)−1 in equation (A.117). Hence, the sums of the elements in
the pˆth and qˆth columns of V(rˆ−g)−1 satisfy:
N−1∑
k=1
Λgkqˆ <
N−1∑
k=1
Λgkpˆ. (A.118)
From equation (A.113), the regression coefficients λ˜gp and λ˜gq are as follows:
λ˜gq = Ξf
(
N−1∑
k=1
Λgkqˆ
)
< Ξf
(
N−1∑
k=1
Λgkpˆ
)
= λ˜gp, (A.119)
where the inequality is due to equation (A.118), noting that Ξf > 0 from proposition A.4.5. Using
equation (A.112), the coefficients λgp and λgq are given by:
λgp = (1− ξg)λ˜gp and λgq = (1− ξg)λ˜gq. (A.120)
Because λ˜gq < λ˜gp and ξg ∈ (0, 1), one has λgq < λgp, which proves the fifth claim.
Having derived the properties of the log wage under social learning, I now turn to the problem
faced by the econometrician with data on test scores, schooling, and log wages. From equation
(A.69), the conditional expectation of the log wage of sibling i ∈ {p, q} given zp, zq, and {sk}Nk=1
can be expressed as:
E
[
log(vi)|zp, zq, {sk}Nk=1
]
=
N∑
j=1
λijE
(
aj|zp, zq, {sk}Nk=1
)
+mi
({sj}Nj=1, ti), (A.121)
where the function mi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) is given by:
mi
({sj}Nj=1, ti) = γi + βsi + N∑
j=1
(δij + βλij)sj +
1
2
σ2bi + h(ti), (A.122)
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and the parameter λi is defined in equation (A.71). The result below, which generalizes proposition
1.2.4, provides a testable restriction on the regression coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test
scores in the conditional expectation in equation (A.121). The first part of the proposition follows
directly from equation (A.71). Specifically, if sibling p is the same age as sibling q, then the
parameters in equation (A.121) satisfy λpp = λqq, λpq = λqp, and λpj = λqj for j /∈ {p, q}; so
that, the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores in the conditional expectation of one’s
log wage given zp, zq, and {sk}Nk=1 are the same for both siblings p and q. The second part of the
proposition indicates that if sibling p is older than sibling q, then the ratio of the coefficient on
sibling q’s test score to that on sibling p’s test score in sibling p’s log wage will typically be lower
than the ratio of the coefficient on sibling p’s test score to that on sibling q’s test score in sibling
q’s log wage.
Proposition A.4.9 Suppose that learning is social. Consider two distinct siblings p and q from the
same family. Let νij denote the regression coefficient on person j’s test score in the conditional
expectation of person i’s log wage given zp, zq and s1, s2, . . . , sN .
1. If tp = tq, then νpqνqq = νqpνpp.
2. If tp > tq, then νpqνqq < νqpνpp.
Proof Assume that tp > tq. For any i ∈ {p, q}, let e = p if i = q, and let e = q if i = p. From
equation (A.121), the coefficients νii and νie in the statement of the proposition are given by:
νii = Πfλie + Πoλii + Πx
∑
k 6= i, e
λik and νie = Πoλie + Πfλii + Πx
∑
k 6= i, e
λik, (A.123)
where Πo, Πf , and Πx are defined in equations (A.44) and (A.59). Then the statement νpqνqq <
νqpνpp is equivalent to:(
Πoλpq + Πfλpp + Πx
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk
)(
Πfλqp + Πoλqq + Πx
∑
k 6= p, q
λqk
)
<
(
Πoλqp + Πfλqq + Πx
∑
k 6= p, q
λqk
)(
Πfλpq + Πoλpp + Πx
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk
). (A.124)
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Expanding both sides of the preceding inequality and canceling out terms appearing on both sides,
one obtains after some rearrangement:
(
Π2fλppλqp + Π
2
oλpqλqq
)
+ Πx (ΠfΩa + ΠoΩb)
<
(
Π2fλpqλqq + Π
2
oλppλqp
)
+ Πx (ΠfΩb + ΠoΩa) ,
(A.125)
where Ωa and Ωb are defined as:
Ωa = λqp
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk + λpp
∑
k 6= p, q
λqk and Ωb = λpq
∑
k 6= p, q
λqk + λqq
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk. (A.126)
In order to prove that νpqνqq < νqpνpp, one needs to show that inequality (A.125) is satisfied. Recall
that Π2o > Π
2
f from proposition A.4.2, λqq > 0 and λpq > 0 from proposition A.4.7, and λqq < λpp
and λpq < λqp from proposition A.4.8. Therefore, the first term in parentheses on each side of
equation (A.125) satisfies:
Π2fλppλqp + Π
2
oλpqλqq < Π
2
fλpqλqq + Π
2
oλppλqp. (A.127)
From equation (A.126), the difference Ωa − Ωb can be expressed as:
Ωa − Ωb = (λqp − λqq)
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk + (λpp − λpq)
∑
k 6= p, q
λqk
> [(λpp − λqq) + (λqp − λpq)]
∑
k 6= p, q
λpk > 0.
(A.128)
where the first and second inequalities follow from propositions and A.4.7 and A.4.8. In particular,
the first inequality holds because λpp > λpq and λqk > λpk for all k /∈ {p, q}, and the second
inequality holds because λpp > λqq and λqp > λpq, noting that λij > 0 for all i, j. Because
Ωa > Ωb as shown above and Πo > Πf from proposition A.4.2, the second term in parentheses on
each side of equation (A.125) satisfies:
ΠfΩa + ΠoΩb < ΠfΩb + ΠoΩa. (A.129)
Noting that Πx > 0 from proposition A.4.3, the inequalities (A.127) and (A.129) imply that in-
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equality (A.125) holds. Therefore, one has νpqνqq < νqpνpp as desired.
A.5 Data on Multiple Siblings
The analysis in the paper focuses on individuals with only one sibling, because comparatively
few respondents have data on two or more interviewed siblings. Nevertheless, for those individuals
with information on multiple siblings, an additional test of the social learning model can be per-
formed by comparing the impacts of a younger and an older sibling’s test scores on an individual’s
log wage. The setup examined here is identical to that in appendix A.4, except that the test scores
of two of one’s siblings are now used as regressors. That is, the assumptions about the labor market
characteristics of siblings and the definitions of individual and social learning are the same as those
in appendix A.4, but the empirical strategy now requires each person’s log wage to be regressed on
both her own and two of her siblings’ test scores and schooling levels.
The first step is to characterize the regression coefficients on one’s own and each sibling’s test
scores in the conditional expectation of one’s ability given one’s own test score and schooling and
those of two of one’s siblings. The result below extends proposition 1.2.2 to the current setting in
which each individual is coupled with two instead of one sibling.
Proposition A.5.1 Consider three distinct siblings p, q, g from the same family. Let pia and pib
respectively denote the coefficients on own’s own and each sibling’s test scores in the regression of
sibling i’s ability ai on zp, zq, zg and sp, sq, sg. Then pia > pib, pia > 0, and pi2a > pi
2
b .
Proof Using proposition A.4.1, the component of zi orthogonal to sp, sq, sg can be expressed as:
zˆi = zi−E(zi|si, xi) = {θa[ai− (∆osi + ∆fxi)] +ωi}− {θa[µai− (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)]}, (A.130)
where xi denotes the average schooling of the two siblings other than sibling i included in the
analysis, and the parameters ∆o and ∆f are defined in equation (A.45) for N = 3. Note that
the coefficient on zp, zq, zg in the regression of ai on zp, zq, zg and sp, sq, sg is identical to the
coefficient on zˆp, zˆq, zˆg in the regression of ai on zˆp, zˆq, zˆg. Therefore, the regression coefficient
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on the siblings’ test scores in proposition A.5.1 has the form:

pia pib pib
pib pia pib
pib pib pia
 = C


ap
aq
ag
 ,

zˆp
zˆq
zˆg

V


zˆp
zˆq
zˆg


−1
=

κa κb κb
κb κa κb
κb κb κa


υa υb υb
υb υa υb
υb υb υa

−1
,
(A.131)
where pia and pib respectively denote the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores. In the
equation above, C(ai, zˆj) is represented by κa if i = j and κb if i 6= j, and C(zˆi, zˆj) is represented
by υa if i = j and υb if i 6= j.
Note that the covariances κa and κb are shown to satisfy κa > κb > 0 in the proof of proposition
A.4.2. I show here that υa and υb satisfy υa > υb > 0. For all i, the variance υa simplifies to:
υa = V(zˆi) = C
({θa[ai − (∆osi + ∆fxi)] + ωi} − {θa[µai − (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)]}, zˆi)
= θaC(ai, zˆi) + σ2ω,
(A.132)
where the first step follows from substituting for zˆi using equation (A.130), and the second step
uses the facts that zˆi is orthogonal to si and xi and that ωi has zero covariance with ai, si, and xi.
For all i, j such that i 6= j, the covariance υb reduces to:
υb = C(zˆi, zˆj) = C
({θa[ai − (∆osi + ∆fxi)] + ωi}
− {θa[µai − (∆oµsi + ∆fµxi)]}, zˆj
)
= θaC(ai, zˆj) + ρωσ2ω,
(A.133)
where the first step substitutes for zˆi from equation (A.130), and the second step holds because
zˆj has zero covariance with si and xi and because ωi is uncorrelated with aj , sj , and xj . In the
proof of proposition A.4.2, the covariances C(ai, zˆi) and C(ai, zˆj) are shown to satisfy C(ai, zˆi) >
C(ai, zˆj) > 0 for all i, j such that i 6= j. Therefore, it follows from equations (A.132) and (A.133)
that υa > υb > 0.
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Inverting the variance matrix in equation (A.131), one has:
V


zˆp
zˆq
zˆg


−1
=

ιa ιb ιb
ιb ιa ιb
ιb ιb ιa
 , (A.134)
where the parameters ιa and ιb are given by:
ιa = (υa + υb)[(υa − υb)(υa + 2υb)]−1 and ιb = −υb/[(υa − υb)(υa + 2υb)]−1. (A.135)
Using equation (A.134) to replace the inverse variance matrix in equation (A.131), the regression
coefficients pia and pib are given by:
pia = ιaκa + 2ιbκb =
κa(υa + υb)− 2κbυb
(υa − υb)(υa + 2υb) ,
pib = ιbκa + ιaκb + ιbκb =
κbυa − κaυb
(υa − υb)(υa + 2υb) ,
(A.136)
where equation (A.135) is used to substitute for ιa and ιb.
It is now straightforward to prove the three claims in proposition A.5.1. From equation (A.136),
the difference pia − pib is equal to:
pia − pib = (κa − κb)/(υa − υb), (A.137)
which is positive because κa > κb and υa > υb. Thus, pia > pib, proving the first claim. Moreover,
it follows from κa > κb > 0 and υa > υb > 0 that both the numerator and the denominator of the
expression for pia are positive in equation (A.136). Therefore, pia > 0, proving the second claim.
Finally, using equation (A.136), the difference pi2a − pi2b is equal to:
pi2a − pi2b =
(κa − κb)(υa + 2υb)[(κa + κb)υa − 2κbυb]
(υa − υb)2(υa + 2υb)2 , (A.138)
which is positive because κa > κb > 0 and υa > υb > 0. Hence, pi2a > pi
2
b , proving the third claim.
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The findings here are analogous to those in proposition 1.2.2. First, one’s own test score is
a stronger predictor of one’s ability than each sibling’s test score even after controlling for one’s
own and both siblings’ schooling. Second, the partial correlation between one’s ability and one’s
own test score is positive given both siblings’ test scores as well as one’s own and both siblings’
schooling. Third, the coefficient on one’s own test score is larger in absolute value than the co-
efficient on each sibling’s test score in the regression of one’s ability on one’s own test score and
schooling and those of two of one’s siblings. Note that the sign of the coefficient on each sibling’s
test score is indeterminate in the regression examined here.3 As discussed in section 1.2.2, a pos-
itive correlation among siblings in the testing error ωi can generate a negative coefficient on each
sibling’s test score, even though the opposite outcome might be expected because of the positive
sibling correlation in ability ai.
The second step is to analyze the problem of predicting an individual’s log wage given her
own and two of her siblings’ test scores and schooling levels. The following result is a counterpart
to propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, which examine the relationship of one’s log wage to one’s own
and a sibling’s test scores under individual and social learning. In the setup here, one chooses
any three siblings from a sibship with at least three members and compares the impacts of the
first two siblings’ test scores on the log wage of the third sibling after controlling for the third
sibling’s test score and the schooling of the three siblings. The first part of the result holds because
an individual’s ability has the same relationship to each of her siblings’ test scores and schooling
levels.4 The first item in the second part follows directly from the fact that one’s log wage under
social learning places equal weight on the average performance of two siblings who are the same
age as each other.5
Proposition A.5.2 Let N ≥ 3. Consider three distinct siblings p, q, g from the same family.
Let $i denote the regression coefficient on the test score of sibling i ∈ {p, q} in the conditional
expectation of sibling g’s log wage given zp, zq, zg and sp, sq, sg.
3For examples in which the coefficient on each sibling’s test score is respectively positive and negative, consider
the limiting cases of the model in which ρω = 0, ρ = 0, ρa ∈ (0, 1) and ρa = 0, ρ = 0, ρω ∈ (0, 1).
4In particular, given three distinct siblings p, q, g from the same family, the coefficients on the test scores of siblings
p and q are the same in the regression of ag on sp, sq , sg and zp, zq , zg .
5That is, if tp = tq , then λgp = λgq in equation (A.141) and so $p −$q = 0 in equation (A.144).
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1. If learning is individual, then $p = $q.
2. If learning is social, then:
(a) $p = $q for tp = tq,
(b) $p > $q for tp > tq.
Proof I prove the second item in the second part of the proposition. From equations (A.69) and
(A.70), sibling g’s log wage under social learning can be expressed as:
log(vg) =(λggr¯g + λgpr¯p + λgqr¯q) + [(β + δgg)sg + δgpsp + δgqsq]
+ u
({sj}j 6=p, q, g, {r¯j}j 6=p, q, g, tg), (A.139)
where the function u
({sj}j 6=p, q, g, {r¯j}j 6=p, q, g, tg) is defined as:
u
({sj}j 6=p, q, g, {r¯j}j 6=p, q, g, tg) = γg + ∑
j 6=p, q, g
λgj r¯j +
∑
j 6=p, q, g
δgjsj +
1
2
σ2bg + h(tg). (A.140)
Denoting c = (sp, sq, sg, zp, zq, zg), the conditional expectation of sibling g’s log wage given
sp, sq, sg and zp, zq, zg is of the form:
E[log(vg)|c] = λggE[ag|c] + λgpE[ap|c] + λgqE[aq|c] + n(c), (A.141)
where the function n(c) is given by:
n(c) =[δgg + β(1 + λgg)]sg + (δgp + βλgp)sp + (δgq + βλgq)sq
+ E
[
u
({sj}j 6=p, q, g, {r¯j}j 6=p, q, g, tg)|c]. (A.142)
Note that the regression coefficients on zp, zq, and zg in the conditional expectation of u
({sj}j 6=p, q, g,
{r¯j}j 6=p, q, g, tg
)
given sp, sq, sg and zp, zq, zg are all equal to the same constant pix. Therefore, using
equation (A.141), the regression coefficients $p and $q in proposition A.5.2 can be expressed as:
$p = λgppia + (λgg + λgq)pib + pix and $q = λgqpia + (λgg + λgp)pib + pix; (A.143)
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so that, the difference $p −$q is equal to:
$p −$q = (pia − pib)(λgp − λgq), (A.144)
which is positive because pia > pib from proposition A.5.1 and λgp > λgq from proposition A.4.8
whenever tp > tq. Therefore, one has $p > $q as desired.
As in propositions 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, the individual and social learning models are indistinguish-
able from each other when the two siblings being compared are of the same age. That is, the test
scores of any two siblings will each have the same impact on the log wage of a third sibling either if
learning is individual and the ages of the three siblings are arbitrary or if learning is social and the
ages of the first two siblings are identical. However, if one of two siblings is older than the other,
then the older sibling’s test score will have a greater impact than the younger sibling’s test score
on the log wage of a third sibling when learning is social. This prediction of the social learning
model simply reflects the fact that an older sibling’s average performance is a stronger predictor of
one’s own ability than a younger sibling’s average performance because a greater number of per-
formance observations are available on an older than on a younger sibling. Hence, if one’s wage
is set equal to the conditional expectation of one’s labor productivity given both one’s own and
every sibling’s schooling and performance, then an older sibling’s average performance will have
a higher coefficient than a younger sibling’s average performance in one’s log wage equation.
A.6 Schooling Coefficients in Log Wage Regression
This result below characterizes the coefficients obtained from the regression of one’s log wage
on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. If learning is social, then the coefficients on one’s own and
a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage will be the same as the corresponding
coefficients on one’s own and an older sibling’s schooling in a younger sibling’s log wage. By
contrast, if learning is individual, then the outcome of this regression will fall into one of three
categories, depending on the relative values of the sibling correlations in ability and in schooling.
First, if the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is positive, then an older sibling will have a lower
coefficient on one’s own schooling than a younger sibling, and the coefficient on a younger sibling’s
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schooling in an older sibling’s log wage will be higher than vice versa. Second, if the coefficient
on a sibling’s schooling is zero, then an older sibling will have the same respective coefficients
on one’s own and a younger sibling’s schooling as a younger sibling has on one’s own and an
older sibling’s schooling. Third, if the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is negative, then an
older sibling will have a higher coefficient on one’s own schooling than a younger sibling, and the
coefficient on a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage will be lower than vice
versa.
Proposition A.6.1 Suppose that sibling 1 is at least as old as sibling 2 with d ≥ 0 being the age
difference between them. Let zij denote the regression coefficient on sibling j’s schooling in the
conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage given s1 and s2.
1. If learning is individual, then:
(a) z11 = z22 and z12 = z21 for d = 0,
(b) z11 < z22 and z12 > z21 > 0 for d > 0 and ρa > ρs,
(c) z11 = z22 and z12 = z21 = 0 for d > 0 and ρa = ρs,
(d) z11 > z22 and z12 < z21 < 0 for d > 0 and ρa < ρs.
2. If learning is social, then z11 = z22 and z12 = z21.
Proof I begin by proving the last three items in the first part of the proposition.6 Using equa-
tions (1.8), (1.9), and (1.11), the log wage of sibling i ∈ {1, 2} under individual learning can be
expressed as:
log(wi) = βsi + (1− χi)E(ai|si) + χi(ai + η¯i) + 12σ2gi + h(ti), (A.145)
where χi and σ2gi are defined in equation (1.9), and η¯i denotes the sample mean of {ηiu}tiu=1. Let e
be the index of the sibling other than i. Calculating the conditional expectation of log(wi) given si
6The first item in the first part of the proposition is a direct implication of the symmetric treatment of the two
siblings in the model from section 1.2.
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and se, one has:
E[log(wi)|si, se] =βsi + (1− χi)E(ai|si) + χiE(ai|si, se) + 12σ2gi + h(ti)
=βsi+(1−χi)γσ
2
a
σ2s
si+χi
γσ2a
σ2s(1−ρ2s)
[(1−ρaρs)si+(ρa−ρs)se]+κi+ 12σ2gi+h(ti)
, (A.146)
where κi is a constant. Noting that χ1 > χ2 whenever t1 > t2, the last three items in the first part
of the proposition follow from inspecting the preceding equation.
I now prove the second part of the proposition. Using equations (1.14), (1.15), and (1.17), the
log wage of sibling i ∈ {1, 2} under social learning can be expressed as:
log(vi) = βsi + E(ai|si, se, ri, re) + 12σ2qi + h(ti), (A.147)
where σ2qi is defined in equation (1.15). Applying the law of iterated expectations, the conditional
expectation of log(vi) given si and se is as follows:
E[log(vi)|si, se] = βsi + E(ai|si, se) + 12σ2qi + h(ti). (A.148)
The second part of the proposition is an immediate consequence of the preceding equation.
A.7 Variance of Change in Log Wage Residual
The result below characterizes the variance of the change between two age levels in the residual
from the regression of one’s log wage on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. On the one hand, if
learning is individual, then the variance of the change in the log wage residual between two given
ages will be the same for both an older and a younger sibling. On the other hand, if learning is
social, then this quantity will be greater for an older than for a younger sibling, and the absolute
difference in this quantity between an older and a younger sibling will be increasing in the size of
the age gap between them.
Proposition A.7.1 Suppose that sibling 1 is at least as old as sibling 2 with d ≥ 0 being the age
difference between them. Choose any two ages ta and tb such that tb > ta > d. For i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ {a, b}, let yi,j denote the log wage of sibling i at age tj , and let ui,j denote the residual from
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the regression of yi,j on s1 and s2.
1. If learning is individual, then V(u1,b − u1,a) = V(u2,b − u2,a).
2. If learning is social, then:
(a) V(u1,b − u1,a) = V(u2,b − u2,a) for d = 0,
(b) V(u1,b − u1,a) > V(u2,b − u2,a) for d > 0,
(c) V(u1,b − u1,a)− V(u2,b − u2,a) is increasing in d, given ta and tb with tb > ta > 1.
Proof I begin by proving the second item in the second part of the proposition.7 Let i ∈ {1, 2}
and j ∈ {a, b}. Let e be the index of the sibling other than i. The log wage residual ui,j is defined
as:
ui,j = yi,j − E(yi,j|si, se); (A.149)
so that, the variance of the difference ui,b − ui,a in log wage residuals is equal to:
V(ui,b − ui,a) = V{[yi,b − yi,a]− [E(yi,b|si, se)− E(yi,a|si, se)]}. (A.150)
Using equation (A.147) to substitute for yi,a and yi,b, the first bracketed term in equation (A.150)
can be expressed as:
yi,b − yi,a = E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )
+ 1
2
[σ2qi(tb, tb + x)− σ2qi(ta, ta + x)] + [h(tb)− h(ta)]
, (A.151)
where σ2qi(ta, ta + x) and σ
2
qi(tb, tb + x) are analogous to σ
2
qi in equation (1.15), and x = −d if
i = 1, e = 2 and x = d if i = 2, e = 1. Using equation (A.148) to substitute for E(yi,a|si, se) and
E(yi,b|si, se), the second bracketed term in equation (A.150) can be expressed as:
E(yi,b|si, se)− E(yi,a|si, se) = 12 [σ2qi(tb, tb + x)− σ2qi(ta, ta + x)] + [h(tb)− h(ta)]. (A.152)
7The first part of the proposition and the first item in the second part follow directly from the symmetric treatment
of the two siblings in the model from section 1.2.
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Now, the variance in equation (A.150) can be simplified as follows:
V(ui,b − ui,a) = V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )
− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )]
= E{V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )
− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]}
+ V{E[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )
− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]}
= V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )
− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )
− E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )]
= V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
= E{V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 }
+ V{E[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 }
= V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+xk=1 ]
, (A.153)
where the first equality follows from noting that σ2qi(ta, ta + x), σ
2
qi(tb, tb + x) and h(ta), h(tb) are
constants in equations (A.151) and (A.152), the second and fifth equalities apply the law of total
variance, and the third and sixth equalities apply the law of iterated expectations.
Next, letting l be a positive integer, the conditional expectation of ai given si, se and {ri,k}tbk=1,
{re,k}lk=1 has the following form:
E[ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}lk=1] = κo,i,l + κs,lsi + κh,lse + κf,l
tb∑
k=1
ri,k + κg,l
l∑
k=1
re,k, (A.154)
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where all of the coefficients vary with l, and the constant depends on i as well. In addition, I define:
γp = C(ai, rˆe,v), γq = V(rˆe,v), γr = C(rˆe,m, rˆe,n), (A.155)
where v is a positive integer, m and n are distinct positive integers, and rˆe,v, which denotes the
component of re,v orthogonal to si, se, and {ri,k}tbk=1, is given by:
rˆe,v = re,v − E(re,v|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1). (A.156)
Now, γq can be expressed as:
γq=V[(βse+ae+ηe,v)−E(re,v|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1)]
=V[(βse+ae)−E(re,v|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1)] +V(ηe,v)>0,
(A.157)
where the second equality follows because ηe,v is independent of all the other variables in the
model. In addition, γp and γr can be related as follows:
γr = C[(βse + ae + ηe,m)− E(re,m|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1), rˆe,n] = C(ae, rˆe,n) = γp, (A.158)
where the second equality follows because ηe,m is independent of all the other variables in the
model and because rˆe,n has zero covariance with si, se, and {ri,k}tbk=1 by definition. Moreover, the
coefficient κg,l in equation (A.154) is given by:
Θl = ΓlΨ
−1
l , (A.159)
where Θl is a 1 × l vector each of whose entries is κg,l, Γl is a 1 × l vector each of whose entries
is γp, and Ψl is a l × l matrix each of whose diagonal entries is γq and each of whose off-diagonal
entries is γr. Calculating the matrix inverse of Ψl, each diagonal entry of Ψ−1l is equal to:
γq + (l − 2)γr
(γq − γr)[γq + (l − 1)γr] , (A.160)
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and each off-diagonal entry of Ψ−1l is equal to:
− γr
(γq − γr)[γq + (l − 1)γr] . (A.161)
Hence, each element of Θl is equal to:
κg,l = γp
γq + (l − 2)γr
(γq − γr)[γq + (l − 1)γr] − (l − 1)γp
γr
(γq − γr)[γq + (l − 1)γr]
=
γp
γq + (l − 1)γr .
(A.162)
Note that γp must be positive. Otherwise, if γp were non-positive, then the preceding equation
would imply that κg,l is non-positive for l = 1, because γq is positive from equation (A.157). How-
ever, this would contradict proposition A.4.7, which shows that κg,l must be positive. Furthermore,
because γp = γr from equation (A.158), it must be that γr is also positive. Therefore, it follows
from the preceding equation that κg,l is positive and decreasing in l.
Now, consider the two variance terms following the last equality in equation (A.153). Noting
that ta > 1 whenever d > 0, let c be an integer between −ta + 1 and ta − 2 inclusive. First, one
has:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+ck=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 ]
= V
(
κo,i,tb+c + κs,tb+csi + κh,tb+cse + κf,tb+c
tb∑
k=1
ri,k
+ κg,tb+c
tb+c∑
k=1
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )
= κ2g,tb+cV
( tb+c∑
k=ta+c+1
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )
= κ2g,tb+cV
( tb+c+1∑
k=ta+c+2
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )
(A.163)
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≥ κ2g,tb+cV
( tb+c+1∑
k=ta+c+2
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
> κ2g,tb+c+1V
( tb+c+1∑
k=ta+c+2
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
= V
(
κo,i,tb+c+1 + κs,tb+c+1si + κh,tb+c+1se + κf,tb+c+1
tb∑
k=1
ri,k
+ κg,tb+c+1
tb+c+1∑
k=1
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
= V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+c+1k=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 ]
,
where the weak inequality holds because the conditional variance here cannot increase if one con-
trols for an additional variable, and the strict inequality follows because the positive coefficient κg,l
is shown above to be decreasing in l. Second, one has:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 ]
= V
(
κo,i,ta+c + κs,ta+csi + κh,ta+cse + κf,ta+c
tb∑
k=1
ri,k
+ κg,ta+c
ta+c∑
k=1
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )
= κ2f,ta+cV
( tb∑
k=ta+1
ri,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )
≥ κ2f,ta+cV
( tb∑
k=ta+1
ri,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
≥ κ2f,ta+c+1V
( tb∑
k=ta+1
ri,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
= V
(
κo,i,ta+c+1 + κs,ta+c+1si + κh,ta+c+1se + κf,ta+c+1
tb∑
k=1
ri,k
+ κg,ta+c+1
ta+c+1∑
k=1
re,k
∣∣∣∣si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )
= V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 ]
, (A.164)
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where the first inequality holds because the conditional variance here cannot increase if one con-
trols for an additional variable, and the second inequality follows from the proof of proposition
A.12.1, in which it is shown that the positive coefficient κf,l is nonincreasing in l.8
Combining equations (A.163) and (A.164), one obtains:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+ck=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+ck=1 ]
> V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+c+1k=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+c+1k=1 ]
, (A.165)
where c is an integer between −ta + 1 and ta − 2 inclusive. Hence, one has:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb−dk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta−dk=1 ]
> V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+dk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+dk=1 ]
. (A.166)
Given equation (A.153), the preceding equation implies that:
V(u1,b − u1,a) > V(u2,b − u2,a), (A.167)
which proves the second item in the second part of the proposition.
To prove the third item in the second part of the proposition, let dh and dl with dh > dl be two
possible values for the age difference d ≥ 0 between the two siblings. If dl = 0, then the first and
second items in the second part of the proposition imply that V(u1,b − u1,a) − V(u2,b − u2,a) is
greater for d = dh than for d = dl. Therefore, assume that dl > 0. From equation (A.165), one
8Specifically, the coefficient ξi ∈ (0, 1) from equation (1.15) is shown to be nonincreasing in te holding ti constant,
where ti and te are the number of signals about one’s own and a sibling’s performance, respectively. Note that ξi is
the coefficient on r¯i in the conditional expectations both of g(si, ai) and of ai given si, se and r¯i, r¯e.
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has:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb−dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 ]
> V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb−dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 ]
, (A.168)
and:
V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 ]
> V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 ]
. (A.169)
Hence, one obtains:
{V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb−dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta−dhk=1 ]}
− {V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+dhk=1 ]}
> {V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb−dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta−dlk=1 ]}
− {V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}tb+dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 ]
+ V[E(ai|si, se, {ri,k}tbk=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 )|si, se, {ri,k}tak=1, {re,k}ta+dlk=1 ]}
. (A.170)
Given equation (A.153), the preceding equation implies thatV(u1,b−u1,a)−V(u2,b−u2,a) is greater
for d = dh than for d = dl, which proves the third item in the second part of the proposition.
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A.8 Empirical Implementation of Generalized Model
This appendix provides a more general treatment of the estimation procedure in section 1.4. To
simplify the exposition in the paper, each family was assumed to consist of exactly two siblings,
and every sibship was assumed to enter the labor market in the same year. These two assumptions
are relaxed in this appendix.9 Consider a random sample of I ≥ 1 sibships, each of which contains
N ≥ 2 members. The families in the sample are indexed from 1 to I , where the siblings in each
family are labeled in order of decreasing age from 1 to N .10
Each sibship i is characterized by a year yi, which denotes the first year that every member of
the sibship is in the labor market. The random variable yi takes values in the set Y = {1, 2, . . . , D}.
The members of sibship i are assumed to be working in each year from yi to D. Let ti,j,d represent
the age of sibling j from family i in year d, and let si,j and zi,j respectively denote the schooling
and the test score of sibling j from family i. The age of each individual is assumed to increase
by one in each year; so that, the ages of the siblings from a given family in year zero uniquely
determine their ages in years 1, 2, . . . , D. Letting ti,0 = (ti,1,0, ti,2,0, . . . , ti,N,0) represent the age
structure for the N siblings from family i in year zero, the set T of possible realizations of the age
structure for the siblings from a given family in year zero is taken to be finite. Every element of T
is assumed to be a vector of N distinct nonnegative integers.
In addition, let bi,j be a K × 1 vector of background variables for sibling j from family i. Al-
though these variables were not discussed in appendix A.4, there is a simple way to formally intro-
duce them into the analysis without changing the predictions of either learning model.11 Assuming
that bi,j is observable both to employers and to the econometrician, one can let the respective means
µa,i,j , µ,i,j , µω,i,j of ai,j , i,j , ωi,j have the form:
(µa,i,j, µ,i,j, µω,i,j)=E
[
(ai,j, i,j, ωi,j)|{bi,j}Nj=1, yi, ti,0
]
=
(
φa,0+b
′
i,jφa, φ,0+b
′
i,jφ, φω,0+b
′
i,jφω
)
,
(A.171)
9The discussion here is based on the presentation in appendix A.4, which extends the learning models in section
1.2 to include an arbitrary number of siblings in each family.
10I assume for simplicity that no two siblings from the same family have the same age.
11Pinkston (2009) uses a similar strategy to add demographic characteristics to a model of asymmetric employer
learning.
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where φa,0, φ,0, and φω,0 are constants, and φa, φ, and φω are K × 1 vectors of coefficients.12
For every family i, I construct all PN2 distinct pairs of siblings, where P
N
2 represents the number
of ways of obtaining an ordered pair of distinct items from a set of N items. Each sibling pair can
be represented by the triple (i, p, q), where i indexes the family from which the two siblings are
drawn, and p and q are the respective labels of the first and the second siblings in the pair. For a
given sibling pair (i, p, q), let si,−(p,q) be the (N − 2)× 1 vector of schooling levels for the siblings
besides p and q, and let ti,−(p,q),d be the (N −2)×1 vector of ages in year d for the siblings besides
p and q. In addition, let bi,−(p,q) denote the K(N − 2) × 1 vector formed by stacking the K × 1
vectors of background variables for each of the N − 2 siblings other than p and q from family i.13
I now define the following three vectors:
zi,(p,q) = (zi,p, zi,q)
′, si,(p,q) = (si,p, si,q, s′i,−(p,q))
′, bi,(p,q) = (b′i,p, b
′
i,q, b
′
i,−(p,q))
′, (A.172)
where zi,(p,q) consists of the test scores of siblings p and q from family i, and si,(p,q) and bi,(p,q)
respectively contain the schooling levels and background attributes of all the siblings in family i.
Finally, I define two additional vectors:
ti,(p,q),d = (ti,p,d, ti,q,d, t
′
i,−(p,q),d)
′, xi,(p,q) = (z′i,(p,q), s
′
i,(p,q), b
′
i,(p,q))
′, (A.173)
where ti,(p,q),d represents the ages of all the siblings in family i in year d, and xi,(p,q) consists of the
vectors zi,(p,q), si,(p,q), and bi,(p,q). The conditional expectation of the log wage wi,p,d of sibling p
from family i in year d ∈ {yi, yi + 1, . . . , D} given xi,(p,q) and ti,(p,q),d can be put in the following
general form both under individual and under social learning:
E
(
wi,p,d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d, yi, ti,0
)
= c(ti,(p,q),d) + x
′
i,(p,q)v(ti,(p,q),d), (A.174)
12The other parameters of the model—β, σ2a, ρa, γ, σ
2
 , θa, θs, σ
2
ω , ρω , σ
2
η—are assumed not to vary with the
realizations of {bi,j}Nj=1, ti,0, and yi. The term h(ti,j,d) is assumed to be a function only of ti,j,d.
13In each of the vectors si,−(p,q), ti,−(p,q),d, and bi,−(p,q), the variables of a sibling with a lower index are assumed
to appear before the variables of a sibling with a higher index. For example, if N = 5 with p = 4 and q = 2, then
si,−(p,q) = (si,1, si,3, si,5)′, ti,−(p,q),d = (ti,1,d, ti,3,d, ti,5,d)′, and bi,−(p,q) = (b′i,1, b
′
i,3, b
′
i,5)
′.
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where v(ti,(p,q),d) is a [(K+1)N+2]×1 coefficient vector, and c(ti,(p,q),d) is a constant.14 Note that
both v(ti,(p,q),d) and c(ti,(p,q),d) can vary with the age vector ti,(p,q),d of the N siblings from family
i in year d.15 The preceding equation indicates that holding constant the ages of all the members
of each sibship, the conditional expectation of one’s log wage given one’s own and a sibling’s test
scores as well as the schooling levels and background attributes of all the members of one’s sibship
is a linear function of the variables in the econometrician’s information set.
I next define the two parameters of interest. For each family i, I introduce some additional
variables. First, let B be the set consisting of all PN2 ordered pairs of distinct integers between 1
and N , and let Ci be a random variable that takes on the value of each element in the set B with
equal probability 1/PN2 .
16 Each realization of Ci designates a specific pair of siblings from family
i. Second, let Gi be a random variable that takes on the value of each element of the set Y with
equal probability 1/D. Each realization of Gi represents a particular year from the set of observed
dates. The random variables Ci and Gi are assumed to be independent of each other and of all
the other variables in the model. Next, let Hi (resp. Li) be a random variable that is equal to one
whenever Ci = (p, q) for some indices p, q with p < q (resp. p > q) and that is equal to zero
otherwise.17 That is, Hi and Li are indicator variables such that Hi is equal to one if and only if Ci
selects a sibling pair with an older sibling listed before a younger sibling and such that Li is equal
to one if and only if Ci selects a sibling pair with a younger sibling listed before an older sibling.
Finally, let Wi be a random variable that is equal to one whenever Gi = d for some date d with
d ≥ yi and that is equal to zero otherwise. That is, Wi indicates whether all the siblings in family
i have started working as of the year chosen by Gi.
For J ∈ {H,L}, I seek to calculate the conditional expectation of v(ti,Ci,Gi) given that Ji = 1
and Wi = 1. Letting δ(y˜i, t˜i,0) denote the proportion of sibships whose year of labor market entry
is y˜i ∈ Y and whose age structure in year zero is t˜i,0 ∈ T , the expected value νH of v(ti,Ci,Gi)
14The expression for the conditional expectation in equation (A.174) is a consequence of equation (A.64) if learning
is individual and of equation (A.121) if learning is social.
15In particular, v(ti,(p,q),d) and c(ti,(p,q),d) will depend on only the first element of ti,(p,q),d under individual learn-
ing and on all the elements of ti,(p,q),d under social learning.
16For example, if N = 3, then Ci has each of the following six values with equal probability 1/6: (1, 2), (2, 1),
(1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 3), and (3, 2).
17For example, if N = 3, then Hi and Li are respectively equal to one and zero if Ci takes on the value (1, 2),
(1, 3), or (2, 3), and Hi and Li are respectively equal to zero and one if Ci takes on the value (2, 1), (3, 1), or (3, 2).
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given that Hi = 1 and Wi = 1 is equal to:
νH = E[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Hi = 1,Wi = 1]
=
∑
y˜i∈Y
∑
t˜i,0∈T
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
D∑
d=y˜i
N−1∑
p=1
N∑
q=p+1
v(t˜i,(p,q),0 + d · 1N),
(A.175)
and the expected value νL of v(ti,Ci,Gi) given that Li = 1 and Wi = 1 is equal to:
νL = E[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Li = 1,Wi = 1]
=
∑
y˜i∈Y
∑
t˜i,0∈T
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
D∑
d=y˜i
N∑
p=2
p−1∑
q=1
v(t˜i,(p,q),0 + d · 1N),
(A.176)
where λ(y˜i, t˜i,0) is defined as:
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0) = δ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
1
2
PN2
∑
yˆi∈Y
∑
tˆi,0∈T
δ(yˆi, tˆi,0)(D − yˆi + 1)
−1 , (A.177)
and 1N is a N × 1 vector of ones. For a randomly sampled family, νH (resp. νL) can be interpreted
as the average value of the coefficient vector v(ti,Ci,Gi) for a randomly chosen sibling pair and year,
given that the first member of the sibling pair is older (resp. younger) than the second member and
that all the siblings in the family have started working as of that year.18
It is now possible to state the following result, which is a generalization of propositions A.4.4
and A.4.9. Consider the conditional expectation function in equation (A.174) as well as the ex-
pected values of the coefficient vector in equations (A.175) and (A.176). First, if learning is indi-
vidual, then the ratio of the second to the first entry of νH will be equal to the ratio of the second
to the first entry of νL. That is, under individual learning, the ratio of the average coefficient on a
younger sibling’s test score to the average coefficient on one’s own test score in an older sibling’s
log wage will be the same as the ratio of the average coefficient on an older sibling’s test score to
the average coefficient on one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage. Second, if learning
18Observe that the first and second elements of the vector νH (resp. νL) represent the average values of the coeffi-
cients on one’s own and a younger (resp. an older) sibling’s test scores in the conditional expectation of an older (resp.
a younger) sibling’s log wage in equation (A.174).
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is social, then the ratio of the second to the first entry of νH will be less than the ratio of the second
to the first entry of νL, especially assuming that the first entries of νH and νL are both positive. That
is, under social learning, the ratio of the average coefficient on a younger sibling’s test score to the
average coefficient on one’s own test score in an older sibling’s log wage will typically be lower
than the ratio of the average coefficient on an older sibling’s test score to the average coefficient on
one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage.
Proposition A.8.1 Let N ≥ 2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let νH,i denote the ith element of the vector νH in
equation (A.175), and let νL,i denote the ith element of the vector νL in equation (A.176).
1. If learning is individual, then νH,2νL,1 = νL,2νH,1.
2. If learning is social, then νH,2νL,1 < νL,2νH,1.
Proof I begin by proving the first item of the proposition, which concerns the individual learning
model in appendix A.4. From equation (A.64), the parameters νH,1, νH,2 and νL,1, νL,2 in the
statement of the proposition have the following form under individual learning for J ∈ {H,L}:
νJ,1 = E[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)Πo|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] and νJ,2 = E[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)Πf |Ji = 1,Wi = 1], (A.178)
where the constants Πo and Πf are defined in equation (A.44). Note that χ(ti,(p,q),d), which only
varies with the first element of ti,(p,q),d under individual learning, is the same as the parameter χi
defined in equation (1.9), where its dependence on ti was suppressed for ease of notation. Consider
the identity:
{ΠfE[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Hi = 1,Wi = 1]}{ΠoE[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Li = 1,Wi = 1]}
= {ΠfE[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Li = 1,Wi = 1]}{ΠoE[χ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Hi = 1,Wi = 1]}
. (A.179)
Noting that Πo and Πf are constants that do not depend on Hi, Li, and Wi, it follows from the
preceding identity that νH,2νL,1 = νL,2νH,1 as desired, because the parameters Πo and Πf can be
moved inside each of the expectation signs.
I next prove the second item of the proposition, which refers to the social learning model in
appendix A.4. Let Ci,1 and Ci,2 be random variables such that Ci,1 = p and Ci,2 = q whenever
Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 1 185
Ci = (p, q). From equation (A.121), the parameters νH,1, νH,2 and νL,1, νL,2 in the statement of the
proposition have the following form under social learning for J ∈ {H,L}:
νJ,1 =E
(
ΠfλCi(ti,Ci,Gi)+ΠoλCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)
+Πx
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1
)
νJ,2 =E
(
ΠoλCi(ti,Ci,Gi)+ΠfλCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)
+Πx
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1
)
, (A.180)
where Πo, Πf , and Πx are defined in equations (A.44) and (A.59). To be clear about the notation
used here, the parameter λp,u(ti,(p,q),d) in the equation above is the same as the coefficient λp,u in
proposition A.4.8, which represents the weight on sibling u’s average performance in sibling p’s
log wage. Note that λp,u(ti,(p,q),d) varies with the age vector ti,(p,q),d of the N siblings from family
i in year d and that this dependence was suppressed in the notation of proposition A.4.8. Hence,
in the current setting where the siblings in each family are all of different ages from each other
and are labeled in order of decreasing age, λp,u(ti,(p,q),d) denotes the coefficient on the average
performance of the uth oldest sibling from a given family in the log wage of the pth oldest sibling
in that family when the vector of ages for the siblings from that family is ti,(p,q),d.
To shorten the notation in the remainder of the proof, let EJ [g(ti,Ci,Gi)] represent the conditional
expectation E[g(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] of g(ti,Ci,Gi) given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1, where
J ∈ {H,L}. Because Πo, Πf , and Πx are constants that do not depend on Hi, Li, and Wi, the
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parameters in equation (A.180) can be rewritten as:
νJ,1 =ΠfEJ [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] + ΠoEJ [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]
+ ΠxEJ
 ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)

νJ,2 =ΠoEJ [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] + ΠfEJ [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]
+ ΠxEJ
 ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)

. (A.181)
The statement νH,2νL,1 < νL,2νH,1 is equivalent to:[
ΠoEH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠfEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠxEH
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)]
·
[
ΠfEL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠoEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠxEL
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)]
<
[
ΠoEL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠfEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠxEL
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)]
·
[
ΠfEH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠoEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]+ΠxEH
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)]
. (A.182)
Expanding both sides of the preceding inequality and canceling out terms appearing on both sides,
one obtains after some rearrangement:
{Π2fEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]
+ Π2oEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]}+ Πx{Πf Ω˜a + ΠoΩ˜b}
< {Π2fEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]
+ Π2oEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]}+ Πx{Πf Ω˜b + ΠoΩ˜a}
, (A.183)
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where Ω˜a is defined as:
Ω˜a = EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH
(∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)
+EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL
(∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
), (A.184)
and Ω˜b is defined as:
Ω˜b = EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL
(∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)
+EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH
(∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
). (A.185)
In order to prove that νH,2νL,1 < νL,2νH,1, I need to show that inequality (A.183) is satisfied.
Consider the following three facts. First, I showed in proposition A.4.2 that Π2o > Π
2
f . Second,
I showed in proposition A.4.7 that λp,p(ti,(p,q),d) and λp,q(ti,(p,q),d) are positive for every family
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, sibling pair (p, q) ∈ B, and year d ∈ {yi, yi + 1, . . . , D}. Therefore, one
has EJ [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] > 0 and EJ [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] > 0 for J ∈ {H,L}. Third, I showed in
proposition A.4.8 that λq,q(ti,(q,p),d) < λp,p(ti,(p,q),d) and λp,q(ti,(p,q),d) < λq,p(ti,(q,p),d) if ti,p,d >
ti,q,d. Furthermore, the random variable Hi is such that Hi = 1 if and only if Ci = (p, q) for some
p and q satisfying ti,p,0 > ti,q,0, and the random variable Li is such that Li = 1 if and only if
Ci = (p, q) for some p and q satisfying ti,p,0 < ti,q,0. Therefore, one has EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] <
EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] and EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]. It follows from these three facts
that the first term in braces on each side of equation (A.183) satisfies:
Π2fEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] + Π2oEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]
< Π2fEL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] + Π2oEH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]
. (A.186)
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From equations (A.184) and (A.185), the difference Ω˜a − Ω˜b can be expressed as:
Ω˜a − Ω˜b = {EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]− EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]}EH
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)
+ {EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]− EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]}EL
 ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)

>
(
{EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]− EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]}+ {EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]
− EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)]}
)
EH
( ∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2
λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)
)
> 0
, (A.187)
where the first and second inequalities follow from propositions A.4.7 and A.4.8. Specifically, I
showed in proposition A.4.8 that λp,p(ti,(p,q),d) > λp,q(ti,(p,q),d) if ti,p,d > ti,q,d. Because Hi = 1 if
and only if Ci = (p, q) for some p and q with ti,p,0 > ti,q,0, it follows that EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] >
EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]. Moreover, I showed in proposition A.4.8 that λq,g(ti,(q,p),d) > λp,g(ti,(p,q),d) for
all g /∈ {p, q} whenever ti,p,d > ti,q,d. Recall that the random variable Hi is such that Hi = 1 if
and only if Ci = (p, q) for some p and q satisfying ti,p,0 > ti,q,0 and that the random variable Li
is such that Li = 1 if and only if Ci = (p, q) for some p and q satisfying ti,p,0 < ti,q,0. Therefore,
it follows that EH [
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EL[
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)]. The first in-
equality in equation (A.187) is a consequence of the following two facts: EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] >
EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] and EH [
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EL[
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)]. In addi-
tion, I showed in proposition A.4.7 that given any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} and d ∈ {yi, yi + 1, . . . , D},
it must be that λp,e(ti,(p,q),d) > 0 for all indices p, q, and e such that p 6= q and e 6= p, q. Hence,
one has EH [
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)] > 0. Furthermore, I explained previously that propo-
sition A.4.8 implies that EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] and EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] <
EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)]. The second inequality in equation (A.187) results from the following three
facts: EL[λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EH [λCi,1,Ci,1(ti,Ci,Gi)], EH [λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)] < EL[λCi(ti,Ci,Gi)], and
EH [
∑
e 6=Ci,1, Ci,2 λCi,1,e(ti,Ci,Gi)] > 0.
Because Ω˜a > Ω˜b from equation (A.187) and Πo > Πf from proposition A.4.2, the second
term in braces on each side of equation (A.183) satisfies:
Πf Ω˜a + ΠoΩ˜b < Πf Ω˜b + ΠoΩ˜a. (A.188)
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Noting that Πx > 0 from proposition A.4.3, the inequalities (A.186) and (A.188) imply that in-
equality (A.183) holds. Therefore, one has νH,2νL,1 < νL,2νH,1 as desired.
Having shown that the main predictions of the learning models hold in aggregate, I next discuss
the estimation of the conditional expectations νH and νL of the coefficient vector v(ti,Ci,Gi). It is
helpful to introduce some further notation. For a given N × 1 vector t of distinct nonnegative
integers, I define:
Tt={t˜i,0 ∈ T : ∃ distinct indices p, q s.t. t˜i,(p,q),0 + d · 1N = t
for some d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}.}.
(A.189)
To understand the definition of the set Tt, suppose that the observed age structure of family i in year
zero is t˜i,0. Then, for a given vector t, the observed age structure t˜i,0 belongs to the set Tt if and only
if there are two distinct siblings p and q from family i such that the associated age vector t˜i,(p,q),d is
equal to t in some year d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}. Note that for each element t˜i,0 of Tt, there exists a unique
pair of indices pt(t˜i,0), qt(t˜i,0) and year dt(t˜i,0) such that t˜i,[pt(t˜i,0),qt(t˜i,0)],0 + dt(t˜i,0) · 1N = t. Next,
for a given t, let Hi,t (resp. Li,t) be a random variable that is equal to one whenever Ci = (p, q)
and Gi = d for some indices p, q and year d satisfying p < q (resp. p > q) and ti,(p,q),d = t and that
is equal to zero otherwise. That is, Hi,t (resp. Li,t) is an indicator random variable such that Hi,t
(resp. Li,t) is equal to one if and only if Ci designates a sibling pair with an older (resp. younger)
sibling listed before a younger (resp. older) sibling and the age vector associated with the sibling
pair selected by Ci is equal to t in the year chosen by Gi. Now, let:
SH ={t : ∃ t˜i,0 ∈ Tt and y˜i ∈ Y
s.t. pt(t˜i,0) < qt(t˜i,0), dt(t˜i,0) ≥ y˜i, and δ(y˜i, t˜i,0) > 0},
(A.190)
and let:
SL ={t : ∃ t˜i,0 ∈ Tt and y˜i ∈ Y
s.t. pt(t˜i,0) > qt(t˜i,0), dt(t˜i,0) ≥ y˜i, and δ(y˜i, t˜i,0) > 0},
(A.191)
where t is assumed to be a N × 1 vector of nonnegative integers in the definitions of SH and SL.
That is, the set SH (resp. SL) contains the vector t if and only if there is a positive probability that
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both Hi,t = 1 (resp. Li,t = 1) and Wi = 1.
For J ∈ {H,L}, let µJ,x(t) represent the conditional expectation of the [(K + 1)N + 2] × 1
random vector xi,Ci given that Ji,t = 1 and Wi = 1, where t ∈ SJ . Then, assuming that t ∈ SJ ,
one can express µJ,x(t) as:
µJ,x(t) = E(xi,Ci |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1)
=
∑
t˜i,0∈Tt
dt(t˜i,0)∑
y˜i=1
θ(y˜i, t˜i,0)E(xi,[pt(t˜i,0),qt(t˜i,0)]|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0),
(A.192)
where θ(y˜i, t˜i,0) is defined as:
θ(y˜i, t˜i,0) = δ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
 ∑
tˆi,0∈Tt
dt(tˆi,0)∑
yˆi=1
δ(yˆi, tˆi,0)
−1 , (A.193)
and E(xi,[pt(t˜i,0),qt(t˜i,0)]|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0) is the conditional expectation of xi,[pt(t˜i,0),qt(t˜i,0)] given
that t˜i,0 is the observed age structure of sibship i in year zero and that y˜i is the observed year of
labor market entry of sibship i, where t˜i,0 ∈ Tt and y˜i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , dt(t˜i,0)}.
I now describe how to construct the vector of regressors used to estimate the parameters νH
and νL. Fixing any integer M ≥ 0, the set P is defined as:
P ={(e1, e2, . . . , eN) ∈ ZN :
N∑
c=1
ec ≤M, where ec ≥ 0 for every c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.},
(A.194)
where Z denotes the set of integers. That is, P represents the set composed of every vector of
N nonnegative integers whose entries sum to some number no greater than M . Letting #P be
the number of elements in the set P , the elements of P can be labeled from 1 to #P with es =
(es1, e
s
2, . . . , e
s
N) denoting the s
th element of P . Then, for a given age vector t = (t1, t2, . . . , tN)′,
let ft denote the #P × 1 vector whose sth entry is equal to the product
∏N
c=1 t
esc
c ; so that, the vector
ft consists of one element for every term of a M th-order N -variate polynomial in t. Finally, let
hi,(p,q),d be the [(K + 1)N + 2 + #P ] × 1 vector formed by stacking the vector xi,(p,q) on top of
Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 1 191
the vector fti,(p,q),d . That is, I define:
hi,(p,q),d = (x
′
i,(p,q), f
′
ti,(p,q),d
)′, (A.195)
where xi,(p,q) comprises the test scores of siblings p and q from family i as well as the schooling
levels and background attributes of every member of sibship i, and fti,(p,q),d contains the terms of a
multivariate polynomial in the ages in year d of all the siblings from family i.
Some further assumptions become relevant when estimating νH and νL. Let J ∈ {H,L}.
First, each element of the conditional expectation function µJ,x(t) is assumed to be adequately
approximated by a M th-order N -variate polynomial in the observed age vector t ∈ SJ . That is, for
any t ∈ SJ , the conditional expectation µJ,x(t) is specified as:
µJ,x(t) =
∑
e∈P
αeJ
(
N∏
c=1
tecc
)
, (A.196)
where αeJ is a [(K+1)N+2]×1 vector that does not depend on t. Second, the matrix representing
the expected value of hi,Ci,Gih
′
i,Ci,Gi
given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1 is required to be nonsingular.
That is, I assume here that:
rank
[
E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)] = (K + 1)N + 2 + #P. (A.197)
Third, the variance of xi,Ci given that Ji,t = 1 and Wi = 1 is restricted to be a matrix of constants
that do not vary with the observed age vector t. In particular, let ri,(p,q),d = xi,(p,q) − µJ,x(ti,(p,q),d)
if ti,(p,q),d = t for some t ∈ SJ . That is, given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1, the random vector ri,Ci,Gi
represents the component of xi,Ci orthogonal to all functions of ti,Ci,Gi .
19 For any t ∈ SJ , I assume
that:
E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi|Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1) = ΣJ,x, (A.198)
where ΣJ,x is a [(K + 1)N + 2]× [(K + 1)N + 2] matrix of constants that do not depend on t.20
19To be clear, if k is a function mapping each t ∈ SJ to a [(K + 1)N + 2] × 1 real-valued vector k(t), then the
definition of ri,(p,q),d implies that E[r′i,Ci,Gik(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] = 0.
20This restriction on the conditional variance matrix can be weakened to some extent. Specifically, proposition A.8.2
remains valid if equation (A.198) is replaced by E[ΣJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] = E[ΣJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji =
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In addition, note that all random variables are treated as having finite first and second moments.
The following result shows that, under the assumptions above, the parameters νH and νL can
be consistently estimated simply by pooling the observations on each sibling pair across every year
and running ordinary least squares regressions on the resulting dataset. In particular, let:
ν˜H =
(
V −1I
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=yi
N−1∑
p=1
N∑
q=p+1
hi,(p,q),dh
′
i,(p,q),d
)−1
(
V −1I
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=yi
N−1∑
p=1
N∑
q=p+1
hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d
)
,
(A.199)
and let:
ν˜L =
(
V −1I
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=yi
N∑
p=2
p−1∑
q=1
hi,(p,q),dh
′
i,(p,q),d
)−1
(
V −1I
I∑
i=1
D∑
d=yi
N∑
p=2
p−1∑
q=1
hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d
)
,
(A.200)
where VI , which represents the total number of observations, is given by:
VI =
(
1
2
PN2
I∑
i=1
(D − yi + 1)
)
. (A.201)
Let νˆH and νˆL be vectors containing the first (K + 1)N + 2 elements of ν˜H and ν˜L, respectively.
That is, νˆH and νˆL represent the estimated coefficients on the covariate vector xi,(p,q) in regressions
that also control for fti,(p,q),d . For J ∈ {H,L}, I show that as the number of sampled sibships I
goes to infinity, the estimator νˆJ converges in probability to νJ . The proof of proposition A.8.2 is
similar to those in Wooldridge (2004).21
Proposition A.8.2 Suppose that the assumptions in equations (A.196), (A.197), and (A.198) are
satisfied. As the number of sampled sibships I goes to infinity, the estimators νˆH and νˆL, which
1,Wi = 1]E[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1], where ΣJ,x(t) = E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1) for t ∈ SJ . That
is, given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1, the random coefficient vector v(ti,Ci,Gi) is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
random conditional variance matrix ΣJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi).
21See especially propositions 3.2 and 6.1 in Wooldridge (2004).
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consist of the first (K + 1)N + 2 elements of ν˜H and ν˜L in equations (A.199) and (A.200), respec-
tively converge in probability to νH and νL, which are defined in equations (A.175) and (A.176).
Proof Let Ci,1 and Ci,2 be random variables such that Ci,1 = p and Ci,2 = q whenever Ci = (p, q).
Let J ∈ {H,L}. The random variable wi,Ci,1,Gi can be expressed as:
wi,Ci,1,Gi = x
′
i,Ci
βJ + f
′
ti,Ci,Gi
γJ + ei,Ci,Gi , (A.202)
where βJ and γJ are the unique coefficient vectors such that:
E(xi,Ciei,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)=O[(K+1)N+2]×1,
E(fti,Ci,Giei,Ci,Gi|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)=O#P×1,
(A.203)
with O[(K+1)N+2]×1 and O#P×1 being a [(K + 1)N + 2]× 1 and a #P × 1 vector of zeros, respec-
tively. Let δJ = (β′J , γ
′
J)
′. Note that δJ = [E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1E(hi,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi|
Ji = 1,Wi = 1) in equation (A.202). Moreover, an alternative expression for wi,Ci,1,Gi is:
wi,Ci,1,Gi = f
′
ti,Ci,Gi
θJ + oi,Ci,Gi , (A.204)
where θJ is the unique coefficient vector such that:
E(fti,Ci,Gioi,Ci,Gi|Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = O#P×1. (A.205)
Note that θJ = [E(fti,Ci,Gif
′
ti,Ci,Gi
|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1E(fti,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) in
equation (A.204). Finally, the random vector xi,Ci can be decomposed as:
x′i,Ci = f
′
ti,Ci,Gi
λJ + u
′
i,Ci,Gi
, (A.206)
where λJ is the unique #P × [(K + 1)N + 2] coefficient matrix such that:
E(fti,Ci,Giu
′
i,Ci
|Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = O#P×[(K+1)N+2], (A.207)
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with O#P×[(K+1)N+2] being a #P × [(K + 1)N + 2] matrix of zeros. Note that λJ = [E(fti,Ci,Gi
f ′ti,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]
−1E(fti,Ci,Gix
′
i,Ci,Gi
|Ji = 1,Wi = 1) in equation (A.206). Because the
conditional expectation function µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi) in equation (A.196) is assumed to be linear in the
elements of fti,Ci,Gi , one can write µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi) as:
[µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]
′ = f ′ti,Ci,GiλJ , (A.208)
where λJ is the same coefficient matrix in equation (A.206) as in equation (A.208).
Now, the parameter θJ can be expressed as:
θJ =[E(fti,Ci,Gif
′
ti,Ci,Gi
|Ji=1,Wi=1)]−1E(fti,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji=1,Wi=1)
=[E(fti,Ci,Gif
′
ti,Ci,Gi
|Ji=1,Wi=1)]−1
E[fti,Ci,Gi (x
′
i,Ci
βJ+f
′
ti,Ci,Gi
γJ+ei,Ci,Gi)|Ji=1,Wi=1]
=[E(fti,Ci,Gif
′
ti,Ci,Gi
|Ji=1,Wi=1)]−1
E(fti,Ci,Gix
′
i,Ci
|Ji=1,Wi=1)βJ + γJ = λJβJ + γJ
, (A.209)
where the second step uses equation (A.202) to substitute for wi,Ci,1,Gi , and the third step follows
from the fact that E(fti,Ci,Giei,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = O#P×1. From equations (A.208) and
(A.209), one has:
f ′ti,Ci,GiθJ = [µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]
′βJ + f ′ti,Ci,GiγJ . (A.210)
Subtracting equation (A.210) from equation (A.202) yields:
wi,Ci,1,Gi − f ′ti,Ci,GiθJ = [xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]
′βJ + ei,Ci,Gi = r
′
i,Ci,Gi
βJ + ei,Ci,Gi . (A.211)
Multiplying the left and right sides of the preceding equation by ri,Ci,Gi and taking the conditional
expectation given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1, one obtains:
E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)− E(ri,Ci,Gif ′ti,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)θJ
= E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)βJ + E(ri,Ci,Giei,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
. (A.212)
Because ri,Ci,Gi is by construction orthogonal to any function of ti,Ci,Gi conditional on Ji = 1 and
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Wi = 1, one has E(ri,Ci,Gif ′ti,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)θJ = O[(K+1)N+2]×1, noting that fti,Ci,Gi is a
function of ti,Ci,Gi . In addition, ei,Ci,Gi is orthogonal to any linear function of xi,Ci and fti,Ci,Gi
conditional on Ji = 1 and Wi = 1; so that, E(ri,Ci,Giei,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = O[(K+1)N+2]×1
since ri,Ci,Gi is linear in xi,Ci and fti,Ci,Gi . Therefore, equation (A.212) implies:
E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)βJ ; (A.213)
so that, one has:
βJ = [E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1), (A.214)
where the matrix E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) is invertible because the matrix [E(hi,Ci,Gi
h′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1 is assumed to have full rank as in equation (A.197).
Next, I consider the vector E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1). Let (p, q) ∈ B be any ordered
pair of distinct integers between 1 and N . From equation (A.174), the log wage wi,p,d of sibling
p from family i in year d ∈ {yi, yi + 1, . . . , D} has the following form under both individual and
social learning:
wi,p,d = c(ti,(p,q),d) + x
′
i,(p,q)v(ti,(p,q),d) + εi,(p,q),d, (A.215)
where the error term εi,(p,q),d satisfies:
E(εi,(p,q),d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d, yi, ti,0) = 0. (A.216)
Using equation (A.215), one obtains:
E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji=1,Wi=1)=E{ri,Ci,Gi [c(ti,Ci,Gi)
+x′i,Civ(ti,Ci,Gi)+εi,Ci,Gi ]|Ji=1,Wi=1}
=E[ri,Ci,Gic(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji=1,Wi=1]+E[ri,Ci,Gix′i,Civ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji=1,Wi=1]
+E[ri,Ci,Giεi,Ci,Gi |Ji=1,Wi=1]
. (A.217)
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First, the conditional expectation E[ri,Ci,Gic(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] can be simplified as follows:
E[ri,Ci,Gic(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1]
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
E{[xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]c(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1}
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
[E(xi,Ci |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1)−µJ,x(t)]c(t) =O[(K+1)N+2]×1
, (A.218)
where O[(K+1)N+2]×1 is a [(K + 1)N + 2]× 1 vector of zeros, and Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
represents the conditional probability that ti,Ci,Gi = t given that Ji = 1 and Wi = 1. In equation
(A.218), the first equality follows from the law of total expectation and from replacing ri,Ci,Gi
with xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi); the second equality follows from the basic properties of the conditional
expectation function; and the third equality follows from replacing E(xi,Ci |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1)
with µJ,x(t). Second, the conditional expectation E[ri,Ci,Gix′i,Civ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] can be
simplified as follows:
E[ri,Ci,Gix′i,Civ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1]
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
E{[xi,Ci−µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]x′i,Civ(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1}
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)(
E{[xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]x′i,Ci |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1}v(t)
− E{[xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]µ′J,x(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1}v(t)
)
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1)v(t)
=
∑
t∈SJ
Pr(ti,Ci,Gi = t|Ji = 1,Wi = 1)ΣJ,xv(t) = ΣJ,xE[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1]
. (A.219)
In equation (A.219), the first equality follows from the law of total expectation and from substi-
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tuting xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi) for ri,Ci,Gi; the second equality follows from the basic properties of
conditional expectations and from the fact that E{[xi,Ci−µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi)]µ′J,x(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji,t = 1,Wi =
1}v(t) = O[(K+1)N+2]×1; the third equality follows from the basic properties of conditional ex-
pectations and from the definition ri,Ci,Gi = xi,Ci − µJ,x(ti,Ci,Gi); the fourth equality follows
from the assumption that E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1) = ΣJ,x in equation (A.198); and
the fifth equality follows from the law of total expectation. Third, the conditional expectation
E[ri,Ci,Giεi,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1] can be simplified as follows:
E[ri,Ci,Giεi,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1]
=
∑
y˜i∈Y
∑
t˜i,0∈T
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
D∑
d=y˜i
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
E(ri,(p,q),dεi,(p,q),d|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0)
=
∑
y˜i∈Y
∑
t˜i,0∈T
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
D∑
d=y˜i
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
E[
E(ri,(p,q),dεi,(p,q),d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d, yi, ti,0)|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0]
=
∑
y˜i∈Y
∑
t˜i,0∈T
λ(y˜i, t˜i,0)
D∑
d=y˜i
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
E{[xi,(p,q) − µJ,x(ti,(p,q),d)]
E(εi,(p,q),d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d, yi, ti,0)|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0}
= O[(K+1)N+2]×1
, (A.220)
where λ(y˜i, t˜i,0) is defined in equation (A.177), pJ,a = 1, pJ,b = N − 1 and qJ,a = p+ 1, qJ,b = N
as in equation (A.175) if J = H , and pJ,a = 2, pJ,b = N and qJ,a = 1, qJ,b = p− 1 as in equation
(A.176) if J = L. In equation (A.220), the first and second equalities follow from the law of total
expectation; the third equality follows from replacing ri,(p,q),d with xi,(p,q)−µJ,x(ti,(p,q),d) and from
the basic properties of the conditional expectation function; and the fourth equality follows from
the fact that E(εi,(p,q),d|xi,(p,q), ti,(p,q),d, yi, ti,0) = 0 by definition. To be clear about the notation in
equation (A.220), the index (i, Ci, Gi) is treated as being random when calculating the conditional
expectation E[ri,Ci,Giεi,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1], and the index [i, (p, q), d] is treated as being known
when taking the conditional expectation E(ri,(p,q),dεi,(p,q),d|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0). That is, one could
also write E(ri,(p,q),dεi,(p,q),d|yi = y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0) = E[ri,Ci,Giεi,Ci,Gi |Ci = (p, q), Gi = d, yi =
y˜i, ti,0 = t˜i,0], where p 6= q and d ≥ y˜i.
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Substituting the results from equations (A.218), (A.219), and (A.220) into equation (A.217),
one obtains:
E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) = ΣJ,xE[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1]. (A.221)
Moreover, it follows from the assumption E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji,t = 1,Wi = 1) = ΣJ,x in equa-
tion (A.198) that [E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1 = Σ−1J,x, where ΣJ,x is invertible because
E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) is assumed to have full rank. Therefore, the parameter βJ in
equation (A.214) can be expressed as:
βJ = [E(ri,Ci,Gir′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1E(ri,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
= E[v(ti,Ci,Gi)|Ji = 1,Wi = 1] = νJ
. (A.222)
Recall that βJ is a [(K+1)N+2]×1 vector containing the first [(K+1)N+2] elements of the full
coefficient vector δJ = [E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)]−1E(hi,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1).
Now, the estimators ν˜H and ν˜L in equations (A.199) and (A.200) can be expressed as follows.
For yˆ ∈ Y and tˆ ∈ T , let χi,tˆ,yˆ be an indicator random variable that is equal to one if yi = yˆ and
ti,0 = tˆ and that is equal to zero otherwise. Letting J ∈ {H,L}, one has:
ν˜J = (ν˜J,1)
−1ν˜J,2, (A.223)
where ν˜J,1 is given by:
ν˜J,1 = (
1
2
PN2 )
−1
I−1 I∑
i=1
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)
−1
I−1 I∑
i=1
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d
, (A.224)
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and ν˜J,2 is given by:
ν˜J,2 = (
1
2
PN2 )
−1
I−1 I∑
i=1
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)
−1
I−1 I∑
i=1
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d
. (A.225)
In equations (A.224) and (A.225), recall from above that pJ,a = 1, pJ,b = N − 1 and qJ,a = p+ 1,
qJ,b = N as in equation (A.175) if J = H and that pJ,a = 2, pJ,b = N and qJ,a = 1, qJ,b = p − 1
as in equation (A.176) if J = L. Using the weak law of large numbers, one has:
plimI→∞ I
−1
I∑
i=1
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)
 = E
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)

=
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
E[χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)] =
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
δ(yˆ, tˆ)(D − yˆ + 1)
, (A.226)
where δ(yˆ, tˆ) denotes the probability of sampling a sibship with the observed entry date yˆ ∈ Y and
the observed age structure tˆ ∈ T . Therefore, by Slutsky’s theorem, it follows that:
plimI→∞
I−1 I∑
i=1
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
χi,tˆ,yˆ · (D − yˆ + 1)
−1=
∑
tˆ∈T
∑
yˆ∈Y
δ(yˆ, tˆ)(D − yˆ + 1)
−1. (A.227)
Again, using the weak law of large numbers, one has:
plimI→∞I
−1
I∑
i=1
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d

= E
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d
 (A.228)
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=
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
E(χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d)
=
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
δ(y˜, t˜) · E(hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d|yi = y˜, ti,0 = t˜)
,
and, using an analogous argument, one has:
plimI→∞ I
−1
I∑
i=1
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
χi,t˜,y˜ · hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d

=
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
δ(y˜, t˜) · E(hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d|yi = y˜, ti,0 = t˜)
. (A.229)
Using Slutsky’s theorem, it follows from equations (A.227), (A.228), and (A.229) that:
plimI→∞ ν˜J,1 =
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
λ(y˜, t˜) · E(hi,(p,q),dh′i,(p,q),d|yi = y˜, ti,0 = t˜)
= E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
, (A.230)
and that:
plimI→∞ ν˜J,2 =
∑
t˜∈T
∑
y˜∈Y
D∑
d=y˜
pJ,b∑
p=pJ,a
qJ,b∑
q=qJ,a
λ(y˜, t˜) · E(hi,(p,q),dwi,p,d|yi = y˜, ti,0 = t˜)
= E(hi,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1)
, (A.231)
where λ(y˜, t˜) is defined in equation (A.177). Now, by Slutsky’s theorem, equations (A.230) and
(A.231) along with equation (A.223) imply that:
plimI→∞ ν˜J =[E(hi,Ci,Gih
′
i,Ci,Gi
|Ji=1,Wi=1)]−1E(hi,Ci,Giwi,Ci,1,Gi|Ji=1,Wi=1), (A.232)
noting that the matrix E(hi,Ci,Gih′i,Ci,Gi |Ji = 1,Wi = 1) is assumed to be nonsingular as in equa-
tion (A.197). It follows from equation (A.232) that plimI→∞ ν˜J = δJ = (β
′
J , γ
′
J)
′, where βJ and
γJ are the regression parameters appearing in equation (A.202). In addition, recall from equation
(A.222) that βJ = νJ . Therefore, as desired, the first [(K + 1)N + 2] elements of ν˜J converge in
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probability to νJ .
A.9 Measurement Error in Schooling
This appendix describes how classical measurement error in the schooling variable affects the
outcome of the test proposed in section 1.2.2 for determining whether ability or schooling is more
highly correlated among siblings. As in section 1.2.1, true schooling and test scores are given by
equations (1.3) and (1.5), respectively. Each sibling’s reported schooling ei, which can now differ
from her true schooling si, is specified as:
ei = si + υi, (A.233)
where υi, which has variance σ2υ ≥ 0, is uncorrelated with (a1, a2), (s1, s2), and (z1, z2).
The following result, which extends proposition 1.2.1, characterizes the coefficient obtained
from the regression of one’s test score on one’s own and a sibling’s reported schooling. The
formula below indicates that if schooling is measured with error, then the test in section 1.2.2 can
be biased towards either a negative or a positive outcome relative to the result when schooling is
not measured with error, depending on whether the measurement error in schooling is more or
less correlated than true schooling. However, the test remains valid if the measurement error in
schooling has the same correlation as true schooling.
Proposition A.9.1 The regression coefficient of (z1, z2)′ on (e1, e2)′ is given by:(
τo τf
τf τo
)
=
1
σ4e(1− ρ2e)
[
θsσ
2
sσ
2
e
(
1− ρsρe ρs − ρe
ρs − ρe 1− ρsρe
)
+ θaγσ
2
aσ
2
e
(
1− ρaρe ρa − ρe
ρa − ρe 1− ρaρe
)]
.
(A.234)
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Proof The conditional expectation of (z1, z2)′ given (e1, e2)′ is:
E
[(
z1
z2
)
|
(
e1
e2
)]
=
(
µz1
µz2
)
+ C
[(
z1
z2
)
,
(
e1
e2
)]
V
[(
e1
e2
)]−1 [(
e1
e2
)
−
(
µe1
µe2
)]
,
(A.235)
where the regression coefficient is given by:
C
[(
z1
z2
)
,
(
e1
e2
)]
V
[(
e1
e2
)]−1
=
[
θsσ
2
s
(
1 ρs
ρs 1
)
+ θaγσ
2
a
(
1 ρa
ρa 1
)](
σ2e ρeσ
2
e
ρeσ
2
e σ
2
e
)−1
.
(A.236)
Inverting the variance matrix and rearranging terms leads to the formula in equation (A.234).
A.10 Asymmetries in Variance of Testing Error
This appendix examines how a difference between siblings in the variances of their testing
errors affects the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores when a person’s log wage
is regressed on both her own and her sibling’s test scores and schooling levels. The statistical
relationships among the characteristics of any pair of siblings are as specified in section 1.2.1,
except that the variance of the testing error ωi in equation (1.5) can now differ between the two
siblings. In particular, I let σ2ωi > 0 denote the variance of the testing error ωi for sibling i ∈ {1, 2}.
As in section 1.2.3, I focus on the case where employer learning is individual. In addition, to
simplify the comparison between the log wages of the two siblings, I consider the log wage of each
sibling upon reaching a given age level t, which is similar to the procedure used in appendix A.2.
In this case, as stated in the first item of proposition A.2.1, it follows directly from the symmetric
treatment of the two siblings that there will be no differences between them in the coefficients
obtained from the regression of each sibling’s log wage at a given age on her own and her sibling’s
schooling and test scores. However, if, for example, sibling 1 has a higher variance in the testing
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error than sibling 2, then the proposition below shows that in this regression, sibling 1 will have
a higher coefficient on her sibling’s test score and a lower coefficient on her own test score than
sibling 2. A symmetric result holds if σ2ω1 < σ
2
ω2
instead of σ2ω1 > σ
2
ω2
.
Proposition A.10.1 Suppose that learning is individual. Let ϑij denote the regression coefficient
on sibling j’s test score in the conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage at age t given s1, s2
and z1, z2.
1. If σ2ω1 = σ
2
ω2
, then ϑ12 = ϑ21 and ϑ11 = ϑ22.
2. If σ2ω1 > σ
2
ω2
, then ϑ12 > ϑ21 and ϑ11 < ϑ22.
Proof From equation (1.12), the conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage at age t given s1,
s2 and z1, z2 has the following form under individual learning:
E[log(wi)|s1, s2, z1, z2] = χE(ai|s1, s2, z1, z2) + fi(si, t), (A.237)
where χ > 0 is given by χi in equation (1.9) for ti = t, and fi(si, t) is defined in equation (1.13).
Therefore, it simply remains to characterize the conditional expectation of ai given s1, s2 and z1,
z2. Letting zˆi denote the component of zi orthogonal to s1 and s2, the coefficients on zˆ1 and zˆ2 in
a regression on zˆ1, zˆ2 are the same as the coefficients on z1 and z2 in a regression on s1, s2 and z1,
z2. Hence, the regression coefficients in the statement of the proposition can be expressed as:
(
ϑ11 ϑ12
ϑ21 ϑ22
)
= C
[(
a1
a2
)
,
(
zˆ1
zˆ2
)]
V
[(
zˆ1
zˆ2
)]−1
, (A.238)
with the inverse variance matrix having the form:
V
[(
zˆ1
zˆ2
)]−1
= [σ2zˆ1σ
2
zˆ2
(1− ρ2zˆ)]−1
(
σ2zˆ2 −ρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2
−ρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2 σ2zˆ1
)
, (A.239)
where σ2zˆ1 and σ
2
zˆ2
denote the respective variances of zˆ1 and zˆ2, and ρzˆ represents the correlation
coefficient between zˆ1 and zˆ2. Denoting τˆ = [σ2zˆ1σ
2
zˆ2
(1 − ρ2zˆ)]−1 > 0, let κc = τˆC(a1, zˆ1) =
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τˆC(a2, zˆ2) and κd = τˆC(a1, zˆ2) = τˆC(a2, zˆ1). From equations (A.238) and (A.239), the parame-
ters ϑ12 and ϑ21 are given by:
ϑ12 = κdσ
2
zˆ1
− κcρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2 and ϑ21 = κdσ2zˆ2 − κcρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2 , (A.240)
and the parameters ϑ11 and ϑ22 are given by:
ϑ11 = κcσ
2
zˆ2
− κdρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2 and ϑ22 = κcσ2zˆ1 − κdρzˆσzˆ1σzˆ2 . (A.241)
Note that the covariances C(a1, zˆ1) = C(a2, zˆ2) and C(a1, zˆ2) = C(a2, zˆ1) in equation (A.238)
are the same as those appearing in the proof of proposition 1.2.2, where they are shown to satisfy
C(ai, zˆi) > 0 and C(ai, zˆj) > 0 for all i, j such that i 6= j. Therefore, κc > 0 and κd > 0
in equations (A.240) and (A.241). Moreover, σ2zˆ1 = σ
2
zˆ2
whenever σ2ω1 = σ
2
ω2
, and σ2zˆ1 > σ
2
zˆ2
whenever σ2ω1 > σ
2
ω2
. Thus, it follows from equations (A.240) and (A.241) that ϑ12 = ϑ21 and
ϑ11 = ϑ22 if σ2ω1 = σ
2
ω2
and that ϑ12 > ϑ21 and ϑ11 < ϑ22 if σ2ω1 > σ
2
ω2
.
A.11 Instrumental-Variables Regressions with Correlated Mea-
surement Error
This appendix examines the instrumental-variables regression of an individual’s test score on
both her own and her sibling’s schooling when the schooling levels of both siblings are measured
with error but both self- and sibling-reported schooling measures are available. The objective
here is to characterize the parameter identified by a two-stage least squares regression in which
one sibling’s reports of the two siblings’ schooling are used as instruments for the other sibling’s
reports of the two siblings’ schooling, despite the fact that the measurement errors in the reports are
correlated between siblings. The underlying setup is essentially the same as in section 1.2.1 with
true schooling and test scores given by equations (1.3) and (1.5), respectively. However, reported
schooling is now allowed to differ from true schooling. In particular, let hij denote the report made
by sibling i ∈ {1, 2} about the schooling of sibling j ∈ {1, 2}. The reported schooling level hij is
defined as:
hij = sj + υ
i
j, (A.242)
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where υij is the error in sibling i’s report about sibling j’s schooling. Letting i index one of the
siblings and e index the sibling other than i, the error terms υii and υ
i
e are assumed to have the form:
υii = oi + u
i
i and υ
i
e = oi + u
i
e, (A.243)
where o1, o2 have identical variance σ2o > 0 and correlation coefficient ρo ∈ (0, 1], and both u11, u22
and u12, u
2
1 have identical variance σ
2
u > 0. The terms o1 and o2, which are intended to represent a
shared tendency of siblings from the same family to misreport their schooling levels, are assumed
to be correlated between themselves but uncorrelated with (a1, a2), (s1, s2), (z1, z2), (u11, u
2
2), and
(u12, u
2
1). For a given i ∈ {1, 2}, the terms uii and uie, which represent sibling i’s idiosyncratic
tendency to misreport her own and her sibling’s schooling, can have a correlation ρu ∈ [−1, 1]
with each other. However, uii and u
i
e are required to be uncorrelated with (a1, a2), (s1, s2), and
(z1, z2) as well as with uei and u
e
e.
The result below analyzes the two-stage least squares regression of sibling i’s test score zi on
her own reports hi1, h
i
2 of the two siblings’ schooling levels s1, s2 using sibling e’s reports h
e
1,
he2 as instruments for sibling i’s reports h
i
1, h
i
2. Specifically, I show that the parameter on sibling
i’s report of sibling e’s schooling hie being estimated by this regression should be less than the
regression coefficient on sibling e’s schooling se in the conditional expectation of sibling i’s test
score zi given the two siblings’ schooling levels s1, s2.
Proposition A.11.1 Let i index one of the two siblings and e index the sibling other than i. Let θˆc
denote the parameter on hie identified by the two-stage least squares regression of sibling i’s test
score zi on her own reports hi1, h
i
2 of both siblings’ schooling where sibling e’s reports h
e
1, h
e
2 are
used as instruments for sibling i’s reports hi1, h
i
2. Let θc denote the regression coefficient on se in
the conditional expectation of sibling i’s test score zi given both siblings’ true schooling s1, s2.
Then θˆc < θc.
Proof The conditional expectation of sibling i’s test score zi given her own and her sibling’s true
schooling si, se has the form:
E[zi|si, se] = θa + θbsi + θcse. (A.244)
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Hence, sibling i’s test score score zi can be expressed as:
zi = θa + θbsi + θcse + εi = θa + θbh
i
i + θch
i
e + εi − (θbυii + θcυie), (A.245)
where the error term εi is independent of si and se by the definition of the conditional expectation
of a normal random variable and uncorrelated with υij for all i, j by the assumptions made above
about the form of the measurement error in schooling. The expressions for θb and θc in equation
(1.6) imply that θb + θc > 0.
Next, I analyze the predicted values of sibling i’s reports hii, h
i
e given sibling e’s reports h
e
i , h
e
e.
The coefficient on (hei , h
e
e)
′ in the linear projection of (hii, h
i
e)
′ on (hei , h
e
e)
′ is equal to:
(
γb γc
γc γb
)
= C
[(
hii
hie
)
,
(
hei
hee
)]
V
[(
hei
hee
)]−1
, (A.246)
which can be expressed as:
(
γb γc
γc γb
)
=
(
σ2s + ρoσ
2
o ρsσ
2
s + ρoσ
2
o
ρsσ
2
s + ρoσ
2
o σ
2
s + ρoσ
2
o
)(
σ2s + σ
2
o + σ
2
u ρsσ
2
s + σ
2
o + ρuσ
2
u
ρsσ
2
s + σ
2
o + ρuσ
2
u σ
2
s + σ
2
o + σ
2
u
)−1
. (A.247)
Defining the constant Q > 0 as:
Q = (σ2s + σ
2
o + σ
2
u)
2 − (ρsσ2s + σ2o + ρuσ2u)2, (A.248)
the parameters γb and γc are:
γb = Q
−1[(σ2s + ρoσ
2
o)(σ
2
s + σ
2
o + σ
2
u)− (ρsσ2s + ρoσ2o)(ρsσ2s + σ2o + ρuσ2u)],
γc = Q
−1[(ρsσ2s + ρoσ
2
o)(σ
2
s + σ
2
o + σ
2
u)− (σ2s + ρoσ2o)(ρsσ2s + σ2o + ρuσ2u)].
(A.249)
Clearly, from equation (A.249), the parameters γb and γc satisfy γb > γc and γb + γc > 0. Thus,
the predicted values of hii, h
i
e given h
e
i , h
e
e have the form:
hi∗i = γp + γbh
e
i + γch
e
e and h
i∗
e = γq + γch
e
i + γbh
e
e. (A.250)
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Now, the parameter on (hii, h
i
e)
′ identified by the two-stage least squares regression of zi on
(hii, h
i
e)
′ using (hei , h
e
e)
′ as an instrument for (hii, h
i
e)
′ is equal to:
(
θˆb θˆc
)
= C
[(
zi
)
,
(
hi∗i
hi∗e
)]
V
[(
hi∗i
hi∗e
)]−1
=
(
θb θc
)
− C
[(
θbυ
i
i + θcυ
i
e
)
,
(
γp + γbh
e
i + γch
e
e
γq + γch
e
i + γbh
e
e
)]
V
[(
hi∗i
hi∗e
)]−1
,
(A.251)
where the second equality follows from the decomposition of the test score in equation (A.245)
as well as the fact that hi∗i and h
i∗
e in equation (A.250) are the respective linear projections of h
i
i
and hie on h
e
i and h
e
e. The covariance matrix from the second term in the second line of equation
(A.251) can be expressed as:
C
[(
θbυ
i
i + θcυ
i
e
)
,
(
γp + γbh
e
i + γch
e
e
γq + γch
e
i + γbh
e
e
)]
= ρoσ
2
o(θb + θc)(γb + γc)
(
1 1
)
. (A.252)
Hence, defining the constant P > 0 as:
P = V(hi∗i )V(hi∗e )− [C(hi∗i , hi∗e )]2, (A.253)
the parameter θˆc in equation (A.251) is given by:
θˆc = θc − ρoσ2o(θb + θc)(γb + γc)P−1[V(hi∗i )− C(hi∗i , hi∗e )]
= θc − ρoσ2o(θb + θc)(γb + γc)P−1(γb − γc)2[V(hee)− C(hei , hee)],
(A.254)
where the second equality results after some simplification from substituting for hi∗i and h
i∗
e using
equation (A.250). It follows from the preceding equation that θˆc < θc as desired, because θb+θc >
0, γb + γc > 0, γb > γc, and V(hee) = V(hei ) > C(hei , hee) = C(hee, hei ).
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A.12 Comparative Statics for Learning Models
This appendix presents some basic comparative statics results for the learning models from
section 1.2. In particular, the proposition below describes how additional signals of one’s own or
a sibling’s performance affect the coefficients on test scores in the regression of one’s log wage on
one’s own and a sibling’s test scores and schooling. If learning is individual as in section 1.2.3, then
the ratio of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to that on one’s own test score remains constant
in this regression, regardless of the number of performance signals that a person or her sibling
possesses. Of course, under the assumption of individual learning, the number of performance
signals available about one’s sibling has no effect on any of the coefficients in this regression. By
contrast, if learning is social as in section 1.2.4, then this ratio typically increases with more signals
about a sibling’s performance or fewer signals about one’s own performance.
Proposition A.12.1 Let i index one of the two siblings and e index the sibling other than i. Let
νii(ti, te) and νie(ti, te) respectively denote the regression coefficients on the test scores of siblings
i and e in the conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage given z1, z2 and s1, s2, where ti > 0
and te > 0 are the corresponding numbers of performance signals available about siblings i and
e.
1. If learning is individual, then νie(tˆi, tˆe)νii(t˜i, t˜e) = νie(t˜i, t˜e)νii(tˆi, tˆe) for all tˆi, tˆe and t˜i, t˜e.
2. If learning is social, then:
(a) νie(tˆi, tˆe)νii(t˜i, t˜e) < νie(t˜i, t˜e)νii(tˆi, tˆe) whenever t˜e > tˆe and t˜i ≤ tˆi,
(b) νie(tˆi, tˆe)νii(t˜i, t˜e) < νie(t˜i, t˜e)νii(tˆi, tˆe) whenever t˜i < tˆi and t˜e ≥ tˆe.
Proof From equation (1.12), the conditional expectation of sibling i’s log wage given s1, s2 and
z1, z2 has the following form under individual learning:
E[log(wi)|s1, s2, z1, z2] = χi(ti)E(ai|s1, s2, z1, z2) + fi(si, ti), (A.255)
where χi(ti) is analogous to χi in equation (1.9), and fi(si, ti) is given by equation (1.13). It
Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 1 209
follows from the preceding equation that:
νie(tˆi, tˆe)νii(t˜i, t˜e) = [χi(tˆi)pif ][χi(t˜i)pio] = [χi(t˜i)pif ][χi(tˆi)pio] = νie(t˜i, t˜e)νii(tˆi, tˆe), (A.256)
where pio and pif are the same as the regression parameters on one’s own and a sibling’s test scores
in equation (1.7). This proves the first item in the proposition.
Next, if learning is social, then as in equation (1.23), the conditional expectation of sibling i’s
log wage given s1, s2 and z1, z2 has the form:
E[log(vi)|si, se, zi, ze] =[1− ξi(ti, te)]ζri(te)E(ae|si, se, zi, ze)
+ ξi(ti, te)E(ai|si, se, zi, ze) + pi(si, se, ti),
(A.257)
where pi(si, se, ti) is specified in equation (1.24); ξi(ti, te) is defined in equations (1.14) and (1.15)
as:
ξi(ti, te) = tiσ
−2
η σ
2
qi(ti, te), σ
2
qi(ti, te) = [σ
−2
ni (te) + tiσ
−2
η ]
−1, σ2ni(te) = V(ai|si, se, re); (A.258)
and ζri is given as in equation (A.21) by:
ζri(te) = σ
2
a[ρa − γ(δoρa + δf )]/(ς2 + t−1e σ2η). (A.259)
As explained in the proof of proposition 1.2.4, the bracketed term in the numerator of the preceding
equation is positive. Note that ξi(ti, te) ∈ (0, 1) in equation (A.258) and that ζri(te) > 0 in
equation (A.259). In addition, ξi(ti, te) is increasing in ti and non-increasing in te, whereas ζri(te)
is increasing in te. From equation (A.257), the regression parameters νii(ti, te) and νie(ti, te) can
be expressed as:
νii(ti, te) = [1− ξi(ti, te)]ζri(te)pif + ξi(ti, te)pio,
νie(ti, te) = [1− ξi(ti, te)]ζri(te)pio + ξi(ti, te)pif ,
(A.260)
which is analogous to equation (A.23). Hence, similar to equations (A.24) and (A.25) in the proof
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of proposition 1.2.4, the statement νie(tˆi, tˆe)νii(t˜i, t˜e) < νie(t˜i, t˜e)νii(tˆi, tˆe) is equivalent to:
[1− ξi(tˆi, tˆe)]ξi(t˜i, t˜e)ζri(tˆe)pi2o + ξi(tˆi, tˆe)[1− ξi(t˜i, t˜e)]ζri(t˜e)pi2f
< [1− ξi(t˜i, t˜e)]ξi(tˆi, tˆe)ζri(t˜e)pi2o + ξi(t˜i, t˜e)[1− ξi(tˆi, tˆe)]ζri(tˆe)pi2f
. (A.261)
Recall from proposition 1.2.2 that pi2o > pi
2
f . Now, if t˜e > tˆe and t˜i ≤ tˆi, then ξi(tˆi, tˆe) ≥ ξi(t˜i, t˜e)
and ζri(tˆe) < ζri(t˜e). Thus, the inequality in expression (A.261) holds whenever t˜e > tˆe and
t˜i ≤ tˆi, which proves the first part in the second item of the proposition. Next, if t˜i < tˆi and
t˜e ≥ tˆe, then ξi(tˆi, tˆe) > ξi(t˜i, t˜e) and ζri(tˆe) ≤ ζri(t˜e). Thus, the inequality in expression (A.261)
holds whenever t˜i < tˆi and t˜e ≥ tˆe, which proves the second part in the second item of the
proposition.
A.13 Simple Model of Employee Referrals
This appendix develops a simple model of employee referrals that seeks to resolve two po-
tential issues mentioned in sections 1.2.4 and 1.6.1. First, the social learning model assumes that
one’s wage is set equal to the conditional expectation of one’s productivity given one’s own and a
sibling’s schooling and performance. If a sibling’s characteristics are not observable to a person’s
employer unless both individuals work for the same firm, then this assumption about wage deter-
mination might be unrealistic as a broad description of the labor market. Second, the percentages
of individuals obtaining a job through a sibling or also working for the same firm as a sibling are
on average moderate in size. If siblings must work for the same firm in order to influence each
other’s wage, then these percentages might be too small to account for the main estimates of sibling
effects.
The model in this section addresses these concerns by relaxing the assumption that one’s em-
ployer observes the characteristics of one’s sibling and by generating an equilibrium with social
effects on wages even if siblings work at different firms. The timing of events in this model is simi-
lar to that in Montgomery (1991). However, the wage setting process here is different. Specifically,
the wage offer made by an informationally advantaged employer is assumed to be observable to
other potential employers, who can use this offer to update their beliefs when making counterof-
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fers.22 In brief, an employer’s wage offer may act as a signal to other employers of a worker’s
productivity.23
The basic structure of the model is as follows. There are two siblings and two periods. The
siblings differ in seniority with the older and the younger sibling being indexed by 1 and 2, re-
spectively. Each sibling i has a schooling level si as well as p ≥ 1 initial log productivity signals
{riu}pu=1. In period 1, sibling 1 enters the labor market, whereupon each of M ≥ 2 firms observes
s1 and {r1u}pu=1. Each of these firms simultaneously makes a wage offer vj to sibling 1. Sibling
1 accepts the wage offer of some firm I and works for one period at firm I . Subsequently, firm I
observes q ≥ 1 log output realizations {r1u}p+qu=p+1 for sibling 1. Having worked, sibling 1 refers
sibling 2 to firm I and then leaves the labor market. In period 2, sibling 2 enters the labor market,
whereupon firm I observes s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1. Firm I makes a wage offer vI to sibling
2. Next, N ≥ 2 other firms observe vI as well as s2 and {r2u}pu=1. Each of these firms simultane-
ously makes a wage offer vOj to sibling 2, and sibling 2 accepts a wage offer and works for one
period. Subsequently, sibling 2’s employer observes q ≥ 1 log output realizations {r2u}p+qu=p+1 for
sibling 2.
The additional assumptions of the model are as follows. The properties of the variables s1, s2
and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}p+qu=1 are as described in section 1.2.1.24 Every wage offer is required to be a
positive real number, and each sibling accepts the highest wage offer received.25 If a firm does not
hire a worker in a given period, then the firm obtains a profit of zero for that period. If a firm hires
sibling i at wage v in a given period, then the firm obtains a profit of exp(Σp+qu=p+1riu) − v for that
period, where exp(Σp+qu=p+1riu) represents sibling i’s total output on the job.
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In period 1, every firm selects vj so
as to maximize the expected discounted value of its profits given the strategies of the other play-
22See Barron et al. (2006) for an empirical and theoretical analysis of counteroffers in labor markets. Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) and Pinkston (2009) present models in which employers observe wage offers from other firms and
can extend counteroffers in response.
23See Waldman (1984) and Golan (2009), respectively, for models in which job assignments and accepted wages
serve as signals of a worker’s ability.
24In particular, see equations (1.3) and (1.4) for the specifications of si and riu, respectively.
25In the treatment here, workers are permitted to use mixed strategies when accepting wage offers, although firms
are restricted to use pure strategies when making wage offers. The results of the analysis do not change if firms are
allowed to randomize over different wage offers.
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ers as well as its beliefs about each sibling i’s total output exp(Σp+qu=p+1riu) conditional on s1 and
{r1u}pu=1. In period 2, firm I chooses vI so as to maximize the expected value of its profits given the
strategies of the other players in addition to its beliefs about sibling 2’s total output exp(Σp+qu=p+1r2u)
conditional on s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1. Each remaining employer then chooses vOj so as to
maximize the expected value of its profits given the strategies of the other players in addition to its
beliefs about sibling 2’s total output exp(Σp+qu=p+1r2u) conditional on vI as well as s2 and {r2u}pu=1.
Based on the strategies of the players, firms’ beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possi-
ble.
In order to solve the model above, I focus on the separating equilibria.26 The result below
establishes the existence of a separating equilibrium. In addition, it shows that in any separating
equilibrium, the wage accepted by the older sibling is equal to the conditional expectation of her
total output given her own schooling and initial log productivity signals, and the wage accepted by
the younger sibling is equal to the conditional expectation of her total output given both siblings’
schooling and initial log productivity signals as well as the older sibling’s log output realizations.
Proposition A.13.1 There exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In any separating
equilibrium, the following hold:
1. The wage w1 accepted by sibling 1 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σ
p+q
u=p+1r1u)
given s1 and {r1u}pu=1.
2. The wage w2 accepted by sibling 2 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σ
p+q
u=p+1r2u)
given s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1.
Proof I begin by providing an example of a separating equilibrium. In period 2, after all the wage
offers have been made, sibling 2 accepts the wage offer vI of firm I if vI is greater than the highest
wage offer maxj vOj of the other firms. If vI is less than or equal to maxj vOj , then sibling 2 accepts
the wage offer vOk of some firm k other than I that makes an offer of maxj vOj . If multiple offers
by firms other than I are equal to maxj vOj , then sibling 2 randomly selects an offer, assigning
equal probability to each such offer.
26To be clear, a separating equilibrium here is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which firm I makes a different
wage offer vI to sibling 2 for each of its possible equilibrium beliefs about sibling 2’s total output exp(Σ
p+q
u=p+1r2u)
conditional on s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1.
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After observing firm I’s wage offer vI to sibling 2, every other firm believes that Σ
p+q
u=p+1r2u is
normally distributed with mean log(vI)− 12σ2I and variance σ2I = V(Σp+qu=p+1r2u|s1, s2, {r1u}p+qu=1,
{r2u}pu=1). Each of these firms offers sibling 2 a wage vOj equal to vI . After observing sibling
1’s log output realizations {r1u}p+qu=p+1, firm I believes that Σp+qu=p+1r2u is normally distributed with
mean µI = E(Σp+qu=p+1r2u|s1, s2, {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1) and variance σ2I . Firm I offers sibling 2 a log
wage log(vI) equal to µI + 12σ
2
I .
In period 1, after observing sibling 1’s schooling s1 and initial log productivity signals {r1u}pu=1,
every firm believes that Σp+qu=p+1riu is normally distributed with mean µOi = E(Σ
p+q
u=p+1riu|s1,
{r1u}pu=1) and variance σ2Oi = V(Σp+qu=p+1riu|s1, {r1u}pu=1). Each firm offers sibling 1 a log wage
log(vj) equal to µO1 + 12σ
2
O1. Sibling 1 accepts the highest wage offer received maxj vj . If multiple
offers are equal to maxj vj , then sibling 1 randomly selects an offer, assigning equal probability to
each offer.
To see that the strategies and beliefs described above form a separating equilibrium, note first
that firm I offers a different log wage log(vI) to sibling 2 for each of its possible equilibrium beliefs
about Σp+qu=p+1r2u conditional on s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1, where any normal distribution with
variance σ2I can be an equilibrium belief. Observe next that the specified beliefs are derived from
Bayes’ rule. In particular, firm I offers sibling 2 a wage vI = exp(µI+ 12σ
2
I ) equal to the conditional
expectation of exp(Σp+qu=p+1r2u) given s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1. Consequently, upon observing
vI , the other firms use Bayes’ rule to infer that Σ
p+q
u=p+1r2u is normally distributed with mean µI
and variance σ2I .
It is now straightforward to confirm that the prescribed strategies are sequentially rational given
beliefs. Each sibling always accepts the highest wage offer received. In period 2, every firm obtains
an equilibrium expected profit of zero. If a firm other than I were to make an offer greater than its
equilibrium offer, then it would obtain a negative expected profit. If such a firm were to make an
offer less than its equilibrium offer, then it would obtain an expected profit of zero. If firm I were
to make an offer different from its equilibrium offer, then it would continue to receive an expected
profit of zero, because the other firms would match this offer, and sibling 2 would never choose to
work for firm I . In period 1, each firm obtains an equilibrium expected discounted payoff of zero.
If a firm were to offer a lower wage, then it would obtain an expected discounted payoff of zero.
If a firm were to offer a higher wage, then it would obtain a negative expected discounted payoff,
because it would receive a negative expected profit in period 1 and an expected profit of zero in
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period 2.
I next show that in any separating equilibrium, the accepted wages must be as given in the
statement of the proposition. Suppose that a separating equilibrium is being played. First, if firm I
offers sibling 2 a log wage log(vI) greater than µI + 12σ
2
I , then no other firm k will offer sibling 2
a wage vOk greater than or equal to vI unless sibling 2 accepts firm k’s offer with probability zero.
Thus, if firm I offers sibling 2 a log wage log(vI) greater than µI + 12σ
2
I , then sibling 2 will accept
the offer made by firm I , and firm I will receive a negative expected profit in period 2. However,
firm I could obtain an expected payoff of zero in period 2 by instead offering sibling 2 a log wage
log(vI) equal to µI + 12σ
2
I . Hence, there cannot be a separating equilibrium in which firm I offers
sibling 2 a log wage log(vI) greater than µI + 12σ
2
I .
Second, if firm I offers sibling 2 a log wage log(vI) equal to µI + 12σ
2
I , then no other firm
k will make an offer greater than vI unless sibling 2 accepts firm k’s offer with probability zero.
Because sibling 2 always accepts the highest wage offer, it must be in such an equilibrium that no
firm offers sibling 2 a log wage greater than µI + 12σ
2
I and that sibling 2 receives a log wage of
µI +
1
2
σ2I . Third, if firm I offers sibling 2 a log wage log(vI) less than µI +
1
2
σ2I , then there cannot
be an equilibrium in which some firm offers sibling 2 a log wage greater than µI + 12σ
2
I . Moreover,
some firm must offer sibling 2 a log wage equal to µI + 12σ
2
I . Otherwise, there would exist a wage
offer vˆ greater than max(maxj vOj, vI) but less than exp(µI + 12σ
2
I ) such that some firm k other
than I would have an incentive to deviate by offering sibling 2 the wage vˆ instead of making its
original wage offer vOk. Because sibling 2 always accepts the highest wage offer, it must be in
such an equilibrium that sibling 2 receives a log wage of µI + 12σ
2
I .
Hence, sibling 2’s wage must be as specified in the statement of the proposition. Because ev-
ery firm obtains an expected profit of zero in period 2, the game played in period 1 is equivalent
to Bertrand competition among M ≥ 2 firms making wage offers to sibling 1, where the total ex-
pected output from hiring sibling 1 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σp+qu=p+1r1u) given
s1 and {r1u}pu=1. Consequently, the highest wage offer made to sibling 1 in such an equilibrium is
exp(µO1 +
1
2
σ2O1). Hence, sibling 1’s wage must be as specified in the statement of the proposition.
Two points should be noted in regard to the result above. First, although attention is restricted to
the separating equilibria of the model, other equilibria with different implications for wage setting
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exist. For example, a pooling equilibrium can be constructed in which the wage accepted by each
sibling i is equal to the conditional expectation of her total output exp(Σp+qu=p+1riu) given her own
schooling si and initial log productivity signals {riu}pu=1. To see this, consider the separating
equilibrium described in the first three paragraphs from the proof of proposition A.13.1. Modify
the strategies such that firm I always offers sibling 2 a log wage log(vˆI) equal to µˆI + 12 σˆ
2
I , where
µˆI = E(Σp+qu=p+1r2u|s2, {r2u}pu=1) and σˆ2I = V(Σp+qu=p+1r2u|s2, {r2u}pu=1). Modify the beliefs such
that firms other than I believe that Σp+qu=p+1r2u is normally distributed with mean µˆI and variance
σˆ2I whenever firm I offers sibling 2 a log wage of µˆI +
1
2
σˆ2I . Letting strategies and beliefs be
as previously described except for these two changes, it is straightforward to confirm that the
resulting strategies and beliefs constitute a pooling equilibrium.27 In such an equilibrium, each
sibling’s wage depends only on one’s own characteristics.
Second, in the separating equilibrium described in the first three paragraphs from the proof of
proposition A.13.1, the older sibling’s characteristics always affect the younger sibling’s log wage,
even though the two siblings never work for the same firm. The reason for this outcome is that
the wage offer of the older sibling’s former employer reveals private information to other firms
about the younger sibling’s productivity. Nonetheless, there can also exist a separating equilibrium
in which the two siblings always work for the same firm. For example, consider the separating
equilibrium described in the first three paragraphs from the proof of proposition A.13.1. Suppose
that sibling 2 observes s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1. Modify sibling 2’s strategy such that sibling
2 always accepts firm I’s offer if firm I makes a wage offer vI of exp(µI + 12σ
2
I ) and no other
firm makes a higher wage offer, where µI and σ2I are as defined in the proof of proposition A.13.1.
Letting strategies and beliefs be as previously described except for this change, it is straightforward
to confirm that the resulting strategies and beliefs constitute a separating equilibrium in which the
two siblings always work for the same firm.
A possible concern with the analysis thus far is that the model does not account for the presence
of specific human capital. In particular, if sibling 2 acquires human capital specific to firm I while
sibling 1 works at firm I , then it would be efficient for sibling 2 to work at firm I as well, because
sibling 2’s total expected output would be greater at firm I than at any other firm. Therefore, it is
unclear if the equilibrium studied earlier would exist when specific human capital is added to the
27In addition, various semi-separating equilibria can be constructed.
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setup. To address this issue, consider a model identical to the one above except that the total output
is K · exp(Σp+qu=p+1r2u) with K > 1 if sibling 2 works at firm I . The result below confirms that
this model has an equilibrium with the same accepted wages as before. The proof of this claim is
simply the first five paragraphs from the proof of proposition A.13.1.
Proposition A.13.2 In the model with specific human capital, there exists a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium such that the following hold:
1. The wage w1 accepted by sibling 1 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σ
p+q
u=p+1r1u)
given s1 and {r1u}pu=1.
2. The wage w2 accepted by sibling 2 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σ
p+q
u=p+1r2u)
given s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1.
Because the strategies and beliefs described in the first three paragraphs from the proof of
proposition A.13.1 are also an equilibrium of the model with specific human capital, it is possible
even in the presence of specific human capital for the two siblings to work for different firms.
Nonetheless, there can also exist an equilibrium in which the two siblings work for the same
firm. For example, consider the separating equilibrium described in the first three paragraphs from
the proof of proposition A.13.1. Suppose that sibling 2 observes s1, s2 and {r1u}p+qu=1, {r2u}pu=1.
Modify sibling 2’s strategy such that sibling 2 always accepts firm I’s offer if firm I makes a wage
offer vI of exp(µI + 12σ
2
I ) and no other firm makes a higher wage offer, where µI and σ
2
I are
as defined in the proof of proposition A.13.1. Modify each firm’s strategy in period 1 such that
each firm’s wage offer to sibling 1 is equal to the conditional expectation of exp(Σp+qu=p+1r1u) +
δ(K − 1) exp(Σp+qu=p+1r2u) given s1 and {r1u}pu=1, where δ denotes the discount factor between
periods. Letting strategies and beliefs be as previously described except for these two changes,
it is straightforward to confirm that the resulting strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium
in which the two siblings always work for the same firm. In addition, the wage accepted by the
older sibling in this equilibrium differs from that given in proposition A.13.2. There can also
exist an equilibrium in which the wage accepted by the younger sibling differs from that given in
proposition A.13.2
The result below shows that if a separating equilibrium is played as in proposition A.13.1, then
the wages of the two siblings have the same basic structure as under the social learning model in
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proposition 1.2.4. That is, if each sibling’s log wage is regressed on both siblings’ schooling and
test scores, then the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s test score to that on one’s own
test score in an older sibling’s log wage is typically lower than the ratio of the coefficient on an
older sibling’s test score to that on one’s own test score in a younger sibling’s log wage. Note that
the properties of each sibling’s test score zi are as described in section 1.2.1.28
Proposition A.13.3 Suppose that a separating equilibrium is played as in proposition A.13.1. Let
νij denote the regression coefficient on sibling j’s test score in the conditional expectation of sibling
i’s log wage given s1, s2 and z1, z2. Then ν12ν22 < ν21ν11.
Proof Using equation (1.12) from the analysis of individual learning in section 1.2.3, the condi-
tional expectation of sibling 1’s log wage log(w1) given s1, s2 and z1, z2 has the form:
E[log(w1)|s1, s2, z1, z2] = qχ1E(a1|s1, s2, z1, z2) +H1(s1), (A.262)
where H1 is some function of s1, and the parameter χ1 is defined by:
χ1 = pσ
−2
η σ
2
g1, σ
2
g1 = (σ
−2
m + pσ
−2
η )
−1, σ2m = V(a1|s1). (A.263)
Hence, the coefficients ν11 and ν12 in the statement of the proposition can be expressed as:
ν11 = qχ1pio and ν12 = qχ1pif , (A.264)
where pio and pif are as defined in equation (1.7). Using equation (1.23) from the analysis of social
learning in section 1.2.4, the conditional expectation of sibling 2’s log wage log(w2) given s1, s2
and z1, z2 has the form:
E[log(w2)|s1, s2, z1, z2]
= q(1− ξ2)ζr2E(a1|s1, s2, z1, z2) + qξ2E(a2|s1, s2, z1, z2) +H2(s1, s2),
(A.265)
where H2 is some function of s1 and s2; ζr2 is equal to (p + q) times the coefficient on r1u in the
28In particular, see equation (1.5) for the specification of zi.
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conditional expectation of a2 given s1, s2, and {r1u}p+qu=1; and the parameter ξ2 is defined by:
ξ2 = pσ
−2
η σ
2
q2, σ
2
q2 = (σ
−2
n2 + pσ
−2
η )
−1, σ2n2 = V(a2|s1, s2, {r1u}p+qu=1). (A.266)
Hence, the coefficients ν21 and ν22 in the statement of the proposition can be expressed as:
ν21 = q(1− ξ2)ζr2pio + qξ2pif and ν22 = q(1− ξ2)ζr2pif + qξ2pio. (A.267)
Note that ζr2 was shown to be positive in the proof of proposition 1.2.4. Now, the statement
ν12ν22 < ν21ν11 is equivalent to:
(qχ1pif ) · [q(1− ξ2)ζr2pif + qξ2pio] < [q(1− ξ2)ζr2pio + qξ2pif ] · (qχ1pio), (A.268)
which reduces to pi2f < pi
2
o . From proposition 1.2.2, we have pi
2
o > pi
2
f , completing the proof.
A.14 Within-Family Estimates of AFQT Impacts
Table A.1 reports family fixed-effects estimates of the impact of the AFQT score on the log
wage. These results can be interpreted as a simple test for the presence of underlying differences
in ability between siblings.29 For example, if there is a perfect correlation in productive ability
ai among siblings, then any within-family differences in the test score zi after controlling for
schooling si should represent test-taking error ωi, given that the test score has the form in equation
(1.5). In this case, assuming that the test-taking error is independent of any variables observable to
employers, within-family differences in test scores should be unrelated to within-family variation
in log wages, although cross-family differences in test scores, which in part reflect heterogeneity in
productive ability, would be associated with cross-family variation in log wages. In a family fixed-
effects log wage regression that controls for schooling, the estimated coefficient on the AFQT
score is 0.1237 with a standard error of 0.0106. This result suggests that within-family variation in
AFQT scores is at least partially attributable to differences in labor market ability between siblings
and is not merely an artifact of test-taking error.
29In addition, Table A.1 tests for birth order effects on the log wage. As in Kessler (1991), I find no significant
evidence of such effects after controlling adequately for age.
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Nonetheless, the family fixed-effects estimates of the schooling coefficient in the third and
fourth columns of Table A.1 may be biased downward because of measurement error in the school-
ing variable, which can also lead to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients on the other regressors
including the AFQT score. In order to account for measurement error in schooling, one can apply
the instrumental-variables procedure in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Bronars and Oettinger
(2006) to the sibling-reported schooling variables in the 1993 sibling roster of the NLSY79. In par-
ticular, I difference the regression variables in the third and fourth columns of Table A.1 between
the two members of each sibling pair in the main estimation sample during 1993 and use one
sibling’s report of the difference in schooling levels between the two members as an instrument
for the other sibling’s report of the schooling difference. The respective two-stage least squares
point estimates (standard errors) for the coefficients on schooling are 0.0798 (0.0107) and 0.0565
(0.0122) before and after controlling for the difference in AFQT scores. In the latter specification,
the point estimate (standard error) for the coefficient on the AFQT score is 0.1200 (0.0254). The
standard errors reported here are adjusted for the correlation in error terms among observations on
the same family.
A.15 Further Job Search Estimates
This appendix presents additional empirical results documenting the job search patterns of
siblings. Table A.2 displays the percentage of respondents in the NLSY79 who report obtaining
their most recent job with the help of a given relative. Of the 52.35 percent of individuals who
received assistance from a personal contact, 38.30 percent report that the personal contact is a
relative. This relative is a parent in 43.64 percent of cases and a sibling in 20.95 percent of cases.
More distant relatives like uncles, aunts, and cousins appear to play a smaller role in helping a
person obtain a job than immediate family members. In addition, the percentage of individuals
who received help from a sibling varies substantially with sibship size, ranging from 1.30 percent
in sibships of size two to 7.20 percent in sibships with at least seven members. Individuals from
large families composed of seven or more siblings are more likely to report assistance from a
sibling than from a parent. Furthermore, in the majority of instances where a personal contact
helped a respondent obtain a job, the contact was initially working for the employer that made a
job offer to the respondent. Specifically, in 70.82 percent of cases involving a relative and in 79.52
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Table A.1: Family Fixed-Effects Estimates of Impact of AFQT and Schooling on Log Wage
Own AFQT 0.1690 0.1237
—— (0.0104) —— (0.0106)
Own Schooling 0.0573 0.0413
—— —— (0.0035) (0.0036)
Birth Order 2 -0.0082 -0.0065 -0.0084 -0.0072
(0.0171) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0159)
Birth Order 3 -0.0324 -0.0195 -0.0203 -0.0142
(0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0221)
Birth Order 4 -0.0469 -0.0296 -0.0205 -0.0152
(0.0303) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0279)
Birth Order 5 -0.0183 -0.0107 -0.0013 -0.0004
(0.0400) (0.0376) (0.0373) (0.0363)
Birth Order 6 0.0034 0.0247 0.0372 0.0433
(0.0485) (0.0446) (0.0447) (0.0431)
Birth Order 7+ 0.0391 0.0366 0.0544 0.0483
(0.0585) (0.0533) (0.0535) (0.0513)
Female -0.1739 -0.1797 -0.2033 -0.1994
(0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0119)
R2 0.5308 0.5492 0.5488 0.5572
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4726 4726 4726 4726
Observations 56552 56552 56552 56552
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for a quartic polynomial in
age and a quartic time trend. The sample used here includes any individual who appears in the main estimation sample in some survey year. Each
individual is included in every year in which she has left school for the first time, has a wage observation on a full-time job, and has non-missing
data on the regressors.
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percent of cases involving a sibling, the personal contact worked for the individual’s most recent
employer.
As a robustness check on the cross-sectional estimates presented in the paper, Table A.3 re-
ports the corresponding family fixed-effects estimates of the influence of birth order on job search
behavior. The upper panel estimates the impact of birth order on an individual’s likelihood of
obtaining her most recent job with the help of a sibling. The point estimate (standard error) for
the coefficient on birth order is 0.0172 (0.0047) when all individuals in the sample are included
and 0.0145 (0.0060) when individuals still in school are excluded. The lower panel estimates the
impact of birth order on an individual’s likelihood of obtaining her most recent job with the help
of a sibling who was working for the employer that offered her the job. The point estimate (stan-
dard error) for the coefficient on birth order is 0.0150 (0.0044) for the entire sample and 0.0114
(0.0056) for those out of school. Estimating a separate coefficient for each birth order up to seven
and higher, the use of a sibling in job search appears to increase monotonically with birth order,
especially in the full sample. Restricting the sample to individuals who have left school for the
first time, later-born children are on average more likely than earlier-born children to obtain a job
through a sibling, although there is little indication of such an effect at the upper and lower tails of
the birth order distribution.
A.16 AFQT Impacts for Youngest and Oldest Siblings
An alternative to performing the empirical analysis on all the sibling pairs in the labor market
would be to focus on the impacts of the youngest and the oldest such siblings from each family,
because these individuals have the largest difference in age between them and so may be most
likely to have disparate effects on the log wage. Therefore, I construct two datasets, the first of
which contains in a given year any person included along with both an older and a younger sibling
in the main estimation sample in that year, and the second of which comprises in each year all
the sibling pairs in the main estimation sample composed of the oldest and the youngest sibling
from a family in the labor market in that year. In Table A.4, the upper panel reports results from
regressing a middle sibling’s log wage on her own AFQT score as well as those of her youngest
and oldest siblings in the labor market, and the lower panel displays estimates from regressions of
an oldest sibling’s log wage on her own and her youngest sibling’s AFQT scores and of a youngest
sibling’s log wage on her own and her oldest sibling’s AFQT scores.
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Table A.2: Probability of Given Relative Helping Respondent Obtain Most Recent Job
Entire Sibship Size
Sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+
Percentage Receiving Help from:
Personal Contact 52.35 49.66 51.67 51.70 53.10 51.77 53.66 53.00
Relative 20.05 12.93 17.66 18.64 20.40 21.20 23.41 21.66
Father 5.28 4.08 7.49 5.77 5.71 4.92 4.39 3.68
Mother 3.47 4.08 3.50 4.33 4.10 3.07 3.66 2.03
Brother 2.08 0.00 0.65 1.29 1.72 2.84 3.17 3.57
Sister 2.12 0.00 0.65 1.34 1.94 2.69 3.05 3.63
Uncle 1.15 1.02 1.14 1.03 1.50 0.84 1.46 1.04
Aunt 0.92 0.34 1.30 0.88 1.00 0.84 1.46 0.55
Cousin 1.39 1.36 1.30 0.82 1.39 1.46 1.46 1.98
Percentage Receiving Help from and
Working for Same Employer as:
Personal Contact 35.06 29.93 35.64 33.83 35.03 35.33 36.71 35.90
Relative 14.20 8.16 12.53 12.20 14.19 15.67 16.83 16.22
Father 3.67 2.72 4.88 3.96 3.88 3.53 3.54 2.64
Mother 2.06 2.38 2.20 2.32 2.49 1.69 2.68 1.21
Brother 1.72 0.00 0.57 1.08 1.55 2.38 1.83 3.08
Sister 1.62 0.00 0.65 0.57 1.61 2.07 2.32 3.02
Uncle 0.85 1.02 0.98 0.72 1.00 0.54 1.34 0.71
Aunt 0.67 0.00 0.90 0.72 0.50 0.77 1.10 0.49
Cousin 1.12 1.02 1.06 0.57 1.11 1.31 1.10 1.65
Note: The tabulations include all 9210 individuals in the NLSY79 with non-missing responses to the relevant questions on job search methods in
the 1982 survey. Respondents were first asked, “Was there anyone specifically who helped you get your job with [employer name]?” If so, this
question was followed by, “Was this person working for [employer name] when you were first offered this job?” Those answering the first question
affirmatively were also asked whether this person was a relative and, if so, what was this person’s relationship to them.
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Table A.3: Family Fixed-Effects Estimates of Relationship of Birth Order to Probability of Sibling
Helping Respondent Obtain Most Recent Job
Receive Help from Sibling
Entire Sample Out of School
Birth Order 0.0172 0.0145
(0.0047) —— (0.0060) ——
Birth Order 2 0.0113 -0.0050
—— (0.0092) —— (0.0136)
Birth Order 3 0.0457 0.0394
—— (0.0150) —— (0.0195)
Birth Order 4 0.0778 0.0528
—— (0.0192) —— (0.0235)
Birth Order 5 0.0807 0.0749
—— (0.0266) —— (0.0371)
Birth Order 6 0.0902 0.0996
—— (0.0331) —— (0.0430)
Birth Order 7+ 0.1207 0.0812
—— (0.0458) —— (0.0552)
R2 0.4299 0.4318 0.4503 0.4528
Families 1621 1621 946 946
Individuals 3716 3716 2090 2090
Receive Help from and Work for
Same Employer as Sibling
Entire Sample Out of School
Birth Order 0.0150 0.0114
(0.0044) —— (0.0056) ——
Birth Order 2 0.0091 -0.0056
—— (0.0088) —— (0.0134)
Birth Order 3 0.0466 0.0425
—— (0.0140) —— (0.0184)
Birth Order 4 0.0755 0.0486
—— (0.0179) —— (0.0218)
Birth Order 5 0.0747 0.0591
—— (0.0248) —— (0.0346)
Birth Order 6 0.0815 0.0844
—— (0.0289) —— (0.0396)
Birth Order 7+ 0.1048 0.0670
—— (0.0429) —— (0.0525)
R2 0.4302 0.4331 0.4440 0.4474
Families 1621 1621 946 946
Individuals 3716 3716 2090 2090
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications include a dummy variable for gender. In the first
pair of columns, the sample comprises all sibships in the NLSY79 containing at least two members who have non-missing responses to the job
search questions in the 1982 survey. In the second pair of columns, the sample is restricted to those sibships in which at least two members have
additionally left school for the first time when surveyed in 1982. Individuals with missing data on birth order are excluded when constructing each
estimation sample.
Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 1 224
Table A.4: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Youngest and Oldest Sibling in Labor Market on
Log Wage
Middle Siblings in Labor Market
Oldest Sibling’s AFQT 0.0617 0.0440 0.0617 0.0467 0.0526 0.0381
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0226) (0.0214) (0.0263) (0.0237)
Youngest Sibling’s AFQT -0.0106 -0.0287 -0.0307 -0.0417 -0.0518 -0.0604
(0.0266) (0.0260) (0.0247) (0.0232) (0.0242) (0.0239)
Own AFQT 0.2229 0.2005 0.1446 0.1262 0.1533 0.1377
(0.0211) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0238) (0.0233) (0.0239)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Siblings’ Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between
sibling AFQT impacts (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0105 0.0114
R2 0.3798 0.4101 0.4139 0.4428 0.4180 0.4462
Families 496 496 496 496 496 496
Individuals 626 626 626 626 626 626
Sibling Trios 828 828 828 828 828 828
Observations 4085 4085 4085 4085 4085 4085
Oldest and Youngest Siblings in Labor Market
Oldest Sibling’s AFQT × Youngest Sibling 0.0333 0.0237 0.0206 0.0194 0.0200 0.0193
(0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0116)
Youngest Sibling’s AFQT × Oldest Sibling 0.0111 -0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0082 -0.0178 -0.0210
(0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Own AFQT × Youngest Sibling 0.1644 0.1475 0.0990 0.0951 0.0991 0.0951
(0.0113) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0120)
Own AFQT × Oldest Sibling 0.2209 0.2012 0.1579 0.1503 0.1615 0.1543
(0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0278 0.0231
R2 0.3241 0.3362 0.3526 0.3595 0.3535 0.3602
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684
Sibling Pairs 6064 6064 6064 6064 6064 6064
Observations 37128 37128 37128 37128 37128 37128
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling trio or pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-
order multivariate polynomial in the ages of the siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship
size, mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the siblings’ birth orders. In the lower panel, the coefficients on
all control variables, except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the
dependent variable for a given pair. In each year, the dataset used in the upper panel consists of those individuals appearing in the main estimation
sample along with both younger and older siblings. The covariates for the youngest and the oldest of these siblings are used in the analysis. In a
given year, the dataset used in the lower panel comprises those sibling pairs in the main estimation sample containing the oldest and the youngest
sibling from a family in the labor market.
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The estimates in Table A.4 largely confirm the findings in Table 1.3. In the upper panel, an
oldest sibling’s AFQT score has a greater estimated impact than a youngest sibling’s AFQT score
on a middle sibling’s log wage. Although the estimated coefficient on an oldest sibling’s AFQT
score is always positive, the coefficient on a youngest sibling’s AFQT score often has a negative
and significant sign, which can be attributed to a positive correlation in testing error among siblings.
Performing the test from proposition A.5.2, the equality of the coefficients on an oldest and a
youngest sibling’s AFQT scores can be safely rejected at the five percent level of significance,
which is inconsistent with individual learning but compatible with social learning. In the lower
panel, an oldest sibling’s AFQT score has a greater estimated impact on a youngest sibling’s log
wage than vice versa, and one’s own AFQT score has a higher coefficient in the log wage of an
oldest sibling than in the log wage of a youngest sibling. Testing the restriction in proposition
1.2.3, the benchmark prediction of the individual learning model can be rejected at the five percent
level of significance on the current subsample. In particular, the ratio of the coefficient on an
oldest sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a youngest sibling’s log wage is
significantly greater than the ratio of the coefficient on a youngest sibling’s AFQT score to that on
one’s own AFQT score in an oldest sibling’s log wage. This result accords with the prediction of
the social learning model in proposition 1.2.4.
I now provide evidence against the claim that the asymmetric impacts of an oldest and a
youngest sibling’s AFQT scores on the log wage are due to interactions among siblings prior to
labor market entry. I assemble two datasets corresponding to the samples in the upper and lower
panels of Table A.4. Using the first of the two datasets, which contains one observation on each
sibling trio in the upper panel of Table A.4, I regress a middle sibling’s AFQT score and schooling
on the AFQT scores of both her youngest and her oldest siblings. The upper panel of Table A.5
displays the results of these regressions. In the first two columns, I find that an oldest sibling’s
AFQT score has an insignificantly weaker relationship than a youngest sibling’s AFQT score to a
middle sibling’s AFQT score. In addition, the estimates in the third through sixth columns indicate
that an oldest sibling’s AFQT score has a significantly smaller impact than a youngest sibling’s
AFQT score on a middle sibling’s schooling. Using the second of the two datasets, which contains
one observation on each sibling pair in the lower panel of Table A.4, I regress a youngest sibling’s
AFQT score and schooling on an oldest sibling’s AFQT score and vice versa. The lower panel of
Table A.5 reports the resulting estimates. A youngest sibling’s AFQT score has a greater impact on
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an oldest sibling’s AFQT score and schooling than vice versa. These differences are statistically
significant in some specifications. Overall, there is little indication that pre-labor market interac-
tions among siblings are driving the results from the log wage regressions, since any asymmetries
in the impacts of siblings’ AFQT scores in Table A.5 have the opposite direction from those in
Table A.4.30
A.17 AFQT Impacts by Number of Siblings
A potential issue with the estimates in Table 1.3 is that the specifications account only for so-
cial interactions between the two members of each sibling pair, even though some families contain
three or more interviewed siblings. As explained in section 1.2.3, this issue would not lead one
to wrongly reject the null hypothesis of individual learning if it is in fact correct. Nonetheless, if
employer learning has a social component, then the models being estimated may be slightly mis-
specified, especially to the extent that some families contain more than two siblings. This appendix,
therefore, examines whether the findings change appreciably after accounting more adequately for
the presence of additional siblings. I implement the empirical strategy outlined in appendix A.4,
which extends the model in sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 to include an arbitrary number of siblings in
each family. First, I classify each pair of siblings in the main estimation sample in a given year into
one of three categories depending on the number of siblings from their family in the labor market
in that year.31 Second, I exclude any observations on the period before all the members of a given
sibship have left school for the first time, because the social learning model properly applies to the
period after all the siblings from a family have entered the labor market. Third, when regressing
a younger sibling’s log wage on one’s own and an older sibling’s AFQT scores and vice versa, I
control for the schooling levels of all the members of one’s sibship.
Table A.6 presents the estimates obtained from this procedure. The log wage regressions are
30Because schooling might exert a causal effect on AFQT scores, appendix A.20 replicates the results in Table A.5
substituting heights for AFQT scores as explanatory variables. Using height as an indicator of cognitive ability, an
oldest sibling’s height is seen to have an insignificantly smaller impact than a youngest sibling’s height on a person’s
AFQT score and schooling.
31Note that these categories are based solely on siblings who are respondents in the NLSY79. Because only those
members of a household between 14 and 22 years of age in 1979 were interviewed, siblings who did not meet this age
restriction are necessarily omitted from the analysis.
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Table A.5: Relationship of Own AFQT and Schooling to AFQT of Youngest and Oldest Sibling
Middle Siblings
AFQT Schooling
Oldest Sibling’s AFQT 0.3023 0.2387 0.4961 0.2550 0.0551 -0.0576
(0.0404) (0.0401) (0.1222) (0.1242) (0.1125) (0.1117)
Youngest Sibling’s AFQT 0.3921 0.3329 1.0187 0.7638 0.4467 0.3278
(0.0454) (0.0470) (0.1193) (0.1169) (0.1054) (0.1100)
Own AFQT 1.4589 1.3095
—— —— —— —— (0.1020) (0.1056)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.2369 0.1917 0.0097 0.0077 0.0260 0.0248
R2 0.5769 0.6252 0.3507 0.4368 0.5012 0.5441
Families 496 496 496 496 496 496
Individuals 626 626 626 626 626 626
Sibling Trios 828 828 828 828 828 828
Oldest and Youngest Siblings
AFQT Schooling
Oldest Sibling’s AFQT × Youngest Sibling 0.5223 0.4069 1.0393 0.6126 0.3196 0.1355
(0.0199) (0.0208) (0.0523) (0.0507) (0.0410) (0.0418)
Youngest Sibling’s AFQT × Oldest Sibling 0.5547 0.4302 1.1726 0.7325 0.4082 0.2280
(0.0190) (0.0207) (0.0507) (0.0501) (0.0389) (0.0404)
Own AFQT 1.3780 1.1725
—— —— —— —— (0.0380) (0.0399)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.0443 0.1333 0.0078 0.0124 0.0391 0.0325
R2 0.4770 0.5249 0.2318 0.3397 0.4083 0.4558
Families 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
Individuals 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684 4684
Sibling Pairs 6064 6064 6064 6064 6064 6064
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling trio or pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable and
fixed effects for each of the siblings’ years of birth. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the siblings’ birth orders. In the lower panel, all specifications include an indicator for whether
the respondent is the older or the younger sibling in a given pair. The dataset used in the upper panel contains the first observation on each sibling
trio in the main estimation sample consisting of a middle sibling along with her youngest and her oldest sibling in the labor market. The dataset
used in the lower panel contains the first observation on every sibling pair in the main estimation sample composed of the oldest and the youngest
sibling from a family in the labor market.
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performed separately for families with two, three, and four siblings in the labor market. As in
Table 1.3, I consistently find that an older sibling’s AFQT score has a higher estimated coefficient
in a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa and that the coefficient on one’s own AFQT score
is larger in an older than in a younger sibling’s log wage. Moreover, the ratio of the coefficient on
an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage
is greater than the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own
AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage, which supports the predictions of the social learning
model in appendix A.4. Although the difference between these two ratios is not statistically sig-
nificant at conventional levels for families with two or four siblings in the labor market, it can be
rejected with substantial confidence for families that contain three such siblings.32 Therefore, I
continue to find significant evidence consistent with social learning after modifying the empirical
strategy to allow for several siblings in each family.
A.18 AFQT Impacts for Siblings at Same Age Level
An advantage of comparing the log wages of siblings at the same age level instead of at the
same point in time is that the coefficient restrictions implied by individual learning can be tested
more directly. To perform this comparison, I construct a sample of sibling pairs in which each
wage observation on an older sibling at a given age is matched with a wage observation on her
younger sibling at that age. In particular, I identify, for a given age level, those individuals in
the NLSY79 who, when interviewed at that age, have left school for the first time, have a wage
observation on a full-time job, and have a non-twin sibling meeting the preceding two criteria at
that age. The sample includes one observation for each age level at which a pair of siblings satisfies
the preceding conditions, where an observation in which the older of two siblings appears first is
distinct from an observation in which the younger of them appears first.33 In brief, the dataset
used here is analogous to the main estimation sample, except that wage observations on older and
32In particular, the two-sided p-values for the hypothesis test are 0.0047 for the third column and 0.0135 for the
fourth column.
33Because the social learning model properly applies to the period after both siblings in a pair have entered the labor
market, I exclude an observation on a pair of siblings at a given age if one sibling has not yet left school for the first
time when the other sibling is surveyed at that age.
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Table A.6: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling on Log Wage by Number
of Siblings in Labor Market
Two Siblings in Three Siblings in Four Siblings in
Labor Market Labor Market Labor Market
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0169 0.0176 0.0293 0.0244 0.0569 0.0417
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0402) (0.0254)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling -0.0126 -0.0171 -0.0393 -0.0380 0.0360 0.0050
(0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0289) (0.0266)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1028 0.1005 0.0874 0.0794 0.0774 0.0480
(0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0329) (0.0309)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1561 0.1502 0.1609 0.1485 0.2030 0.1825
(0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0200) (0.0199) (0.0335) (0.0288)
Own Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Every Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.1097 0.0712 0.0047 0.0135 0.3737 0.1572
Families 1966 1966 521 521 94 94
Individuals 4374 4374 1672 1672 394 394
Sibling Pairs 5088 5088 3588 3588 1248 1248
Observations 28176 28176 17630 17630 5628 5628
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of each individual and all of her siblings in the labor market. Included also are indicators for missing data on a
given variable, a third-order multivariate polynomial in the ages of all the members of a sibship in the labor market, and a quartic time trend. Family
background controls are indicator variables for mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and one’s own and each sibling’s
birth order. The coefficients on all control variables, except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger
sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable for a given pair. In order to calculate the estimates reported here, each pair of siblings in the
main estimation sample in a given year is classified into a group depending on the number of siblings from their family in the labor market in that
year. The analysis is restricted to observations on the period after all siblings from a family have left school for the first time. There are insufficiently
many observations on families with five or more siblings in the labor market to compute estimates for them.
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younger siblings are matched at a given age level instead of in a given survey year.
I regress the log wage of the older sibling in a pair on her own AFQT score and that of the
younger sibling in the pair and the log wage of the younger sibling in a pair on her own AFQT
score and that of the older sibling in the pair. Table A.7 reports the results of these regressions.
The pattern of results in Table A.7 is similar to that in Table 1.3. An older sibling’s AFQT score
has a greater estimated impact on a younger sibling’s log wage than vice versa, and the estimated
coefficient on one’s own AFQT score is larger for an older than for a younger sibling. An older
sibling has a lower estimated coefficient than a younger sibling on her own schooling, and the
estimated coefficient on a younger sibling’s schooling in an older sibling’s log wage is higher
than vice versa. The observed differences between the estimated coefficients on test scores and
schooling levels appear to be inconsistent with a simple model of individual learning, which would
typically predict that these coefficients should be the same for younger and older siblings at similar
age levels, provided that younger and older siblings have symmetric processes of human capital
accumulation, the wage structure stays essentially constant over time, and the speed of employer
learning does not differ between the older and the younger members of a sibship.
Using the estimates in the last two columns to test the predictions of the learning models in
proposition A.2.1, one can individually reject both the hypothesis that the coefficient on an older
sibling’s AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is equal to the coefficient on a younger sib-
ling’s AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage and the hypothesis that the ratio of the coefficient
on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log
wage is equal to the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s
own AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage.34 Thus, the coefficient restrictions implied by in-
dividual learning fail to hold. Consistent with social learning, the coefficient on an older sibling’s
AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly greater than vice versa. Moreover,
the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in
a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly greater than the ratio of the coefficient on a younger
sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage.
34The two-sided p-values for the test of equality between the coefficients on an older and a younger sibling’s AFQT
scores are 0.0064 in the fifth column and 0.0094 in the sixth column. For the test of the hypothesis that the ratio of the
coefficient on a sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score is the same for older and for younger siblings,
the respective p-values are 0.0090 and 0.0120 in the fifth and sixths columns.
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Table A.7: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling in Labor Market on Log
Wage at Same Age Level
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0402 0.0255 0.0317 0.0254 0.0296 0.0245
(0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0116)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0194 0.0070 0.0081 0.0022 -0.0122 -0.0148
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0114) (0.0113)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1707 0.1502 0.1035 0.0965 0.1037 0.0966
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0117)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.2016 0.1829 0.1496 0.1402 0.1551 0.1464
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0120)
Own Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0505 0.0477 0.0500 0.0476
—— —— (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0045)
Own Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0385 0.0364 0.0325 0.0316
—— —— (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0046)
Older Sibling’s Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0016 0.0007
—— —— —— —— (0.0042) (0.0042)
Younger Sibling’s Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0165 0.0153
—— —— —— —— (0.0043) (0.0042)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT impacts (p-value) —— ——- —— —— 0.0064 0.0094
test for equality between own
AFQT impacts (p-value) —— ——- —— —— 0.0017 0.0018
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0090 0.0120
R2 0.3101 0.3244 0.3360 0.3456 0.3376 0.3469
Families 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887
Individuals 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
Sibling Pairs 6630 6630 6630 6630 6630 6630
Observations 36656 36656 36656 36656 36656 36656
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. For a given age level, the dataset comprises those individuals in the NLSY79 who, when interviewed at that age, have left school
for the first time, have non-missing data on their AFQT score and schooling, have a valid wage observation on a full-time job, have non-missing
sibling data including birth order and sibship size, and have a non-twin sibling also meeting these criteria. The sample includes one observation for
every age level at which a pair of siblings satisfies the preceding conditions. An observation on a pair of siblings at a given age level is excluded
from the analysis if one sibling has not yet left school for the first time when the other sibling is interviewed at that age.
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Three further deviations from a simple model of individual learning are evident in the fifth
and sixth columns. First, the coefficient on one’s own AFQT score is significantly greater in an
older than in a younger sibling’s log wage. Second, the impact of an older sibling’s schooling on
a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly lower than vice versa. Third, the coefficient on one’s
own schooling is significantly smaller in an older than in a younger sibling’s log wage.35 Although
the social learning model does not guarantee that these three outcomes will simultaneously arise
for every possible parameter value, there do exist parameter values for which the social learning
model generates all of these features of the data.
One final point should be made in this context. When comparing the AFQT scores of younger
and older siblings in section 1.6.2, I noted that older siblings may have a higher variance in testing
error than younger siblings after conditioning on various background variables. This observation
raised the question of whether differences between younger and older siblings in the distribution
of testing error could explain the relevant patterns in the wage data, even if employer learning were
in fact individual. The analysis in appendix A.10 shows that if the error term in test scores has a
higher variance for an older than for a younger sibling, then assuming that learning is individual,
the coefficient on one’s own test score will be smaller in the log wage of an older compared to a
younger sibling, and the impact of an older sibling’s test score on a younger sibling’s log wage
will be lower than vice versa. However, as can be seen from the estimates in the fifth and sixth
columns of Table A.7, I find significant effects in the opposite direction from those suggested by
this explanation. Therefore, it is unlikely that such differences in the composition of siblings’ test
scores are driving the important asymmetries in the results from the log wage regressions.
A potential issue with the estimates in Table A.7 is that the wage structure may change over
time. In particular, if the rates of return to labor market skills are not constant across survey years,
then some of the asymmetries between younger and older siblings in the coefficients on one’s own
and a sibling’s test scores and schooling might be attributable to differences in the returns to skills
between the times when an older and a younger sibling reach a given age.36 In order to address
35The respective two-sided p-values in the fifth and sixth columns are 0.0017 and 0.0018 for the test of equality
between the coefficients on one’s own AFQT score, 0.0129 and 0.0120 for the test of equality between the coefficients
on a sibling’s schooling, and 0.0060 and 0.0106 for the test of equality between the coefficients on one’s own schooling.
36For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1992) document an increase in educational wage
differentials during the 1980’s. If the returns to skills tend to be rising over time, then a younger sibling’s wage at a
given age might place greater weight on human capital measures than an older sibling’s wage at that age.
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this issue, Table A.8 provides estimates for the six specifications in Table A.7 after additionally
controlling for interactions between the quartic time trend and both one’s own and a sibling’s
AFQT scores. In addition, the third through sixth columns include interaction terms between the
time trend and one’s own schooling, and the fifth and sixth columns also contain interaction terms
between the time trend and a sibling’s schooling.
The pattern of results in Table A.8 is similar to that in Table A.7. Specifically, the point es-
timates suggest that the log wage of an older sibling at a given age exhibits a lower coefficient
on a sibling’s AFQT score, a higher coefficient on one’s own AFQT score, a higher coefficient
on a sibling’s schooling, and a lower coefficient on one’s own schooling than the log wage of a
younger sibling at the same age. Based on the estimates in the fifth and sixth columns, all of these
differences, except for the last finding, are statistically significant at either the one or five percent
level.37 These deviations from the restrictions implied by individual learning can all be generated
for some parameter values by a model with social learning. Finally, consistent with the predictions
of social learning, I find that the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that
on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly greater than the ratio of
the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older
sibling’s log wage.38 Thus, the estimates in Table A.8 suggest that the asymmetries between the
log wages of younger and older siblings in Table A.7 are unlikely to be explained by changes in
the wage structure over time.
Another potential issue with the estimates in Table A.7 is that the employer learning process
might differ between older and younger siblings, making the comparison of log wages at the same
age level somewhat imprecise. For example, suppose that older siblings obtain more schooling on
average than younger siblings. One possibility is that individuals acquire performance signals at
a slower rate while in school than while employed; so that, at a given age, older siblings would
tend to have fewer signals of their own performance than younger siblings. Another possibility
is that individuals obtain ability signals more rapidly while attending school than after entering
37The respective two-sided p-values in the fifth and sixth columns are 0.0170 and 0.0229 for the test of equality
between the coefficients on a sibling’s AFQT score, 0.0003 and 0.0003 for the test of equality between the coefficients
on one’s own AFQT score, 0.0390 and 0.0344 for the test of equality between the coefficients on a sibling’s schooling,
and 0.2057 and 0.3121 for the test of equality between the coefficients on one’s own schooling.
38The two-sided p-values for the test of equality between the ratios of the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to that
on one’s own test score are 0.0137 and 0.0165 for the fifth and sixth columns, respectively.
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Table A.8: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling on Log Wage at Same
Age Level after Controlling for Interactions of AFQT and Schooling with Time Trend
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0459 0.0311 0.0367 0.0302 0.0380 0.0330
(0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0145) (0.0136)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0293 0.0167 0.0162 0.0100 0.0015 -0.0015
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0138) (0.0136)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1721 0.1522 0.1043 0.0975 0.1034 0.0964
(0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.2236 0.2054 0.1596 0.1504 0.1634 0.1548
(0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0144) (0.0138)
Own Schooling × Younger Sibling 0.0483 0.0456 0.0490 0.0468
—— —— (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0049)
Own Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0445 0.0430 0.0408 0.0403
—— —— (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0054)
Older Sibling’s Schooling × Younger Sibling -0.0018 -0.0028
—— —— —— —— (0.0046) (0.0047)
Younger Sibling’s Schooling × Older Sibling 0.0106 0.0095
—— —— —— —— (0.0051) (0.0050)
Own AFQT × Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s AFQT × Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Own Schooling × Time Trend No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling × Time Trend No No No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT impacts (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0170 0.0229
test for equality between own
AFQT impacts (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0003 0.0003
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0137 0.0165
R2 0.3203 0.3339 0.3468 0.3563 0.3482 0.3574
Families 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887
Individuals 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
Sibling Pairs 6630 6630 6630 6630 6630 6630
Observations 36656 36656 36656 36656 36656 36656
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The base year for the time trend is 1993.
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the labor market; so that, at a given age, older siblings would tend to have more signals of their
own productivity than younger siblings.39 As a result, even if employer learning is individual,
some asymmetries between older and younger siblings in the composition of log wages might
persist when comparing siblings at the same age. However, these two possibilities are not very
likely to explain the main patterns observed in Table A.7. In particular, assuming that ability is
a unidimensional factor, proposition 1.2.3 indicates that if learning is individual, then the ratio of
the coefficient on a sibling’s test score to that on one’s own test score should be independent of
the number of performance signals that an individual possesses. By contrast, Table A.7 reveals
significant differences in this ratio between older and younger siblings.
As a further check that differences in the rate of employer learning related to differences in
schooling are not primarily responsible for the asymmetries in Table A.7, I estimate the specifi-
cations in the fifth and sixth columns for three subsamples of the dataset in which both members
of a sibling pair have similar amounts of schooling. These subsamples comprise sibling pairs in
which both members have less than twelve, exactly twelve, and more than twelve years of school-
ing. Table A.9 displays the regression output for each group. The estimated impact of an older
sibling’s AFQT score on a younger sibling’s log wage is greater than vice versa, and the estimated
coefficient on one’s own AFQT score is greater in the log wage of an older compared to a younger
sibling. Furthermore, the observed ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that
on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is greater than the observed ratio of
the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in an older
sibling’s log wage. Although these differences are not statistically significant for every group, the
relevant null hypotheses can usually be rejected at the five percent level of significance for sib-
lings with exactly twelve years of schooling.40 Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the
potential effect of schooling on employer learning is generating the asymmetries in Table A.7.
39In particular, Arcidiacono et al. (2010) argue that college attendance hastens the revelation of productive ability
to the labor market.
40For siblings with exactly twelve years of schooling, the two-sided p-values in the third and fourth columns are
respectively 0.0317 and 0.0453 for the test of equality between the coefficients on a sibling’s AFQT score, 0.0390 and
0.0505 for the test of equality between the coefficients on one’s own AFQT score, and 0.0344 and 0.0518 for the test
of equality between the ratios of the coefficient on a sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score.
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Table A.9: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling on Log Wage at Same
Age Level by Years of Schooling Completed
Less than Equal to More than
Twelve Years Twelve Years Twelve Years
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0367 0.0377 0.0330 0.0302 0.0249 0.0212
(0.0409) (0.0394) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0207)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling -0.0834 -0.0843 -0.0330 -0.0284 -0.0254 -0.0236
(0.0623) (0.0672) (0.0232) (0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0210)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0879 0.0412 0.1099 0.1025 0.1137 0.1039
(0.0627) (0.0611) (0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0223) (0.0215)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1402 0.1558 0.1727 0.1600 0.1532 0.1456
(0.0545) (0.0511) (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0233) (0.0235)
Own Schooling Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT impacts (p-value) 0.1289 0.1382 0.0317 0.0453 0.0887 0.1352
test for equality between own
AFQT impacts (p-value) 0.5552 0.1813 0.0390 0.0505 0.2099 0.1864
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.1867 0.2737 0.0344 0.0518 0.0993 0.1567
Families 261 261 536 536 617 617
Individuals 577 577 1214 1214 1327 1327
Sibling Pairs 730 730 1574 1574 1746 1746
Observations 3248 3248 8232 8232 8726 8726
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. In order to compute the estimates reported here, three groups of sibling pairs were identified depending on whether both siblings
have completed less than twelve, exactly twelve, or more than twelve years of schooling.
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A.19 AFQT Impacts Controlling for Schooling at Time of Test
This appendix examines whether the causal effect of education on test scores is likely to con-
tribute to the disparate impacts of older and younger siblings’ AFQT scores on the log wage. As
explained in appendix A.3, it may be possible to largely account for the influence of schooling on
test scores in Table 1.3 by simply controlling for one’s schooling at the time of AFQT administra-
tion. Table A.10 documents the relationship between one’s AFQT score and both one’s own and a
sibling’s schooling at AFQT administration and when in the labor market. The first two columns
present estimates for the specification analyzed in proposition 1.2.1, in which schooling at test
administration is assumed to be the same as schooling when in the labor market. Not surprisingly,
the coefficient on one’s own schooling is significantly positive, which could be due either to a pos-
itive causal effect of schooling on the AFQT score or to the positive partial correlation between
one’s ability and one’s own schooling. Furthermore, the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is pos-
itive. In the framework in section 1.2.2, this result suggests that the sibling correlation in ability
is greater than that in schooling, especially if schooling itself is measured without error or if the
measurement error in schooling is highly correlated among siblings.41
The third and fourth columns of Table A.10 add one’s own and a sibling’s schooling at AFQT
administration to the list of regressors.42 The pattern of results in the third and fourth columns is
consistent with the assumptions in appendix A.3. First, the coefficients on a person’s schooling at
labor market entry and at AFQT administration are both significantly positive. In the framework
in appendix A.3, the coefficient on one’s own schooling at labor market entry reflects the positive
relationship between ability and schooling, and the coefficient on one’s own schooling at AFQT
administration represents the positive causal effect of schooling on the AFQT score. Second, the
coefficient on a sibling’s schooling at labor market entry is significantly positive, possibly indicat-
ing that ability is more highly correlated among siblings than schooling. Third, the coefficient on
a sibling’s schooling at AFQT administration is statistically insignificant and close to zero. This
finding is consistent with the assumption in appendix A.3 that a sibling’s schooling at AFQT ad-
41In appendix A.22, I examine the issue of measurement error in more detail, presenting evidence that this finding
does not seem to be due simply to error in the schooling reports.
42As in Neal and Johnson (1996), a respondent’s schooling at the time of taking the AFQT is treated as being the
highest grade completed as of May 1980, because the ASVAB was administered to participants in the NLSY79 during
the summer and fall of 1980.
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Table A.10: Relationship of Own and Sibling’s Schooling at Labor Market Entry and at AFQT
Administration to AFQT Score
Sibling’s Schooling at Labor Market Entry 0.0483 0.0262 0.0468 0.0238
(0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0065)
Own Schooling at Labor Market Entry 0.1984 0.1733 0.1684 0.1441
(0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0069) (0.0071)
Sibling’s Schooling at Time of AFQT -0.0009 0.0022
—— —— (0.0105) (0.0099)
Own Schooling at Time of AFQT 0.0867 0.0847
—— —— (0.0133) (0.0127)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
R2 0.5333 0.5598 0.5400 0.5660
Families 1993 1993 1956 1956
Individuals 4726 4726 4631 4631
Sibling Pairs 7074 7074 6904 6904
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable and fixed
effects for each of the two siblings’ years of birth. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The dataset contains the first observation on every sibling pair
appearing in the main estimation sample. For each pair of siblings, schooling at labor market entry is the highest grade completed as of the survey
year in which the pair first appears in the main estimation sample, and schooling at time of AFQT is the highest grade completed as of May 1980,
being that the AFQT was administered during the summer and fall of 1980.
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ministration is unrelated to one’s underlying ability and testing error after controlling for one’s
own and a sibling’s schooling when in the labor market as well as one’s own schooling at AFQT
administration.
Table A.11 presents estimates for the six specifications in Table 1.3 after including both one’s
own and a sibling’s schooling at AFQT administration as regressors. The basic pattern of results
is unchanged. The estimated impact of an older sibling’s AFQT score on a younger sibling’s log
wage is greater than vice versa, and the estimated coefficient on one’s own AFQT score is higher
in the log wage of an older compared to a younger sibling. Each of these differences is statistically
significant at least at the five percent level. Using the estimates in the fifth and sixth columns, the
restriction imposed by the individual learning model in proposition A.3.1 can be safely rejected.43
Consistent with the implications of social learning, the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s
AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage is significantly
greater than the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own
AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage. Hence, the asymmetric impacts of older and younger
siblings’ AFQT scores in Table 1.3 do not appear to be due to the causal effect of schooling on
AFQT scores.
As explained in appendix A.3, an additional test of the restriction that one’s own and a sibling’s
schooling levels at AFQT administration are uninformative about a person’s ability after control-
ling for one’s own and a sibling’s schooling levels when in the labor market can be constructed by
regressing a person’s log wage on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling both at AFQT administra-
tion and when in the labor market. In particular, the coefficients on both one’s own and a sibling’s
schooling at the time of the AFQT should be zero in this regression. Table A.12 reports the re-
sults of such a test. The dataset used here is obtained by restricting the main estimation sample to
the period before either member of each sibling pair acquires more education after initially leav-
ing school. The rationale for excluding observations following a return to school is that if one’s
educational attainment changes after entering the labor market, then one’s schooling at AFQT ad-
ministration might be acting as a proxy for one’s education upon first leaving school, which could
be correlated with one’s ability despite conditioning on one’s current level of schooling.
43The two-sided p-values for this test are 0.0043 and 0.0055 for the fifth and sixth columns, respectively.
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Table A.11: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling in Labor Market on
Log Wage after Controlling for Own and Sibling’s Schooling at Time of AFQT Administration
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0318 0.0204 0.0314 0.0256 0.0286 0.0233
(0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0114)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0012 -0.0096 -0.0031 -0.0096 -0.0180 -0.0218
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0112)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1538 0.1373 0.0960 0.0902 0.0968 0.0910
(0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0117)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1967 0.1822 0.1639 0.1541 0.1671 0.1578
(0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0124)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Own Schooling at Time of AFQT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling at Time of AFQT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0043 0.0055
R2 0.3369 0.3494 0.3590 0.3680 0.3600 0.3688
Families 1956 1956 1956 1956 1956 1956
Individuals 4631 4361 4361 4361 4361 4361
Sibling Pairs 6904 6904 6904 6904 6904 6904
Observations 53462 53462 53462 53462 53462 53462
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The main estimation sample described in the text is used here.
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The first two columns of Table A.12 report the results of regressing one’s log wage on one’s
own and a sibling’s schooling when in the labor market. Similar to the corresponding findings in
Table A.10, where the dependent variable is the AFQT score, the coefficients on one’s own and a
sibling’s schooling when in the labor market are both positive and significant at the one percent
level. As explained in section 1.2.2, the positive coefficient on a sibling’s schooling can possibly
be interpreted as indicating that ability is more highly correlated among siblings than schooling.
The third and fourth columns of Table A.12 add one’s own and a sibling’s schooling at AFQT
administration to the specifications in the first and second columns. As before, the coefficients
on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling when in the labor market are both significantly positive.
Moreover, the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling at the time of the AFQT is close to zero in
magnitude and far from being statistically significant, which is analogous to the results in Table
A.10 when using the AFQT score instead of the log wage as the dependent variable. Finally, unlike
in Table A.10, where one’s own schooling at the time of the AFQT is more likely to have a causal
effect on the dependent variable, the coefficient on one’s own schooling at AFQT administration is
relatively small in size and not significantly different from zero. Overall, the results in Table A.12
are consistent with the assumptions in appendix A.3 about the relationship of one’s ability to one’s
own and a sibling’s schooling at AFQT administration.
For completeness, Table A.13 presents estimates for the six specifications in Table A.11 using
the sample from Table A.12. The basic pattern of results in Table A.13 is the same as that in Table
A.11. The estimated coefficient on one’s own AFQT score is larger for an older than for a younger
sibling, and the estimated impact of an older sibling’s AFQT score on a younger sibling’s log wage
is greater than vice versa. Furthermore, in the fifth and sixth columns, the ratio of the coefficient
on an older sibling’s AFQT score to that on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s log wage
is significantly higher than the ratio of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to that on
one’s own AFQT score in an older sibling’s log wage.44 Thus, I continue to find evidence contrary
to individual learning but consistent with social learning. The causal effect of schooling on AFQT
scores does not seem to play a role in generating the relevant asymmetries in Table 1.3.
44The two-sided p-values for the test of equality between these ratios is 0.0310 for the fifth and 0.0259 for the sixth
column.
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Table A.12: Relationship of Own and Sibling’s Schooling at Labor Market Entry and at AFQT Ad-
ministration to Log Wage after Excluding Observations on Sibling Pairs in Which Either Member
Has Returned to School
Sibling’s Schooling at Labor Market Entry 0.0194 0.0150 0.0185 0.0145
(0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0045)
Own Schooling at Labor Market Entry 0.0729 0.0659 0.0694 0.0638
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0052)
Sibling’s Schooling at Time of AFQT 0.0027 0.0022
—— —— (0.0065) (0.0063)
Own Schooling at Time of AFQT 0.0080 0.0048
—— —— (0.0088) (0.0084)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
R2 0.3066 0.3186 0.3072 0.3193
Families 1454 1454 1430 1430
Individuals 3363 3363 3302 3302
Sibling Pairs 4636 4636 4534 4534
Observations 30276 30276 29686 29686
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. In each survey year, the sample used here contains all observations in the main estimation sample, except for those in which either
member of a sibling pair has completed more years of schooling when interviewed in that year than when leaving school for the first time.
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Table A.13: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling in Labor Market on
Log Wage after Controlling for Schooling at AFQT Administration and Excluding Observations
Following a Return to School
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0377 0.0312 0.0314 0.0313 0.0270 0.0267
(0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0152)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling -0.0027 -0.0081 -0.0067 -0.0083 -0.0200 -0.0195
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0141)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.1402 0.1273 0.0899 0.0850 0.0904 0.0859
(0.0145) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0147)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.1944 0.1746 0.1721 0.1583 0.1741 0.1610
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0158)
Own Schooling No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling No No No No Yes Yes
Own Schooling at Time of AFQT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sibling’s Schooling at Time of AFQT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) —— —— —— —— 0.0310 0.0259
R2 0.3235 0.3375 0.3416 0.3529 0.3429 0.3539
Families 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430
Individuals 3302 3302 3302 3302 3302 3302
Sibling Pairs 4534 4534 4534 4534 4534 4534
Observations 29686 29686 29686 29686 29686 29686
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s log wage is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. In each survey year, the sample used here contains all observations in the main estimation sample, except for those in which either
member of a sibling pair has completed more years of schooling when interviewed in that year than when leaving school for the first time.
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A.20 Sibling Height Impacts
A potential issue with the specifications in Tables 1.5 and A.5 is that the AFQT scores used as
explanatory variables might be endogenously influenced by educational investments. To address
this concern, I reproduce the earlier analysis replacing the AFQT score with height as a measure of
cognitive skills.45 As noted in Case and Paxson (2008), a person’s adult height is partly determined
by nutritional conditions in early childhood and is positively associated with intellectual ability.
Because schooling is unlikely to have a large causal effect on a person’s height, the use of heights
instead of AFQT scores reduces the likelihood that a person’s education would alter the ability
measures used as regressors.
Table A.14, which is an analogue of Table 1.5, reports the results of regressing a younger (resp.
older) sibling’s AFQT score and schooling on her own and her older (resp. younger) sibling’s
heights. In all cases, the coefficient on an older sibling’s height is insignificantly smaller than the
coefficient on a younger sibling’s height.46 Table A.15 replicates the analysis in Table A.5 with
heights instead of AFQT scores as explanatory variables. In the upper panel, where a middle sib-
ling’s AFQT score and schooling are regressed on her own height as well as those of her youngest
and oldest siblings, the coefficient on an oldest sibling’s height is insignificantly lower than the
coefficient on a youngest sibling’s height.47 In the lower panel, where a youngest (resp. oldest)
sibling’s AFQT score and schooling are regressed on her own and her oldest (resp. youngest) sib-
ling’s heights, the coefficient on an oldest sibling’s height is insignificantly less than the coefficient
on a youngest sibling’s height.48 Overall, using height as an ability measure that is unlikely to be
45Information on height is available in the NLSY79 for the following survey years: 1982, 1983, 1985, 2006, and
2008. The most recent height observation on an individual is used for the analysis. Because some respondents may
not have reached their adult height when surveyed, the estimation was also performed excluding respondents whose
height was recorded only before reaching age 20. The findings are similar regardless of whether such individuals are
dropped.
46With and without including family background controls, the respective two-sided p-values for the test of equality
between these coefficients are 0.2196 and 0.2851 when the AFQT score is the dependent variable and 0.3273 and
0.3594 when schooling is the dependent variable.
47With and without including family background controls, the respective two-sided p-values for the test of equality
between these coefficients are 0.5795 and 0.5618 when the AFQT score is the dependent variable and 0.6741 and
0.6317 when schooling is the dependent variable.
48With and without including family background controls, the respective two-sided p-values for the test of equality
between these coefficients are 0.1214 and 0.1219 when the AFQT score is the dependent variable and 0.1519 and
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affected by schooling, I continue to find no evidence that an older sibling has a stronger impact
than a younger sibling on pre-labor market indicators of skills.49
A.21 AFQT Impacts on Joint Work-Wage Outcomes
As noted in section 1.5, a potential issue with the selection criteria used to generate the main
estimation sample is that the analysis is restricted to sibling pairs in which both members have
worked since the last interview. However, selection into employment is unlikely to be entirely
exogenous. Therefore, this appendix reports the impacts of one’s own and a sibling’s AFQT scores
on the probability of having worked since the last interview as well as the joint probability of having
worked and earned a wage above a given level.50 To perform this extension, the main estimation
sample is expanded to include observations on sibling pairs in which one or both members may
not have valid wage data on a full-time job. Using information on the number of weeks worked
since the previous interview, I generate an indicator equal to one if the respondent worked since
last being surveyed and equal to zero otherwise.51 In addition, I generate two additional indicators
of joint work-wage outcomes, the first equal to one if the respondent worked at an hourly wage
of at least $5.00 in 1982-1984 terms and equal to zero otherwise, the second equal to one if the
respondent worked at an hourly wage of at least $10.00 in 1982-1984 terms and equal to zero
otherwise.52 These indicator variables are then regressed on one’s own and a sibling’s AFQT
scores and schooling as in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1.3, controlling for the siblings’
0.1300 when schooling is the dependent variable.
49In addition, the estimates in Table 1.7 were reproduced using height instead of schooling as an explanatory vari-
able. Consistent with one’s own and a sibling’s heights being easily observable to employers, there is no significant
evidence of a difference between the impacts of one’s own and an older sibling’s heights on a younger sibling’s log
wage and the impacts of one’s own and a younger sibling’s heights on an older sibling’s log wage.
50Other methods of accounting for the employment decision include the use of a median regression or a selection
correction. However, such procedures are difficult to justify in the current setting because they usually rely on an
assumption about the wage offers of nonparticipants relative to participants or the existence of a variable affecting
participation but not wage offers.
51An observation on a sibling pair is excluded if one or both members are missing information on the number of
weeks worked or have a positive number of weeks unaccounted for in the work history data.
52An observation on a sibling pair is eliminated from the sample if one or both members worked since the previous
interview but lack valid wage information.
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Table A.14: Relationship of Own AFQT and Schooling to Height of Younger or Older Sibling
AFQT Schooling
Older Sibling’s Height × Younger Sibling 0.0150 0.0030 0.0424 0.0094
(0.0050) (0.0044) (0.0140) (0.0129)
Younger Sibling’s Height × Older Sibling 0.0203 0.0084 0.0549 0.0214
(0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0139) (0.0123)
Own Height 0.0281 0.0142 0.0772 0.0386
(0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0129) (0.0119)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.2851 0.2196 0.3594 0.3273
R2 0.2749 0.4254 0.0852 0.2903
Families 1990 1990 1990 1990
Individuals 4720 4720 4720 4720
Sibling Pairs 7068 7068 7068 7068
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable and fixed
effects for each of the two siblings’ years of birth. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. All specifications include an indicator for whether the respondent
is the older or the younger sibling in a given pair. The dataset used here contains the first observation on every sibling pair in the main estimation
sample for which both members have information on height.
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Table A.15: Relationship of Own AFQT and Schooling to Height of Youngest and Oldest Sibling
Middle Siblings
AFQT Schooling
Oldest Sibling’s Height 0.0006 -0.0021 0.0081 -0.0051
(0.0137) (0.0124) (0.0385) (0.0364)
Youngest Sibling’s Height 0.0118 0.0071 0.0355 0.0173
(0.0113) (0.0097) (0.0344) (0.0303)
Own Height 0.0239 0.0086 0.0572 0.0197
(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0350) (0.0336)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.5618 0.5795 0.6317 0.6741
R2 0.3510 0.5159 0.1723 0.3758
Families 496 496 496 496
Individuals 626 626 626 626
Sibling Trios 828 828 828 828
Oldest and Youngest Siblings
AFQT Schooling
Oldest Sibling’s Height × Youngest Sibling 0.0121 0.0009 0.0325 0.0015
(0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0146) (0.0136)
Youngest Sibling’s Height × Oldest Sibling 0.0203 0.0083 0.0549 0.0207
(0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0146) (0.0128)
Own Height 0.0277 0.0146 0.0770 0.0399
(0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0131) (0.0120)
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes
test for equality between sibling
AFQT coefficients (p-value) 0.1219 0.1214 0.1300 0.1519
R2 0.2754 0.4246 0.0873 0.2953
Families 1990 1990 1990 1990
Individuals 4678 4678 4678 4678
Sibling Pairs 6058 6058 6058 6058
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling trio or pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable and
fixed effects for each of the siblings’ years of birth. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size, mother’s education, father’s
education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the siblings’ birth orders. In the lower panel, all specifications include an indicator for whether
the respondent is the older or the younger sibling in a given pair. The dataset used in the upper panel contains the first observation on each sibling
trio in the main estimation sample consisting of a middle sibling along with her youngest and her oldest sibling in the labor market, provided that
all members of the sibling trio have information on height. The dataset used in the lower panel contains the first observation on every sibling pair in
the main estimation sample composed of the oldest and the youngest sibling from a family in the labor market, provided that both members of the
sibling pair have information on height.
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demographic characteristics and computing separate estimates for younger and older siblings.
The results of this procedure are documented in Table A.16. The upper panel includes obser-
vations on sibling pairs in which one or both members may not yet have left school, and the lower
panel is limited to observations on sibling pairs in which both members have left school for the
first time.53 In all cases, an older sibling’s AFQT score has a greater estimated impact on a younger
sibling’s outcome than a younger sibling’s AFQT score has on an older sibling’s outcome, and the
estimated impact of one’s own AFQT score on one’s own outcome is larger for an older than for a
younger sibling. Testing whether the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to the
coefficient on one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s outcome equation is equal to the ratio
of the coefficient on a younger sibling’s AFQT score to the coefficient on one’s own AFQT score
in an older sibling’s outcome equation, the restriction can be rejected when the dependent variable
is an indicator for having worked at a wage of at least $5.00.54 When the dependent variable is an
indicator for having worked since the last interview or an indicator for having worked at a wage of
at least $10.00, the ratio of the coefficient on an older sibling’s AFQT score to the coefficient on
one’s own AFQT score in a younger sibling’s outcome equation is higher than vice versa, although
this difference is not statistically significant at the five percent level. In sum, after modifying the
estimation procedure to account for non-working individuals, I continue to find some evidence that
an older sibling has a bigger impact on a younger sibling’s labor market outcomes than vice versa.
A.22 Instrumental-Variables Estimates of Schooling Coefficients
This appendix provides instrumental-variables estimates for the relationship of one’s own and
a sibling’s schooling to one’s test score and log wage. In Tables A.10 and A.12, I found that the
coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is significantly positive in the regression of one’s test score or
log wage on both one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. As explained in section 1.2.2, this finding
may indicate that the sibling correlation in ability is greater than that in schooling. However,
53In the upper panel, the percentages of observations on respondents working since the last interview, working for
a wage of at least $5.00, and working for a wage of at least $10.00 are respectively 81.82, 49.53, and 14.71. In the
lower panel, these percentages are 84.00, 53.97, and 16.63, respectively.
54With and without including family background controls, the respective two-sided p-values for this test are 0.0476
and 0.0438 in the upper panel and 0.0384 and 0.0362 in the lower panel.
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Table A.16: Impact of Own AFQT and AFQT of Younger or Older Sibling on Joint Work-Wage
Outcomes
Entire Sample
Worked Wage ≥ $5 Also Wage ≥ $10 Also
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0103 0.0121 0.0148 0.0157 0.0110 0.0082
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0055)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0094 0.0102 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0023 -0.0043
(0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0058)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0260 0.0279 0.0615 0.0624 0.0393 0.0366
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0056) (0.0057)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0356 0.0350 0.0993 0.0982 0.0653 0.0626
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.6546 0.6194 0.0438 0.0476 0.0753 0.1061
R2 0.1725 0.1836 0.2558 0.2632 0.2049 0.2090
Families 2181 2181 2181 2181 2181 2181
Individuals 5195 5195 5195 5195 5195 5195
Sibling Pairs 8032 8032 8032 8032 8032 8032
Observations 123388 123388 123388 123388 123388 123388
Out of School
Worked Wage ≥ $5 Also Wage ≥ $10 Also
Older Sibling’s AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0146 0.0167 0.0197 0.0202 0.0150 0.0114
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0067) (0.0065)
Younger Sibling’s AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0060 0.0072 -0.0018 -0.0008 0.0037 0.0006
(0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0071) (0.0070)
Own AFQT × Younger Sibling 0.0285 0.0306 0.0794 0.0798 0.0544 0.0506
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Own AFQT × Older Sibling 0.0374 0.0374 0.1134 0.1120 0.0780 0.0745
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0082)
Own and Sibling’s Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Background Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
test for equality of ratios of own AFQT
impact to sibling AFQT impact (p-value) 0.2301 0.2142 0.0362 0.0384 0.1541 0.1878
R2 0.1210 0.1342 0.2303 0.2388 0.2019 0.2165
Families 2161 2161 2161 2161 2161 2161
Individuals 5149 5149 5149 5149 5149 5149
Sibling Pairs 7948 7948 7948 7948 7948 7948
Observations 104602 104602 104602 104602 104602 104602
Note: Huber-White standard errors, clustered at the family level, are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for the race, gender, region
of residence, and urban location of the members of each sibling pair. Included also are indicators for missing data on a given variable, a third-order
bivariate polynomial in the ages of the two siblings, and a quartic time trend. Family background controls are indicator variables for sibship size,
mother’s education, father’s education, mother’s age, father’s age, and each of the two siblings’ birth orders. The coefficients on all control variables,
except for the time trend, are estimated separately based on whether the older or the younger sibling’s outcome is used as the dependent variable
for a given pair. The datasets used here are constructed as follows. First, the main estimation sample is expanded to include observations on sibling
pairs in which one or both members may not have valid wage data on a full-time job. Second, the resulting sample is restricted to observations on
sibling pairs in which both members have non-missing data on the number of weeks worked since the last interview. An observation on a sibling
pair is excluded from the analysis if one or both members worked since the last interview but do not have valid wage data. In the upper panel, the
sample contains observations on sibling pairs in which one or both members may not yet have left school. In the lower panel, the sample includes
only observations on sibling pairs in which both members have left school for the first time. In the first pair of columns, the dependent variable
is an indicator equal to one if the respondent worked since the last interview and equal to zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the second
(third) pair of columns is an indicator equal to one if the respondent worked since the last interview at an hourly wage of at least $5.00 ($10.00) in
1982-1984 terms and equal to zero otherwise.
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the presence of measurement error in the schooling variable complicates the interpretation of the
result. In this appendix, I attempt to correct for measurement error by using a variant of the
instrumental-variables procedure in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Bronars and Oettinger
(2006). Specifically, respondents in the NLSY79 were asked to report the highest grade completed
by each of their siblings when interviewed in 1993, making it possible to use one sibling’s reports
of both siblings’ schooling as an instrument for the other sibling’s reports of these variables in that
year.
In the current context, a potential issue with the instrumental-variables procedure is that one
sibling’s reports of both siblings’ schooling will not be a valid instrument for the other sibling’s
reports of these variables if the measurement error in schooling is correlated between siblings.
Nonetheless, there are two arguments for proceeding with the instrumental-variables strategy. First,
the two-stage least squares estimator is valid if there is no correlation in measurement error between
siblings. As shown in appendix A.9, this is precisely the case in which the interpretation of the
positive coefficient on a sibling’s schooling as indicating a greater sibling correlation in ability
than in schooling is most likely to be incorrect when schooling is measured with a certain amount
of classical error. Hence, the instrumental-variables procedure should be relatively accurate in
this most critical case. Second, appendix A.11 examines the two-stage least squares regression
of one’s test score or log wage on both one’s own and a sibling’s schooling in which a sibling’s
reports of the latter two variables are used as instruments for one’s own reports of these variables,
even though there is a positive correlation between the errors in the reports of the two siblings.
Under reasonable assumptions, I show that the parameter on a sibling’s schooling identified by
this regression is less than the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling in the conditional expectation
of one’s test score or log wage given one’s own and a sibling’s true schooling. Therefore, if one
continues to observe that the coefficient on a sibling’s schooling is significantly positive when
using the instrumental-variables estimator, then this finding can likely be regarded as evidence of
a higher sibling correlation in ability than in schooling.
The instrumental-variables procedure is implemented as follows. First, I construct a dataset
containing all sibling pairs belonging to the sample from Table A.11 in 1993 for which both mem-
bers have non-missing data on sibling-reported schooling. This dataset consists of 2740 sibling
pairs from 902 families. Second, I perform a two-stage least squares regression of the first sib-
ling’s test score on both her own and the second sibling’s schooling, where the second sibling’s
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reports of her own and the first sibling’s schooling are used as instruments for the first sibling’s
reports of her own and the second sibling’s schooling. The estimated specification controls for both
one’s own and a sibling’s race, gender, region of residence, urban location, birth order, sibship size,
and birth year. The Huber-White estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with clustering at the
family level is used to account for the correlation in the error terms among individuals belonging
to the same sibship.
In the first-stage regression of the first sibling’s reports of her own and the second sibling’s
schooling on the second sibling’s reports of her own and the first sibling’s schooling as well as the
other control variables, the point estimate (standard error) is 0.0541 (0.0144) for the coefficient
on the second sibling’s report of her own schooling and 0.9085 (0.0179) for the coefficient on
the second sibling’s report of the first sibling’s schooling when the dependent variable is the first
sibling’s report of her own schooling, and the point estimate (standard error) is 0.7506 (0.0152)
for the coefficient on the second sibling’s report of her own schooling and 0.0930 (0.0156) for
the coefficient on the second sibling’s report of the first sibling’s schooling when the dependent
variable is the first sibling’s report of the second sibling’s schooling. The R-squared value is
0.7757 for the former and 0.7803 for the latter regression. The corresponding two-stage least
squares estimates (standard errors) for the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling are
respectively 0.2127 (0.0098) and 0.0338 (0.0104) when the dependent variable is the AFQT score.
Hence, I continue to observe a significantly positive coefficient on a sibling’s schooling when
regressing one’s AFQT score on both one’s own and a sibling’s schooling. Using the AFQT score
as an ability measure, the earlier finding in Table A.10 of a higher sibling correlation in ability than
in schooling is not likely to be attributable merely to measurement error in the schooling variable.
I also report the results of the instrumental-variables procedure when the dependent variable is
the log wage instead of the AFQT score. The dataset used here includes any sibling pair belonging
to the sample in Table A.13 during the 1993 survey year, provided that both members of the pair
have non-missing data on sibling-reported schooling. On this dataset composed of 1448 sibling
pairs from 522 families, I run a two-stage least squares regression of the first sibling’s log wage
on both her own and the second sibling’s schooling, where the second sibling’s reports of the
two siblings’ schooling are used as instruments for the first sibling’s reports of the two siblings’
schooling. In addition, I control for both one’s own and a sibling’s race, gender, region of residence,
urban location, birth order, and sibship size as well as a third-order bivariate polynomial in the ages
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of the siblings in each pair. As before, the standard errors are clustered at the family level.
In the first-stage regression of the first sibling’s reports of the two siblings’ schooling on the
second sibling’s reports of the two siblings’ schooling along with the other control variables, the
point estimate (standard error) is 0.0507 (0.0230) for the coefficient on the second sibling’s report
of her own schooling and 0.8942 (0.0253) for the coefficient on the second sibling’s report of the
first sibling’s schooling when the dependent variable is the first sibling’s report of her own school-
ing, and the point estimate (standard error) is 0.7636 (0.0215) for the coefficient on the second
sibling’s report of her own schooling and 0.0926 (0.0186) for the coefficient on the second sib-
ling’s report of the first sibling’s schooling when the dependent variable is the first sibling’s report
of the second sibling’s schooling. The R-squared value is 0.7744 for the former and 0.7798 for the
latter regression. Using the log wage as the dependent variable, the two-stage least squares esti-
mates (standard errors) for the coefficients on one’s own and a sibling’s schooling are respectively
0.0888 (0.0099) and 0.0188 (0.0094). As in Table A.12, the significantly positive coefficient on a
sibling’s schooling suggests that the sibling correlation in ability is higher than that in schooling.
Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Proof Because transaction costs are paid only a countable number of times, s12t and s21t are step
functions in time, which we define to be continuous from the right. Letting t(k − 1;pi) = 0 if
k = 1, we have for j 6= i:∫ ∞
d
e−ρ·(t−d)sijt dt −
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]Ct(k;pi)
=
∫ ∞
d
e−ρ·(t−d)sijt(k−1;pi)dt+
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
∫ ∞
t(k;pi)
e−ρ·(τ−d)(sijt(k;pi) − sijt(k−1;pi))dτ
−
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]Ct(k;pi)
= sijt(k−1;pi) · −
1
ρ
e−ρ·(τ−d)
∣∣∣∣∞
d
+
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
(sijt(k;pi) − sijt(k−1;pi)) · −
1
ρ
e−ρ·(τ−d)
∣∣∣∣∞
t(k;pi)
−
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]Ct(k;pi)
=
1
ρ
sijt(k−1;pi) +
1
ρ
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
(sijt(k;pi) − sijt(k−1;pi))e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]
− 1
ρ
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]ρCt(k;pi)
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=
1
ρ
(
sijt(k−1;pi) +
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]xjt(k;pi) −
∑
{k: t(k;pi)≥d}
e−ρ·[t(k;pi)−d]ct(k;pi)
)
,
where we set ct(k;pi) = ρCt(k;pi).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
Proof We prove by induction that no strategies in which some agent i makes a positive transfer xit
at some history ht can be played in any SPE.
Consider any history ht where sˆiit ∈ [0, q] is the amount of agent i’s good remaining up to but
not including time t. If sˆ11t < c, then no strategy where agent 2 makes a positive transfer at history
ht can be played in any SPE, because such a strategy would give agent 2 an expected discounted
payoff no greater than sˆ11t − c < 0, whereas agent 2 could obtain an expected discounted payoff
of at least zero by making no transfers after history ht. Because no strategy where agent 2 makes
a positive transfer at some history ht with sˆ11t < c can be played in any SPE, agent 1 would obtain
an expected discounted payoff no greater than −c < 0 by making a positive transfer at a history
ht with sˆ11t < c but would obtain an expected discounted payoff of zero by making no transfers
after such a history. Thus, no strategy where agent 1 makes a positive transfer at some history ht
in which sˆ11t < c can be played in any SPE. A symmetric argument shows that no strategy where
agent 1 or 2 makes a positive transfer at some history ht in which sˆ22t < c can be played in any
SPE.
Suppose now that for some integer n ≥ 1, no strategies where agent 1 or 2 makes a positive
transfer at some history ht in which sˆ11t < nc or sˆ
22
t < nc can be played in any SPE. Given this
assumption, we show that no strategies where agent 1 or 2 makes a positive transfer at some history
ht in which nc ≤ sˆ11t < (n + 1)c or nc ≤ sˆ22t < (n + 1)c can be played in any SPE. Consider in
particular a history ht in which nc ≤ sˆ11t < (n+1)c. If agent 1 is using a strategy that can be played
in an SPE, then the greatest amount of the good that agent 1 can transfer at history ht is sˆ11t − nc,
because if agent 1 made a transfer greater than sˆ11t − nc at history ht, then the remaining amount
sˆ11τ of agent 1’s good for τ > t would be such that agent 2 makes no further transfers, implying
that agent 1 could obtain a higher expected discounted payoff by instead making no transfers after
history ht. Thus, if agent 1 is using a strategy that can be played in an SPE and history ht is
reached, then it must be that sˆ11τ ≥ nc for every history hτ with τ > t; so that, the total amount
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transferred by agent 1 after history ht is at most sˆ11t − nc < c.
It follows that no strategy in which agent 2 makes a positive transfer after history ht can be
played in any SPE, because making a positive transfer would give agent 2 an expected discounted
payoff no greater than sˆ11t − nc − c < 0, whereas agent 2 could obtain an expected discounted
payoff of at least zero by making no transfers after history ht. Thus, no strategy where agent 1
makes a transfer at history ht can be played in any SPE, because agent 1 would obtain an expected
discounted payoff no greater than −c < 0 by making a transfer at history ht but would obtain an
expected discounted payoff of zero by making no transfers after history ht. Thus, no strategies
where agent 1 or 2 makes a transfer at some history ht in which nc ≤ sˆ11t < (n+1)c can be played
in any SPE. A symmetric argument holds for any history ht in which nc ≤ sˆ22t < (n + 1)c. This
completes the induction.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
Proof Fix any SPE pi = (pi1, pi2). We construct an SPE that induces the same equilibrium path
of play using grim-trigger strategies. Given any history ht, let ui(ht, pi) denote the expected dis-
counted payoff to agent i when both agents follow the strategy profile pi from time t onwards, and
let vi(ht, pi) denote the supremum of the expected discounted payoffs to agent i from any set of
deviations when pi−i is fixed.1 Because pi is an SPE, it must be that ui(ht, pi) ≥ vi(ht, pi).
Now consider the grim-trigger strategy profile pi′ = (pi′1, pi
′
2) such that pi
′(ht) = pi(ht) for any
history ht on the equilibrium path induced by pi and such that pi′(ht) = 0 for any history ht not on
the equilibrium path induced by pi.2 We show that pi′ is an SPE strategy profile.3
Suppose that the history ht is on the equilibrium path induced by pi. If pi′i(ht) = 0, then the
expected discounted payoff to agent i from a one-shot deviation at history ht must be negative.
However, the expected discounted payoff to agent i when both agents follow the strategy profile
pi′ from history ht onwards must be nonnegative, because pi′(ht) = pi(ht) for any history ht on the
1Note that the index −i is used to denote the agent other than i.
2Recall that pii(ht) is the amount that agent i transfers at time t conditional on history ht when using strategy pii.
3When confirming that the grim-trigger strategy profile pi′ is an SPE, it is sufficient to consider only one-shot
deviations from pi′.
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equilibrium path induced by pi, where pi is an SPE. Hence, if pi′i(ht) = 0, then agent i does not have
an incentive to make a one-shot deviation at history ht.
Assume instead that pi′i(ht) > 0. By definition, if agent −i is using strategy pi′−i, then the
expected discounted payoff to agent i from following pi′i from history ht onwards is ui(ht, pi); so
that, ui(ht, pi′) = ui(ht, pi). In addition, if agent −i is using strategy pi′−i, then a one-shot deviation
at history ht gives agent i an expected discounted payoff of at most pi′−i(ht), because agent −i
makes no transfers at any history not on the equilibrium path induced by pi. Furthermore, agent
i can ensure that she receives an expected discounted payoff of pi′−i(ht) by transferring nothing
from time t onward. Hence, v˜i(ht, pi′) = pi′−i(ht), where v˜i(ht, pi
′) is the supremum of the expected
discounted payoffs to agent i at history ht from any one-shot deviation when pi′−i is fixed.
Now note that vi(ht, pi) ≥ pi−i(ht) = pi′−i(ht) because if agent −i is using strategy pi−i, then
agent i can always obtain at history ht an expected discounted payoff of at least pi−i(ht) by trans-
ferring nothing from time t onward. Thus, we have ui(ht, pi′) = ui(ht, pi) ≥ vi(ht, pi) ≥ pi′−i(ht) =
v˜i(ht, pi
′) for any history ht on the equilibrium path induced by pi such that pi′i(ht) > 0. Moreover,
for any history ht not on the equilibrium path induced by pi, we have ui(ht, pi′) ≥ vi(ht, pi′) because
ui(ht, pi
′) = 0 = vi(ht, pi′). Hence, the strategy profile pi′ constitutes an SPE. Since pi′ is defined
so as to agree with pi on the equilibrium path, this completes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Corollaries to Theorem 3.4.4
B.4.1 Proof of Corollary 3.5.4
Proof The sign of ∂x∗k/∂β can be determined as follows:
sgn
[
∂x∗k
∂β
]
= sgn
[
∂
(
q
1− β
(
β
β − 1
)k−1)/
∂β
]
= sgn
[−(k − 1)(β)k−2(β − 1)k + k(β)k−1(β − 1)k−1]
= sgn
[
[−(k − 1)(β − 1) + kβ](β)k−2(β − 1)k−1]
= sgn [(k − 1)(β − 1)− kβ] = sgn [1− k − β] .
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Thus, ∂x∗k/∂β is negative if k−1 > |β| and positive if k−1 < |β|. In addition, we have ∂β/∂µ < 0
and ∂β/∂(σ2) > 0. Combining these facts, we obtain the desired result.
B.4.2 Proof of Corollary 3.5.5
Proof The sign of ∂c∗k/∂β can be determined as follows:
sgn
[
∂c∗k
∂β
]
= sgn
[
∂ ln (c∗k)
∂β
]
= sgn
[
∂{ln (q)− ln (1− β) + (k − β) [ln (−β)− ln (1− β)]}
∂β
]
= sgn
[
1
1− β + (k − β)
(
− 1
β
+
1
1− β
)
− [ln (−β)− ln (1− β)]
]
= sgn
[
1
1− β + (k − β)
(
1
−β +
1
1− β
)
+ [ln (1− β)− ln (−β)]
]
.
Thus, ∂c∗k/∂β is positive. In addition, we have ∂β/∂µ < 0 and ∂β/∂(σ
2) > 0. Combining these
facts, we obtain the desired result.
B.5 Proofs of Theorem 3.6.1 and Corollary 3.6.2
B.5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.6.1
Proof We begin by computing the solution to the second-best problem. From the proof of The-
orem 3.4.4, the value function V sb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] of each agent for the second-best problem is as
follows:
V sb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] =
f [β(ρ)]sii0
{h[sii0 ; β(ρ)]}β(ρ)
(c0)
β(ρ),
where f [β(ρ)] and h[sii0 ; β(ρ)] are defined as follows:
f [β(ρ)] =
1
1− β(ρ) and h[s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] =
sii0
1− β(ρ)
( −β(ρ)
1− β(ρ)
)1−β(ρ)
,
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and β(ρ) < 0 is given by:
β(ρ) = 1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2 ρ
σ2
.
The notation here differs from that used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.4 in that β appears as an
argument in the value function. In addition, β(ρ) is used to denote the value of β given the discount
rate ρ.
Substituting for f [β(ρ)] and h[sii0 ; β(ρ)] in the expression for V
sb[sii0 , c0; β(ρ)] results in:
V sb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] = {a[β(ρ)]}1−β(ρ)(sii0 )1−β(ρ)(c0)β(ρ),
where the constant a[β(ρ)] ∈ (0, 1) is given by:
a[β(ρ)] = [−β(ρ)]−β(ρ)[1− β(ρ)]−[1−β(ρ)].
We next compute the solution to the first-best problem. In the absence of incentive constraints,
the optimal policy requires the agents to make at most one transfer. Given that the agents use
a stationary threshold policy, the value function V fb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] of each agent for the first-best
problem can be obtained by choosing cˆ ∈ (0, sii0 ) so as to maximize the value W fb[c0, sii0 , cˆ; β(ρ)]
of an asset that pays sii0 − cˆ when the cost first reaches cˆ starting from c0. From the earlier analysis,
the value of such an asset is:
W fb[c0, s
ii
0 , cˆ; β(ρ)] = (s
ii
0 − cˆ)(cˆ/c0)−β(ρ).
Differentiating with respect to cˆ yields the following first-order condition for cˆ∗:
−β(ρ)(sii0 − cˆ∗)c−10 (cˆ∗/c0)−β(ρ)−1 − (cˆ∗/c0)−β(ρ) = 0 ⇒ cˆ∗ = −β(ρ)[1− β(ρ)]−1sii0 ,
where the derivative is positive for cˆ < cˆ∗ and negative for cˆ > cˆ∗. Thus, the value function for the
first-best problem is:
V fb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] = a[β(ρ)](s
ii
0 )
1−β(ρ)(c0)β(ρ).
We now show that V sb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] converges to V
fb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] as ρ approaches zero from
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the right if and only if the condition µ ≤ σ2/2 is satisfied. The limiting value of β(ρ) is as follows:
lim
ρ→0+
β(ρ) =
0, if µ ≤ σ2/21− 2µ/σ2, if µ > σ2/2 .
Note that limz→0− a(z) = limz→0−(−z)−z · limz→0−(1 − z)−(1−z), where limz→0−(1 − z)−(1−z)
is clearly equal to one, and limz→0−(−z)−z is easily shown to be one by taking the logarithm and
applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule. Thus, the limiting value of a[β(ρ)] is given by:
lim
ρ→0+
a[β(ρ)] =
1, if µ ≤ σ2/2a(1− 2µ/σ2), if µ > σ2/2 .
It follows that:
lim
ρ→0+
V sb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] =
sii0 , if µ ≤ σ2/2[a(1− 2µ/σ2)]2µ/σ2(sii0 )2µ/σ2(c0)1−2µ/σ2 , if µ > σ2/2 ,
lim
ρ→0+
V fb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] =
sii0 , if µ ≤ σ2/2a(1− 2µ/σ2)(sii0 )2µ/σ2(c0)1−2µ/σ2 , if µ > σ2/2 .
Note that if µ > σ2/2, then:
[a(1− 2µ/σ2)]2µ/σ2 < a(1− 2µ/σ2);
so that, V sb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] does not converge to V
fb[c0, s
ii
0 ; β(ρ)] in this case.
B.5.2 Proof of Corollary 3.6.2
Proof Let γ = µ/σ2. Then the ratio of V sb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] to V fb[c0, sii0 ; β(ρ)] is given by:
[a(1− 2γ)]−(1−2γ).
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Recall that a(β) = (−β)−β(1− β)−(1−β). Taking the logarithm of both sides, we obtain:
ln[a(β)] = −β ln(−β)− (1− β) ln(−β).
Differentiating with respect to β, we have:
∂ ln[a(β)]
∂β
= − ln(−β)− 1 + ln(−β)− (1− β)
β
= − 1
β
> 0.
Hence, a(β) is increasing in β. Consequently, both (1 − 2γ) and a(1 − 2γ) are decreasing in γ.
Because a(β) ∈ (0, 1) and (1 − 2γ) < 0, the ratio is decreasing in γ. Since γ is increasing in µ
and decreasing in σ2, this completes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 3.7.1
Proof A symmetric SPE with a positive expected discounted payoff at each point along the path
of play can be constructed as follows for the model with stochastic supplies of goods. Consider a
symmetric strategy profile pi such that each agent transfers a fraction f˜ ∈ (0, 1) of the remaining
stock of each good if the stock is currently z˜ > χ. Otherwise, if the stock is not currently z˜, then
no transfer is made. Let J(siit ) denote the expected discounted payoff to each agent under strategy
profile pi when the remaining stock of each good is currently siit < z˜. Then J(s) is the same as the
value of an asset that pays f˜ z˜ − χ + J [(1 − f˜)z˜] at the first time that the stock reaches z˜ starting
from s.
The Bellman equation for this asset-pricing problem is given by the following for s ≤ z˜:
ρJ(s)dt = E(dJ) (B.1)
subject to the boundary condition J(z˜) = f˜ z˜ − χ+ J [(1− f˜)z˜]. A straightforward application of
Ito’s lemma to the preceding equation yields
ρJ(s) = θs
∂J(s)
∂s
+
1
2
ξ2s2
∂2J(s)
∂s2
,
which provides a second-order linear differential equation for J(s). Seeking a solution of the form
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g(s; f˜ , z˜) = B(f˜ , z˜)sβ˜ , the following quadratic equation is obtained by substituting the functional
form into the differential equation
1
2
ξ2β˜(β˜ − 1) + θβ˜ − ρ = 0,
whose solution is given by
β˜ = 1
2
− θ
ξ2
±
√(
θ
ξ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2 ρ
ξ2
.
Letting β˜+ and β˜− respectively denote the positive and negative roots of the quadratic, the general
solution to the differential equation is J(s) = B+(f˜ , z˜)sβ˜+ + B−(f˜ , z˜)sβ˜− . It must be the case
that B−(f˜ , z˜) = 0, because J(s) would otherwise become unboundedly large in absolute value as
s goes to 0. Moreover, the boundary condition J(z˜) = f˜ z˜ − χ + J [(1 − f˜)z˜] yields B+(f˜ , z˜) =
{f˜ z˜ − χ+ J [(1− f˜)z˜]}/z˜β˜+ . Hence, the solution to the Bellman equation is
J(s) = {f˜ z˜ − χ+ J [(1− f˜)z˜]}(s/z˜)λ,
where λ = β˜+. Note that λ > 1 if θ < ρ.
In order to construct an SPE with a positive expected discounted payoff at each point along
the path of play, one can choose f˜ , z˜ in the definition of pi so as to maximize J(s) subject to the
constraint J [(1− f˜)z˜] = χ. This constrained maximization problem can be expressed as
max
f˜ ,z˜
{f˜ z˜ − χ+ J [(1− f˜)z˜]}(s/z˜)λ s.t. J [(1− f˜)z˜] = {f˜ z˜ − χ+ J [(1− f˜)z˜]}(1− f˜)λ = χ,
which can be rewritten as
max
f˜ ,z˜
f˜ z˜(s/z˜)λ s.t. f˜ z˜(1− f˜)λ = χ or max
f˜
χ1−λsλf˜λ(1− f˜)λ2−λ,
where the second expression follows from substituting z˜ = f˜−1(1 − f˜)−λχ into the maximand.
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Taking the log of the maximand and eliminating constants, we obtain
max
f˜
λ ln(f˜) + (λ2 − λ) ln(1− f˜),
which is a concave function of f˜ . The first-order condition is
λ/f˜ − (λ2 − λ)/(1− f˜) = 0.
Hence, we have f˜ = λ−1. It follows that z˜ = λ[λ/(λ− 1)]λχ.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.7.2
Proof A symmetric SPE with a positive expected discounted payoff at each point along the path of
play can be constructed as follows for the model with a cost proportional to the amount transferred,
provided that the component of the cost proportional to the amount transferred is sufficiently small.
Let  ∈ (0, 1). Consider the symmetric grim-trigger strategy profile pi in which the kth transaction
is made when the fixed cost reaches c∗∗k () = (1−)c∗k for the first time, and the amount x∗∗k () = x∗k
is transferred by each agent at this transaction, where c∗k and x
∗
k are as defined in Theorem 3.4.4.
Let H(c, s; ) denote the expected discounted payoff under strategy profile pi in the model with
a cost proportional to the amount transferred if the size of the fixed cost is currently c and the
remaining stock of each good is s.
Note that for any positive integer k, the expected discounted payoffH[c∗∗k (), q−
∑k
l=1 x
∗∗
l (); ]
immediately after transaction k is increasing in  for the model with a cost proportional to the
amount transferred. This property holds because for any transactionm > k, the amount transferred
at transaction m as well as the distribution of waiting times between transactions k and m do not
change with , whereas the total cost paid at transaction m is decreasing in .
In addition, observe that H[c∗∗k (φ), q −
∑k
l=1 x
∗∗
l (φ);φ] = (1 − φ)V (c∗k, q −
∑k
l=1 x
∗
l ) for
each transaction k, where V (c∗k, q −
∑k
l=1 x
∗
l ) is the expected discounted payoff to each agent
immediately after transaction k in the basic model. This observation follows from the following
facts. First, the value function V (s, c) for the basic model is homogeneous of degree one. Second,
if strategy profile piφ is played in the model with a cost proportional to the amount transferred, then
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the fixed cost paid at each transaction k is a fraction (1−φ) of the total cost incurred at transaction
k under the path of play in Theorem 3.4.4 for the basic model, and the amount transferred minus
the component of the cost proportional to the amount transferred at each transaction k is a fraction
(1 − φ) of the amount transferred at transaction k under the path of play in Theorem 3.4.4 for
the basic model. Third, if strategy profile piφ is played in the model with a cost proportional to
the amount transferred, then for any transaction m > k, the distribution of waiting times between
transactions k and m is the same as it is under the path of play in Theorem 3.4.4 for the basic
model.
Hence, the incentive constraint c∗∗k ()+φ·x∗∗k () ≤ H[c∗∗k (), q−
∑k
l=1 x
∗∗
l (); ] will be satisfied
at each transaction k when strategy profile pi is played in the model with a cost proportional to the
amount transferred if the following condition holds for some  > φ:
(1− )c∗k + φ · x∗k ≤ (1− φ)V (c∗k, q − Σkl=1x∗l ).
Substituting x∗k = [β/(β−1)]β−1c∗k and (1−φ)V (c∗k, q−
∑k
l=1 x
∗
l ) = (1−φ)c∗k into the preceding
expression, we obtain
(1− ) + φ · [β/(β − 1)]β−1 ≤ (1− φ)
after canceling out c∗k on both sides. The inequality above is satisfied if  ≥ φ·{1+[β/(β−1)]β−1}.
If φ < {1 + [β/(β − 1)]β−1}−1, then there exists  < 1 satisfying the inequality above. Defining
φ¯ = {1 + [β/(β − 1)]β−1}−1, it follows that if φ < φ¯, then there exists  < 1 for which pi is
a symmetric SPE of the model with a cost proportional to the amount transferred such that each
agent receives a positive expected discounted payoff at each point along the path of play.
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